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Abstract
In a world where the amount of resources is constant and unchanging but where their 
use and exploitation is growing because of the rapid population growth, a rise in standards 
of living and the development of industrialization, the resource of water has become a 
critical issue in the foreign relations between different states. As a result of this many 
research scholars claim that, today, we are facing the beginning of the "Geopolitical era of 
water".
The danger of conflict of water is especially severe in the Middle East which is 
characterized by the low level of precipitation and high temperatures. The Middle Eastern 
countries have been involved in a constant state of political tension and the gap between 
the growing number of inhabitants and the fixed supply of water and land has been a 
factor in contributing to this tension. These circumstances have led some researchers to 
predict that the next war in the region will break out because of a conflict over the 
allocation of water resources in the region.
The Euphrates is the third biggest river in the Middle East. It rises in East Turkey, 
and crosses 2,330 km of territory through Syria and Iraq until it links up with the Shatt- 
Al-Arab river. The amount of average annual water flow over many years is about 32 
billion m^ but the seasonal and annual variations are very great because of the regions 
climate.
From the nineteen-sixties onward the three riparians began to plan and carry out 
extensive development programmes for the Euphrates river water by constructing dams 
whose main purpose was to control the flow of its water, for the production of hydro­
electric power and for agricultural purposes. These programmes caused tension in the 
foreign relations between the countries.
The study provides a review of the hydrology of the river and of the river's relevance 
to the economies of its three riparians. This resource profile is the basis of the analysis of 
the strategic role of the river in the relations between Turkey, Syria and Iraq.
This study also examines the influence of the Euphrates water allocation on the 
network of relations between the riparians countries. An examination of the different 
variables involved in this subject has been carried out with the help of three models:
1. Cognitive mapping - which allows all the states along the river basin to evaluate the 
interests of a particular country over three periods of time (past, present, future).
2. Quantitative indicators of vulnerability due to water shortages - which measure the 
level of vulnerability of states to a possible shortage of water.
3. Matrix model - which examines the possibility of military conflict between the 
states on the basis of five factors - also over three periods.
Analyses based on these models together with the data on the river and on the 
economies of the riparians show that there will not be a future shortage of Euphrates 
water, military conflicts between the countries along the river are unlikely to develop. It 
appears that social, economic and political factors are the central issues in the tense 
relations between the riparians and not necessarily, as many research scholars claim, 
issues of water allocation.
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A. Introduction
A1. The basic importance of water
It should surprise no-one that water is the most abundant chemical substance on the earth's 
crust; covering more than half of the five km deep outer shell of the earth. Water and air, 
are vital to the existence of both man, and life itself. Water and watery solutions play an 
all-important role in the physical, biological and geological processes which take place on 
earth. The great oceans, the inland lakes, rivers and the polar icecaps together cover some 
three quarters of the surface of the Earth providing sustenance, transportation and 
protection. Population centres have evolved on the shores of water bodies, creating 
economic development along sea-shores and in major river valleys such as the Euphrates- 
Tigris, the Nile, the Mekong and the Danube (Gustafsson, 1985,130).
A prevailing scientific consensus agreed upon at the United Nations Water Conference 
in 1977 placed the world's total volume of fresh water at less than one thirtieth of all the 
water on the globe with the water moving in streams each year estimated at 40 to 47 trillion 
m3. Altogether, at any one time, about 22 per cent of the fresh water is in the soil in, 
ground water storage and flows, 0.35 per cent in the lakes and wetlands, 0.04 per cent in 
the atmosphere, less than 0.001 per cent in the streams, and about 77 per cent in snow and 
ice. These figures show that the great reserves of fresh water, apart from snow and ice, lie 
underground, while the running streams and lakes are a very small, rapidly circulating 
proportion of the total resource. There is, however, some doubt about how much of the 
ground water is within economic pumping depth: perhaps only one-third at most 
(Shiklomanov, 1990, 34) . Estimates of global water in various storages and fluxes are in 
general agreements, but there can be significant competition for available water by 
different using sectors. It is also relevant to note the very unequal per capita distribution of 
the available water resources in the world. Relative per capita water availability has been 
classified by Shiklomanov (1990) according to the following seven categories (see table 
A.l)
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Table A.l:
Relative water availability (m3/year per capita)
* Extremely low = below 1,000
* Very low = 1,100 to 2,000
* Low = 2,100 to 5,000
* Medium = 5,100 to 10,000
* Above medium = 10,000 to 20,000
* High = 20,000 to 50,000
* Very high = over 50,000
(Source: Shiklomanov, 1990,40)
Individual users depend on the availability of a relatively small volume of one cubic 
metre per year as a minimum supply of potable water and an additional volume of safe 
water which increases with economic and social development and advancing technology. 
In modem societies, water is used for human consumption, the removal of wastes, general 
sanitation, the production of energy, agricultural production, transportation and recreation. 
In 1940 the world’s average per capita water use, including water diverted for irrigation, 
was below 400 cubic metres a year; it is now at least double that and stands at 800 cubic 
metres a year (Clarke, 1991, 32) reflecting the increased use of water in all sectors and 
especially in agriculture. No account is taken here of the contribution of rainfall in the 
agricultural sector.
Table A.2:
Global water use by sector per year
Domestic 100 cubic kilometres
Industrial 200 cubic kilometres
Cooling 225 cubic kilometres
Livestock 40 cubic kilometres
Total 565 cubic kilometres
Source: Clarke, 1991, 23.
These figures, which come from a 1977 estimate, assess per capita values for domestic, 
industrial, cooling and livestock use at about 20,40,45, and eight m^ per head per year in 
round terms - an annual total of some 120 m^ per person (Clarke, 1991, 23).
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A2. Irrigation water use
Irrigation is, by far, the biggest and most rapidly expanding user of water since plants use 
large quantities of water during their growth. Under dry conditions, it takes about 1000 
cubic metres of water to produce one tonne of plant growth. Where rainfall alone is 
insufficient to meet plant needs, irrigation is required and the volume of water needed rises 
dramatically. The amount of water used for irrigation has increased ten times this century, 
and elaborate plans are still being made to extend irrigation to more and more areas 
(Clarke, 1991, 27).
In 1900, some 40 million hectares were irrigated world-wide and by 1950, the total 
had reached 94 million hectares. Over the next four decades, the growth was explosive 
with irrigation increasing some three times to 272 million hectares (see figure Al).
Figure Al:
World irrigation areas: 1990 - 2000
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 1985 1990 2000
year
The 178 million hectares added to the world's irrigated area from 1950 to 1990 entailed the 
heavy use of both river and underground water resources. Since both of these methods 
involved large capital commitments, irrigation was a major focus of investment for
200 -
100 -
0  M illion  H ectares
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national governments as well as leading international development agencies (Brown, 
1988, 23).
The watering of crops currently uses something like 3300 cubic kilometres of water a 
year - roughly six times the requirement for industrial and domestic use. Unless land is 
irrigated carefully, irrigation can cause a great deal of environmental damage, but, it has 
also brought enormous benefits when properly managed.
Irrigation has extended cultivation in areas that are too dry for rainfed farming, and 
irrigation also allows multiple crops to be taken in the same year, thus further increasing 
productivity. Finally, irrigation can provide security to a farmer who was previously 
dependent on unreliable seasonal rains, encouraging him to use higher-yielding varieties 
and more costly inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides on which he might not dare risk 
spending money if his water supply was unreliable.
Table A.3:
The increase of water consumption and irretrievable water losses over the 
world (km^/year).
Water user/Year 1900 1940 1950 1960 1970 1982 2000
Irrigated area 
Million Hectares 47 75 101 142 173 218 347
Municipal water 20 40 60 80 120 250 440
consumption 5 8 11 14 20 38 65
Industry 30 120 190 310 510 1100 1900
2 6 9 15 20 45 70
Agriculture 350 660 860 1500 1900 2400 3400
260 480 630 1150 1600 1900 2600
Reservoirs 0 1 4 20 70 170 240
0 1 4 20 70 170 240
Total 400 820 1100 1900 2600 3900 6000
270 500 650 1200 1600 2200 3000
Sources: Gustafsson, 1985, 130: Shiklomanov, 1990, 39.
Although irrigated land comprises only 13 per cent of the world's total arable area, 
irrigation accounts for the largest proportion of the total water used by man. Other non- 
agricultural water uses (for industry, mining and domestic purposes) are however now 
increasing much faster than the use for irrigation. A considerable amount of this water is 
non-consumptive and such water can be recycled, while irrigation continues to be a 
consumptive use with little recycling except in special alluvial circumstances. Irrigated 
agriculture will therefore continue to be the greatest water consumer in the future (The
12
Global 2000,1982,150).
As economies have developed and populations have grown, water has become a 
scarce resource, at least in many parts of the world, and it has been predicted that world 
demand for water will quickly outstrip supply. By the year 2000 population growth alone 
will at least double the demand for water in half the countries of the world, principally in 
developing economies with the greatest pressure taking place in parts of Africa, South 
Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. If the growing demand for water cannot be met 
in these countries it will, for instance, be impossible to increase food production, causing 
food deficits which lead to malnutrition in several developing countries where food cannot 
be imported to make up the deficit. Agriculture consumes two-thirds to four-fifths of the 
water used in nearly every dry country. Meanwhile world food demand will increase by at 
least one-third by the end of the century, and will increase by a similar volume in the 
Middle East region and in the Euphrates countries which are the subject of this study. The 
capacity of the Euphrates resource will be identified and the extent to which its future 
regulated flows can service the national and sectoral needs will be studied. To meet such 
demands it will be necessary to extend the irrigated area and to increase production from 
existing irrigated fie\ds(Global 2000, 1982,142).
In table A.3 one can read the increase of water consumption and irretrievable water 
losses over the world. Table A.4 shows the estimates of world water use in 1967 and 
projections to 2000.
Table A.4: 
Estimates of world water use in 1976 and projections for 2000
Total use in Projected Rate fraction
millions of nP growth of total use
in per cent in per cent
per year
1967 - 2000 1967-2000 1967 - 2000
AGRICULTURE
Irrigation 1.400.000 2.800.000 2.1 70 51
Livestock 58.800 102.200 1.7 3 2
Rural domestic 19.800 38.300 2.0 1 1
OTHER
Urban domestic 73.000 278.900 4.1 4 5
Industry & mining 437.700 2.231.000 5.0 2 41
Total 1.989.300 5.450.400 3.1 100 100
Source: The Global 2000, 1982, 150.
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Because of the ubiquitousness, heterogeneity, and ability of water to renew its 
supply, it is difficult to estimate the present or future supply while the common - property 
characteristics of water, the large quantities used, and the low user costs all act as 
obstacles to forecasting its future use. Global water consumption is expected to grow, as 
shown in table A.3, and this trend will probably continue into the next century with about 
70 per cent of total water use and 90 per cent of irretrievable, consumptive use being due 
to irrigation. According to Shiklomanov, the expected increase from 1980 to 2000 will 
range from a minimum of 20 per cent in North America, 32 per cent in Europe, 70 per cent 
in Africa to a maximum of 95 per cent in South America (Shiklomanov, 1990, 39).
From the GNP and resource projections it has been concluded that: "increases of at 
least 200 to 300 per cent in world water withdrawals are expected over the period 1975- 
2000". The report asserts that "population growth alone will cause demands for water to at 
least double, relative to 1971, in nearly half the countries of the world"(Global 2000, 
1982, 149). The Food and Agriculture Organization's 1977 estimates, note that by far the 
largest absolute increase in demand will be (and so far has been) for irrigation. The study 
stressed the problems of meeting the needs for potable water and of using irrigation water 
effectively without causing soil and water deterioration. As is well known, fresh water 
resources are not always situated clearly inside state borders. The greater the number of 
international boundaries that a nation has, the more complex its internal water management 
becomes. Approximately 148 of the 200 first order river basins in the world (whose final 
destination for basin water flow is an ocean, closed inland sea or lake) are shared by two 
countries and 52 by three to ten countries. Thus policy regarding the use and management 
of water resources cannot be treated exclusively as an internal affair of different states, 
since two or more states often participate in the formulation of policy. This international 
characteristic of water resource policy is, for its part, likely to intensify conflicts among 
nations with shared water resources, especially in times when the pressure on water 
resources increases (Gustafsson, 1985, 131). The Euphrates River traverses three 
countries with very different water and other resource endowments, and differing 
economic opportunities and policies. It will be the purpose of the thesis to establish the 
capacity of the Euphrates water to provide the water needs of the foreseeable political 
economies of the catchment.
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A3. Domestic water use
In the most water scarce and extreme environmental conditions individual users in 
subsistence economies seem to use a minimum of about 2 litres of water daily (one cubic 
metre/year) to meet drinking requirements, the limit depending on the water content of the 
food eaten and the climate of the region. When users are supplied with accessible water 
which is carried from a standpipe in the neighbourhood, daily use commonly runs from 10 
to 20 litres per capita. No matter how plentiful the water nearby is, or how suitable its 
quality for health and culinary purposes, one person's use rarely exceeds 40 litres per day 
where the supply has to be transported. Where water is less readily available because of 
either time or quality, the daily use per capita ordinarily ranges from 4 to 20 litres. For 
global purposes, a rough figure of about 12 litres may be taken as a conservative estimate 
of the daily use for those who are obliged to draw water from outside their households.
Where engineering works bring piped water into the family household, the daily use 
in virtually all cases exceeds 16 litres per capita, and 30 to 40 litres is the general level of 
use in buildings with only one tap per family group and without indoor waste disposal. In 
households with more than one tap and with indoor waste disposal, the use ranges from 
25 to more than 600 litres daily. The mean use for modem cities is about 100 to 180 litres 
but this average figure varies by as much as 60 to 600 litres for consumers within the same 
city (White, 1983, 481).
Domestic use can be estimated from data on urban and rural populations, using 
figures or per capita use where such data are available. Use factors for European countries 
range from 76 to 270 litres per day per capita, with a general average of 150 litres. The 
World Health Organization considers 150 litres per day to be an adequate amount for 
planning urban supply in developing countries (Falkenmark, 1983, 472). In 1977 the 
global use of domestic water was estimated at 100 billion m^/year - the equivalent of about 
20 m^ per person per year. As a result of population growth, and ambitious plans to 
increase the availability of safe drinking water and sanitation throughout developing 
countries, this is expected to rise more than nine fold by the end of the century, to 920 
billion m^/year,- more than 150 m^ per head for the project population. Much of this 
increase will be for sewage disposal, which is a water-intensive process, and is really for 
municipal rather than strictly domestic use. The figure of 150 m^ per head per year is 
equivalent to 400 litres per head per day (Clarke, 1991, 21). Thus domestic water use will 
depend upon future lifestyles, family income, family size, water-using appliances, 
technology, and the future price of water for domestic purposes.
Many water problems facing those responsible for providing new domestic water 
supplies relate to the settlement of immigrants. In most large cities in the Third World we 
find peripherally located shanty towns which are considered illegal by the city authorities
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who do not feel obliged to provide them with water, drainage and sanitation facilities. 
Most of these are surrounded by squatter settlements house relatively poor families, 
without title to the land they occupy, and living in dwellings made of very crude materials. 
Their water is often contaminated and they lack sewage systems and waste-disposal 
services encouraging vermin infestation and disease (Richards & Waterbury, 1990, 276; 
Lindh, 1990, 30).
Although fertility rates have fallen during the past generation the decline in the death 
rate has been swifter, accelerating population growth during the past ten years. The old 
debates over the political economics of population ("Malthus versus Marx") have remained 
vigorous with some of the neo-Malthusians believing that rapid population growth will 
negate any attempts at development. In this view, population growth is the cause of 
underdevelopment. The Marxists believe that maintaining poverty and underdevelopment 
causes rapid population growth, but they may agree that rapid population growth is 
undesirable since it complicates the development process and generates political problems 
(Richards & Waterbury, 1990, 82).
A simple linear extrapolation based on population growth alone obviously ignores 
many other important factors that might affect a country’s water situation (e.g., the level of 
agricultural development, degree of urbanization, etc.). Indeed, water availability itself is a 
relatively crude measure of an overall water situation. Nonetheless, population growth will 
be the single most significant cause of increased future demand, and the projections are 
useful as a general indication of potential problem areas.
A4. The role of water in the Middle East
Although important in many places, water interests and issues are more significant in the 
Middle East than in any other region of the world - and the reasons are obvious. Relatively 
recent colonialism and international intervention in the region have left a legacy of conflict 
and suspicion. Most of the Middle East is semi-arid and arid with the location of major 
Middle Eastern cities determined by access to water from rivers often flowing from 
mountains in remote parts of the region and even outside it. In addition agriculture and 
animal husbandry (both water dependent) have traditionally been the region’s basic 
economic activities, and population growth has been generally high, increasing water 
demands. Under such conditions, water is vital, trust is low, conflict rife and harmonious 
management difficult, at best. Water runs both on and under the surface of politics in the 
Middle East, and it has often been seen as the primary strategic factor behind political and 
military manoeuvring in the region. As the water problem becomes more acute, it will 
surface as a domestic political issue and this domestic conflict will probably affect other 
issues, including foreign relations (Naff & Matson, 1984,180).
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A recent assessment of water resources in the Arab League countries by INWARD has 
assumed a basic demand for water of 55 m3 per head per year for domestic water use, 
plus 1150 m^ needed to provide an average daily diet of 3000 - 3500 kilo calories. The 
total of 1205 m^ of water per head per year was called the lower limit of water 
requirements. In 1985 nine of the Arab League countries could meet this basic level of 
water demand but twelve could not. Overall, the average per capita supply will be well in 
excess of the minimum at 1750 m3 by the year 2000 but, as a result of population growth, 
the estimated overall availability will fall to just under the minimum, of 1108 m3. By the 
year 2025, however, supply will lag far behind demand and only 536 m3 will be 
available. By then the region's deficit will amount to more than 421 billion m3 of water a 
year - more than the region's total supply, and only a few countries in the region will be 
able to meet even the lower limits of water requirement f Clarke, 1991, 88).
A4.1 Domestic water use 
A41.1 Urbanization
The Middle-East has long been dominated by cities which control their rural hinterlands 
and were the focal points of the extensive international trade system linking Europe to 
Asia. The most spectacular change in water use in the Middle East since the Second World 
War has been associated with the growth of urban centres. Urbanization has concentrated 
large numbers of people in relatively small areas, while the rising standards of living of 
urban dwellers has meant that per capita water consumption has increased rapidly. The net 
result has been to put severe strains on the water-resource base and especially on the water 
resource infrastructure in many regions, besides causing other environmental problems 
(Beaumont, 1981, 63).
The overall picture of urbanization in the region shows that it is more urbanized than 
China, India, Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa, and less urbanized than Latin 
America. For the larger countries of the region (Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Iran), 
from two-fifths to over one-half the population live in cities - in many cases in one or two 
very large cities (Richards & Waterbury, 1990, 263). During this century most cities have 
grown rapidly through both immigration and natural increase and their morphologies have 
been transformed. Generally, the growth of large cities has been more rapid than that of 
smaller cities, but not without exception, and particularly rapid growth has been 
experienced by ports and capitals (Clarke & Fisher, 1972, 31). The diverse significance of 
cities for populations within the region, ranges from a low of around 20 per cent in Sudan 
and Yemen, to about 90 per cent in Kuwait and Israel. The higher the per capita income, 
the higher the percentage of the population that is urban. It is therefore plausible that 
increased urbanization and rising per capita incomes are both the result of the economic
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growth processes and industrialization. Middle East countries have some of the highest 
birth-rates in the world as well as disruptive rural-to-urban migration, both of which 
require constantly increasing domestic water provision. The natural growth of the urban 
population is not the same as is in rural areas since both fertility and mortality rates are 
lower in urban areas. Thus, since general mortality is also lower in urban areas, it is 
uncertain whether overall rates of natural growth are lower in the cities than in the 
villages^Richards & Waterbury, 1990, 266).
A4.1.2 Food deficit
The Middle-East has a rapidly escalating demand for food and a sluggish supply response 
so the region is considered to be the least food self-sufficient region in the world. Self- 
sufficiency in food production is not a realistic goal as, the amounts of water needed for 
irrigation would be many times those potentially available even assuming substantial 
improvements in the productivity of irrigated agriculture. For example Egypt already 
would need almost twice as much water for its agricultural sector than currently available 
to be food self sufficient.
Figure A2:
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Regional population growth is unlikely to fall dramatically and even the recent 
collapse of oil prices has not reduced income sufficiently to have affected national food 
demand substantially. Food consumption is highly inflexible downward: and governments 
are likely to cut everything else (except defence) before they reduce the nation's (urban) 
food supply. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that there will be little reduction in the 
food gap from the demand side. There are two ways to increase agricultural production: 
bring new land into cultivation, and raise the productivity of existing farms. Middle-East 
countries must increasingly rely on the second option. Output growth can only be 
accelerated by shifting from ''extensive” to "intensive" growth. This kind of process is 
difficult and expensive, and requires numerous state initiatives which will transform 
Middle Eastern rural societies, and generally involve an increase in water use. The rate of 
growth of the production of various crops has also varied widely with the output of 
"luxury" foods like fruit, vegetables, poultry & livestock products increasing more rapidly 
than that of the cereals. Such trends do not reduce the food gap, but may actually increase 
it since, for example, increased poultry production stimulates feed imports. The most 
important natural constraint in the Middle East is the unfavourable rainfall. The "gamble on 
rain" causes many countries to look for supplementary foreign currency to buy increasing 
amounts of food four years out of ten (Richards & Waterbury, 1990,143). The 
devastating droughts cause social, economic and political disruption; forcing people from 
their homes, and causing movement to cities or to less severely affected areas ("drought 
refugees"). The first response to this situation was to import food. Food imports grew 
region wide at an annual rate of about 12 per cent between 1960 to 1980. Because of the 
rapid population growth rates in the region and the significant rise in the standard of 
living, food shortages continues to grow. In 1960, the Middle East was still a net food 
exporter but, in 1973, food imports amounted to $ U.S. 4 billion; by 1980, the food 
import bill had reached $ US 20 billion, and by 1984 $ U.S. 26 billion. (Lawless, 
1985,107; Qasem, 1990,162). According to Comet (1992), in 1989 alone the food 
imports amounted to $ U.S. 26 billion (see figure A3) as opposed to the $ 23 billion in 
1984. One should note that, since the various researchers do not define the Middle East 
region and the countries included in it, differences in the data might result.
Wheat is the most widely grown food crop in Middle East and, in 1970, but total 
wheat imports to Arab countries still averaged 4.9 million tons, costing $ U.S. 323 
million. This amount increased to 10 million tons in 1980, and 16.7 million tons in 1983, 
at a cost of $ U.S. 3,237 million. The Arab countries produced 60 per cent of the wheat 
they consumed in 1970 and only 33 per cent in 1983. There were several main reasons for 
this: unstable domestic production was caused by erratic rainfall and the oil exporters 
commanded large supplies of foreign exchange and they could buy food freely and were 
not constrained by balance of payments problems until the 1980s. In addition since most
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of the wheat imports to the region were hardly related to the international market, increased 
purchases had no impact on price and, in some countries, urban-consumers preferred 
wheat which had to be imported.
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In most countries of the Middle East the food deficit between domestic production and 
consumption has increased over the last two decades. Syria was a net exporter of basic 
food commodities (wheat) and feed stuff (barley) in 1960s but in the 1970s, although it 
still reached self-sufficiency in barley production, it was only 72 per cent self-sufficient in 
wheat production. In the 1980s production lost ground again, and Syria slipped to 84 per 
cent self-sufficiency in barley and 60 per cent in wheat. These circumstances are critical 
but many countries in the region find themselves in an even worse situation. If current 
levels of productivity continue to the year 2000, not only Syria, but most of the countries 
of the region, will have a deficit in wheat production of 55 per cent of domestic needs 
(Perrier & Salkini, 1991, 279).
All Arab countries, suffer from trade deficits in food commodities, however Arab 
countries vary in the magnitude of their food trade deficits. To a certain extent, the level of 
such deficits is an indicator of the extent to which each country takes measures to correct 
its trade imbalance. Arab food trade deficits for the years 1980-1984 are shown in table 
A .5.
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Table A.5: 
Average annual food trade deficits (1980-1984)
Country Value of net food imports
(in millions of US dollars)
Saudi Arabia 4000-5000
Egypt, Algeria 2000-2500
Libya, Iraq 1000-1500
Kuwait, United Arab Emirates 700- 850
Lebanon, Syria, Yemen Arab Republic 400- 600
Jordan 300- 400
Morocco, PDR Y emen, Qatar 200- 300
Bahrain, Tunisia, Oman Sudan, Djibouti 50- 100
Source: Qasem, 1990,162.
For a country to import food is not necessarily problematic for the economy, but when 
food imports make up a large share of the total value of a country’s exports of all types 
then they become a constraint upon the economy. The cost of food imports as a percentage 
of the value of all exports in the Arab world during the period 1980-1984 is shown in table
A.5. Saudi Arabia, for example, imported food commodities at an average value of $ US 
4.5 billion each year during 1980-1984. However, this figure represented only about 5 per 
cent of the total export income. On the other hand, Egypt's net imports of food averaged $ 
US 2.4 billion over the same period, constituting 68 per cent of all its export income 
(Qasem, 1990,163).
Several of the states in the Middle-East have become entirely dependent upon 
imported food, a situation from which they would prefer to be freed by means of planned 
agricultural development. One result has been that food imports have increased 
government control over strategic urban food supplies (Richards & Waterbury, 1990, 
144).
Expansion of food production in water-short areas and in marginal land has made 
rapid development of irrigation and land reclamation necessary, to the degree that water 
and land resources have often been exploited to their limits. Throughout most of the 1980s 
period Middle East governments and farmers were mainly concerned with the provision of 
a sufficient volume of water for agricultural needs, and only minor amounts of water were 
diverted for domestic purposes. Although agriculture continues to be the largest single 
user of water, the growth of domestic and industrial water consumption has increased 
sharply (Beaumont, 1981, 67). From calculations of the demand for water and agricultural 
soil in the region it is clear that, there is a high natural growth rate in the Middle East and 
that some 150 million people will be added to the total population between 1980 and 2000 
representing an additional regional water requirement of 150 billion per year or nearly
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three times the flow of Egypt's section of the Nile. As a result, the states would like to 
increase their cultivated areas significantly and add large amounts of water to irrigate these 
additional regions. Locating and developing sufficient new water for this purpose is not 
possible (Beaumont, 1985b, 318).
Table A.6: 
Average cost of food imports as a share of total exports
Country Food imports/total exports
(as a percentage)
Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait, U.A.E, Qatar 4-5%
Libya, Oman, Morocco, Sudan 6-10%
Tunisia, Iraq, Algeria 13-15%
Syria 27%
Lebanon, PDRY (South Yemen) 41-46%
Jordan 56%
Egypt 68%
Bahrain, Yemen Arab Republic Over 84%
Source: Qasem, 1990,163.12
A4.2 Industrialization and industrial water use
Household and even municipal water needs are only a small part of the water supply 
problem. Globally, industrial water usage is at least twice that of domestic use industrial 
uses include uses associated with the generation of thermo-electric power, the production 
of steel, chemical and allied products, paper and allied products, mining and petroleum 
refining.
We need at least three litres of water to produce a tin of vegetables, 100 litres to produce 
one kilogram of paper, 4,500 litres to produce one tonne of cement, 4.3 tonnes to 
manufacture one tonne of steel, 50 tonnes to manufacture a tonne of leather and no less 
than 2700 tonnes to make a tonne of worsted suiting (Clarke, 1991, 3).
The Middle-East countries have embarked on industralization to reduce their 
dependence on imports of industrial products and to gain prestige, economic strength and 
national and international significance. Industralization implies a higher level of labour 
productivity and income, and is profitable to those willing to invest in a modem economy. 
Most significantly returns to water are much higher in the non-agricultural sectors of 
industry and services. Such economic and business reasons have suited the Middle East 
where purchasing has risen during the last three decades (Tuma, 1987 ,131).
The move towards industrialization has enjoyed high priority in government planned
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expenditure in the Middle East. Such governments may be directly involved in 
industrialization either as a natural result of the "relative backwardness" and 
underdeveloped structure of the economy and policy in the region, or because they have 
socialist ideologies where central planning and ownership of the means of production 
predominate. Alternatively they may be traditional and state capitalist economies, where 
the state owns or controls most of the natural resources and carries responsibility for large 
sectors of the economy (Tuma, 1987,138).
Regardless of the ideology or economic and political systems, all the countries in the 
region have economic plans that specify the expected level of expenditure in each of the 
main sectors of the economy and reflect the emphasis on industry and manufacturing. 
According to the national plans of six out of twelve Arab countries in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, on which data were available, more than 50 per cent of the total government 
investment expenditure was devoted to industry and manufacturing. The other six 
countries devoted from 21 per cent to 49 per cent of their investment budget to industry 
and manufacturing. This trend continues and is generally expressed as a joint venture 
between the public and private sectors, with the public sector controlling a majority of the 
shares.
There are many ways of evaluating industrial development: by examining the rates of 
industrial growth, changes in the relative contribution of industry to the GDP, or by the 
per cent of the labor force employed (Tuma, 1987, 131). For example, half of the Middle 
East countries reported a larger percentage of the GDP originating in industry and 
manufacturing in 1980 than was reported by the industrialized countries for the same year.
While the share of the GDP of industrial and manufacturing products increased 
between the years 1960s and 1981, the average annual rates of growth varied widely. 
Another way of looking at the pattern of industrialization is to observe the consumption of 
energy per-capita, on the assumption that industrialized societies use more power, 
machinery and equipment than less industrialized ones. In fact, energy consumption has 
increased in all countries of the region, very dramatically in some cases, and especially in
the oil-rich countries.
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Another criterion of industrialization is the percentage of the economically active labour 
force which is engaged in industry and manufacturing. For example Israel, Tunisia and 
Egypt, employed more than 30 per cent of their labour force in industry and manufacturing 
in 1980 (Tuma, 1987, 134). All the countries of the region (except Jordan) have 
experienced increases in the percentage of the labor force engaged in industry and 
manufacturing. In Jordan the shift in emphasis has been towards the service sector 
reflecting its particular circumstances and international relations.
Energy is considered to be a crucial factor for rapid development and the welfare of 
society and, as the pace of economic growth increases, energy derives critical importance 
through the development of energy-intensive industries. The bulk of water used by
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industry is for the production of electricity. This use is generally not a problem because 
there is little consumptive loss and there is usually only the disposal of hot water to worry 
about. Vast quantities of water are used by power stations as cooling water, and although 
this water is not "used", - being returned directly to the river from which it is taken, 
unaltered except for a temperature increase of a degree or two - it must still be subtracted 
from available run-off. A power station must have a reliable supply of cooling water (a 
condition that is increasingly hard to meet in some areas), and this means that the water 
power station use cannot be diverted upstream for other purposes, making cooling water a 
drain on water resources. Taken together, these two uses - industrial use and cooling - 
amount to more than four times domestic water use and they must be supplied from 
reliable sources of run-off water (Clarke, 1991, 22). In other industries water is used as a 
coolant, a lubricant, and a component. Three industries - chemicals, primary metals and 
paper - account for 70 per cent of industrial water use. When the petroleum, coal and food 
industries are added to the three largest users, the water use of these industrial groups 
amounts to more than 85 per cent of the total industrial water use (Speidel, 1988, 914).
When industry develops the amount of water required increases and, in regions with 
a water surplus, some branches of industries have developed technologies with relatively 
high water demands. At present, water saving technology is being developed in many 
places in order to make industrial development less dependent on large amounts of good 
quality water.
A5: Research topic: water in the region - supply and 
demand
One of the most important characteristics of the Middle East is, undoubtedly, the small 
amount of precipitation, and the most limiting characteristic in the agriculture of the region 
is the lack of water. Throughout most of the region rainfall is seasonal, mostly in the 
winter although in southern Arabia and the Sudan there is summer monsoon rainfall. Only 
in northern Turkey and northern Iran (in the Black Sea-Caspian Sea region) is there year- 
round precipitation. The heaviest precipitation, some 1,500 mm annually, falls along the 
Black Sea and Mediterranean coasts of Turkey while in most of the upland areas of the 
region, the average annual precipitation is around 400 mm. In the Arabian peninsula^ 
southern Iran, Iraq and Egypt, the annual precipitation is less than 100 mm. In most cases, 
the rain falling in the mountainous areas is not utilised for agriculture in the areas in which 
it falls due to the steep topography and low temperatures which cause the precipitation of 
snow in these areas; thus the water flows in rivers over hundreds of kilometres towards 
the arid regions of the Middle East (Beaumont, 1985a, 16). Because of the political 
subdivision of the region, the Middle East is characterized by a large number of rivers
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shared by more than one state. According to Kolars (1990), over fifty per cent of all the 
population in the Middle East and North Africa (excluding the Maghreb), either depend 
upon water from rivers which cross an international boundary before reaching them, or 
upon desalinized water and water drawn from deep wells. More startling, two-thirds of all 
Arabic speaking people in the same region depend upon river water which flows to them 
from non-Arabic speaking countries, while another 24 per cent live in areas with no 
perennial surface streams whatsoever (Kolars, 1990, 57).
Agriculture, the largest user of water, is the most important economic activity in the 
region. On an average, some 30 per cent of employed people in the region make their 
living directly from agriculture, and there is an additional population which is dependent 
upon agricultural production as a source of raw material for their industrial production. 
This is still the case, even though the contribution of agriculture to the Gross National 
Product in all the states of the Middle East has been in constant decline, as has the 
proportion of the total population employed in agriculture (World Bank, 1992). Most of 
the states in the region base their agriculture on ground water or water from rivers, the 
sources of which are outside the state or even outside the region (Allan, 1985, 52).
According to Miladi (Regional coordinator of the UN in the Middle East), the total 
area of fertile land in the Arab Countries is only six per cent, and sixty per cent of that area 
depends on rain, while the other forty percent is mostly forest or grazing land. Only 
relatively small areas are such as the valley of the Nile in Egypt and the Sudan, and the 
Tigris and Euphrates region of Syria and Iraq are irrigated (Underwood, 1981, 53).
In the past 40 years an agricultural revolution has taken place in the Middle East 
originating in the transition from a traditionally agricultural society to one based on modem 
agriculture using water on ever-increasing areas. Additional substantial changes in water 
usage in the region have stemmed from the rapid population growth, in particular since the 
Second World War. In 1950, there were some 130 million inhabitants in the region 
extending from Iran, in the east, to Morocco in the west, and from Turkey, in the north, to 
Sudan, in the south. In 1985, the same region had 264 million, people and the projected 
population for the year 2000 is 420 million (Beaumont, 1985b, 315). A strong process of 
urbanization, a rise in the standard of living, industrialization, and the desire of the states 
to reach self-sufficiency in the area of food production have created a demand for large 
quantities of water (Beaumont, 1985a, 20, Allan, 1981, 24,).
Today the supply of water is seen, by most of the governments of the region and 
most of those shaping water policy, not only as a prerequisite for organized development, 
but also as a basis for spontaneous development (Beaumont, 1981, 62). On the other 
hand, the shortage of water in the region has been exacerbated by the development of 
modem irrigation systems which can only be operated with the aid of considerable energy, 
a feature which reduces the quantity of water in the rivers and leads to an increase in the 
subsidies to in the agricultural sector and especially in the provision of water. The energy
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subsidies to the agricultural sector are especially high due to the enormous costs of 
transferring the irrigation water to the most fertile soils which are not necessarily found in 
the areas closest to the sources of water. The model for the development of new irrigated 
agricultural areas is based on the transfer of irrigation water to previously uncultivated 
areas or on the improvement of agriculture in areas which once used dry-farming methods. 
The transfer of river water for irrigation has been made possible through advanced 
technology introduced over the past 40 years, especially water pumps operated by 
electricity or diesel engines which have replaced the traditional methods based on 
manpower or animal power (Beaumont, 1981, 59).
The development projects of the past 40 years have had a considerable influence on 
the river and ground water regimes and on the quality of the irrigation water. In several 
instances, the development projects have caused a diminution in the amounts of water 
reaching states further downstream because of water utilization for irrigation purposes and 
the considerable evaporation which occurs in the reservoirs behind the dams, especially in 
dams built for the sole purpose of creating electricity (Adams, 1985, 72).
Further damage is caused by a rise in water salinity as a result of the increased 
evaporation and the return of polluted water to the rivers, preventing downstream states 
from cultivating salt-sensitive crops. The implementation of development plans is in turn 
greatly influenced by the damage caused to the irrigation systems by inadequate drainage 
and the increased salinity of agricultural soils (Naff & Matson, 1984,160).
The high natural growth rates in the region (between Iran and Morocco and 
between Turkey and Sudan), some 150 million people will be added to the population 
between 1980 and 2000. As a result the states must significantly increase cultivated areas 
and increase the amount of water to irrigate these additional regions. There is no doubt that 
adding water for this purpose to the amounts of water currently in use, is not possible 
(Beaumont, 1985b, 318). According to Fahmi (1988), the water resources of the Middle 
East (for purposes of agriculture, industrial and human use), are estimated at about 163 
billion m^/yr., of which 140 m-^  meters are surface water and 23 billion m^ are ground 
water. In addition, 9.7 billion m^ are derived from unconventional sources such as the 
processing of drainage water and the desalination of sea water, leading to total annual 
utilized water resources for all purposes of 173 billion m-^  • These volumes represent only 
50 per cent of the 305 billion m^/yr. required by Arab states to achieve self-sufficiency 
(Fahmi, 1988, 8). Because of the rapid natural growth rates in the region and the 
significant rise in the standard of living, the food shortage, has continued to grow since 
the growth rate in the agriculture sector during the last decade has remained at a low level 
of only two per cent. Demand for food products, on the other hand, has increased at the 
very rapid pace of five per cent per annum causing the Middle East to now be one of the 
world's largest food deficit areas. (Fahmi, 1988, 8). In 1960 the Middle-East was still a 
net food exporter, but by 1973, food imports amounted to $ U.S. 4 billion and by 1980,
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the food import bill had reached $ U.S. 20 billion (Lawless, 1985, 107). In 1989 the 
Middle East import of foodstuffs, mostly cereals, amounted to $ U.S. 22.3 billion 
(Comet, January 1992, 25). According to Miladi, the food imports in the Arab World as a 
whole, increased during the eighties by 700 per cent, and the annual food imports reached 
35 per cent of the world total (Underwood, 1981, 53). In this way several of the states in 
the Middle East have became entirely dependent upon imported food, a situation from 
which they would prefer to be freed with the aid of development plans (Lawless, 1985, 
102 ).
The development projects of the various states have created an increasing shortage of 
water which will become much more acute in the future, as additional development 
projects are put into operation. All the states in the Middle East are increasing their use of 
water; thus the possibility of disputes arising over shared water resources has been 
sharpened. This process is occurring over a wide geographic area, from the viewpoints of 
physical, ethnic, cultural, religious, and political structure. This makes solving the 
problems difficult since the finding of solutions to water problems is unique in the range 
of factors which impinge on the societies, economies and political institutions of the 
countries which share surface and ground water resources..
As the use of water is essential to the development of agriculture, the production of 
energy, industrialization, health, and raising the standard of living, it should be seen from 
political, economic, legal, social, and ecological perspectives. Thus, any examination or 
analysis of the topic will be both complex and complicated.
A6: Competing demands
In the opinion of several researchers, the future of the Middle East depends more on water 
sources than oil resources (MEI, June, 1990; Perera 1981, 47; Caelleigh 1983, 22; 
Nasrallah, 1990,16). Nesser Wahabi, the Minister of Social Affairs & Labour of Oman, 
puts a common argument and even if it is based more on emotion than on sound economic 
evidence it is nevertheless a pervasive and for many a persuasive one: "Obviously 
agriculture cannot compete at the moment with the lure of the capital area where people can 
get a guaranteed wage for an eight hour working day and, as a result, agriculture is 
suffering. But it is clearly something that has to be sorted out because agriculture, together 
with fisheries, is in the long term more important to this country than oil and minerals". 
(MEED, 1977,14)
As long as there is joint use of river water systems in the Middle East it is natural for 
the developing system of relations in the region to be expressed in terms of cooperation or 
conflict between the states involved. An example of this can be seen in the struggles 
directed against development works concerned with water resources in the region. Only a
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small number of agreements to divide the waters of a joint river system among several 
states have been signed or otherwise settled and those that exist have proved to be difficult 
to implement.
For example Syria and Jordan signed an agreement to divide the water of the 
Yarmuk River in 1987, but about 30 million m^ of the Yarmuk water reaches lake 
Kinneret in Israel annually. It can be assumed that Israel will probably not permit any 
change in the quantity of water reaching Kinneret, and that Syria will probably not in the 
event be prepared to give up water to Jordan.
The Orontes River rises in Lebanon and flows through Syria to the sea in the Hatay 
region of Turkey. Syria and Lebanon reached an agreement over the use of water from this 
river in 1972, but there is no similar agreement between Syria and Turkey. The Syrians 
claim that the Hatay region is an integral part of their state which was illegally transferred 
by the French Mandate to Turkey in 1938. The Syrians' demand for a water division of 
the Euphrates is countered by the Turks demands for an agreement to divide the water of 
the Orontes which is used almost entirely by the Syrians. However, such an agreement 
would bring about de facto Syrian recognition of the area as belonging to Turkey, 
something that the Syrians are not prepared to acknowledge (Naff & Matson 1984).
Israel and Jordan, both of which currently over utilize their water potential (Frey & 
Naff 1985) are examples of states whose future development of agriculture will be 
retarded. In this respect, Cooley (1983), Naff (1991, 17) and Stork (1983) have presented 
the external relations strategy of Israel as one which is directed, first and foremost, at 
answering the country's water needs. These researchers claim that Israel annexed the 
Golan Heights because it controls part of the Jordan's sources, and aims to retain control 
over this area in the future. Similarly, the same researchers claim that, to a large extent, the 
Lebanon War of 1982 was designed to assure Israel's control of the source of the River 
Litani. These statements, supported by insufficient evidence, indicate the need for more all 
encompassing research, which will examine both the influence of water on regional 
geopolitics and the influence of regional geopolitics on the development of the river 
systems.
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A7: The role of water in regional international relations
From these examples, it is clear that differences of opinion over the use of river water in 
the Middle East is one of the most important active issues in regional politics, both overtly 
and covertly. Overtly, we can see the issue clearly when agreements are signed, or 
complaints filed with the United Nations or when a military threat is felt. Covertly, the 
river waters can be seen as an important strategic factor when states in the region consider 
political manoeuvres and these political manoeuvres influence the development of the river 
systems.
The use of joint river systems and the utilization of their waters is particularly 
complex from a legal standpoint. International law with respect to water provides a poorly 
developed framework for international discourse and for the foreseeable future the legal 
arguments will be subordinate to political considerations. International law is also 
ambiguous, in for example the interpretation of the principle of ‘no harm’. A state's 
territory undoubtedly includes the water flowing through it, "national waters", but national 
waters, flowing in rivers, may reach the territory of another state, becoming the national 
waters of that state. Water, being part of the territory, but temporary and flowing, makes 
the definition of the concept "territory" problematic, and raises complex questions in 
international law (Berber, 1959, 4). When "unfair" use of river water is made by other 
states, international law refers to this as "destructive use". "Destructive use" can be caused 
by a change in the flow of the river in such a way that the water is not returned to the 
existing system for the use of others, or brought about if an upstream state uses more than 
an agreed amount of water. Although some of the water may return to the river system, it 
may do so in marginal amounts and be of such poor quality, that it cannot be used by the 
other partners (Naff & Matson, 1984, 158).
Typical of the views held by states which share water systems with others is the 
claim by an upstream state that its sovereignty is full thus allowing it to use the water 
within its borders in any way it sees fit, without taking into consideration the ensuing 
effect upon the downstream states. In many instances, the downstream states are those 
which begin the confrontation, demanding that the historical river flow into their territories 
continue without any change. The principle guiding international law in such issues is 
"Use your own water so that you do not undermine the use of those using it after you" 
(Berber, 1959,13).
The best expression of the principle of communal water utilization can be found in the 
Dubrovnik draft (1956), the Helsinki rules (1966) and the ILC draft (1991), which have 
become the accepted legal foundation for the utilization of international rivers (see chapter 
F).
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A7.1: The Euphrates catchment
The Euphrates river is shared by Turkey, Syria and Iraq, and the sources of the river are 
two principal tributaries which rise in the mountains of Armenia in eastern Turkey, a 
region with a mountainous Mediterranean climate which determines the flow regime of the 
river. The river flows through a pass in the Antitaurus Mountains towards the plains of 
Jezirah in Syria, when three additional tributaries join it - the Sajur, the Balikh and the 
Khabur. From here to the Persian Gulf, there are no further additions of water to the river.
The river is 2,330 km long, and its average flow is 31.8 billion m^/yr. However, 
the flow is greatly influenced by the amount of precipitation, and the flow in a drought 
year has been measured at 16 billion m-3 whereas, in rainy years, it has been measured at 
43 billion m^. These irregular flows have stimulated the construction of reservoirs to 
channel a constant flow of water through the river over the years.
The area of the drainage basin of the river is 444,000 km^ of which 28 per cent is in 
Turkey, 17 per cent in Syria, 40 per cent in Iraq and 15 per cent in Saudi Arabia (see table
B.l). In contrast to these figures, conservative estimates will claim some 88 per cent of the 
river water originates in Turkey and 12 per cent in Syria, whereas Iraq contributes nothing 
to the river water (Beaumont, 1978, 38). According to Kolars (1986), 98 per cent of the 
stream flows from Turkey when all factors are considered (Kolars 1986a, 54).
All three states, at one point began to prepare intensive development plans to utilize 
water from the river. The purpose of the development plans in each of these states was to 
increase self-sufficiency in food in order to keep up with the rapid rate of population 
growth and reduce the level of political and economic dependence on the import of food. 
They wished to reduce unemployment, raise the standard of living in backward regions, 
prevent migration from the rural areas to the large cities, supply raw materials to local 
industry (cotton and sugar beet), and produce hydroelectricity. In order to realize the 
agricultural development plans, raise living standards and develop industry, each of the 
states involved needed to increase the use of water. During a tripartite meeting in Baghdad 
in September 1965, Iraq demanded at least 18 billion m^» Syria 13 billion m-3 and Turkey 
14 billion m^ (Naff & Matson 1984, 92).
Many meetings have been held since 1965 involving representatives of the three 
states concerned in an attempt to reach agreement over water distribution. The last such 
meeting was held in Ankara in June 1990 where Turkey refused Iraq's demand for a flow 
of 700 /sec, and was unwilling to concede the average of more than 500 m^/sec offered 
by Turkey (Dateline, 30 June, 1990). It would appear that Turkey is not interested in 
reaching a final agreement over dividing the waters of the river before the exact quantity of 
water needed for the Southeast Anatolia Development Project (GAP) finally becomes 
clear. Turkish development projects have greatly influenced the flow regime of the river
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and will have an increased impact in the future, on the quantity and quality of the water 
reaching the downstream states. Turkey's political influence, through interfering with the 
flow of water to downstream states can only increase. Turkey already has considerable 
power today since its ability to store water behind the dams already constructed is more 
than double the annual flow of the river.
Without any doubt, the sharing of the Euphrates water is a very important 
geopolitical issue which has already created political tension and military posturing 
between the states several times in the past.
A8. The purpose of the study
There has been relatively little research on the possible linkages between the growing 
scarcity of fresh water and potential for future conflicts, although the interconnection of 
the water factor with other key factors has been demonstrated.
The Euphrates river system, where the problems of water use are at an advanced 
stage, exemplifies many such problems, and is a case of a resource conflict over fresh 
water with many associated economic and political factors involved. In this kind of 
conflict, it is not possible to assert which factor is foremost at any given time. A dispute 
over fresh water resources may, for instance, spill over to political conflict or economic 
factors and disputes may cause the sharpening of the water conflict.
The central aim of this research is to examine the utilization of the Euphrates River, 
by Turkey, Syria and Iraq and to analyse current supplies and future supplies which will 
be available as a result of supply management policies in terms of foreseeable water 
demands by the riparians to determine the extent to which supplies will match demands.
The Euphrates is a very important case study and provides significant insights into 
the environmental, economic, social, legal and political issues which have to be addressed 
when riparians attempt to optimise their national interests while claiming to take the rights 
and interests of neighbouring states into account in the attempt to avoid conflict. The study 
will analyze the factors which influence the relations between these states, using data on 
hydrological, territorial, legal, political, economic, historical, social, demographic and 
military variables. The study will also examine the river and its tributaries as a 
geographical phenomenon (the river basin as one ecosystem unit) influenced by these 
relationships.
The research will review issues on both the theoretical and practical levels. On the 
theoretical level, points of both contention and cooperation concerning the joint waters will 
be examined through the use of geographical models taken from the field of regional 
planning, models from relevant international legal regimes (Helsinki Rules on the uses of 
the waters of international rivers) and models dealing with international conflicts connected
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with the joint use of river systems. A primary theoretical tool used to analyse the 
significance of water as an emerging national and international issue will be the use of 
cognitive maps. The second tool will be quantitative indicators of vulnerability arising 
from water shortages, and the third will be a matrix model. On the practical level, the 
Euphrates river system will be examined by evaluating the water-related components of the 
disputes in recent and past international conflicts which have taken place between states of 
the basin and possible future conflicts.
The main contribution of the study will be to provide a rigorous examination of the 
current hydropolitical situation based on a more comprehensive review of the hydrological 
and socio-economic data than elsewhere attempted. So far, the evidence, assembled from 
environmental and socio-economic information, is consistent with the thesis - that there 
will be sufficient water in the Euphrates system to meet the foreseeable demands made by 
the developing political economies of the states which share the catchment and that the 
riparians will continue to make the economic and political adjustments necessary to avoid 
conflict. The only factor which could negate this analysis is the unusual political and 
economic predicament of Iraq following the Gulf War of 1991. This is an important 
conclusion since it contradicts the popular, and irresponsible, contention found elsewhere 
in supposed scientific literature that armed conflict is inevitable (Coley, 1984 ; Naff & 
Matson, 1984 ; Starr, 1991; Musallam, 1989).
In order to establish the thesis that there is enough water in the Euphrates system, 
with supplements from the Tigris, it will be necessary to qualify the natural flow in the 
system. Chapter B examines quantitative and qualitative aspects of the Euphrates flow and 
of its tributaries. The management of Euphrates water is the major using sector - irrigated 
agriculture. It is shown that a variety of environmental and economic factors will tend to 
restrict the use of water in agriculture, confirming the prime thesis. The overall position 
for all three riparians and for all using sectors is analysed in chapter D and it is again 
demonstrated that water is not the constraining element on the socio-economic 
development of the Euphrates countries.
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B . The Euphrates River - A General 
Description
The policy-making process for the development plans in the Euphrates drainage basin is 
influenced by the physical conditions of the valley, and these factors constitute an essential 
basis for a discussion of the topics to be considered later.
The Euphrates River rises north of Erzerum in Turkey, where the highest mountains 
are more than 3000 metres above sea level. The sources are situated between the Black Sea 
and Lake Van, and the river is formed by the confluence of two tributaries, the Murad- 
Sue, which originates in the many springs in the area of Ala-Dag, and flows from the 
south, and the Kara-Sue, which begins in the Kargapazari Mountains, north of Erzerum 
and flows from the north to meet at a point near the village of Keban. The Murad-Sue river 
is 650 km long and the Kara-Sue river is 450 km long, but from the height of 1,000m, 
above sea level, the river is then known as the Euphrates (Al-Hadithi, 1979, 45). These 
tributaries contribute 75 per cent of the Euphrates water.
Ten kilometres downstream from the confluence, there is a narrow gorge, where the 
Keban Dam has been constructed. Downstream from the Keban Dam many tributaries and 
wadis join the river, increasing its discharge. The most important tributary is the Tokhma 
Sue which drains the Taurus mountains and joins the Euphrates near the town of 
Malorteya. Below the village of Keban, the Euphrates flows down the steep slopes on the 
southern margin of the mountains of the Kurdestan and Armenian areas, and enters the 
region of the eastern plains of Syria. The total length of the Euphrates in Turkey, from the 
point of confluence of the Kara-Sue and Murad-Sue until it enters Syria at the town of 
Trablus, is 455 km. The Euphrates has three tributaries in Syria. The Sajur joins the 
Euphrates on the right bank about 30 km downstream from Jerablus; the Balikh joins on 
the left bank halfway between Jerablus and Dier-ez-Zor while below Dier-ez-Zor, the river 
broadens out somewhat and now contains numerous rocky stretches, shallow rapids and 
islands and is joined by the last important tributary, the Khabur, about 30 km below Deir- 
ez-Zor. The Khabur rises on the south-facing slopes of the Taurus mountains in Turkey 
and drains into north-eastern Syria. South of the Balikh river the Euphrates river receives 
no further discharge from any source, but a number of dry river beds indicate that in 
relatively recent geologic time a number of tributaries flowed into the Euphrates from what 
are now the Syrian and Arabian deserts.
The total length of the Euphrates in Syria is 675 km and it enters Iraq at the Husaiba 
Settlement, after flowing through Abu Kamal in Syria. Having crossed the Iraqi border, it 
continues its flow in a south-easterly direction, crossing the desert uplands and narrow 
wadis which end at Ramadi and enters the Mesopotamian plains. Because there is no
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Map B.l : The drainage basin of the Euphrates river
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great difference in elevation between the river beds and the surrounding irrigated areas, 
gravity canals are used to divert the water for irrigation (Al-Khashab, 1958, 8). Although 
the Euphrates comes very close to the Tigris near the town of Falluja, it again flows away 
from it, but the water level in the Euphrates is higher than that of the Tigris at a similar 
point. This is why the land between the two rivers can be irrigated by diverting Euphrates 
water from its left bank by means of canals. Downstream from the town of Mussaiyab and 
upstream of the Hindiya barrage many large canals draw water from the Euphrates River, 
and the most important is Shatt-al-Hilla (called Shatt-al-Hindiya at this point), which 
passes the Hindiya barrage and then flows through the towns of Hindiya and Kifil. 
Downstream from Kifil it bifurcates into two branches - the Kufa branch on the west and 
the Shamiya branch on the east. The Kufa branch again bifurcates downstream from the 
town of Abu Shukhir into the Jehad and Mishkhab branches and the Jehad branch ends in 
an area of agricultural land where its waters are completely utilized for irrigation purposes. 
The Mishkhab branch continues to flow in a southern direction and passes through 
Mishkhab, Qadisiya and then to the south of Shinafiya. Here the river then flows into 
many branches which join one another to the north of the town of Nasiriya. From Nasiriya 
the river again flows into many branches towards the town of Souk-al-Shiukh and all 
these branches discharge into the Hammar Marshes. From the Hammar Marshes the 
Euphrates waters flow into Shatt-al-Arab, near Karmat-Ali.
The total length of the Euphrates in Iraq is about 1200 km and the total length of the 
Euphrates from the confluence of the Kara-Sue and Murad-Sue to its confluence with 
Shatt-al-Arab near Karmat-Ali is about 2330 km. The Euphrates and its tributaries drain an 
enormous basin of 444,000 km^ in area, 28 per cent of which lies in Turkey, 17 per cent 
in Syria, 40 per cent in Iraq and 15 per cent in Saudi Arabia ( Naff & Matson, 1984, 82). 
In its course, the river flows through four topographic regions:
a. The high mountainous region which is located in the northern part of the basin, from the 
sources of the river to the area south of the village Cungus in Turkey. Here the region 
rises to an attitude of 1,500 to 3,000 metres above sea level, where the river flows through 
narrow and deep wadis and, later through a line of basins and wadis until it reaches the 
Anti-Taurus system. In this region, the river flows rapidly and is characterized as an 
Alpine River.
b. The foothill region and the Kracali heights which are located south of the mountainous 
region south to Chingiz (740m) and Birecik (420m) in southern Turkey. This is the 
transition zone between the mountains and the lowlands and most of this area is located in 
Turkey. The Euphrates flows in a cleft that is partly covered with lava accumulations and 
the river cuts down into a deep and curved valley 20-30m beneath the surrounding area.
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Here the river’s stream becomes wider and its flow weakens.
c. The Plains of Gezira which are located south of the foothills stretch, from Birecik 
(420m) to Hit in Iraq (52m). In this area the river flows in a series of extensive flood 
plains. The river meanders through a wide, valley and geological circumstances cause the 
river to flow between elevated bluffs
d. The Plains of Iraq and the Delta from Hit until the Euphrates joins the Tigris river, the 
region is a flat, delta-like plain. The river flows across an alluvial plain built up from 
eroded material upstream. The river gradient is small (sometimes no more than 510 cm per 
kilometre). In the plains region, there are wide areas of marshy lands including streams 
and meanders which have been abandoned (Abbas, 1984. 69).
Bl: The climate of the basin
The Euphrates River, from its sources in north-east Turkey up to its confluence at Shatt al- 
Arab, flows through three climate zones which differ significantly from one another (see 
map B.2). These are:
a) The Mountainous Mediterranean Climate Zone - climate determines the flow regime of 
the river. Temperatures in the mountains frequently fall bellow 0°C during the winter and 
the Euphrates is largely fed by precipitation falling over the uplands of Eastern Turkey, 
where the annual total precipitation often exceeds 1,000 mm. As most of this precipitation 
occurs during the winter months as snow, it tends to be locked up as snow and ice, but 
with rising temperatures in spring and early summer, the snow fields melt. The rainy 
season starts in October and ends in April (Beaumont, 1978, 35).
b) The Semi-Arid Mediterranean-type Zone which includes those areas where there is a 
small winter water surplus. Such areas can be described as having a steppe type 
vegetation, climate and land use. Temperatures in the winter months in Urfa, Turkey, a 
site with a climate typical of the foothills region, range from 5°C to 7°C, and, in the 
summer, they range from 27°C to 30°C. The average rainfall is 300 mm per annum near 
the Turkish-Syrian border (Abbas, 1984, 79).
c) The Arid Zone of South Syria and Iraq. Rainfall in the plains is characterized by a low 
average precipitation, of 150-200 mm per annum which occurs mainly in the November- 
April winter season. The rainfall is not reliable in any part of the plains, and the records 
show large fluctuations from year to year. Summer in this region is intensely hot, with day 
shade temperatures frequently reaching a maximum of 45°C in July and August and from
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30°C to 35°C in the Al-Jazira subregion. Throughout the entire basin, the winter season 
(December, January, and February) is the most humid, with over half of the annual 
precipitation in the valley falling during these months, while the summer season is very 
dry and brings little precipitation. The average annual temperature in Turkey is 17°C, in 
Syria 20°C, and in Iraq 23°C (McLachlan, 1976, 41).
Map B.2: The Middle East climatic regions
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The effectiveness of the winter rainfall regime is well illustrated by the Thomthwaite 
type of water-balance graph which plots potential evapotranspiration, reflecting water 
needs compared seasonally against precipitation (Smith, 1970, 411).
The evaporation rate in the upper part of the Euphrates valley in Turkey is about 700 
mm per annum, and about 900 mm per annum in southern Turkey, near the border with 
Syria. At Deir ez Zor in southern Syria the evaporation rate is 1,356 mm per annum and at 
Haditha the evaporation rises to about 1,450 mm per annum (Beaumont, 1978, 38). 
According to the Haigh report, the annual evaporation losses at Abu Dibis is about 1,900 
mm per annum, and on Habbaniyah Lake about 1,800 mm per annum (Haigh, 1951, 33 ).
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The large amount of evaporation that characterizes the arid and semi-arid climates has a 
great influence on both the water consumption for agriculture, and the potential 
productivity of dryland agriculture.
B2.The river hydrology
An assessment of the amount of water naturally flowing in the river is essential for an 
examination of the developmental possibilities of major water using sectors such as 
agriculture in the riparian states as well as for an analysis of the effects of reservoir 
building and irrigation upon the amount of water flowing in the river. One must also 
remember that, in order to implement international law which recommends co-operative 
sharing of the river water between the riparian states, there is a need for basic data on the 
amount of water naturally flowing in the river
The amount of water in the Euphrates river, the third largest river in the Middle East 
after the Nile and the Tigris, varies considerably from month to month and from year to 
year (figures B.l - B.3).
Clawson (1971), using the report of the International Bank, which made estimates of 
irrigation diversions in the riparian countries, assessed "natural" river flows at Hit Iraq at 
33.69 billion m^/yr., for the period 1937-1964 (Clawson, 1971, 205).
Figure Bl:
Euphrates river: historical annual run-off at Belkiskoy (1937-1980)
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According to discharge records obtained between 1937 and 1980 at the Belkiskoy 
(Birecik) gauging site, just upstream from the point where the Euphrates crosses the 
Syrian border, the annual average flow is 30.37 billion nP  per annum (GAP, 1990, Vol. 
4, E6). This figure is very similar to the World Bank figure for flows of the Turkish - 
Syrian border which Clowson (1971, 205) recorded as 33.69 billion m^ per annum.
Table B.l:
Hydrological data for the Euphrates river
Turkey Syria Iraq Saudi Arabia Total
Drainage area
(1,000 km2) 125 76 177 66 444
% of total area 28 17 40 15 100
% of country 16 41 39 5
Annual discharge T urkey Syria Iraq
(10 /m3) OUTFLOW INFLOW OUTFLOW INFLOW
(1937-1963)
Minimum 12,600 12,600 14,000 14,000
Mean 28,400 28,400 32,400 32,400
Maximum 42,000 42,000 45,000 45,000
% of mean discharge 88 12 0
Source: Beaumont, 1978,37
Since the discharge value of the Sajur, Balikh, and the Khabur in Syria has been 
measured at about 2.05 billion m^, the average "natural" river flow at Hit should be about
32.4 billion m-^/yr. This figure is 1.3 billion m^ less than calculated by Clawson but Ubell 
(1971), Beaumont (1978), and Gischler (1979), used the amount of 31.8 billion m^/yr. as 
the annual average volume of flow from 1931 till 1969 (Ubell, 1971, 3; Beaumont, 1978, 
35; Gischler, 1979, 100). According to Abbas (1984) the average annual flow of the river 
is only 29.26 billion (Abbas, 1984, 87). Another source, Al-Khashab (1958), quoted 
the lowest amount of the average annual water surplus of the Euphrates river at Hit, at
26.4 billion m^ based on 22 years of measurements (1925-1946), and the Haigh report 
(1951), calculated the same amount (Al-Khashab, 1958 46; Haigh, 1951, 39). The annual 
discharge varied from 16.8 billion m^ per annum in 1961, to a maximum of 53,5 billion 
m^ per annum in 1969 and 65 per cent of this discharge occurred during the flood 
(Beaumont 1978, 36).
From the examination of the data in the amount of river water, upon which the various 
researchers base their findings, it is no wonder that there is, in fact, no agreement about 
the amount of water naturally flowing in the river. The natural flow can only be calculated
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up to the Winter of 1974 when Turkey began to fill the reservoir behind the Keban Dam 
and Syria began to fill the reservoir behind the Tabqa Dam. This intervention by states in 
the process of the river's natural flow makes it virtually impossible to calculate the natural 
flow after the event. There is no doubt, however, that due to the very large perennial 
variation in the amount of water flowing in the river (which can be seen in figure Bl.), 
calculation of the average flow becomes a statistical manipulation and there are long 
periods in which the amount of flowing water is significantly greater than or smaller than 
the average. It is difficult, however, to explain the differences in the flow as is presented 
by various researchers, distorted by partial national water recording agencies. One way to 
explain the different results may arise out of relating to different periods of time those 
studies took place. One must also consider that the amount of water in a river is a 
mathematical calculation of data - something which produce the possibility of making 
arithmetical errors.
Figure B2:
M onthly variations in discharge of the 
Euphrates at Keban and Yusef Pasha 1950-1966
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Minimum instantaneous discharge, according to Cressey, is 181 m-^/sec (equivalent to 
5,700 million m^/yr.), while maximum instantaneous discharge is 5,200 m-Vsec 
(equivalent to 164.000 million m-^/yr.) (Beaumont 1978, 37). There were two severe 
droughts in the Euphrates area between 1937 and 1980 (see fugure B 1). The first was in
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1958-1962, with the most severe period (with an annual flow as low as 14,883 million m3 
at the Turkish/Syrian border), being in 1961. The second critical period began in 1970 and 
ended in 1975, the lowest flow being in 1973, when the annual flow fell to 62 per cent of 
the annual average flow over the 1937-1980 period. Total flow reached a peak in 1969 
when it was recorded at 53,548 million m3 which represented 86 per cent increase over 
the average (GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, E6).
Table B.2:
The average water flow of the Euphrates river at selected locations
Gauging station Years Watershed area Average flow
(km3) (Billion m3/yr.)
Keban, Turkey 64,100 20.12
Tabqa, Syria 120,700 28.84
Hit, Iraq 1924-1970 264,100 29.36
Hindiyah, Iraq 1930-1971 274,100 19.50
Shinafiya, Iraq 1954-1971 280,000 14.90
Al-Nasiriyah, Iraq 1930-1971 289,000 15.00
Source: Abbas, 1984, 90
At the Keban station in Turkey the mean annual flow of the Euphrates is about 20.12 
billion (see table B.2) and the flow increases between Keban and Tabqa to 28.84 
billion m^ per year. Further downstream at Hit, Iraq, near the Syrian border, the annual 
flow of the river reaches 29.26 billion m3 per year while still further to the south in Iraq at 
the city of Al-Nasiriyah, (as a result of diversions and evaporation), the average flow of 
the river drops to about 15 billion m3 per year. Table B.2 shows the annual flow of the 
Euphrates river.
The annual cycle of the Euphrates River discharge can be divided into three parts (see 
figures B2-B3):
a. Period of high discharge - March to June
b. Period of low discharge - July to October
c. Period of average discharge - November to February
The melting of the winter snow in the uplands of Turkey releases large quantities of water 
into the river to produce a discharge peak during April and May, when the discharge at 
Hit, Iraq averages 2,400 nAsec. The discharge drops sharply in June and July as the 
frozen precipitation of the winter season is exhausted and the nearly rainless summer 
begins.
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Figure B3:
Monthly variations in discharge of the 
Euphrates at Hit and Hindiya 1931-1966
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In August, September and October the mean discharge at Hit is around 300 m^/sec. 
In a year of heavy winter precipitation, however, the peak discharge in May can reach 
4,300 m^/sec, while there is little increase in the average summer flow level. After a dry 
winter the discharge in April or May can be as low as 1,300 m^/sec and may drop to about 
100 m^/sec in August and September. Thus, in one year, as much as twice the average 
amount of water may flow in the Euphrates while, in another, little more than half the 
average annual discharge will be generated. The discharge of the Euphrates diminishes 
systematically with distance downstream after its confluence with the Khabur, primarily as 
a result of evaporation and infiltration into the subsurface. In the swampland of region the 
upper delta, both before and after confluence with the Tigris, the influence of large scale 
transpiration by aquatic vegetation further diminishes the flow (GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, E6). 
An examination of the origin of the content and discharge of the river reveals that 88 per 
cent of the mean annual content is generated within Turkey and virtually the whole of the 
remaining 12 percent in Syria (Table B.l). This means that Iraq's contribution to the total 
content of the river, under average conditions, is practically nil (Beaumont 197B, 36).
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Figure B4:
The Euphrates river mean monthly discharge 
in Iraq: 1926-1948
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The seasonal distribution of the water supply of the system does not coincide with 
crop needs. Winter crops in the riparian countries need water from May onwards, but the 
low water season, lasts from July to December and, during this period, the mean water 
discharge of the Euphrates is 421 m^/sec - thus the river reaches its lowest levels in 
September and October when water is badly needed.
When the crops are either half-grown or almost ready for harvest, and water is no 
longer so badly needed, the fields are subject to the danger of inundation since spring is 
the flood season During this period the mean water discharge of the river is 1,765 m^/sec.
In the case of summer crops which need water from April to September, the situation 
is reversed. At first they receive abundant supplies, and then the supply declines 
gradually until it reaches a low point in September (Qudain, I960, 57). The normal 
difference between high and low levels is about 3.3m (see Figure B5).
Storage of the river water is desirable because it increases the water available for 
economic use, especially in Turkey, but also in Syria and Iraq. The flow in low of low
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years at the Syria-Iraq border illustrate the problems for cultivators depending on the 
natural flow of the river. Regulating the flow also addresses the problem of the timing of 
the flood w hich is too late for the winter crops and too early for the summer ones. Once 
major storage has been effected perennial irrigation can be extended in each of the riparians 
allowing two crops a year to be grown on the same land. Another reason for storage is to 
achieve flood control and the utilization of the water for the generation of hydroelectricity 
(Ubell, 1971, 3).
Figure B5:
High and low levels of the Euphrates: 1911-1932
(in metres above sea level)
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B3: The correlation between annual rainfall and annual 
discharge of the Euphrates
In studying the flow regime of the upper Euphrates basin, it is evident that the component 
of base flow, due to spring discharge, is an important factor in the flow regime.
A high correlation between rainfall and flow discharge, is expected in a watershed where 
the slope overland flow' is a major contributor. The correlation between annual rainfall and 
annual discharge is low in drainage basins where the slope overland is less
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Figure B6: The correlation between annual rainfall at Adiyaman, Erzincan 
and Erzurum, and annual discharge at Belkiskoy: 1938-1980
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important and base flow due to spring discharge is affected by rains of previous years.
In order to test this assumption for the upper Euphrates basin, annual rainfall data 
from the three rain gauging stations, Adiyaman, Erzincan and Erzurum (see locations in 
map B.l) were correlated to the discharge data in Beliskoy, next to the Syrian-Turkish 
border as published in Turkish sources (GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, 37). It is recognised that the 
rainfall data are neither comprehensive nor ideally distributed for catchmnet analysis, but 
they represent two parts of the basin which together contribute over 90% of the Euphrates 
flow. The Erzurum station and the Erzincan station are located in the part of the catchment 
which contributes 75 per cent of the Euphrates flow. The Adiyaman station represents a 
much less significant element of the catchment representing approximately 15 to 20 per 
cent of the flow. Clearly the Erzurum and Erzincan stations are likely to be more clearly 
correlated with the flow at Belikskoy.
Figure B6 for Erzurum and Erzincan demonstrate a close correlation between 
precipitation and flow except in 1950 and 1951. The data for the Adiyamam station and 
flows are relatively poorly correlated, with especially strong departure between 1962 and 
1970. As the Adiyaman segment of the catchment contributes a small proportion of the 
flow the minor impact of the unusually high rainfall on downstream flow is explicable.
An important part of precipitation in the Erzurum and Erzincan segments of the basin 
falls as snow. Attempts to obtain snow data from the University of East Anglia Climate 
Research Unit archives as well as from D.S.I. in Ankara failed. UEA CRU did not hold 
such data and D.S.I officials would not provide data concerning the absence of detailed 
flow data in the upper parts of the catchment and it was not possible to model the likely 
contribution of snow melt to Euphrates flow. The present relationship between 
precipitation and flow is entirely consistant with a contention that variations between 
precipitation and flow could be explained by variations in year to year snowfall.
There seems to be a bias in the hydrometerological records since the hydro-political 
significance of meteorological and river flow data make them very susceptible to 
manipulation.
The correlation between rainfall data in each individual rain gauging station and the 
flow regime, was low (R=0.10 - 0.28), in order to find the relationship between rain and 
runoff, the average rainfall for the three stations was calculated . In addition, the running 
average of rainfall for a periods of two, three and four years was also calculated. Figure 
B7 presents the relationship between the correlation coefficients of runoff versus rainfall 
for the various running averages.
It is clear that the correlation coefficient for the three years running average is much 
better that the correlation coefficient for a one year rainfall amount, a result which supports 
the initial assumption (see figure B8).
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Figure B8:
Correlation between Euphrates basin precipitation 
and runoff at Beliksoy
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Yet, a correlation coefficient of R=0.425 between rainfall and runoff data is 
considered low. The low correlation in this case study is probably caused by three 
possible factors:
1. The three rain gauging stations are the only available source of data for the upper 
Euphrates basin and therefore they do not necessarily represent the rainfall for the whole 
basin. An analysis of the rainfall map reveals that there are more rain gauging stations but 
their data are not available (GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, 35). The precipitation map shows a high 
variation of rainfall. It can be seen that a difference of 700 mm a year exist over distances 
of 50 km.
2. The rainfall data used for the calculation of the correlations is, the gross annual 
rain amounts only. No data are available for important parameters such as rainfall 
intensity, or the snow component of the precipitation. These parameters have an important 
influence on the flow regime.
3. The low correlation can also be explained by a technical problem. The rain data 
refers to the calendar year whereas the runoff data refers to the hydrological year.
During the last twenty years three big dams have been built on the upper part of the 
Euphrates, and several more are planned. The storage capacity of the dams is 90 billion 
nY*. Consequently the flow of the river will be controlled to meet economic needs and by
48
political decisions. Hence, an even lower correlation between rain and runoff is to be 
expected after 1974 and especially in future. Meanwhile the impact of climate change is not 
clear. Global and regional climate models have proved to be sound with respect to 
temperature and the Euphrates Basin will experience the minor increases in temperature 
predicted by the models. Climate models have proved to be very unreliable in predicting 
precipitation which is the most important variable with respect to modelling surface run­
off. It has to be assumed that the jury is still out on the rainfall future of the upper 
Euphrates. It has to be assumed that rainfall could either decline or increase, but for the 
foreseeable future such natural impacts will be minor between 0 and 10 per cent compared 
with the supply management impacts which have increased the volume of usable water of 
80 per cent though the works constructed since 1974.
It should be noted that the complete control by the Turkish authorities over rainfall 
and runoff data, makes it possible for them to publish selective data or to decline to 
publish them at all.
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C. Irrigation Development Projects
C1. Irrigation in early history
The history of international relations and law is vital to an understanding of the 
conditions and problems in any international drainage basin since the history of a 
region may either facilitate or impede international agreements over water.
In the period between the two world wars no conflict existed among the three 
countries over the use of the Euphrates' water at that time. Turkey was engaged in one 
boundary dispute with Iraq over the Mosul province but, despite its seriousness, after 
these conflicts were resolved it did not affect the water issue (Abbas, 1984,172).
Until the mid-1960s, the only country which made large-scale use of the waters of 
the Euphrates was Iraq. In Syria limited irrigation was practised alongside the river, 
while in Turkey the waters of the Euphrates were used even less (Beaumont, 1978, 35). 
Any debate over the subject of irrigation in ancient times will therefore, focus naturally 
upon Iraq. In ancient times irrigation was practised by digging ditches to bring water 
from the river to the fields. For a country such as Iraq with regular summer temperatures 
of 45°C in the shade and no rain for eight months in the year, the distribution of water to 
man, beasts and plants has always been vital. Therefore, one could say that water has 
always been the basic requirement for existence in this arid area and that the utilization 
of it has been a civilizing factor since the beginning of recorded history. The history of 
Sumer and Babylon was largely the history of a struggle for control of the water supply 
because land without water in Iraq is valueless.
Since Sumerian days, rulers have struggled against flood, on the one hand, and the 
need to provide an irrigation system, on the other. Irrigation engineering by trench and 
canal had already been brought to a fine art in Babylonian times and the waterways, seen 
from the air, show a complete network of ancient dead canals. These numerous dead 
canals may never have been in simultaneous operation since the Tigris and the Euphrates 
waters contain a heavy proportion of salt and silting has been brought down by the two 
rivers for countless centuries. The silting and salting between them evidently forced the 
inhabitants to periodically abandon their canals and dig new ones; hence the land, after a 
certain length of time of exploitation, became useless.
The method of farming used was simple seasonal method where farmers used to 
cultivate half of the field one season and leave the other half for the next season. The 
tools used were the simple wooden plough drawn by two cows, or oxen, making such 
animals very important to the cultivators in Iraq. The cultivators used one of the simplest 
and probably earliest devise for lifting water called a "Naur" which was equipped with
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paddles so that the water could be raised by the force of the current in the stream. Next 
came the horizontal water-wheel which was run by the power of draft animals and both 
of these devices have been used since the ninth century (B.C.E).
The old-fashioned water wheels or current wheels, especially on the upper 
Euphrates river, were turned by the velocity of the stream to lift water from the river to a 
level where it could flow to the fields through small waterways constructed especially 
for this purpose. The wheel is still used and is built from strong local woods without 
using any kind of metal, and with even the nails being made of wood. To hold the water, 
a kind of bucket is locally made of "fired mud". However in order to construct the wheel, 
the installation and the buckets, there was need for special technical knowledge and 
certain families specialized in each one of these occupations. The efficiency of the wheel 
varies according to the strength of the current since it converts the energy residing in the 
flowing stream into the mechanical energy of motion. At the beginning the problem for 
the cultivators was how to locate the water wheel in the stream, where there was a steep 
near rocks after which a dam, whose function was to provide the drop or "head", could 
be artificially located to both provide a water way and fill the function of storing water. 
By means of these wheels, the people can irrigate their fields and raise crops since the 
device, though very primitive, is economical as a basic irrigation system when linked to 
an aqueduct called a "Korya" which is a waterway constructed once and forever from 
stone and locally produced cement. The farmers then only need to renew the wheel once 
every two or three years at a relatively low cost because they use the timber from their 
own fields - and no money is involved. The primitive wheel keeps running day and night 
for years without any other expense involved (Al-Dahiri, 1969,42).
An important feature of the rivers system which has had a favourable effect on 
agriculture is that the bed of the Euphrates, from north of Falluja southwards until the 
two rivers meet at Quma, is slightly higher than that of the Tigris. In modem times, as in 
the past, this difference of elevation has been utilized to build a network of gravity flow 
canals from west to east to irrigate large areas of land (Qubain, 1960, 70).
Canals from the Euphrates, either old, reopened, or entirely new, form a system and 
the most important canal is the Naher Isa, named after a relative of Al-Mansur who re- 
excavated it. It connects the Euphrates with the Tigris at Baghdad and, since it is 
navigable, it also acts as a communicating link between the Euphrates and the Tigris (Al- 
Dahiri, 1969,42).
In 1253 Hulagu, a grandson of Ghinghiz Khan, moved westward in force, captured 
Baghdad in 1258 and thus brought an end to the Abbasid Caliphate. With its population 
decimated, the canal system fallen into disrepair, and the old skills forgotten, Iraq 
became the victim rather than the beneficiary of its rivers. Seasonal floods made life 
along the river banks precarious, and misuse of the waters salinized large areas of once
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fertile soillt seems that there is no other similar case in world history, where the 
destruction of irrigation canals so badly influenced a state for a period of more than 600 
years. Only at the beginning of the 20th century did new technology, borrowed from the 
West, begin to open the way for the re-establishment of human control over these 
streams (Harris, 1958, 206).
Irrigation was neglected during Turkish rule except at the last stage when a group of 
young Turks came into power. In 1908, Sir William Willcocks, a well-known engineer 
at that time who had built regulatory systems for irrigation in India and Egypt, was 
invited to make a report on the possibilities of irrigation development in Iraq. He brought 
a dozen engineers with him from Egypt and, in 1911, presented a comprehensive report 
which is still considered to be a basic source of reference on irrigation development for 
Iraq.
During this same year, 1911, the Turkish government accepted his suggested 
projects and began work on the Al-Hindiya barrage on the lower Euphrates. This project, 
completed in 1913, was a major installation, according to the Committee of Officials of 
Iraq and the barrage controlled the Hilla canal system, the largest canal in Iraq served by 
a single in-take. With its four main branches, it serves some 2.7 million dunams of land 
in the Euphrates basin, even today but one of its branches, the Dagharra, has deteriorated 
to the point of becoming useless (Qubain, 1960, 57).
C2. The transitional period
The transitional period began during the First World War with the end of Turkish rule 
and was followed by the British Mandate rule in Iraq, and the French mandate in Syria 
which ultimately led to the establishment of new forms of governments, in newly 
independent Iraq and Syria. During this time, the basic political economy which has 
affected development ever since was created and the more important aspects included 
the establishment of the system of government and, the provision of social overhead 
capital for projects such as railroads, land transportation, electric power, water supply, 
and the ports of Iraq, as well as telephone, telegraph and postal systems. This was the 
time which saw the beginnings of a new phase of agricultural development, including 
markets and the introduction and establishment of numerous national innovations, 
including the beginnings of modem industry, the establishment of financial institutions, 
the public health system and the educational system (Al-Dahiri, 1969, 49).
The use of the telegraph as an aid to the prevention of flooding in the plains is a 
good illustration of the new technology introduced into the area. In this connection the 
Franco - Syrian authorities supplied, readings of the Euphrates at Jarablus and Dair-as-
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Zor, by wireless thus providing five days' warning to those in Iraq about what was in 
store for them south of Ramadi.
In Iraq, towards the end of the First World war, a Military Department of 
Agriculture was organized and, in 1919, the department was transferred to a civil 
administration. One of the major projects of the department was to initiate agricultural 
education and the spreading of new innovations.
Partly as a means of making maximum use of scarce funds, pump irrigation 
increased considerably during this period. The British army had encouraged the use of 
pumps as early as 1918, and the government encouraged their use by granting tax 
exceptions to crops produced on pump irrigated land, both through granting state land on 
favourable terms to those willing to install pumps, and by making pumps exempt from 
customs duty. Here, the legislation played a major role in directing the economic 
activities. The pumps were privately owned but the installations were controlled through 
a licensing system. Pump irrigation (technically called lift irrigation) extended along 
both banks of the main rivers throughout the delta and, occasionally, on the higher 
reaches, but it was also found on the banks of the main canals where the pumps were 
sited on high ground (Sassoon, 1987, 141).
In 1927 the Ministry of Communication and Works declared all rivers and 
waterways in the country to be "irrigation works", a term which covered all irrigation 
and flood protection installations. Since then all irrigation works of public importance, 
have been constructed, maintained, and managed by an irrigation department where 
government irrigation engineers determine the dimensions of canals and waterways, and 
the department controls water distribution - only interrupting supply when necessary 
(Harris, 1958,206).
The British Mandate Government began to examine closely some of the large works 
which the Irrigation Department had been considering for years. One such major 
irrigation project was the Habbaniya barrage and flood-escape system whose main 
purpose was to use Lake Habbaniya, situated on the right bank of the Euphrates, for 
flood relief in times of dangerously high floods. The Habbaniya scheme was to provide a 
run-off lake from the Euphrates near the town of Ramadi, with a channel which would 
run into the great Habbaniya depression and fill it whenever the river reached a certain 
level. Thereafter, in any given year, one of two things would happen. If the flood proved 
to be exceptionally big, another channel at the south end of the depression would be 
opened and the additional surplus water in the river, after entering Habbaniya, would 
dissipate itself in another and still greater depression, the Bahr-al-Milh. In a normal year, 
however, the release to the south would not be used, since the Euphrates water would be 
normally stored at Habbaniya itself until the summer when an outlet near Fallujah would
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be opened to allow the impounded water to run back into the river. This scheme was first 
proposed to the Turks by the late Sir William Willcocks. Its virtues were that it would 
protect the lands of the lower Euphrates from severe flooding in the spring and give the 
cultivators of Central Iraq the assurance of more water for their thirsty crops in the late 
summer, when supply is usually exceedingly poor. The scheme was criticized by the 
Iraqis on the ground that it was a Machiavellian policy of Britain which wanted to create 
a big lake at Habbaniya for the use of flying-boats and seaplanes. Today, the Habbaniya 
Reservoir has a capacity of 3.25 billion m^ and many irrigation projects rely upon it (Al 
-An'i, 1977,35).
The development of the irrigation projects and the use of pumps increased the use of 
the river water and the approximate disposal of water supplies calculated for a normal 
September month (low water season) before the Abu Ghurib canal, was established and 
regulated (1937). The Euphrates canals in 1937, altogether, drew approximately 31.5 per 
cent, from the river above the Hindiya barrage in the low-water season with lift irrigation 
to minor canals and directly to fields and gardens accounting for another two per cent, 
and evaporation calculated at about 3.5 per cent. The amount that passed on down the 
Hindiya channel was therefore about 63 per cent of the volume available at Hit, but none 
of the water drawn off above the barrage in the low-water season found its way back to 
the Euphrates lower down (Iraq, 1944, 36). The country's irrigation area expanded 
substantially as a result of the water projects and the growing use of pumps to lift water 
from the rivers directly onto the fields.
The Hindiya and the Ramadi dams merely served as large weirs to control the water 
level at the intake points of irrigation canals and it is only since about 1960 that river 
control schemes have become technically and economically feasible in the riparian 
countries. This has been made possible through the construction of dams large enough to 
store the seasonal flood surplus and regulate flow downstream through-out the year, thus 
producing the man-made reservoirs which hold surplus water from especially wet years 
which can be released during drought years (Smith, 1970, 417).
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C3. Modern development projects in Turkey
Until the nineteenth century Ottoman Turkey was the dominant power in the Middle 
East with an empire which covered 4.7 million km^. The Ottoman hold on this vast 
territory was, however, seriously weakened, partly by internal instability but, more 
importantly, by the growing strength of the major European industrial nations. 
Consequently, at the time of outbreak of the First World War, which was to prove 
disastrous for Turkey, the Ottoman Empire had already been reduced to under 40 per 
cent of its previous size. After the war, and the subsequent conflict with Greece, more 
territory was lost and, today, Turkey covers only 776,980 km2 - less than 17 per cent of 
the land area of the Ottoman Empire (Wilson, 1979, 87).
In 1913 there were only 269 factories in the whole empire, employing less than
17,000 workers; most of whom were concerned with either food processing or textile 
manufacture while agriculture was the most common economic activity.
Against this economic background, under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk, Turkey 
became the first state in the Middle East to draw up a five-year development plan and, 
within a few years of the announcement of this initiative, Turkey embarked upon an 
economic experiment that was to be emulated in several countries following World War 
II (Richards & Waterbury, 1990, 188). Since 1963, when the first five year development 
plan was launched, the economic development policy of Turkey has centred around state 
enterprise initiative and imports substitution through industrialization. The policy has 
been effective in attaining high economic growth, in a period when the basic economic 
infrastructure was insufficient to expect private enterprises to flourish in competitive 
markets. Agriculture and water development, however, have received relatively little 
attention, with the exception of power generation projects that were needed to provide 
energy for new industry. This emphasis on power generation has led to the development 
of a number of multipurpose water projects, particularly on the Euphrates river (Turkey, 
1958, 5). The gross national product (GNP) grew, on an average, by 6.7 per cent and 7.1 
per cent per annum respectively in the first and the second five year plan periods (1963- 
67 and 1968-72). Such high economic performance was frustrated by a series of sharp 
increases in petroleum prices in 1970's, coupled with other unfavourable factors such as 
stagnate agricultural exports (GAP, 1990, Vol. 2, 2.1).
Throughout this period of economic development agriculture has remained the main 
source of employment despite the rapid growth of industry averaging 11 per cent per 
annum (Wilson, 1979, 95). The share of agricultural goods exported as a per cent of total 
exports decreased from 57.5 per cent in 1980 to 21.6 per cent in 1985 (Demirgil, 1990, 
193).
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In the seven year period between 1979 and 1986 Turkey's GDP grew at an average 
annual rate of 4.1 per cent. The industrial sector contributed twice as much as the 
agricultural sector to the increase in GDP during this period by attaining 5.4 per cent per 
annum average growth. In particular the average annual growth of the manufacturing 
industry was 5.8 per cent and that of the agricultural sector in the same period was a 
modest 3 per cent. The per capita GDP of Turkey grew in this seven year period at an 
annual average rate of 2.3 per cent while the per capita GDP of Turkey's 16 statistical 
regions ranged from 48 per cent to 150 per cent of the national per capita GDP (GAP, 
1990, Vol. 2, 2.2).
The population in Turkey increased between 1950 and 1985 at about 2.5 per cent 
per annum, reaching its peak during the 1955-1960 period (since when the rate of 
increase has gradually decreased) and, according to the 1990 census, stood at 57 million 
people. Over the last 40 years, however, the annual population growth rate has never 
been below 2 per cent. The annual population increase between 1980 and 1985 was 
about 2.49 per cent while in the same period the rate of urbanization was to 5.14 per 
cent. According to the preliminary results of the last census of October 1990, as well, the 
overall total population increase came to 2.35 per cent and the rate of increase of 
urbanization was calculated at 3.59 per cent between the years 1985-1990, whereas the 
same figures for rural increase was only about 0.68 per cent. Urbanization is expected to 
continue because of the development of the socio-economic structure and the increase in 
population.
Given the current average annual population growth rate of 2.2 per cent, and an 
increase in per capita demand for food of around 1.2 per cent per annum, Turkey needs 
to maintain an annual growth rate in food production of around 3.5 per cent to meet the 
requirements of domestic demand (Bilen & JJskay, 1991, 4.1).
Until the 1950's Turkey was predominantly an agricultural country with around 85 
per cent of its population employed in agriculture, compared with 58 per cent in 1980; 
industry employed 17 per cent in 1980, compared to 7 per cent in 1950; and services 
employed 25 per cent in 1980 compared to 6 per cent in 1950 (see table C l . l ) .
Table C l.l: 
Turkey's sectorial distribution of the labor force, 1950-1980 ( % )
Agriculture
Industry
Services
1950
87
7
6
1960
78
11
11
1970
68
12
20
1980
58
17
25
Source: Richards & Waterbury, 1990,74,12
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The fifties witnessed the introduction of modem technology and marketing methods 
in agriculture which resulted in a massive rural to urban migration. The ratio of urban 
population to total population grew steadily from 1950 and, by the year 1985, the 
country had more than half of its population living in urban areas. The highest rate of 
migration has been in the three largest cities: Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. The Thrace, 
Marmara, Aegean and Mediterranean coasts, that is the western and the south-western 
regions, show the highest rate of population increase. These regions, as the result of 
industrial development and increased employment opportunities in the tertiary sector, 
attract migrants from other parts of the country.
It is expected that the urban population will increase further from the present rate of 
53 per cent to 70 per cent by the year 2000 and while 33 million people lived in urban 
areas in 1991, this number is expected to exceed 45 million by the year 2000.
The high rate of growth in total population and the even higher rates of increase in 
urban population, together with changing household structures and social preferences, 
have led to an increased demand for water with the total water supplied for drinking and 
utility purposes increasing almost 2.5 times throughout Turkey. In 1980 the total amount 
reached about 1.6 km^ per year, increased to 2.8 km^ annually by the end of 1985, and 
rose to 4.0 km^ by the end of 1990. The situation of drinking water supply with respect 
to population served for the years 1980 and 1990 is summarized below.
Table C1.2:
The supply of drinking water and per cent of the population
Type of access to 
drinking water
1980 
Urban Rural
1990 
Urban Rural
Water piped to 
home or 
by standpipe
64.2 62.0 97.7 85.0
Served by other means 21.8 20.0 1.8 12.0
No access to water 14.0 18.0 0.5 3.0
Source: Bilen & Uskay, 1991,4.17
As can be seen from the above table, a great effort was made during this decade to 
supply water through a network or by standpipes to the population which increased from 
64.2 to 97.7 per cent in urban areas and from 62 to 85 per cent in rural areas.
The total land area of Turkey is 77.9 million hectares, made up of 27.7 million 
hectares of arable land, 21.7 million hectares of pastures and common grazing lands, 1.1
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million hectares of water surface areas, 23.4 million hectares of shrubs and forests, 3.3 
million hectares of unused land, and 569,400 hectares of residential areas.
Figure C l.l:
Turkey: arable land for irrigation
Non-irrigable 
2,393,560 ha.
Sloped areas 
8,793,600
Plain areas 
16,511,840
Irrigable land 
25,305,444 ha.
Arable land 
27,699,000 ha.
Source: Gulbahar, 1991, 531
Of the arable land, 25.3 million hectares are irrigable (see figure C l.l) .  With 
current available water resources it would be economically feasible to irrigate an 
estimated 8.5 million hectares with major and minor irrigation works and a further 16.8 
million hectares using advanced technology. At present both groundwater and surface 
flow are used to irrigate 3.2 million hectares (Gulbahar, 1991, 531). By the beginning of 
the 1990's, about 2.5 million hectares of irrigation infrastructure was developed in the 
public sector and an area of about 1.3 million hectares was provided with supplementary 
water by small scale, privately owned irrigation schemes, making the total area under 
irrigation about 3.8 millions ha. or 45 per cent of the potential total (Bilen & Uskay, 
1991, 1.4).
The growth of urban areas and the creation of an urban middle class has produced a 
rapid rise in per capita water consumption. In rural areas water consumption for 
domestic purposes was once probably less than 50 litres per day while in urban areas, it 
often reaches as high as 200 litres per day. This pronounced growth in per capita demand 
has meant that water needs have grown much more rapidly than population data alone 
would suggest.
Water supplies in urban areas are expected to deteriorate and, since sustaining a 
healthy urban economy requires substantial investments in water supply and sanitation,
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enormous strains have been placed on water resources. The growing pollution from 
sewage has also been associated with the increased use of water in urban areas (Bilen &
Uskay, 1991, 2.9).
Figure C1.2: 
Turkey: arable land use
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Source: Gulbahar, 1991, 531.
One of the most important concerns regarding population growth is how to ensure 
the present and future needs of all people in terms of food, fibre and so on. Opportunities 
have been made available to either increase the cropped area, increase yields from the 
same area or some combination of the two (Bilen & Uskay, 1991, 2.11; Richards & 
Waterhury, 1991, 141). According to Morvaridi (1990), two phases can be seen in 
Turkish land use policy as regards agriculture from 1950-1960, first mechanical 
innovation (e.g. the introduction of tractors) and secondly the expansion of arable land. 
Turkish agriculture underwent a major transformation in the 1950s as a result of state 
intervention and technical change supported by US aid and from 1960 biological 
innovation and the intensification of land use was introduced. The number of tractors in 
use increased from 1658 in 1948 reached 40,282 in 1955, and rose to 637,449 in 1987. 
In addition to mechanical innovation, the area under crop cultivation increased by 61 per 
cent between 1948 and I960 (Morvaridi, 1990, 306). A major response to the increasing 
food and fibre demand in Turkey, has been the expansion of irrigated agriculture 
sponsored largely by government agencies. In contrast to other developing countries, 
Turkish agriculture has undergone a complete land reform program, in which more than
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80 per cent of the farmers in Turkey own and work small farms of less than 10 ha. of 
land (Morvaridi, 1990, 304).
Because of the Mediterranean and semi - arid conditions, with a hot and dry 
summer, the critical growing period for most crops is during the months of June, July, 
and August and, during this period, most of the rivers carry base flow only. Water 
storage, therefore, is indispensable. At present 141 dams are in operation and 57 dams 
are under construction making about 70 per cent of major irrigation projects fed with 
water from reservoirs or lakes (Bilen & Uskay, 1991, 4.2)
The past two decades have seen a transformation in Turkish energy production. The 
Turkish government, realising the crucial importance of a sufficient energy supply for a 
sustained and balanced economic development, has given priority to the energy sector in 
its economic policies and adjustments particularly since 1980 (Bagis, 1989, 61). Turkey 
is steadily increasing its energy consumption, much of which must come from hydro­
carbon sources beyond its border. The present installed capacity of power is about 
16,488 MW of which 6,755 MW come from the hydro power plants and, in 1990, the 
total net consumption of electricity was about 46,770 GWh with a total gross generation 
of 57,800 GWh.
Table C13:
Electricity demand projection (base condition)
Years
]
Power
(MW)
Demand
Energy
(GWh)
Per Capita 
Consumption 
KWh / capita
1990 16488 57000 1017
1995 15005 92984 1472
2000 22435 139213 1978
Source: Bilen & Uskay, 1991,4.9
In order to balance the regional deficiencies 220 GWh of energy was imported in 
1990 and 917 GWh of energy was exported in the same year. In the early 1970’s, the 
high level of dependence on imported oil was a dominant factor in the pattern of energy 
consumption in Turkey. Following the oil shocks in the second half of the 1970's the 
government embarked on a programme of indigenous resource development, especially 
encouraging hydro-power and lignite schemes to reduce the burden of imported energy 
on the national economy (Bilen & Uskay, 1991, 4.7). In 1985, 24 per cent of public 
sector investments went to the energy sector making it also the second largest sector 
receiving foreign capital. In 1986 total reliable energy consumption in Turkey, including 
non-commercial energy, was 45 million tons petroleum equivalent (KPE). Over the 
1975-1985 period, total reliable energy consumption grew at an annual average rate of
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4.2 per cent and average energy consumption per capita rose from 703 kg (KPE) in 1975 
to 861 KPE in 1986. Energy consumption at home, including household and services, 
takes the major share of energy consumption although this fell from 39 per cent in 1975 
to 33.4 per cent in 1987 while the manufacturing sector steadily increased its share from 
23.3 per cent in 1975 to 25 per cent in 1986. The third sector in energy consumption is 
transportation and here it fell to 15.4 per cent in 1986 from 18.2 in 1975 (Bagis, 1989, 
61). Nearly 39 per cent of the energy consumed in the nation in 1983 was derived from 
imported petroleum and, when imports of coal and electricity are also considered, this 
makes for two - fifths of all the energy used in Turkey originating from foreign sources. 
Petroleum imports currently amount to some four billion dollars per year, an amount 
that equals approximately one third of total imports (Kolars, 1986, 53).
Figure C1.3:
Share of hydro power in energy sector-1990
Fuel oil 7 %
Hydro - power 
40%
Natural gas 1 8%
Source: Bilen & Uskay, 1991, 4.13
The share of hydro-sources has increased substantially from 30 per cent at the 
beginning of 1970's to more than 40 per cent of the total supply recently (see figure 
C l.3). In order to maintain this percentage, there needs to be an increase of about eight 
per cent per annum (Kolars, 1986, 53).
Turkey is petroleum poor but water rich. The nation receives about 509 billion m^ 
of precipitation annually, and 38 per cent of this (186 billion nP) ends up as surface
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runoff, much of which into the USSR, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and the surrounding seas. 
Turkish estimates indicate that only a little over half of this surface runoff (95 out of 185 
billion m^) and 9 billion m^ of groundwater can technically be used for domestic, 
irrigation, and industrial purposes within Turkey. The actual consumption of surface 
water is 25.2 billion m^ per year indicating that only 26.5 per cent of surface water 
development potential is consumed presently while the actual annual consumption of 
groundwater is 5.4 billion m^ (Bilen & Uskay, 1991, 1.3).
Driven by its need for new sources of energy and because only 20 per cent of the 
hydropower potential has been developed so far, Turkey has turned to the hydro - 
electric potential of its many rivers, the greatest of which is the Euphrates. With this end 
in mind Turkey has undertaken a gigantic development project on the river. The 
Southeast Anatolia Development Project (Turkish acronym: GAP). This project is 
intended not only to provide hydropower but also to earn foreign exchange for the 
country through the sale of agricultural products to be raised on over a million hectares 
of land irrigated with water drawn from the river (Kolars, 1990, 59). GAP's total 
hydroelectric generation capacity will increase the country's present total generation 
capacity by 70 per cent. (NewSpot, 28 June, 1990, 2). According to the fifth five year 
development plan (1985-89), Turkey estimated there would be a steady increase in its 
total need for water.
Table C1.4:
Turkey: total need for water (billion m^)
Utilization unit 1985 1990 1995 2000
Drinking & using 4.73 5.95 7.38 9.07
Irrigation 31.80 42.00 54.10 57.60
Industry 4.00 5.10 6.20 7.30
Total 40.53 53.05 67.68 73.97
Source: Turkey's fifth five year development plan, 1987, 188.
According to the table, there has been a steady increase in water demand in all 
consumption sectors for domestic, irrigation and industrial needs. The total additional 
consumption from 1985 to 2000 is expected to be 24 billion m^ - an increase of 70 per 
cent.
Turkey is in a position to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency and possibly have 
food surpluses to sell to the Middle-East and elsewhere. Agricultural products in 1991 
constituted a fifth of the total annual export volume of about $ U.S. 13 billion, and there 
were only minimal imports while the all-important wheat crop rose to around 16 million
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tons, leaving a large exportable surplus. The annual meat production total in 1991 was 
around 1.1 million tons, about half of which is exported, primarily to Middle Eastern 
markets (International Herald Tribune, 13 July 1992, 9).
The GAP is a massive, planned development program within the Turkish portions of 
the Euphrates and Tigris river basins which account for about 30 per cent of the 
country's total surface runoff making the GAP program the most ambitious development 
activity ever undertaken in Turkey. The area referred to as "South-eastern Anatolia" 
consists of six provinces corresponding to 9.5 per cent of the total area of Turkey and 
occupies the south-eastern part of Turkey bordering on Syria to the south and Iraq to the 
south-east. The project includes land along the border with Syria and on the plains 
between the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. The GAP, in turn, could provide water to 
irrigate 1,641,000 ha. (about 30 per cent of all possible irrigated land, as well as 43 per 
cent of projected hydropower from all such projects) (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 2 ,* GAP 
1990, Vol. 2, 2.2). The GAP will include dams, hydroelectric power plants, irrigation 
projects and an infrastructure supporting, not only agriculture, but other economic and 
social quality-of-life improvements - such as urban development, transportation, non­
farm employment opportunities, and improved education and health services. Given that 
the GAP will create economic, social and spatial changes once energy and irrigation 
schemes come on line, the Turkish Government views the project as a comprehensive 
"irrigated region development project" (Inan, March 1990, 4 ; Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 
19) The economic future of south-eastern Turkey, the future supply of energy to Turkey 
itself and the security of the national economy depend on the success of the GAP. If all 
goes according to plan, energy and agricultural output can be expected to take off as the 
GAP development project comes into its own during this decade.
Not only is Southeast Anatolia Turkey's poorest region, but it also contains the bulk 
of Turkey's Kurdish population, and has experienced cross-border terrorist attacks by 
militant Kurds from Iraq and Syria. Turkey hopes that this difficult political situation can 
be stabilized by improving the local standard of living (Briefing, 27 January 1992, 7 ; 
MEED, 13 October 1989,5).
C3.1 The GAP project
The south-eastern Anatolia project (GAP) region is defined as having jurisdiction over 
eight provinces: Adiyaman, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep, Mardin, Siirt, Sanliurfa, Simak and 
Batman. It occupies the south-eastern part of Turkey bordering on Syria to the south and 
Iraq to the south-east and, covers a land area of 75,000 km 2 corresponding to 9.5 per 
cent of the total national land area (see map C.l). Population growth rates in the GAP
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region have been consistently higher than those of Turkey for any five-year period since 
1945. Consequently the population of the region as a share of the total population has 
steadily increased from 7.0 per cent in 1945, to 8.5 per cent in 1985 and to 9.2 per cent 
according to the 1990 census (GAP, 1992, 4). All provinces of the region are considered 
to be areas of emigration, yet the average annual population growth over the past two 
decades has increased from 2.9 per cent, to 3.9 per cent which is higher than the national 
average of 2.4 per cent (Morvaridi, 1990,308 ; GAP, 1992,4).
The GAP region was classified as a less developed region in 1985 in Turkey and 
its per capita gross regional product was 47 per cent of the per capita gross domestic 
product of Turkey. 8.5 per cent of the Turkish population lives in the region, with about 
50 per cent living in urban areas, while the average population density is 58/km2, (below 
the national average of 65/km2) and the agricultural sector employs 70 per cent of the 
labour force (Morvaridi, 1990, 308). Although the GAP region is one of the 
underdeveloped parts of the country with a per capita gross product of only 47 per cent 
of the national average in 1985, the region has attained self-sufficiency in basic 
foodstuffs including wheat, meat and milk. The region is also a significant producer of 
several agricultural products, with a high share of the national production. According to 
the 1990 census 5.27 million inhabitants live there, so the region is not yet 
overpopulated, but it could reach 10 million when the consequences of the current 
investment come into being and room has to be found for Turkey's rapidly increasing 
population (GAP, 1990, Vol. 1,1).
Table C1.5:
Comparison of the GAP region and Turkey by selected indices (1985)
Index Unit Turkey GAP
Region
GAP 
Share (
Land Area km2 779,459 73,863 9.5
Total population 50,664,458 4,303,567 8.5
Population growth % p.a. 2.4 2.9 -
(1965-85)
Population density /km2 65 58 -
Urban population % to Total 53.0 49.9 -
Economic structure % in GDP/GRP
Agriculture 17.7 39.6 (9.0)
Manufacturing 25.2 11.7 (1.9)
Gross domestic product 109 TL 83,785,419 3,365,559 4.0
Per capita GDP/GRP 103 TL 1,822 862 (47)
Source: GAP, 1990, Vol. 1, 1
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The GAP project is the largest project yet carried out in Turkey. It is multi-purpose 
and integrates a development project comprising dams, hydroelectric power plants and 
irrigation facilities to be built on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. This gigantic project 
also includes investments for the development of agriculture, transportation, education, 
industry, health, as well as social, cultural and other sectors in the region (NewSpot, 19 
July 1988,5).
The GAP, a combination of 13 major projects primarily aimed at irrigation and 
hydropower generation, includes the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric power 
plants on the Euphrates and Tigris and their tributaries (GAP, 1992, 4). The area has a 
favourable environment for large scale intensive agriculture and irrigation will provide 
the region with an opportunity to utilize this agricultural potential to the full. Therefore a 
significant increase is expected in crop yields which will create a new basis for 
developing agro-industries and agricultural input - producing industries that depend 
largely on market opportunities (Inan, 1989,49).
C3.2 Basic characteristics of the GAP region
The Euphrates and Tigris river systems act as the source of life for the region and South­
east Anatolia is endowed with a large quantity of high quality water, although it is both 
unevenly distributed and neither fully nor efficiently used throughout the region.
The Sanliurfa and Mardin plains, situated in the centre of the region and extending 
between the Euphrates and Tigris basin, are drained by most of the small rivers in the 
region. Some of these rivers which flow along the Gaziantep plains also cross the Syrian 
border and ultimately merge with the Euphrates in Syrian territory (Bagis, 1989, 25).
The climate of the GAP region is of a continental nature, with dry hot summers and 
cold rainy winters. While the region reaches very high temperatures of around 45'°C 
during the summer season, the temperatures drop to around -13' to -24'°C in winter. The 
hottest areas of the region extend southwards towards Syria.
The mean annual rainfall over the region is relatively low compared to other regions 
of Turkey and ranges from 280 mm in the Southwest of Sanliurfa near the Syrian border 
to 1,300 mm in the foothills of the mountains which divide the Tigris river basin and the 
Murat river basin. The mean annual precipitation has been measured and found to be 660 
mm in the Euphrates river basin, 880 mm in the Tigris river basin and 490 mm in the 
other small river basins, but between June and September there is no rain. Dry farming 
techniques currently dominate the region with wheat being the major crop (Morvaridi, 
1990, 308).
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Figure C l.4:
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Another peculiar characteristic of South-eastern Anatolia's climate is the high 
degree of pan evaporation (see table C l.6) due to the high temperatures and a lengthy 
dry season with evaporation ranging from 2,400 mm near the Syrian boundary to 1,470 
mm at Gaziantep. This constitutes on obstacle to rainfed farming in the region and 
makes the need for irrigation urgent (Bagis, 1989, 30).
While the present agricultural production is limited to one harvest every two years, 
with irrigation and modem technology, the soil and climate can sustain two or three 
harvests annually (Tekeli, 1990, 208).
Table C1.6:
Annual pan evaporation in the GAP region
Station Annual pan evaporation (mm) Record length (years)
Diyarbakir 1,935 33
Gaziantep 1,466 15
Cizre 2,424 16
Sanliurfa 2,048 23
Ceylanpinar 1,834 14
Elazig 1,519 15
Source: GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, E4
C3.3 Current use of land
Almost half of the land (42.3 per cent) in the GAP region is presently devoted to 
agriculture and, of the total cultivated area, 36 per cent (or 262,870 ha.) is used for dry 
farming while irrigated farming accounts for only 4 per cent (or 12,070 ha.). The rest of 
the cultivated land is used for horticulture and various other purposes but intensive 
farming, which properly employs modem production techniques, is only sporadically 
practised in the region.
In addition to the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, the GAP region has quite a high 
ground water potential especially in the lowlands of Sanliurfa, Mardin and Diyarbakir 
(see table C l.7). Part of this ground water is used to provide domestic water to the cities 
but it is also used for small-scale irrigation purposes. The ground water potential of the 
region (estimated to be 1,526 million m^) represents 78 per cent of the total in the 
Sanliurfa province (Bagis, 1989, 45). There are areas in the region which have not yet 
been the subject of hydrogeological investigations, so proven ground water sources in 
the region may be greater. Crop cultivation covers 42 per cent of land with 85 per cent of
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this in dry fanning, 4 per cent under irrigation, and the remainder devoted to horticulture 
(Morvaridi, 1990, 308).
Table C1.7:
Ground water potential in the GAP region
Province Yield (million m^/ year)
Sanliurfa 1,202.0
Diyarbakir 190.0
Mardin 113.0
Gaziantep 15.0
Adiyaman 6.0
Siirt 0.0
Source: GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, E8
Although the region is sufficiently rich in water resources, the degree to which the water 
has been used for agricultural purposes is very low because the sources have not been 
developed.
C3.4 The economic structure of the region
Agriculture is the most widespread and dominant economic activity in the GAP region 
and its share in the regional economy is about 42 per cent. Although the agriculture uses 
backward technology and no irrigation, the region is a major grower of certain crops 
within the country. The agricultural sector is sensitive to climatic conditions because of 
its structure, lack of integration with the market and the absence of irrigation, modem 
inputs and advanced agricultural techniques - all which lead to low yields in agriculture.
Industry's share of the regional economy in 1985 was 17.5 per cent, mostly in 
manufacturing (75 per cent). The service sector has the largest share within the Regional 
Gross Product, with 43.9 per cent, mainly from two centres: Gaziantep and Diyarbakir.
An imbalance in the inter-regional distribution of economic activities characterizes 
the region which has a low share of the national economy relative to its physical and 
human conditions. The regional economy cannot break out of two major vicious circles: 
poverty characterised by the inability to save because of low income levels which results 
in the inability to invest and increase income levels (see figure C l.4); and a small market 
that is limited in its ability to sell the produce, (again because of low income levels), and 
in the limited possibilities for maintaining production or expanding the size of the 
market (Bagis, 1989, 110).
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C3.5 Development objectives and strategy
Analysis of the present conditions in the GAP region which deals with the resource base 
and constraints as well as the national economy and national development objectives has 
the following objectives and basic strategy for the region's development.
Overall development objectives
1. To raise income levels in the GAP region by improving the economic structure 
and narrowing the income disparity between this and other regions.
2. To increase productivity and employment opportunities in rural areas.
3. To enhance the assimilative capacity of larger cities in the region.
4. To contribute to the national objectives of sustained economic growth, export 
promotion and social stability by efficient utilization of the region's resources.
Agricultural development objectives
1. To raise income levels in rural areas by enhancing agricultural productivity and 
diversifying farming activities.
2. To provide sufficient inputs for agro-processing industries
3. To increase employment opportunities in order to minimize the drift of population 
out of the rural areas.
4. To contribute to the production of exportable surpluses.
Industrial development objectives
1. To serve, on the one hand, as a driving force for the economic development of the 
GAP region and, on the other hand, as a demand generator for education/training 
and technology development, in order to enhance the region's image, social welfare 
and the people's motivation.
2. To contribute to the reduction of inter-regional income disparity by expanding 
high income employment opportunities
3. To contribute to the national objectives of export promotion and foreign 
exchange earnings/savings (GAP, 1990, Vol. 1,4).
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C3.6 Projects for developing water resources in the GAP region
The Euphrates and Tigris basins have always been a focus of interest for basin planners 
as they constitute the most important part of the potential land and water resources of 
Turkey. Research studies in the Euphrates basin began in the early years of the republic 
and, in 1936, the Keban gauging station was built at a section near the axis of what is 
now the Keban Dam. This marked the beginning of one of the earliest hydrological 
observation activities in Turkey but the development planning for the region was 
delayed by World War II and the general Directorate of State Water Works (DSI) was 
only established in 1953.
According to Kolars & Mitchell (1991), the development of large hydroelectric 
projects has benefited from the fact that Suleyman Demirel, the premier and former 
chairman of the disbanded Justice Party, received his degree in hydrological engineering. 
He became the director of DSI in 1955 and earned the nickname the "King of Dams". 
Demirel became prime minister in 1965 and it was during his period that the plans for 
the GAP were prepared. During this same period, Turgut Ozal, destined to become prime 
minister in the 1980’s, finished graduate work in the United States in economics and 
engineering and returned to Turkey during the late 1950’s. At that time he directed 
studies of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and their hydroelectric potential. In the 
political campaigns of the mid-eighties, both Turgut Ozal and Suleyman Demirel were 
important in the development of the Keban Dam and the GAP region (Kolars & 
Mitchell, 1991, 25).
The GAP project implementation is expected to take 30-40 years. The status of the 
project varies from preliminary level through master plan, design plans, and construction 
with components already under way, and some operating.
The Keban Dam
The Keban Dam is a compacted rock-filled dam with a clay core whose reservoir 
holds 30,6 billion m^ and covers an area of 675 km2 (see photo 1). It is intended both to 
regulate the seasonal fluctuations of the river and generate power (see photo 1). During 
full production, the average annual amount of electricity generated is expected to be 
approximately 6 billion KWh (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 35). In 1966, the main contract 
for construction of the Keban Dam was signed between the Turkish government and SCI 
- Impreglio, a Franco-Italian consortium. The foundation of the dam was laid in 1966, 
while the reservoir was filled and power production began in 1974. Although the Keban 
Dam is an integral part of the overall Euphrates development scheme, and does not fall
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within GAP, it has a significant effect on the planning of water resources in the GAP 
region due to its huge storage capacity (GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, El 1).
With the completion of the Keban Dam and reservoir, the government announced 
that it had established river flow at a minimum of 450 m^ second and a maximum of
1,000 m^ second. Although the Keban Dam has consistently been referred to in Turkish 
publications as solely a hydroelectric generating facility a recent news release refers to a 
proposed "Kuzova Project” which will irrigate 30,000 hectares of land with water from 
the Keban reservoir (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 26).
The Euphrates basin development plan is shown in figure C l.5 in the form of seven
sub-projects.
1. The Lower Euphrates project
2. The Karakaya project
3. The Suruk-Baziki project
4. The Kahta-Adiyaman project
5. The Adiyaman-Goksu-Araban project
6. The Gaziantep project
7. The Frontier-Euphrates project
1. The Lower Euphrates project.
The Lower Euphrates project is the largest and the most comprehensive of all the 
GAP power generation projects. It is planned to be completed in several stages by the 
year 2002. The Ataturk Dam and Hydroelectric power plant currently under 
construction, is not only the largest individual project and most important unit of the 
GAP project, but also the most costly.
The Ataturk Dam
The Ataturk Dam, being built on the Euphrates proper, is located some 180 km 
downstream from Karakaya and 60 km to the Northwest of Sanliurfa. The dam, which is 
the key structure for the lower Euphrates development, is 184 metres high from the 
foundation and has a gross storage capacity of 48.7 million m^ (see photo 2). It is 
planned to have an active storage capacity of 19.3 million and the reservoir surface 
area will impound an 817 km 2 lake (GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, E l3). The dam site chosen is 
located where the Euphrates enters a limestone mountain pass. Since the dam is in an 
active seismic zone, the dam design is said to be able to withstand an earthquake of a
71
magnitude of 8 on the Richter scale - that is an earthquake of force that can be expected 
to occur once in 500 years (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 41).
Figure C1.5:
Euphrates river, main stream model
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The Ataturk Dam is important to the completion of the lower Euphrates project and 
even the entire GAP project, because it is the water source for the four irrigation projects 
in the 852,781 hectare area. This area represents slightly more than half of the total 
1,641,282 ha. to be irrigated when all the GAP project is completed but, the irrigation 
water requirements of the Suruk-Baziki and Adiyaman-Kahta projects will also be 
mainly met from the Ataturk dam. Thus, the total area to be irrigated from the Ataturk 
Dam will reach approximately 1,000,000 ha. (Bagis, 1989, 50).
The dam whose first two power unit turbines began operating in July 1992 will have 
a generating capacity of 2,400 MW from eight turbines, and will generate 8,100 GWh 
energy annually, but this will drop to 5,300 GWh when all the irrigation projects are 
complete. In addition, the Ataturk Dam, (by regulating the water flow throughout the 
year) will contribute to the hydroelectric power plants planned within the framework of 
the frontier Euphrates project. Part of the water in the Ataturk Dam reservoir will go to 
the Sanliurfa-Harran and Mardin-Ceylanpinar plants through the Sanliurfa tunnels under 
construction and small pumping irrigation projects are planned along the west bank of 
the reservoir (GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, E l3).
The impounding of the reservoir of the Ataturk Dam began in January 1990, and, in 
May 1991, the first of the eight units planned for the power plant was commissioned 
(Bagis, 1989, 51). It will still require two or three good years of heavy snows to fill the 
reservoir to the required maximum elevation of 542 meters but, at the height of 526 
meters, the twin Urfa tunnels come into operation.
The second important component of the lower Euphrates project, after the Ataturk 
Dam, is the Sanliurfa tunnel system through which the main canals of the irrigation area 
of the Sanliurfa-Harran plants and Mardin-Ceylanpinar flow along a system whose total 
length is 57.8 km. The output capacity of the tunnel totals 328 m3/sec, and consists of 
two lines of pressured water way of 7.62 meters inner diameter. The tunnel was 
completed in early 1993 (see photo 3). Water flowing through the tunnels will reach the 
forbear of the Sanliurfa power plant which is located on this canal and has a drop of 50 
meters; it will generate 124 GWh energy annually (GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, E l4).
The Sanliurfa-Harran irrigation area which is 141,500 ha. in size stretches from the 
low plains south of the city of Sanliurfa to the Syrian border. In addition to this surface 
water irrigation, a small-scale ground water irrigation system which irrigates an area of
13,000 ha. has already been established to the south of the low plains, near the Syrian 
border (see photo 4).
According to the GAP master plan, the Mardin-Ceylanpinar irrigation area of 
334,900 ha. will be completed in the year 2000. The Ceylanpinar ground water irrigation 
areas are located to the south of the surface irrigation projects and, in this area, 9,000 ha. 
of land is currently irrigated from wells. Thus it is estimated that a total of 60,000 ha. 
can be irrigated with ground water.
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Photo 1: Keban Dam (July 1992)
Photo 2: Ataturk Dam (July 1992)
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Map C .l:
Location of water resource development schemes in the GAP project
jaqiuv
Source: GAP, 1990, Vol. 2, 35
The Siverek-Hilvan pumping irrigation area, covering a total area of 160,105 ha., 
will be fed from the Ataturk Dam reservoir, seven pumping stations and 17 small 
reservoirs planned in the network system.
In the hilly terrain between the Hilvan and Bozova districts, the area to be irrigated 
is 69,702 ha. gross, but it is necessary to elevate water 260 m above the reservoir water 
level through six steps of pumping (GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, E l5). The irrigation will be 
carried out by raising water from the Ataturk Dam reservoir and, according to the GAP 
schedule, the Bozova irrigation scheme will be completed in 1995 (Bagis, 1989, 53).
2. The Karakaya Project
The Karakaya Dam is located about 166 km downstream from the Keban Dam, near 
Cungus in the Diyarbakir region. The Karakaya, with a planned 1,800 MW capacity 
from six 300 MW units, each was completed in late 1988 and will have an annual 
electricity generation of between 7.3 and 7.5 billion KWh (NewSpot, 4 March 1988, 5) .
The Karakaya, a concrete arch-type dam with a height of 187m (see photo 5). and a 
total reservoir volume of about 9,500 million m^ of water, will regulate the Euphrates 
runoff and supply an incremental firm yield of an estimated 1,000 million m^ a year 
when it is operated for power generation with a 41 per cent plant factor (GAP, 1990, Vol. 
4, E16). The Karakaya Dam is similar to the Keban Dam in that its dual purpose is to 
regulate stream flow and generate hydroelectric power.
3. The Suruk-Baziki Project
This large-scale irrigation project, consisting of various pumping stations, is designed to 
irrigate an area of 146,500 ha. located along the Euphrates river near the Ataturk dam, to 
the west of the Sanliurfa-Harran irrigation area, and extending towards the Syrian border 
in the form of low plains. The water is planned to be pumped from the Ataturk reservoir 
into three reservoirs (Tozluca, Aylan and Tasbasan) making 27 million of total active 
storage which are yet to be built (GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, E17). According to the GAP master 
plain, the project will be completed in the year 2000.
4. The Adiyaman-Kahta Project
The Adiyaman-Kahta project is a multipurpose project in the central and northern part of 
the Adiyaman province and aims to develop water resources on the right bank of the 
Ataturk Dam reservoir. The project consists of five irrigation schemes, four storage type 
hydropower plants and one run-of-river type hydropower plant.
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Photo 3: The Sanliurfa-Haran tunnel (July 1992)
Photo 4: The Sanliurfa-Haran irrigation area (July 1992)
M L'
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Photo 5: Karakaya Dam (July 1992)
Photo 6: Karkamish area near the Syrian border (July 1992)
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The total irrigation area will amount to 77,409 ha., of which 30,000 ha. will be irrigated 
from the Ataturk reservoir (Bagis, 1989, 55).
5. The Adiyaman-Goksu-Araban Project
This project will first cover the south-western part of the province of Adiyaman and the 
north-western part of the province of Gaziantep. The main purpose of the project is to 
supply water for irrigation to 71,598 ha. of land gross and municipal water to Gaziantep, 
but a run-of- river hydropower plant is also planned. The 112m high Cataltepe Dam, the 
key-structure of the project, will be built on the river Goksu, 7 km Northeast of Golbasi, 
and will create a reservoir of 627 million m^ of active storage capacity. Water from the 
reservoir will go to irrigation areas through 200 km length main feeder canals (Bagis, 
1989, 55). Two dams (Harmancik and Catabogazi) are planned on small tributaries of 
the Karasu river near Araban and will have a total active storage capacity of 420 million 
m3 (GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, E18).
6. The Gaziantep Project
This project is designed to supply irrigation water to a 89,000 ha area along the Syrian 
border to the south of the Gaziantep province by pumping from the Birecik Dam. Four 
dams are planned for small streams along the main feeder canal and, of these four dams, 
the already completed Hancagis Dam, with 83 million m^ of active storage capacity, is 
planned to cover 7,300 ha of irrigation area. The Gaziantep irrigation project envisaged 
to be completed in 1997, contains 400 km of main canals and nine large pumping 
stations (Bagis, 1989, 56).
7. The Frontier Euphrates Project
The Frontier Euphrates project is divided into two sub-projects comprising the Birecik 
Dam and HPP and the Karkamish Dam and HPP. The Birecik Dam, with 6 of the 112 
MW hydroelectric power stations, falls within the scope of the GAP project. The energy 
production will be affected by both the operation of the Ataturk dam for irrigation water 
supply and an irrigation development of the Adiyaman-Goksu-Araban planned in the 
tributaries upstream of the Birecik, as well as the Gaziantep project (GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, 
E16). The Birecik Dam which is planned to be built approximately 92 km downstream 
from the Ataturk Dam will have an active storage capacity of 972 million m^ and will 
supply a significant part of the water for the Gaziantep irrigation project which has been 
planned to take water mainly from the Birecik reservoir (Erimtan, March 1990, 21).
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The Karkamish Dam which will be located on the Euphrates river 33 km 
downstream from the Birecik site and 4.5 km upstream of the Syrian border (see photo 
6) is a single purpose project aimed at energy production. The future annual energy 
production for this dam is estimated to be 680 GWh but this will be reduced to 450 GWh 
when all the planned upstream irrigation projects are completed (GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, 
El 7).
The GAP, it is estimated, will cost about US$ 20 billion, and an additional US $ 11 
billion for the lower Euphrates project. Due to the international flow of the river, and no 
international agreement, it has not been possible for Turkey to secure international 
finance. However, determined to start GAP implementation, Turkey has awarded the 
construction contract for the Ataturk Dam to a Turkish constructor and has managed to 
fund the project from its own sources (Tekeli, 1990, 208).
Table C1.8: 
Main features of the South-eastern Anatolia Project (GAP)
Power
Irrigation generation Irrigation water 
Project area (ha) (MW) required (million m^)
1.Lower Euphrates Project 
Ataturk Dam and HPP 
Urfa Tunnel and HPP 
Urfa-Harran Irrigation
Mardin-Ceylappinar Irr.
1. First Stage Irr.
2. Second Stage Irr. 
Siverek-Hilvan Pumped Irr. 
Bozova Pumped Irr.
2.Karakaya Dam and 
HPP Project
3.Frontier Euphrates Project 
Birecik Dam and HPP 
Karkamish Dam and HPP
4.Suruc-Baziki Project
5. Adiyaman-Kahta Project 
HPP (5 Projects)
Irr. Projects (5 Projects)
6.Adiyaman-Goksu- 
Araban Project
7.Gaziantep Project 
TOTAL (1 to 7)
141,535
230,130
104,809
160,105
69,702
146,500
77,409
71,598
81,670
1,083,458
2,400
48
6
1,800
672
180
44
196
1,481
2302
1,049
1,428
622
5346
1,525
590
517
590
10,104
Source: Bagis, 1989, 52
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C4. Modern irrigation development projects in Syria
Until 1918 the area within the present frontiers of Syria was part of the Ottoman empire 
and was governed from Istanbul, as were the areas we know as Iraq, Jordan, Israel and 
Lebanon. The Turks lost all of these territories because of the defeat in the First World 
War. As a result of the Sykes - Picot agreement, Syria became a French sphere of 
influence and, until 1946, France ruled Syria as the responsible mandatory power 
creating the modem Syrian economy. Although economic and social development was 
not rapid during the French mandatory period, it was far from negligible; internal 
security was imposed, roads were built and education and health services improved. Few 
modem industrial plants were built, but a start was made on irrigation projects and a 
gradually increasing area of land was cultivated (Lewis, 1987, 7).
Syria covers an area of 185,180 km2, of which about nearly half is poor steppe or 
semi-arid land, with 30 per cent agricultural land, and only 9 per cent of the agricultural 
land is irrigated. Potential irrigable land is about 1.6 million hectares with the greatest 
potential located in the Khabur - (85,000 hectares), and the Euphrates projects - (640,000 
hectares) (Mitchell, 1982, 4). The uncultivated land provided some of the fodder 
required by Syria's several million sheep and farming of all kinds (including sheep 
rearing) contributed a larger proportion of the gross national product supporting more 
people than any other activity. The report of the United Nation Economic Survey for the 
Middle East in the year 1949 claimed that more than two - thirds of Syria's entire 
population derived their source of livelihood directly from the cultivation of the land, 
whilst its raw products were the source upon which a large proportion of the remaining 
population subsisted (UnitedNation, 1949, 22).
Syria is usually divided into five regions: the Mediterranean coast and mountains in 
the Northwest; the central plains, which extend from Horns north to Aleppo and then 
east to the Euphrates river; the south-western area around Damascus; the north-eastern 
plains along and beyond the Euphrates; and the desert region.
The main areas of cultivation are a narrow strip of land along the coast, from the 
Lebanese to the Turkish frontiers, which enjoys a Mediterranean climate, is exceedingly 
fertile and produces fruit, olives, tobacco and cotton. East of this strip lays the northward 
extension of the Lebanese range of mountains, which falls sharply on the east to the 
Orontes river valley whose marshes have been reclaimed to form part of Syria's most 
fertile areas. In central Syria this valley joins the steppe - plain, about 150 km wide, 
which runs from the Jordanian borders north - eastward towards the Euphrates valley.
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The plain is traditionally Syria’s major agricultural area, with cereals as the principal 
crops. In this region one also finds the country’s main cities: Damascus, Horns, Hama 
and Aleppo. This area may be termed the core of the nation since it contains nearly half 
of the total population. The importance of this plain is now being challenged by a fourth 
area, the Gezira, which lies between the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. Although fertile 
lands along the banks of the Euphrates and its tributaries have previously been 
cultivated, the Gezira’s value was only recognized in the early 1950s when large - scale 
cotton cultivation was introduced in former pasture lands. The Damascus - Southwest 
region, separated from the core by the northern fringes of the Anti - Lebanon mountains, 
has a more varied landscape and contains about 27 per cent of the total population 
(Taylor, 1972,151-153).
The most significant changes in the geographic distribution of the population have 
occurred as a result of urbanization. Although the distribution of the population may not 
have changed greatly at the province level, within provinces there has been a significant 
redistribution of people with a continuing movement from village to town. In 1960 about 
37 per cent of the population was classified as urban but, by 1985, the proportion had 
risen to 49 per cent (Drysdale, 1987, 73). The urban population increased at an annual 
rate of 5.5 per cent in 1980 - 1985, compared with 4.5 per cent in 1965 - 1980 with the 
fastest rates of urban growth in some of the least urbanized provinces. The process of 
urbanization has put a strain on services in the cities and has led to the growth of shanty 
towns along the edges of large urban centres such as Damascus and Aleppo. The 
population of Damascus trebled between 1950 and 1975 and, since then, has increased 
by another 50 per cent. This growth is fuelled by a continuing influx of people from the 
country side which cannot possibly support its own rapidly growing population (Lewis, 
1987,15). The most dramatic urbanization occurred in the Al-Raqqa province which was 
eight per cent urban in 1960 but 39 per cent in 1981. This growth is a result of the 
Euphrates dam and related irrigation and agricultural projects.
Agriculture retains its position as the mainstay of the Syrian economy despite the 
existence of a traditionally strong trading sector and partially successful attempts at 
industrialization. In 1984 the agricultural sector employed 25.4 per cent of a total labour 
force of 2,246,300 compared with 31.8 per cent in 1979 and 50 per cent in 1975, while 
manufacturing employed 15 per cent in 1984, compared with 15.6 per cent in 1979 and
11.5 per cent in 1975. Services employed 24 per cent in 1984 compared with 19.4 per 
cent in 1979; building and construction employed 16.3 per cent (compared with 13.7 per 
cent); and trade and catering employed 11.3 per cent (compared with 10.2 per cent).
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Table C4.1:
Syria: sectoral distribution of the labor force, 1950-1980 (%)
1950 1960 1970 1980
Agriculture 58 54 51 32
Industry 18 19 21 32
Services 24 27 28 36
Source: Richards & Waterbury, 1990,74
Irrigation is the only strategy which can make agriculture secure in dry countries 
such as Syria. Yields from irrigated land can be five times those on rainfed tracts, and a 
secure water supply enables more flexibility in cropping as well as enabling an effective 
high input and high output system of farming (Allan, 1987, 28). Because of its heavy 
dependence on rainfall, the agricultural output of Syria was considerably affected by 
adverse weather conditions during several years in the 1970s and by a prolonged drought 
from 1982 to 1985. As Syria's principal crop, and one which is cultivated mostly on a 
rainfed basis, cereals suffered particularly seriously from inadequate rainfalls (Meyer, 
1987, 44). This is the main reason why the expansion of irrigated areas to reduce 
dependence upon rain - fed cultivation has been the stated goal of successive Syrian 
governments since the 1940s.
Table C4.2: 
Syria: land use: 1963-1990 (thousand of ha.)
1963-66 1975 1980 1985 1990
Forest 465 445 466 516 723
Steppe and pasture 5,803 8,631 8,378 8,328 7,869
Uncultivable 3,470 3,487 3,520 3,547 3,777
Cultivable 8,780 5,955 6,154 6,127 6,149
Uncultivated 2,261 479 470 504 523
Cultivated 6,519 5,476 5,684 5,623 5,626
Fallow 3,143 1,776 1,791 1,653 160
Rain-fed 2,826 3,184 3,354 3,318 4,773
Irrigated 550 516 539 652 693
Total 18,518 18,158 18,158 18,158 18,518
Sources: Manners & Nejad, 1985, 265 ; Syrian Arab Republic, 1991,6/4.
The final report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission provides some 
insight into the structure of the Syrian economy at the end of the 1940s. According to the 
report about 90 per cent of the cropping in that period was rain-fed and only very limited
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action had been taken to develop the water resources of Syria for irrigation purposes. 
The irrigation area was estimated at about 280,000 hectares or one-eighth of the land 
under cultivation. Most of the water was derived from river supplies while wells and 
springs made only a small contribution (UnitedNation, 1949, 22). The 1950s and 1960s 
saw a considerable increase in irrigated farming (table C4.3) with the greatest change 
during this period occurring along the Euphrates where the use of river pumps enabled 
large areas of land to be brought under irrigation. For the first time in 1955, the irrigated 
area in Syria probably amounted to around 400,000 hectares approximately 250,000 
hectares of which were believed to have been irrigated by pumping and the balance by 
gravity flow from rivers, springs and underground qanats (Manners & Nejad, 1985, 
259). By 1990 the irrigation area in Syria amounted to about 693,000 hectares, and 
approximately 559,000 hectares were probably being irrigated by pumping (Syrian Arab 
Republic, 1990, 8/4).
Table C4.3
Syria: irrigation area by source of water, 1955-1990 (hectares)
Pump irrigation 1955 1963 1980 1985 1990
River pumps 393,700 186,000 204300 216,900
Groundwater wells 158,100 237,700 250300 342,000
Total 250,000 551,800 423,700 454,600 558,900
Gravity flow
Water Wheels 8,100 1,200
Diversion from
rivers, springs 111,300 114,100
Total 150,000 119,400 115,300 119,300 134,100
Total 400,000 671,200 539,000 651,900 693,000
Sources: Manners & Nejad, 1985, 259 ; Syrian Arab Republic, 1991, 8/4.
According the figures in table C4.3, there was actually a net loss of irrigated land 
from the early 1960s until the 1990s. This decline is variously attributed to inundation, 
water logging, salinization, and the impact of the land reform program which set a 
ceiling on the ownership of irrigated land. Since the mid 1980s, there has been a new 
expansion of irrigated land but, according to Meyer (1987), more than 30,000 hectares of 
old irrigated land were flooded in the reservoir area between 1973 and 1975, and some
4,000 hectares went out of production every year because of increasing salinity in the 
Lower Euphrates valley (Meyer, 1987, 44).
In 1955, only 48,000 hectares of land were covered by government irrigation 
schemes and, within the next 15 years, around 140,000 hectares were reportedly irrigated
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by government schemes. Particular importance was placed upon the Ghab reclamation 
project which transformed an area of marsh and swampland in the Orontes valley into 
some of the most productive farmland in Syria. With the completion of the Ghab project 
in 1968, attention was turned to making fuller use of the Euphrates and its tributary the 
Khabur (Manners & Najed, 1985, 261).
Syria suffers from a shortage of agricultural products, which forces the authorities 
to increase imports of food products from foreign markets and in 1988, for example, 
food made up about 71 per cent of the country's overall imports (Syrie & Monde Arabe, 
1988, No. 408, 1). This situation was caused by a sharp growth in population and it is 
predicted that the demand for food will increase by 3.1 per cent annually, a figure that is 
higher than the annual rate of actual increase in food production, which amounted in the 
past two decades to 2.8 per cent. Thus food security has become one of the most 
important elements for the progress and development of Syria.
After a directive from President Hafez Al-Assad in February 1986, Syria began to 
pay special attention to agriculture and the livestock sector with the aim of achieving 
self- sufficiency, abundant production for export and, consequently, achieving food 
sufficiency at the regional level (Syria & Monde Arabe, 1988, No. 408, 2).
Syria has the potential to feed its increasing population and even export basic food 
staples such as wheat and barley, but over the last thirty years, the picture in the 
agricultural sector, despite the bright prospects, has been one of stagnation. Some of the 
blame for this can be levelled at the adverse climatic conditions that have occurred from 
time to time, but the problem is also political (Mitchell, 1982, 22). Industry became the 
country's main priority in the fourth five year plan and, with the rush of agricultural 
workers from the land, small farmers turned to cash crops such as water melons, sugar 
beet and pistachio nuts. This trend was reversed for the fifth five year plan (1981-1985), 
which has given agriculture a high priority (The Middle East, 1984, 28). According to 
Syrian statistics the success of the Syrian fifth five year plan reached almost 75 per cent 
for total production and around 60 per cent for agriculture and industry (Syria & Monde 
Arabe, 1988, No. 409, 3).
With population rising at a rate of well over three per cent per year for several 
decades and with changes and improvements in domestic food consumption taking 
place, at the same time the need to increase food output has been inescapable. As a result 
policies to improve land, as well as the rural infrastructure and rural institutions 
associated with agricultural production, have been a basic element in national policy and 
planning for almost three decades. An increase in production is immediately required to 
meet the national demand for grain which has resulted from the rapid rise in population. 
Additional pressure has been the steady increase in demand for livestock products
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(Allan, 1987a, 22). According to Syrian officials, in 1991 the total amount of water for 
irrigation in Syria was 10.6 billion m3 while domestic and industrial water was 2.5 
billion m^. The Syrian experts believe that, because of the annual growth and further 
demands by industry and agriculture, by the year 2,000 Syria could suffer from a 
shortage of water (CICH, 6 November 1991,4).
C4.1 Surface water flows in Syria
The total annual surface water resources are estimated at 33.7 billion m3> of which 27.4 
billion m3 come from the flow of the Euphrates river and 4.1 billion m3 from the flow of 
springs that feed a number of rivers during the year.
Table C4.4:
Flow rates of Syrian rivers
Rivers Minimum
m3/sec
Maximum
m^/sec
Average
m3/sec
Average
bil/m3/vr.
Euphrates 250.0 5200.0 830.0 27.40
Sajour 0.5 25.0 3.1 0.08
Balikh 5.0 12.0 6.0 0.19
Khabur 0.0 421.0 35.0 1.78
Orontes 7.0 12.4 10.1 0.32
Afrin 1.4 15.7 8.6 0.27
Queiq 0.0 7.8 0.3 0.01
Alkabir 0.2 6.4 2.3 0.07
Sinn 7.0 21.0 4.0 0.44
Barada 5.0 25.0 7.0 0.22
Awaj 0.4 20.6 1.9 0.06
Yarmouk 7.0 100.0 15.0 0.22
A1 Kabir 0.7 37.0 5.6 0.17
Banyas 0.5 11.8 1.6 0.05
Sybarani
Total
0.2 7.9 1.6 0.00
31.4
Sources: Syrian Arab Republic, 1986,40 ; Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 108 ; 
Wolf art, 1967,229.
Syria, as the second riparian user of the Euphrates river, contributes water to the 
system and also extracts large amounts of water from it. According to table C4.4 the 
total annual flow of the Euphrates in Syria before reaching the Iraqi border is about 31.4 
billion m3; and the volume of the Euphrates main stream, before reaching the Turkish - 
Syrian border at Karkamish is about 27,4 billion m3. The next measure of annual stream 
flow (80 million m3) is from the Sajur, which rises in Turkey and enters the Euphrates a
86
short distance (48 km) inside Syria on the right bank. The Balikh is the next tributary 
which enters on the left bank and receives the bulk of its water from the Ain-Arous in 
Syria, near the Turkish border. In Syria this river is heavily utilized for irrigation, along 
its 116 km length. The final contribution to the flow of the Euphrates comes from the 
Khabur river system, which joins the mainstream 40 km downstream from Deir ez-Zor. 
The length of the Khabur in Syria is 442 km and the natural flow of the stream is about 
1,780 million m3/yr. The total annual water added to the Euphrates in Syria is about 2 
billion m3 (Kolars & Mitchell, 7997,110).
Water storage in Syria
According to table C4.5 the storage capacity of the present water projects of the 
Euphrates river in Syria is about 13.8 billion m3. with the Tabqa dam having a capacity 
of 11.6 billion m3. and all other dams having a total capacity of about 2.2 billion m3.
Table C4.5:
Dams in the Euphrates river basin in Syria
Dam / project name Storage capacity Reservoir area
Tabqa (800 MW) 11,600 Mm3 625 km2
Tishreen (1.6 MW) 1,300 Mm3 70 km2
Ba'ath (64 MW) 90 Mm3 2.7 km2
Western Hasakah (12 MW) 73 Mm3 1,020 ha.
Eastern Hasakah 200 Mm3 3,100 ha.
Khabur (8 MW) 540 Mm3 9,580 ha.
Sources: Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 153; Al-Tawara, 21 January 1991,3
According to report of The Arab Economist in 1982, The Syrian Ministry of Public 
Works and Water Resources introduced a policy that aimed at setting up an extensive 
network of small to medium sized, low cost surface dams throughout the country. These 
dams collect rainwater during the winter, forming small lakes from which water is drawn 
during the dry summer months. The surface dams vary in storage capacity from 700,000 
m^ of water to more than 25 million m3 and are mainly used to supply water for 
agricultural purposes, such as irrigating crops watering livestock and, to a lesser extent, 
as a supply of water for human use in some of the more isolated rural villages. Up until 
1982, seventy one surface dams had been constructed with a total storage capacity of 
about 200 million m^ of water, most of them located in the regions of Al-Badia and the 
coast; but another thirteen dams with a total storage capacity of 130 million m3 were 
still yet to be built. Surface dams are also desirable because they are relatively simple to
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build and do not require the large injections of capital and labour that large capacity 
dams do (The Arab Economist, 1982, 20).
Ground water is available in the main water - bearing formations. In descending 
importance these formations are: the carbonate rocks dating back to the Jurassic and 
Cretaceous times; the marine limestone rocks dating back to the Palaeocene and 
Miocene times; and the basalt rocks. The annual replenishment is estimated at 1,625 
billion m3, through pumped wells, and is found primarily on the coastal strip, the lower 
plains and the internal plains of the west and the Northeast (Baasiri, 1990, 22). Perhaps 
the most serious problems involve groundwater development. Prior to 1950 the water of 
the Euphrates was little used and traditional lifts, often camel powered, brought what 
little water reached fields along the river's banks. Following independence, however, 
speculation in cotton by Syrian merchants led to a rapid increase in the number of 
gasoline pumps drawing water from the river (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 144). The 
number of pumps used for agricultural purposes has continued to increase, rising from 
about 21,000 in 1963 to more than 47,000 in 1980, and more than 73,000 in 1985 
(Syrian Arab Republic, 1986, 181). A serious overdraft situation now exists in several 
parts of the country, notably in the vicinity of Damascus and Aleppo and in the Orontes 
basin (Manners & Nejad, 1985, 263). According to Allan (1987), by 1975, the area 
irrigated from groundwater exceeded that fed by water pumped from rivers and by 1984, 
groundwater was commanding an area just a little less than the total fed from surface 
flows, both gravity and pump fed. The complete picture of the potential of the ground 
water resources in Syria is still unclear, although the pumping rate in some aquifers has 
reached the critical limit, as is the case in the basins of Damascus, Al-Assi, Aleppo and 
the Central Euphrates. Certainly the rates of increase for this type of irrigation in the 
1970s and 1980s will not be sustained in the future (Allan, 1987a, 31 ; Baasiri, 1990, 
22 ).
Although, today, the Euphrates accounts for around 85 per cent of the nation's 
surface water resources, in the 1960s probably less than one fifth of the country's 
irrigated area was located within its basin. Horizontal expansion is probably the one area 
of greatest potential for irrigation. The Euphrates and Khabur projects will carry 
cultivation into areas formerly too dry to be economically viable, but, combined with 
this, there is the effect of irrigation on vertical production expansion. Certain varieties of 
wheat yield twice as much under irrigation as under rainfed conditions, and cotton yields 
on irrigated land is 4.6 times higher than on rainfed land. Horizontal expansion together 
with vertical expansion, as the result of not only irrigation but also a variety of other 
factors, hold the key to Syrian future agricultural prosperity (Mitchell, 1982, 22). After 
being the subject of repeated engineering studies, financial and technical assistance was 
finally secured from the USSR for a large-scale, multi-purpose project involving hydro­
electric power generation and irrigation. This was an important economic contribution to 
a country poor in energy resources. It was hoped to increase agricultural production and 
productivity dramatically in the Northeast through land reclamation and extended 
irrigation. The plan was to reclaim an area officially estimated at 640,000 hectares of 
irrigation and the scheme would not only double Syria's total irrigated area by the end of 
the century, but would also eliminate the uncontrolled flooding of the Euphrates 
(Manners & Nejad, 1985, 261 ; Rabo, 1986, 32). The Syrian authorities pinned great 
hopes on the Euphrates Dam project, not only from an economic point of view but also 
because they believed that it would help to create a developed modem society, based on 
socialism rather than capitalism. The project was also expected to help create a new class 
of skilled manpower and personnel who would ultimately be of great benefit to the 
country's development. This implied the establishment of new cities and towns, the 
provision of health services, education, communications and other social services to a 
rural area in order to provide a new focus of socio-economic activity and help counter 
the growing urbanization of the country (The Arab Economist, April 1978, 18 ; October 
1979).
Euphrates water is the key to any significant transformation of the Syrian 
agricultural sector. The central element in the Euphrates project is the Tabqa Dam, a 
large earth fill structure, sixty metres high and four and a half kilometres long. It retains 
a lake of 630 km2 which is 80 by 8 km in area at its greatest extent. Begun in 1968, the 
dam was finally completed in 1973 at which time Lake Assad, with an ultimate storage 
capacity of 11.6 billion m^ (of which 7.4 billion will be live storage) began to fill.
C4.2 The Euphrates project
Syria's Euphrates basin, chiefly in the two provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez Zor, is part of 
the country's vast, but under-populated and underdeveloped, eastern hinterland. For 
centuries, with the collapse of strong government and irrigation, the region had become 
de-populated, a trend which has only really been reversed since independence. In 1970, 
only 8.3 per cent of the population and 16.7 per cent of the cultivated land were located 
in these arid provinces where cultivation is almost entirely irrigation dependent and the 
growing of cotton along the river is the main source of income. The dry expanses are 
given over to sheep husbandry and, mostly in Raqqa, some precarious and extensive 
grain cultivation. The population in 1975 was 73 per cent rural compared to the national 
average of 54 per cent and illiteracy was much higher-57 per cent for males compared to 
32 per cent nationally (Hinnebusch, 1989, 233).
A major dam on the Euphrates was envisaged as early as 1927 by the French, but it 
was not constructed. Shortly after independence in 1946 , Sir Alexander Gibbs and Co. 
conducted a preliminary study for a dam near Yusuf Pasha which would have irrigated
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100.000 ha. but nothing came of it. This effort was followed by a twelve - volume study 
made by the Soviets published in 1960. Next came a study by the West German 
government in 1961 and another by the Dutch consulting firm, NEDECO (also engaged 
on the Ghab project), in 1963-1964. The disruption of the U.A.R. and the breakdown of 
relations with the Germans in 1965 left the way open for Soviet participation in the 
building of the Tabqa Dam, which was officially inaugurated in July 1973 (Kolars & 
Mitchell, 1991, 145). The Soviet proposal originally spoke of some 850,000 ha. that 
could be irrigated with the waters of Lake Assad but this estimate was quickly 
downgraded by the Germans to 650,000 ha. and then slightly revised by the Syrians to
640.000 ha. In theory, 420,000 new hectares could be brought under irrigation, 150,000 
already irrigated along the river but threatened with salinity, were to be reclaimed, and a 
dam on the lower Khabur would add another 70,000 new hectares, for a total of 640,000 
ha. Besides the Euphrates valley itself these areas included the Balikh basin north of the 
river, the lower Khabur basin to the east, the Mayadin area on the south bank of the 
Euphrates near Iraq, the Rassafe basin south of the river near Raqqa, and the Meskene 
plain between Raqqa and Aleppo. The project was to double Syria's irrigated surface 
(Hinnebusch, 1989, 236). This total was made up from the six districts shown on map 
C.2 below as well as in table C4.6.
The Euphrates project has always had a high political priority. Not only is it the 
showcase of the Ba'ath development drive but, by having the dam-created lake named 
after himself, President Assad's personal prestige has been attached to it. 
Administratively, the project is overseen by the High Committee for the Euphrates 
headed by the prime minister. The Ministry of the Euphrates was specially created to 
carry out the project and was generously provided with the funds to attract the best 
personnel at exceptional salaries (by public sector standards) and at the expense of the 
traditional agricultural sector (Hinnebusch, 1989, 236).
C4.3 Physical background
The Euphrates river flows through some of most arid land in Syria and almost all its 600 
km length within Syria runs through areas below 300 mm rainfall per annum. The 
average rainfall at Raqqa on the Euphrates is 250 mm, at Deir ez Zor 170 mm, and at 
Abu Kemal, (on the Iraqi frontier), 130 mm. Outside the immediate alluvial flood plain 
of the river itself little cultivation has been possible, and pastoralism has been the 
traditional means of supporting the admittedly sparse population (Mitchell, 1982, 68).
The Euphrates river is Syria's most valuable surface water resource and the figures in 
table C4.4 show that the average flow of the Euphrates represents 85 per cent of the total 
flow of Syria's 15 main rivers.
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Table C4.6:
Areas studied for possible irrigation and irrigable areas (ha.)
Region Area studied Irrigable are;
1) Balikh basin 525,000 185,000
2) Euphrates valley 280,000 170,000
3) Lower Khabur 695,000 70,000
4) Ressefe basin 50,000 25,000
5) Meyadine plain 50,000 40,000
6) Meskeneh basin 410,000 155,000
Total 2,010,000 645,000
Source: Mitchell, 1982, 69 ; Rabo, 1986, 33.
Prior to the construction of the El Thawara dam (in Arabic - the revolution), the 
average annual flow of the river was estimated at 27.4 billion m3 (a figure lower by 
about 3 billion m-^  than the Turkish calculation). The Euphrates dam was supposed to 
regulate this flow, prevent winter floods, and provide irrigation water in summer and 
throughout the year to an area far larger than could be served by simple pump irrigation 
to the soils of the Euphrates basin which were readily usable for cultivation.
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However, the presence of gypsiferous soils, notably those of very high gypsum 
content in the lower Khabur basin, were the cause of a major debate in the early 1960s, 
in regard to the size of the new irrigated area in the Euphrates project. With its planned 
area officially estimated at 640,000 hectares of potential irrigated land, the scheme 
would double Syria’s total irrigated area of 516,000 ha. in 1975 - by the end of the 
century (Mitchell, 1982, 70).
A pioneer, or pilot, project was initiated in May 1973 on the left bank of the 
Euphrates 18 km from the Tabqa Dam in the Raid area. The purpose of this project was 
to resettle nearly 60,000 villagers who had been flooded out by Lake Assad. Fifteen 
villages were built to replace the 59 that had been abandoned along with the 31,231 ha. 
of irrigated land and 7,495 ha. of rain - fed land lost to reservoir flooding (Kolars & 
Mitchell, 1991, 145). The whole basin of the Balikh region included 185,000 ha. of 
irrigable land of which about 20,000 ha. were designated for the pilot project, a figure 
which was to increase to 38,700 ha. by the end of the third five-year plan in the pilot 
project. Today four main pumping station control the irrigation water supply which is 
distributed through a 2,400 km network of drainage and irrigation channels. Cropping 
experiments have produced a variety of results; wheat has yielded well and rice and 
cotton have both been grown on a large scale, but rice has been abandoned and cotton 
cut back (from 3,240 ha. to 1,648 ha.) to make way for government encouraged sugar 
beet. Maize, potatoes, sunflowers, sesame, and Soya beans are also grown, as well as 
alfalfa which is grown both for fodder and to enrich the soil (Mitchell, 1982, 71).
In 1985 Bulgaria agreed to build two dams in the north-east on the Khabur river. 
The project was designed to irrigate an eventual 40,000 ha. and included a canal linking 
the two dams (Fisher, 1991, 827).
The Meskeneh basin runs from Lake Assad to the northern industrial city of Aleppo. 
The basin, divided for project purposes into the East and West Meskeneh, had by the end 
of the 1970s only produced 4,000 of its 155,000 potential irrigable hectares. Up to the 
end of the 1970s these two tiny projects represented all that had been done to get the new 
lands of the Euphrates project into production (Mitchell, 1982, 73).
In May 1988 the first pump at the Al- Babiri Station started operating. This pump is 
the first of 14 principal pumps which pump water from Lake Assad to an area whose 
altitude is 86 meters higher than the lake. Each pump has a capacity to pump 6.5 m3/sec 
and water of the Euphrates flows into a 32 km canal that carries water to irrigate 3,600 
ha. of land in the valleys of West Maskanah. This land is a small part of the estimated
125,000 ha. which will eventually be irrigated by the Al-Babiri Station (.Al-Ba'ath, 18 
April, 1988).
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Photo 7: The Euphrates valley and Lake Assad (September 1975)
S ource:  Syria  A rab  R ep u b l i c ,  1985 ,  2 9
Photo 8: The Euphrates valley and Lake Assad (1980)
Source:  111 ustrert B i b e l l e k s ik o n ,  1990.  M S - 16
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C4.4 Revision of proposed irrigation goals
The plan for the project as a whole is to reclaim and irrigate approximately 640,000 ha. 
by the year 2000, but the execution of the project has fallen behind schedule. The 
Euphrates Basin soils in Syria are in large part gypsiferous, crusty, prone to erosion, and 
suitable only for careful applications of irrigation water. The canals leading to the 
pioneer project not only collapsed when water was channelled through them, but also 
lost 5 m3/sec of water into the ground. It has been estimated that 50 per cent of the 
irrigated land in Syria's Euphrates valley is affected by salinization, causing crop losses 
of up to 300 million US$ a year (The Middle East, 1984, 29). In 1984 it was reported 
that "cracks" had appeared in the Balikh canal because the gypsiferous soil on which it 
rests had been dissolved by leaks from the canal (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991,152). Salinity 
in the middle and lower Euphrates in the early eighties took 22,000 ha. of privately 
pumped, originally undrained areas out of cultivation, cut production in half in 35,000 
ha. more, and threatened a 3,000 ha. annual further loss. In addition ground water 
pumped for a irrigated cotton up river (in West Meskene) was exhausted (Hinnebusch, 
1989, 236). A report from 1980 noted that less than half of the 640,000 ha. was 
reasonably good for irrigation purposes and suggested a goal of 240,000 ha., but by 1978 
only 7,400 ha. had been prepared. To these figures should be added the lands of the 
upper Khabur basin, which were also to receive irrigation water and which, although 
originally estimated at 400,000 ha., only 137.000 irrigated (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 
152). According to Hinnebusch (1989), the Balikh basin had been slated to be reclaimed 
first, but all but 28 per cent of it may be too high in gypsum and a fifth of the 20,000 
reclaimed ha. in the pilot project are reported to be too gypsiferous for use. By 1980, 
projections for East Meskene had scaled the potential irrigable surface back from 33,000 
to 18,000 ha. West Meskene, where fertility is good, was then advanced in priority. The 
Rassafe area, three-fourths of the 40,000 ha. in Mayadin, and 45,000 of the 70,000 ha. in 
the lower Khabur area also look unpromising. Studies are being done of two promising 
basins north and south of Aleppo totalling 212,000 ha. which could compensate for the 
loss of potential areas further east (Hinnebusch, 1989, 240). According to Fisher, only 
about 60,000 ha. had been irrigated by 1984, and perhaps 300,000 ha. may be impossible 
to develop according to the original plans (Fisher, 1989, 780). According to Kolars & 
Mitchell (1991), the actual amount of land successfully brought into production by 1986 
was about 64,000 ha, and the total lands irrigated by Euphrates waters reached about
241,000 ha. by 1990 (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991,154-165).
In Satellite photos of the Euphrates valley and the Lake Assad area taken for 
purposes of comparison in 1975 (immediately after the Lake was filled) and 1980, one 
cannot see any significant changes in the amount of cultivated land despite the fact that
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one can see the more intensive version in 1980. This estimate matches tables C4.2-C4.3 
which show that only after 1980 was it possible to distinguish the extension of irrigated 
areas in the country (see photos 7 and 8).
C4.5 Electric power
Until recently Syria was petroleum poor, but since the mid-1980s oil production has 
almost tripled and it has been able to expand crude oil production to an average of
570,000 bpd in 1992 (MEI, 16 April, 1993). Electricity has been one of the key areas of 
Syria's under - investment during the past two decades and efforts are under way to 
exploit natural gas as a local source of energy for power stations and industry. The 
increase in the generation of electricity is regarded as the key to much of Syria's future 
industrial development. After the completion of the Euphrates dam at Tabqa and the 
installation of eight 100 megawatt turbines in 1977 this problem seemed to have been 
solved for many years to come. The hydro-electric power station at Lake Assad was 
expected to generate about 80 per cent of the country's electric power, but just six years 
later, the high expectations were badly frustrated. The energy produced by the Tabqa 
power station dropped from 2,500 million KWh per annum to less than 1,500 million 
KWh.
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In 1983, and during the following years, the turbines could work at only 30-40 per 
cent capacity due to a lack of rainfall, Turkey's increased use of the upper waters of the 
Euphrates and the absence of Russian maintenance. The result is that, in 1993, the 
operating capacity of the dam was barely 150 MW with a further 75 MW of operating 
hydroelectric capacity coming from the nearby Al-Baath dam (MEED, 4 June 1993, 2). 
As more villages received electricity, more Syrians bought air-conditioners and other 
electrical consumer goods, and more industrial establishments switched to modem 
energy consuming machinery creating a serious power shortage. The Euphrates dam was 
operating well below capacity, the thermal power supply was insufficient to bridge the 
gap, and the difference between supply and demand continued to grow even more, so 
that daily power cuts were extended to four hours from 1986 on wards (Meyer, 1987, 
49).
As a result, Syria started to developed thermal power stations to reduce the 
importance of the Tabqa hydro - power station and, in 1985, hydro - power generation 
was reduced to 40 per cent of the total production (Maury, 1983, 322). In the year 2000, 
Syria's operating capacity will reach 5,000 MW (compared to 2,500 MW in 1993) and, 
as a result, hydroelectric power will be less than 18 per cent of the total production 
(MEED, 4 June 1993, 3). It is expected that hydro - power as a form of energy supply 
will continue to become less important during the next century.
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C5. Modern irrigation development projects in Iraq
C5.1 Physical features
Iraq, like Syria, was part of the Ottoman Empire, until World War I. An old name of 
Iraq, Mesopotamia, means the "Land between the rivers" indicates the main physical 
character of the country - the presence of the two river valleys of the Tigris and 
Euphrates, which merge in their lower courses. On the eastern side of this double valley 
the Zagros Mountains of Persia rise like wall, overhanging the river lowlands, 
particularly in the south, below Baghdad. North of the latitude of Baghdad the rise to the 
mountains is more gradual, with several intervening hill ranges. These ranges are fairly 
low and narrow at first, with separating lowlands, but towards the main Zagros 
mountains the topography becomes more imposing with summits over 3,000 m in height 
occur. This region, lying north and east of Baghdad, is the ancient land of Assyria ; and 
nowadays the hill ranges lying in the extreme east are called Iraqi Kurdistan, since many 
Kurdish tribes inhabit them.
On the western side of the river valley the land rises gradually to form the plateau 
which continues into Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and its maximum height in Iraq is 
about 1,000 m. In places it is possible to trace a cliff formation where a more resistant 
bed of rock stands out prominently, and from this the name of the country is said to have 
derived (Fisher, 1989, 452).
The heartland of Iraq lies in the fertile plains of the Tigris- Euphrates, where the 
abundant water supply provided by the two great rivers and the tributaries of the Tigris, 
together with the rich alluvial soils, permit intensive irrigated agriculture to be practised, 
particularly in the region between Baghdad-Fallujah and the Gulf coast (McLachlan, 
1976, 41).
The alluvial soils of the Mesopotamian Plain in Iraq are primarily a product of 
man's activity during the last six thousand years. They cover more than a third of the 
country, and are characterized by low elevation, below 100 metres, and poor natural 
drainage. Large areas are subject to widespread seasonal flooding, and there are 
extensive marshlands, some of which dry up in the summer to become salty wastelands. 
Most of this plain has been covered to a depth of several feet with sediments brought in 
suspension by irrigation water thus the soils are not pedologically developed in the usual 
sense. Beneath these sediments, which are the result of man's activity, lie thick layers of 
deposits not thus caused that are similar in composition, but which have usually 
somewhat coarser. It has been said (Clawson, 1971) that these deposits are as much as 
three kilometres thick.
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The alluvial soils have a consistently high (usually 20-30 per cent) content of 
calcium carbonate and a small percentage of gypsum; they are reasonably permeable 
both laterally and vertically and textures are generally fine silty, fine loamy, or fine 
clayey but near the rivers they are coarser than this (Clawson, 1971,18).
C5.2 The Population
The population of Iraq at the end of 1991 was estimated at 19.5 million. Iraq’s 
population growth rate has been high, reaching an annual average of 3.6 per cent during 
1980-1988. The World Bank projects that this rate will slow down to 3.4 per cent over 
the 1988-2000 period but the high fertility rate (6.3 in 1988) and a young population 
pyramid suggest that the rate of population growth will remain high (World Population 
Profile, 1991, A/5). The combination of the fertility of the Mesopotamian plain and the 
location there of the government in Baghdad has led to much more rapid population 
growth in this region than all others. There has been a general and accelerating trend for 
the people of the less prosperous regions to migrate to the lowlands and particularly to 
the major cities that are sited there. Baghdad and the govemorate around the capital 
accounted for more than 30 per cent of the population at the time of the 1987 census. An 
axis of dense population developed between Baghdad and Basra as a result of migration 
and natural growth, leaving all other areas of the country comparatively sparsely 
populated; however, the missile and artillery barrages against Basra during 1986 and 
1987 caused an exodus of population from Basra to safer areas of the country.
Table C5.1:
Iraq: religious groups (1987)
Population Per cent
Shia Muslims 8,801,000 53.5
Sunni Muslims 6,827,000 41.5
Christians 592,000 3.6
Yazidis & others 230,000 1.4
Total 16,450,000 100.0
Source: EIU, 1990,8.
Some 73 per cent of Iraq's population is resident in towns and the annual growth 
rate of the urban population was estimated to have averaged 4.8 per cent during 1980-88, 
according to World Bank data. The major towns are Baghdad, with an estimated 
population of 5.4 million in 1988, Basra with 1.4 million (during 1987 its population was 
reduced due to heavy Iranian shelling in the Iran/Iraq War), Mosul with 1 million and
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Kirkuk with 550,000. Migration to towns has eroded some of the ethnic, linguistic and 
religious differences between the various regions, although family, tribal, religious and 
cultural affiliations remain strong. The majority of Iraqis are Muslims (95 per cent), 
most of whom are non-orthodox Shia, (53.5 per cent of the total population) and 
orthodox Sunni (41.5 per cent), who are a clear minority despite their favoured political 
and social positions within the state (especially after excluding the Sunni Kurds). 
Christians make up 3.6 per cent of Iraqis, the Chaldeans being the most important, with 
3 per cent of the total population. Small numbers of Yazidis and Jews make up the 
remainder (see table C5.1 )(EIU, 1990, 8).
The ethnic balance in Iraq is a major complication in an already varied religious 
pattern. Arabs comprise the majority of the population with 73.5 per cent, though the 
Kurds at 21.6 per cent are an important component of the total. A variety of other ethnic 
groups gathered in Iraq during Ottoman times and were augmented by Persians who 
visited the Shia Muslim shrines of Karbala and Najaf, and often remained (see table 
C5.2) (EIU, 1990,1991, 9).
Table C5.2:
Iraq: ethnic groups (1987)
Population Per cent
Arabs 12,091,000 73.5
Kurds 3,553,000 21.6
Turkomens 395,000 2.4
Others 411,000 2.5
Total 16,450,000 100.0
Source: EIU, 1990-91,9
C5.3 The economy
The national economy of Iraq before independence was very weak, and almost all the 
population was employed in agriculture. After World War I, the advent of petroleum - 
powered irrigation pumps and other modem machinery began to change farming 
methods. Oil revenues grew in the 1930s and the government of Iraq began to spend 
increasing sums of money on economic development (Abbas, 1984, 111).
Iraq is a socialist economy in which the public sector plays a dominant role with 
responsibility for 85-90 per cent of the country's GNP and 95 per cent of imports. Private 
sector activity is relatively insignificant though surprisingly buoyant.
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The great resources of Iraq are its fertile soils, (in Northwest Al-Jezirah and in the 
river valleys in the Northwest and in the lowland) its water and oil. Iraq had an almost 
exclusively agricultural economy until expansion in manufacturing, service industries, 
and non-agricultural activities began in the 1950s. The successive governments have 
committed themselves to industrial growth and increasing income from oil production 
has enabled the Iraqi government to devote a considerable percentage of the national 
budget to industrial development and modernization of its agricultural base. Land- 
distribution reforms initiated in 1959, and amended by the 1970 agricultural act, co­
operative rural associations, and the decline of the landed aristocracy have contributed to 
improved agricultural productivity and to a more equitable distribution of income.
After the Iraq/Iran war, the most immediate task for Iraq was the rehabilitation of its 
oil industry, from which increased oil exports would bring the funds for reconstruction 
and economic development. The average annual rate of growth in GNP was reported by 
the World Bank at 4.4 per cent for the period 1965-1973, rising thereafter to 
approximately 10.5 per cent until the beginning of Iran/Iraq War. As a result of the 
Iran/Iraq war by 1980 a serious decline in the GDP had set in. In the latter half of the 
1980s Iraq's economy recorded erratic growth rates and 1987 and 1989 saw large 
increases in the nominal GDP largely due to a rise in oil output combined with a 
recovery of oil prices (EIU, 1990-91, 13). The cost of repairing the industrial plant alone 
was estimated at 16 billion $US (Fisher, 1989, 465), (these estimates were collected 
before the Gulf War).
C5.4 Natural resources
Iraq has been totally dependent for its recent development on the exploitation of its large 
oil resources since the early 1950s. In 1989, the most recent year for which figures are 
available, the oil sector accounted for more than 60 per cent of the GDP (see table C5.3).
Table C5.3:
Estimates of main origin of gross domestic product ( % )
1976 1980 1988 1989
Oil 59.7 63.0 60.5 61.3
Agriculture 8.4 7.0 6.3 5.1
Industry 7.8 5.0 10.4 11.6
Services 24.2 25.0 22.9 22.0
Source: EIU, 1990-91, 14.
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During the 1970s the engine of economic growth was the oil sector. After oil prices 
dropped in the early 1980s the share of GDP contributed by oil fluctuated but, by 1989, 
it was 61 per cent, close to its 1980 level. Agriculture registered low and erratic growth 
rates, while the contribution of the services sector has remained more or less constant 
during the 1980s. The industrial sector, on the other hand, has shown a steady increase, 
reflecting the importance given to military industries during the Iran/Iraq War, and the 
high political priority accorded to this sector.
Table C5.4: 
Real sectorial growth rates (%)
1986 1987 1988 1989
Agriculture -6.5 -8.1 2.8 1.7
Oil & mining 24.5 60.8 -4.0 27.0
Industry -7.0 11.2 -22.6 41.5
Services 11.0 -0.3 -20.7 20.9
Source: EIU, 1990-91, 14.
In the period between the Second World War and 1955, when oil exports rose 
sharply and oil revenues began to have an important impact on the economy, 
development was slow and inhibited by a shortage of funds particularly a lack of foreign 
exchange {EIU, 1980, 22).
Iraq has modest mineral deposits of iron ore, chromate, copper, lead, and zinc in the 
north while limestone, gypsum, phosphates, and sulphur are abundant. The most 
important single mineral, however, is oil, which is exploited in the north, Northeast, and 
the south. The petroleum and natural-gas industries support domestic and export-based 
refining and petrochemical industries. Iraq published a major upward revision of its oil 
reserves in 1987, which had the effect of increasing its estimate of proven reserves by 40 
per cent. In mid-1988 proven oil reserves were estimated at 100 billion barrels and 
probable reserves at 50 billion barrels. Iraq also estimated its proven reserves of gas at 
2,690 billion m^ in 1988, the great bulk of which is in the form of associated gas. On an 
energy equivalence basis, gas reserves represented 17.5 per cent of oil reserves in 1988, 
when Iraq’s oil reserves were 14 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves and 1.8 per 
cent of the world’s proven gas reserves (EIU, 1990-91, 23). With the increase in 
production of crude oil, production of associated gas has increased considerably in 
recent years but only 15 per cent of production is utilized, the rest being flared.
Oil production in 1978 is believed to have averaged some 2.6 million barrels a day, 
having risen fairly steadily from 1.9 million in 1973. In the first nine months of 1980,
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before the outbreak of the war with Iran, Iraq’s exports of petroleum averaged about 3.2 
million barrels per day, making it the world's second largest supplier of crude oil, 
(exceeded only by Saudi Arabia). Most oil was exported in the form of crude but there 
are some ten refineries in the country (Fisher, 1989, 467).
In the 1976-80 plan there was a clear redirection of the industrialization process 
towards heavy industry. Official policies were expressed as an amalgam of import 
substitution and diversification away from oil dependence. In fact, targets were more 
random and tended to enhance the role of petroleum in the economy by using oil and 
natural gas to add value or as a basic feed stock/energy supply.
The self-sufficiency drive included the setting up of leather works and plants to 
produce bread, alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, baby food and date products. There was 
also an expansion of capacity in the construction materials industries such as asbestos 
sheeting, pipes, glass and prefabricated buildings. Arrangements with foreign interests, 
(often Eastern bloc states), permitted the establishment of projects for light industry such 
as electrical goods, consumer durables and telephones.
The main push, however, was in the realm of heavy industry during the 1976-80 
plan period when an iron and steel industry was set up and projects were prepared for 
aluminium smelting and for ship repair and building. Not all were implemented - 
ostensibly for fear of an excess capacity of such industries throughout the Gulf and most 
resources were made available for the petrochemical industry (EIU, 1989-90, 27). The 
Gulf Crisis and Gulf War of 1990-1991 transformed the Iraqi economy and especially its 
petroleum economy. By 1994 Iraq's capacity to sell oil was still severely restricted by the 
international community. At the same time the price of crude oil on the international 
market remained low and in real terms below the prices before the 'oil-shocks' of the 
1970s. Other elements of the international embargo on Iraq's trade have added to the 
difficulties of developing its economy. The consequences of the 1991 Gulf War are 
discussed in more detail in section C5.9.
C5.5 Water resources
At the end of the 1960s Iraq's potential surface water resources were estimated at 2,679 
cubic metres per second, equivalent to 84,485 million m^/year (table C5.5).
The annual volume of flow in the upper stations both of the Tigris and Euphrates 
and the tributaries represent the potential surface water resources (table C5.6).
The discharge of the Euphrates and Tigris is almost entirely represented by water 
coming from abroad, while Iraq's most important future surface water resources are 
carried by the tributaries, and represent part of the total discharge originating in the
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country itself. Potential water resources have already been reduced (45 per cent in 1969) 
by diversions, water withdrawal and utilization to a considerable degree especially in the 
Mesopotamian Plain (Ubell, 1971,4).
Although the total area of arable land has only been slightly increased, the amount 
of water withdrawn has grown considerably. Annual groundwater production averages 
about 1.2 million m^ with a salt content of 500 - 3000 ppm (Gischler, 1979, 100).
Table C 5.5: 
Flow rates of Iraqi rivers
Perennial average discharge (m3/sec)
River and station 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1940-69
Euphrates at Hit 1,004 871 1,151 1,009
Tigris at Mosul 697 659 853 736
Khazir at Manaquba 30 28 30 30
Greater Zab at Eski Kelek 461 414 500 458
Lesser Zab at Altun Kupri 225 239 270 245
Adhaim at Injana 23 23 23 23
Diyala at discharge site 180 192 162 172
Total 2,679
Source: Ubell, 1971,4
Table C5.6:
Iraqi rivers: annual volume of flow
River
Euphrates at Hit 
Tigris at Mosul 
Tributaries of Tigris
Total
Cubic metres 
per second
1009
736
934
Million cubic 
metres per year
31820
23210
29455
12,679 84,485
Source: Ubell, 1971,3
C5.6 Hydroelectric power
Iraq water control is handicapped by its location since the usually flat terrain provides 
relatively few dam sites, and most of the drainage area of both the Tigris and Euphrates 
lies in other countries. Unfortunately the Euphrates only falls 166m along its entire 
course in Iraq, and so there are no ideal sites where large dams and associated reservoirs 
can be created (Beaumont, 1978, 38). Iraq, however, does use the river water to cool 
thermal power stations.
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The Tigris river constitutes Iraq's main sources of hydroelectric power, especially at 
the upper reaches of the river and its tributaries, where there are maximum bed slopes, 
but the water is limited, by the seasonal flow and the largely level valleys through which 
it flows. The Tigris tributaries that flow from the Zagros Mountains - the Little Zab and 
Diyala rivers - have been developed for power generation, as has the Tigris at Wadi 
Tharthar. The Kut barrage was the first hydro - electric structure built on the Tigris 
between 1937-1939 and the second was the Sammara dam in 1956. The Derbendi Khan 
dam on the Diyala river was bombed by the Iranians in 1988 while Mosul dam and the 
lower Mosul dam were built in 1989 (AMER, 1992, 52).
Electricity generation from the hydro stations situated in the dam schemes has 
developed slowly. Only the Tharthar scheme provides significant (84 MW) capacity, 
though there are plans for 1,300 MW of installed capacity by 1995, and the Haditha dam 
(1986) is expected to generate 660 MW (Ockerman & Samano, 1985, 194).
Figure C5.1:
Iraq: energy consumption 1981-1988 
(million tons coal equivalent)
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Source: EIU, 1991, No 2, 14
In 1984 electric power generation took up 6.6 per cent of the water used in Iraq, a 
proportion that is expected to continue rising for some time at the expense of water 
availability for irrigation (EIU, 1990-91, 22). The main conclusion from figure C 5.1 is
H  H ydroe lectric ity
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104
that the amount of hydro-electric power produced continues to represent a very low 
percentage of Iraq's total electricity production.
C5.7 Agricultural potential
The total area of Iraq is 43,750,000 ha, of which 11,800,000 ha. is arable. Of this area,
3.500.000 ha. are irrigated and 3,350,000 are rainfed on average each year. According to 
Fisher (1989), the total area under cultivation rose from 3.2 million ha. in 1984 to 3.6 
million ha. in 1985 (Fisher, 7989, 466). The total area of both forest and pasture is
1.800.000 ha., the irrigated land that is cultivated covers 1,560,000 ha., and the 
cultivated land in the rainfed area is 1,300,000 ha. (Hussain, 7990, 238). 20 million ha. 
are taken up by both the arid and barren areas of the western and southern deserts and 
the semi-desert of al-Jezirah in upper Mesopotamia.
Table C5.7:
Iraq: the total arable land in irrigated and rainfed areas
Agricultural land 
(by type)
Total arable land 
Irrigated land 
Cultivated (irrigated) 
Rainfed area 
Cultivated (rainfed) 
Forest pastures
Source: Hussain, 1990,238
Area
(thousands of hectares)
11,800
3,500
1,560
3,350
1300
1,800
Two types of agricultural activity predominate in Iraq one dependent upon rainfall 
in the north and the other dependent upon irrigation in the south. The rain zone which is 
watered by rain is also divided into two sub-zones: the mountain area which is located 
along both the Iraqi-Turkish and Iraqi-Iranian border, and the steppe zone (Al-A'ni, 1977 
422). The best known agricultural product, (and the largest source of foreign currency 
revenues after oil) is the date, of which Iraq is one of the world's largest producers. Other 
crops include barley, wheat, linseed, lentils, and beans, as well as rice, sesame, maize, 
and millet while cotton production is hampered by soil salinity. Total agricultural 
production was 13.9 million tons in 1985, compared with 13.1 million tons in 1984 
(Fisher, 1989, 466).
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A large land area, a small rural population and a generous endowment of water 
resources appears to offer the possibility of rapid and rewarding expansion in 
agriculture. According to Clawson (1971), under proper resource management, Iraq 
could offer the greatest opportunities in the region for agricultural growth (Clawson, 
1971, 52). The expansion of irrigation has contributed to serious drainage problems 
since the additional water, combined with the shallow gradient of the terrain from above 
Baghdad to the Gulf, has raised the water table and brought salts closer to the surface, 
affecting plant growth. Some observers believe that as much as 65 per cent of irrigated 
areas have had salinity problems and that 20 to 30 per cent of the irrigated land has been 
abandoned over the years because of it (Nyrop, 1979, 157 ; EIU, 1989-90, 21). In fact, 
however, despite its high agricultural potential, Iraq is not self-sufficient in food 
production and almost 25 per cent of all Iraqi imports were taken up by food in 1990 
(Hussain, 1990, 237). On the whole, Iraq is under-populated and could support a larger 
number of inhabitants. Many factors affect agricultural production directly and indirectly 
but one of the most important factors is the establishment of a long - term strategic plan 
for agricultural development and efficient land use. The Iraqi government in its 1976- 
1980 development plans, was anxious to free itself from both reliance on foreign food 
sources, and from the uncertain external, capitalist / imperialist, world in order to prevent 
food shortages which would be politically embarrassing and which would aggravate 
problems of inflation. Imports of agricultural goods were worth $ US 535.8 million in 
1978, of which cereal imports made up almost half (EIU, 1980, 56).
Self-sufficiency in food supplies, necessitating a 25 per cent increase in the area of 
land under cultivation, remains a high priority. However, the 1980s, saw a substantial 
increase in the volume of cereal imports, originally mainly from Australia, but 
subsequently from the USA as a result of generous financing arrangements. Total US 
agricultural exports to Iraq increased from $ US 528 million in 1987 to $ US 791 million 
in 1989. They were due to increase to $ US 900 million in 1990 but the UN trade 
embargo halted all shipments during the second half of the year. The bulk of this trade 
was wheat, flour, feed and fodder, but also included significant amounts of cotton, sugar 
and tobacco (EIU, 1989-90, 19). The country's food import bill, which reached $ US 
3,100 million in 1984, declined to $ US 2,712 million in 1986, although Iraq still 
imported large amounts of frozen chicken, meat and fish. The USA was a major 
agricultural supplier during this period, with its share of the market reaching 13 per cent 
in 1986 under a credit programme.
106
Table C5.8:
Iraq: agricultural imports (1000 tons)
1984 1985 1986 1989
Wheat 3,075 2,074 2,105 2,000
Wheat flour 300 370 347
Rice 510 550 525 500
Barley 541 130 20 ..
Com 352 245 320 320
Beef 240 159 170
Frozen poultry 107 73 59 ••
Source: EIU, 1990-91,20
The EEC supplied some $345 million worth of farm products in 1986, equivalent to 
a 12.7 per cent market share, compared with 16 per cent in 1984. Canada and Australia 
have always been long-term wheat suppliers and Cuba is a long-standing sugar supplier. 
Barley was substituted for wheat during the 1980s because of its resistance to salinity 
and vegetable production nearly doubled between 1975 and 1985, but local rice and 
sugar production were in decline, as was the date harvest, which was Iraq's only 
significant agricultural export. Date production in 1987 was very much affected by the 
war with Iran when the important date gardens near Basra were in the war zone and 
dropped to only 324,000 tons compared with 956,000 tons in 1976. Two thirds of the 
date crop was exported in 1987 but, with the imposition of sanctions, dates were 
promoted as a sugar substitute, resulting in higher domestic consumption (EIU, 1989-90, 
19).
Table C5.9:
Iraq: agricultural trade (million US $)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Exports 270 793 885 1,244 870~
Imports -2,843 -2,243 -1,778 -1,832 -2,508
Source: EIU, 1990-91,20
Because of the ready availability of agricultural land, wasteful, 'extensive' farming 
methods which give a low yield are common; thus only one-sixth of the potentially 
cultivable territory and 3 per cent of the country's total area is in use. There can be no 
doubt that the mounting costs of the war and the increased rural-urban migration caused
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by it were virtually the main reasons for the increased deterioration of the agricultural 
sector. (Mofid, 1990, 50)
In the two previous national development plans (1970-75 and 1976-1980), priority 
was given to petroleum and other industries, the aim being to diversify sources of 
revenue (from different industrial exports). The country's increasing industrialization is 
reflected in the population distribution (Fisher, 1989, 465). This is the reason for the size 
of the proportion of investment in agriculture within the development programme during 
the period 1970 to 1975 when it fell from 25 per cent to 16 per cent. In 1978 the figure 
stood at 18 per cent, indicating that the 1976-80 plan period showed more commitment 
to agriculture than the preceding one (EIU, 1980, 23).
Agriculture retains its position as the mainstay of the Iraqi economy, despite the 
existence of a traditionally strong trading sector and partially successful attempts at 
industrialization. Of the 3.2 million persons estimated to have been involved in 
agriculture in 1957, only about one quarter of a million were landowners or tenants, 
totalling perhaps 1.2 million (with their families), while the remaining 2 million were 
landless farmers and their families (Clawson, 1971, 52). The agricultural sector 
employed 33 per cent of the labour force in 1987, compared to 47 per cent in 1970 and 
53 per cent in 1960, while industry employed 22 per cent in 1970, 26 percent in 1980, 
and 28 per cent in 1987, compared to 18 per cent in 1960. Services employed 39 per cent 
in 1987, compared to 31 per cent in 1970 and 29 per cent in 1960 (see table C5.10). The 
population directly involved with farming, is substantially smaller and indicates the 
presence of a substantial small scale craft or service function in Iraq's rural areas. 
According to Fisher (1989) about 74 per cent of the population was classed as urban in 
1986, compared to 53 per cent in 1980 (Fisher, 1989, 465).
Table C5.10:
Iraq: sectorial distribution of the labor force, 1950-1987 (%)
1950 1960 1970 J980 1987
Agriculture 58 53 47 43 33
Industry 16 18 22 26 28
Services 26 29 31 31 39
Sources: Richards & Waterbury, 1990,74 ; EIU, 1988-89, 17 
C5.8 River control and irrigation
Iraq's abundant water resources - (some 0.8 per cent of the country's surface area 
contains lakes, reservoirs and marshlands) - carry great potential for the development of
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irrigation but also present significant problems in terms of water control since 
considerable flooding and poor drainage have been the negative attributes of the two 
major rivers and their tributaries.
River control policy in Iraq has three main objectives: the provision of water for 
irrigation, the prevention of devastating floods, and the creation of hydroelectric power. 
Southern and central Iraq are affected by all three types of schems, since northern Iraq is 
rain-fed and, for the most part, contains terrain which is unsuitable for large-scale 
irrigation from the stored water of major dams.
The Tigris provides irrigation water for some 2.2 million ha., in the valley of the 
north bank tributaries - the Greater Zab, the Lesser Zab, the Adhaim and the Diyala. The 
Euphrates serves approximately 1 million ha, while the joint rivers in the Shatt al-Arab 
provide a further 105,000 ha. The principal water sources for irrigation are the five great 
reservoirs at Dokan, Darbandikhan, Habbaniya, Samara and Abu Dibbis which together 
are reported to provide 120 km^ of storage capacity. There will be a massive increase in 
storage capacity as another four dam schemes are brought into use at Himrim, Bekheme, 
Mosul and Fatha on the Tigris and Haditha on the Euphrates which, together, will 
provide another 45 km^ of water storage (EIU, 1990-91, 21). The policy to extend more 
effective control over Iraq's water resources has already brought benefits and in the 
summer of 1984 the government was able to release stored water to farmers, to offset the 
low levels of the Euphrates (Fisher, 1989, 467). When the waters of the Euphrates and 
Tigris are fully utilized through dams and reservoirs the area of cultivated land in Iraq 
will be almost doubled.
Modem irrigation development projects in Iraq began during the later years of 
Turkish rule with the adoption of an irrigation and water-control scheme designed by Sir 
William Willcocks, and a barrage, was completed at Hindiya on the Euphrates in 1913. 
During the First World War several of the Euphrates canals were modernized and, 
between 1918 and 1934, the program continued to upgrade much of the existing canal 
system. Several large dams and control projects were built, some old canals were 
rehabilitated, and new irrigation systems were constructed. The large projects were 
multipurpose; to provide additional water for the irrigation of new land and the 
reclamation of old; to prevent flooding, and to generate electric power where possible. 
The country's irrigated area expanded substantially as a result of the water projects and 
the growing use of pumps to lift water from the rivers directly onto the fields. The area 
of irrigation increased from a little over one million hectares in 1918 to about 5.6 million 
hectares in 1953 and to about 8 million hectares in the early 1970s (although far less was 
cropped each year partly because of the practice of leaving fields fallow at least every 
other year). The number of pumps increased from 143 in 1921 to 3,775 in 1951 and to 
over 18,000 by 1974. The estimated water withdrawal from the Tigris-Euphrates system 
by Iraqis was about 19 billion m^ in the 1940s and 49 billion m^ in the 1960s (Nyrop,
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1979,157). According to Al-Dahiri (1969), the irrigated area served by flow systems at 
the end of the 1950s, was 54 per cent, 38 per sent irrigated by pumps and 8 per cent by 
water wheels and other means (Al-Dahiri, 1969,170).
Table C 5.ll:
Iraq: total needs for water (billion m^)
Utilisation unit 1975 1995
Irrigation 40.00 52.00
Domestic 0.58 3.50
Industry 2.24 11.90
Total 42.82 67.40
Sources: Gischler, 1979, 101 ; MEED, 1977,14
According to table C5.ll there has been a steady increase in water demand for all 
consumption sectors: for irrigation, domestic and industrial needs; and the total added 
consumption from 1975 to 1995 is expected to be about 25 billion m^. The approximate 
water consumption per person in the 1970s was about 150 litre/day in large cities and 
100 litre/day in smaller towns. At that time, according to Al-Hadithi (1979), the total 
annual water supply for domestic and municipal uses, was estimated to be approximately 
27 million m^. The big industrial enterprises such as oil refineries, textile factories and 
cooling water for thermal power generation in the Euphrates valley, was 113 million m^. 
The total amount of consumption, including 8.8 billion for irrigation, was 9.2 billion 
m^ in the 1970s (Al-Hadithi, 1979, 100). These figures do not take water losses, such as 
evaporation, into account.
A striking feature of Iraq since the 1940s has been an increasing use of the water 
resources of the Euphrates, largely for irrigation purposes. Calculations of the actual 
amounts used are difficult to make, but reasonable estimates may be obtained by 
examining the records of discharge from the rivers at the two gauging stations at Hit and 
Hindiya (see table C5.12). These records indicate that, over the thirty-year period from 
1940 to 1969, utilised discharge has increased from 27.3 per cent to 45.1 per cent of the 
annual discharge. In absolute terms, this means an average withdrawal of 16368 million 
m^/yr. for the 10-year period from 1960 to 1969 (Ubell, 1971, 9 ). These figures do not, 
of course, give any indication of the amount of water removed downstream from the 
Hindiya barrage or upstream from Hit, where little irrigation is carried out. In terms of 
current irrigation water-use in Iraq Ubell quotes an average figure of 13,300 
m^/hectare/yr. This implies using the figure of 16,368 million m^/yr. for water
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withdrawal to irrigate 1,230,000 hectares between the Hit and Hindiya barrages (see 
table C5.12-C5.13).
Table C5.12:
Iraq: average water consumption between 1960 and 1969
River Million cubic 
metres per year
Euphrates between Hit and Hindiya 17,213
Tigris and tributaries between Mosul and Fatha 4,190
Tigris between Fatha and Baghdad 14,052
Diyala 5,139
Tigris between Baghdad and Kut 8,614
Total 49,208
Source: Ubell, 1971,4
These calculations for the withdrawal of water have been made as percentages of 
the average annual flow, however, it must be remembered that river-flows vary 
considerably from year to year, whereas irrigation demands tend to remain relatively 
constant. This means that if a very dry year such as 1961 (in which the total amount 
flow at Hit was only 16.8 billion m^) - had recurred during the 1960-69 period, Iraq's 
demand for water would have been greater than the total available flow for a 
considerable period. By way of contrast, in a wet year such as 1963, Iraq's use of water 
would have represented only 40 per cent of the total flow and the total water withdrawn 
would have amounted to 58.2 per cent of the initial water resources.
According to Al-Hadithi (1979) it was estimated that the population living in the 
Euphrates basin in 1977 was 2.86 million (24 per cent of the Iraq's total population) but, 
in the year 2000, the population could exceed 6.3 million. Assuming a water 
consumption per capita per day of 300 litres, the mean annual domestic requirement will 
be 693.5 million m^ for the total population in the Euphrates basin while the expected 
annual water required for industry located in the Euphrates basin in the year 2000 will 
be 256 million m^ (Al-Hadithi, 1979, 103-112). The Euphrates system can easily cope 
with domestic and industrial demands for water. The unpredictable demands for 
agricultural water is the use which may need careful regulation.
Until 1958 agricultural improvement was often inhibited by the need for adequate 
land reform. The reforms themselves may be divided into four phases: (1) the initial 
decrease of 1958 (2) the second law in 1970, (3) the extension of the reforms to Kurdish 
areas in 1975, and (4) a reversal of previous policy in 1981, when private enterprise in 
farming was encouraged for the first time (Richards & Waterbury, 1990, 154).
I l l
Table C5.13:
Mean discharge (million m^/yr.) daring 10-year periods, and 
withdrawal of water from the Euphrates in Iraq
Gauging station 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69
Discharge at Hit 31,662 27,468 32,298
Discharge at Hindiya 23,021 17,281 19,930
Withdrawal between
stations 8,641 10,197 16368
Withdrawal as percentage
of mean flow at Hit 273% 37.1% 45.1%
Source: Beaumont, 1978,38.
After the revolution of 14 July 1958, the first steps were taken to formulate and pass 
the Agrarian Reform Law when the Iraqi government announced a new and more radical 
land reform project. This provided for the break-up of large estates whose owners were 
to be compelled to forfeit their "excess" land to the government, which would 
redistribute the land to new peasant owners. Landowners losing land were originally to 
be compensated with state bonds but in 1969 all the state's liabilities to recompense land­
owners were cancelled. The reform of 1958 expropriated some 75 per cent of the 
privately owned land. Despite the agro-ecological diversity of the country, the state 
specified only two land holding ceilings, one of 250 hectares for irrigated land and the 
other of 500 hectares for non-irrigated land.
Table C5.14
Iraq: land tenure before the 1958 revolution
Landowners Land area
Area per holding Per cent Thousand Per cent
(in Iraqi dunams)* Numbers of total dunams of total
Less than 4 57,958 34.5 73 0.3
4-30 56,725 33.7 697 3.0
30-100 30,119 17.9 1,677 7.2
100-1,000 20,126 11.9 5,025 21.5
1,000-10,000 3,143 1.83 9,090 39.0
10,000-50,000 251 0.15 4,554 19.5
50,000-100,000 19 0.01 1,334 5.8
100,000 and more 5 0.00 877 3.7
Total 168,346 100.00 23,327 100.0
*one Iraqi dunams = 0.25 hectares 
Source: Clawson, 1971,61.
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The Agrarian Reform Law of 1958 marked the end of feudalism in Iraq and the 
start of a new era. It was hoped that the reform would take only five years to complete 
but the application of the law was initially mismanaged and the expropriation of land 
consistently ran ahead of the ability of the administration’s ability to distribute it. 
Although the FAO had estimated that some 2,000 co-operative societies would be 
needed to replace the landlords, there were only 25 by 1963. By the end of 1972 some 
4.73 million dunams had been requisitioned from landlords and distributed to 100,646 
families, but considerable areas of land still remain to be distributed although the 
government had been promoting the growth of co-operatives and collective farms since 
1967. When the Ba'ath party returned to power in 1968, they issued a new Agrarian 
Reform Law where they reduced the land ceiling further and confiscated an additional 
1.5 million hectares of land but, even so, by the end of 1975 only one-third of the 
sequestered land had been distributed. In 1984 there were 23 state farms, covering
188,000 ha. but by 1986, the land area occupied by state farms had fallen to only 52,925 
ha, and by 1988 more than 220,000 ha. had been leased (Fisher, 1989, 466).
Politics has been as unhelpful as ecology to Iraqi reformers and the country is 
sharply divided ethnically and religiously, between Sbi'i and Sunni, Arab and Kurd. The 
political situation (because of the coup in 1958) up till the early 1970's was highly 
uncertain, with four (typically violent) changes of government. In the light of such 
developments, it is little wonder that Iraqi land reforms have failed to achieve their 
economic goals (Richards & Waterbury, 1990,153).
C5.9 The effect of wars on the Iraqi economy
Although Iraq survived the nine year war against Iran and the disastrous consequences of 
its invasion of Kuwait, its economy, especially the oil sector, was severely damaged. On 
the eve of the invasion Iraq was enjoying a period of having 'never had it so good', with 
years of sustained economic growth, and a rapid and unparalleled increase in oil 
production/exports and revenues. The significant decline in oil production / exports 
during the Iraq-Iran War can best be seen in figure C5.2, where the volume of oil 
production and exports during the 1974-91 period are noted. As can be seen, oil 
production decreased by 66 per cent between 1979-80 and 1980-81, falling from 
170,300 thousand tonnes in 1979 to 130,000 thousand tonnes in 1980, and then again 
falling drastically to only 43,900 thousand tones in 1981. After 1982 the situation 
improved somewhat, although production did not rise to anything near the pre-war levels 
(Mofid, 1990, 38).
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In all, during 1979 to 1986, oil exports value declined by 12.7 per cent on average 
each year while, during 1973-79, the corresponding figure had been an increase of 10.3 
per cent (Mofid, 1990, 39).
Iraq's recovery from the disasters of the Iraq-Iran War was slow. By 1990 
production capacity exceeded 3.5 million b/d, with an actual output of 3.07 million b/d 
during the first six months. Domestic consumption in 1989 was 300,000 b/d, and 
production was effectively constrained by the limited export capacity available through 
Turkish and Saudi pipelines, the partly rehabilitated Gulf oil loading terminals and the 
trucking of a small volume of products and crude to Jordan. However, the imposition of 
the UN blockade in early August 1990 stopped all exports except those to Jordanian 
supplies and production was cut back accordingly. Iraq's quota according to OPEC had 
been 3.14 million b/d in 1990.
The war seriously affected Iraqi refining capacity throughout the country, and this 
was reduced as a result of Iranian bombing in 1981 causing temporary difficulties until 
the Salaheddin unit came on stream in 1983. Before the Iran-Iraq war, production of 
refined products was 1.32 million tons of gasoline, 1.2 million tons of kerosene and jet 
fuels, 2379 tons of distillate fuel oils and 2.9 million tons of residual fuel oils. Iraq had a 
total refinery capacity of 656,000 b/d; but, as a result of the UN sanctions, there was a 
shortage of chemicals used for the refining process which caused in a reduction in 
refinery output by the end of 1990 (EIU, 1990-91, 26).
Power stations were a special target for the Iranian air force from the beginning of 
the Iran/Iraq War, and the result was frequent and severe shortages of electricity. Since 
that time the country has struggled to repair the damage caused and to create new 
generating capacity. Iraq's power generating capacity was 8,538 MW in early 1989, but 
it plans to double this to 17,000 MW by the year 2000. There are new plans to increase 
hydroelectric generating capacity (with potential hydro resources estimated at 7.7 billion 
KWh/yr.) and to install small generating sets in many medium sized towns. In fact 
before the disruption caused by the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq was in the process of 
constructing four new power stations, two of which were due to be completed in early 
1991, while the two other plants were in an early stage of construction and were to add 
an extra 3,200 MW of generating capacity. In rural areas, however, there is still 
dependence on kerosene and wood for heating and cooking (EIU, 1990-91, 26).
The potential of the agricultural sector in Iraq is substantial, both in terms of 
abundant agricultural land and the availability of ample water resources, mainly from the 
Tigris and Euphrates rivers. In 1980 the importance and potential of agriculture to Iraq's 
overall development was once more highlighted when Saddam Hussain declared that 
agriculture was Iraq's "permanent oil" and that he wanted to see the country become self- 
sufficient and a net exporter of food within this century. This statement however was 
made before he ordered his army to invade Iran (Mofid, 1990, 48).
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Figure C5.2:
Iraq: oil production and export 1974-1991
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Source: MEES, November 1992, D1-D3
The figures for the estimated production of principal crop products and main 
livestock items between 1973 and 1985 show that the average annual rate of production 
of many items such as wheat, rice, com and bovine meat fell significantly during the 
1979-85 period. At this point, if the pre- and post-war figures of agricultural production 
are compared, it can be argued that, even though the pre-war performance was far from 
perfect, there can be no doubt that during, and since, the war there has been a major 
deterioration in agricultural productivity (Mofid, 1990,50).
At the beginning of August 1990 figures from the US Department of Agriculture 
suggested that Iraq's food supplies were extremely low and that the country would run 
out of beans, barley and maize in a month and wheat and rice in three months. What 
these estimates failed to take into account was the fact that Iraq's recently privatized 
agricultural sector had been improving its output, and that the 1990 harvest was a record. 
Totalling 1.2 million tons of wheat and 1.9 million tons of barley. The barley is usually 
grown mainly for animal feed, but after the sanctions were imposed bakeries started 
mixing barley flour with the wheat flour. The combination of such measures, such as
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making smaller standard loaves and effective food rationing meant that cereal stocks 
were sufficient to last until the early summer of 1991.
The Iraqi government has also announced various measures aimed at raising 
production of food next year such as ordering farmers to increase their acreage, and 
backing this up with fines and sanctions. As a carrot, the government offered chemical 
fertilisers at ultra cheap prices because of oversupply. Analysts suggests that, with 
favourable weather, Iraq may be able to increase its cereal crop by a further 30 per cent 
in 1991/92, although this order of production is not sustainable in the longer term 
because heavy investment is required to deal with soil deficiencies (EIU, 1990, No. 4, 
12).
Although the Iraqi government announced a number of major food import deals in 
May 1991 for the second half of 1991 with Canada (500, 000 tons of wheat), Australia 
(1 million tons of wheat) and Thailand (200,000 tons of rice), the problem it faces is the 
lack of oil revenues and the continued freeze on its overseas assets (EIU, 1991, No. 2, 
17).
In the 1991 Gulf-War, the UN coalition commenced the bombing and missile 
campaign against Iraq on 16 January 1991. All vital industrial installations were 
destroyed, including power plants, refineries, major industrial complexes, including 
factories and communication facilities. In addition, the economic infrastructure: roads, 
bridges, railways, airports and dams was attacked. The bombing came close to 
completely destroying the power system and Iraq's pre 1991 War electrical generation 
capacity of between 9000 MW and 9500 MW was reduced to 2325 MW as of 1 July. 
The devastation of the electricity system seriously hampered the operation of water 
supply and sewerage systems. The 160 MW Durbandikhan Dam was the only Iraqi 
hydroelectric project to have emerged unscathed from the Gulf conflict. Two other 
hydroelectric schemes, the 400 MW Dokan dam and the 220 MW Haditha Dam, were 75 
per cent destroyed in bombing raids and remain non-operational, while the 808 MW 
Saddam Dam and 60 MW Samara Dam were completely destroyed (World Water and 
Environmental Engineer, September 1991, 9). In order to cut off supplies to the Iraqi 
armed forces, the coalition commanders chose to hit any target which had any suspected 
or potential military utility. Thus, the transportation infrastructure was a prime target 
since it involved the movement of men and material. The oil refining and distribution 
system was hit because it provided the fuel for transportation and the electricity 
generation and distribution system became a target because it provided power to 
manufacturing plants which could be used to produce war related materials. The latter 
category included not only the ammunition factories, but also chemical and fertiliser 
plants (because of their potential for chemical weapon manufacture) and the country's 
iron and steel industry (because of its ability to produce shell casings and spare parts).
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The definition of "command and control" centres resulted in the targeting of much of the 
country's telecommunications capacity. Office buildings which housed government 
ministries of all kinds were also regarded as military targets because of their political 
significance. Water supply and sewage treatment both depend upon a steady supply of 
electrical power and garbage disposal depends on the availability of fuel. The lack of 
fuel and power created conditions for epidemics of, for instance, cholera and dysentery 
(EIU, 1991, No. 2,16).
The Economist Intelligence Unit has placed the overall cost to Iraq of the war with 
Iran at about $US 300 billion and the war over Kuwait must have cost Iraq tens of 
billions (The Middle East Review, 1991-92, 69). It will cost $US 12,000 million to 
restore pre-war power generating capacity, $US 6,000 million to rebuild the oil sector, 
$US 450 million for water and sanitation system, $US 2,640 million for food imports 
and $US 500 million for other agricultural imports (MEED, 6 March 1992,11). To sum 
up, Iraq, which might be considered the most favoured of the three riparians because of 
its petroleum resources and its access to two major streams and vast arable lands, in 
reality, is seriously at risk from wartime destruction and poorly managed irrigation 
practices. Even in peacetime petroleum revenues were diverted to buy food imports and 
the possibility of achieving self-sufficiency in food production has remained elusive.
To sum up this chapter, the review made of the three states sharing the river's 
drainage basin shows a common picture of a rapid rate of natural population growth (see 
figure C5.3). As a result the all-inclusive number of the states' inhabitants will be close 
to 95 million in the year 2000 and approximately 180 million in 2025 (see figure C5.4).
Parallel to the rapid population growth, there is a rapid process of urbanization and 
industralization taking place in each of the countries. To all this must be added the rise in 
the standard of living (except for Iraq which has been suffering from wars and the 
resultant damage since the eighties).
On the one hand the rapid population growth has brought about a reduction in the 
amount of water available to each resident. Taking the accepted 1,000 per capita per 
annum as an extremely low category, it can be seen that there is a shortfall being created 
among the riparian countries of the Euphrates river, especially in Syria (see table C5.15).
On the other, the rise in the number of inhabitants and the standard of living 
requires each state to significantly increase its annual production of food (above the 
natural rate of population increase), something which can be achieved by increasing the 
amount of cultivated land, by developing the cultivation of irrigated crops and by trying 
to increase agricultural productivity.
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Figure C5.3:
Average annual population growth rate (per cent)
@ 1965-80 
M  1980-90 
^  1989-2000
Turkey Syria Iraq
Source: World Development Report, 1992, 268
Figure C5.4:
Population projections (millions)
W  1990 
H  2 0 0 0  
^  2025
Turkey Syria Iraq
Source: World Development Report, 1992, 269
Table C5.15:
Per capita water availability: 1971 and 2000 (1,000 m )^
1971 2000 Per cent change in
population 1971-2000
Turkey 4.9 2.3 118
Syria 3.0 1.0 165
Iraq 3.6 1.3 173
Source: The Global 2000, 1982, 156.
Since each state has planned its economic development including the projects which 
involve water resources without consideration of the interests of the other riparians and 
without consideration of the global limitations on water in the river systems, it is to be 
expected that these plans, will affect the network of relationships existing between the 
states.
In order to examine this issue we first have to examine the effects of the 
development programmes on the amount of water in the river (see chapter D).
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D. The Influence of Development Projects on 
the River Water
D1. The quantity of water
The Euphrates river is a renewable resource. There are four main uses for the Euphrates 
river by the riparian countries here presented in approximate diminishing order of 
importance in terms of volume at the end of 1980'S: irrigation, domestic use, 
hydropower, and industrial use. However, the pattern of future use of water in these three 
countries depends on their very different geographical circumstances. What will be the 
impact of developments (both in place and planned) on the quantity and quality of the 
river's water in Turkey, Syria in Iraq? In order to assess this we must review the 
Euphrates river from its source to its mouth in terms of dams, reservoirs, and diversions 
for irrigation as well as for evaporation, evapotranspiration, crop patterns and their 
rotation, water loss, return flows, and the domestic and industrial use of water.
Figure D l.l, shows a model developed by Kolars & Mitchell (1991), which 
illustrates the elements which Middle Eastern rivers have in common. Stream flow begins 
with natural precipitation at the headwaters of the upstream country; at various points 
downstream water may be impounded for the generation of hydropower, with some 
possible loss through evaporation from reservoir surfaces; water then continues 
downstream to the next reservoir where impounded water may not only be used to 
generate power but also to irrigate crops. Evaporation losses occur from the surface of the 
reservoirs but losses also occur from agricultural fields through evapotranspiration and 
system inefficiencies. Return flows may or may not be unacceptably polluted. Further 
downstream, pumping from independent aquifers may irrigate additional fields and 
provide some additional return flow but losses also occur here through local evaporation 
while excessive pumping may diminish spring flow downstream and even across an 
international frontier. In a downstream country similar patterns are repeated, all of which 
can have implications for a country farther downstream. At all points along the river, 
changes in the amount and quality of water may affect domestic and industrial use (Kolars 
& Mitchell, 1991, 82).
Some researchers have made attempts to evaluate the impact of the riparian states' 
development projects on the water flow quantities, and it seems that part of the present 
antagonism over water use between the riparian states can be attributed to the fact that the 
"acquired rights” calculation have, for some bine, been based on the World Bank estimates 
of irrigated areas in the Euphrates basin made in 1965. According to these estimates, the
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area amounted to 135,000 ha. in Turkey, 212,500 ha. in Syria and 1,231,000 ha. in Iraq. 
The World Bank further estimated their water needs for irrigation at that time to be 2.14 
billion m^ for Turkey, 2.98 billion m^ for Syria and 12.86 billion m^ for Iraq (see table 
D l.l).
Figure D l.l:
Elements of a hypothetical international river use system
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Table D l.l:
Euphrates "acquired rights" according to the World Bank estimates
Irrigation area Water needs
(hectares) (billion m^/yr.)
Turkey 135,000 2.14
Syria 212,500 2.98
Iraq 1,231,000 12.86
Total 1,578,500 17.98
Source: the Arab Economist, May 1975,16
According to Clawson (1971), the annual diversion of water in Iraq is 18 billion 
but both Turkey and Syria reject the estimate of Iraq's current use as up to twice what it 
actually is, and regard it simply as a position taken to establish the position of major 
claimant. In Syria the diversion is not quite 3,500 million m^ and there is little diversion in 
Turkey at all making a total use of 21,500 million m^. Current development plans amount 
to an additional 16,000 million m-* in Iraq, 11 million m^ in Syria, and 10,000 million m^ 
in Turkey, or a total of 27,000 million nA  Total future use would thus add up to nearly
48,000 million m^, compared with an average flow per year of about 34,000 million m^, 
which would be reduced by perhaps 10 per cent through evaporation from new reservoirs 
(Clawson, 1971, 114).
Table D1.2:
Total future use of the Euphrates river (million nr*)
Current use 
Planned additions 
Total future use
Turkey Svria Iraq Total
1,500 2,980 12,860 17,340
12,140 4,610 6,040 22,790
13,640 7,590 18,900 40,130
Source: Clawson, 1971, 114
As will be seen in table D1.2, the above estimates report a lower current use in Iraq 
and a lower future use in Syria , but a higher present and future use in Turkey than 
reported earlier by Clawson.
An attempt to estimate the likely volumes of water to be abstracted from the Euphrates 
as the result of projects already implemented, currently being implemented, or in the 
planning stage was made by Beaumont in 1978. According to Beaumont, the evaporation 
data suggest water losses of about 700 mm/annum from the reservoir behind the Keban 
Dam, and as high as 900 mm/annum from the lakes in GAP area. The Keban reservoir
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covers an area of 680 km^ when full, and this means a maximum water loss of 476 
million m^/annum. With the three lower dams, the total surface area of the associated lakes 
is expected to be 674 km^, producing a likely evaporation loss of 607 million m^/annum. 
Taken together these potential water losses, of the order of 1,000 million m^ /annum, 
represent about 3.4 per cent of the total annual discharge at Hit in Iraq. In the late 1960s 
Syria's irrigation water use from the Euphrates was about 3,000 million m^/yr. with the 
largest dam on the Euphrates in Syria being the Tabqa Dam whose reservoir covers about 
630 km2 when full. With such an area of water surface, evaporation losses from the lake 
behind the Tabqa Dam will be high - about 1,000 mm/yr.- so the water loss will be 630 
million m^/yr., a figure which represents about 2 per cent of the annual flow at Hit. 
According to Beaumont (1978), an extra one million hectares of irrigated land will be 
available for cultivation by the end of the twentieth century and, assuming an irrigation 
water need of between 5,000 and 10,000 m^/ha, an extra 5,000 to 10,000 million m^ of 
water will be abstracted from the river if the planned projects are carried out.
Table D1.3:
Potential water-use along the Euphrates (million year)
Mean total discharge at Hit 31,820
Turkey
Evaporation from reservoir
above Keban Dam 476 (max.)
Evaporation from reservoir
above GAP project 606 (max.)
Potential water withdrawal
for irrigation 3,500- 7,000
Syria
Evaporation from reservoir
above Tabqa Dam 630 (max.)
Potential water withdrawal
for irrigation 5,000-10,000
Iraq
Water use (1960-1969) 17,213
Evaporation from reservoir
above Haditha Dam 602 (max.)
Total Min. = 28,028
Max. = 36,538
Source: Beaumont, 1978,41
For irrigation water use in Iraq, Beaumont (1978) quoted an average figure of 13300 
m^/hectare/yr. using the figure of water withdrawals of 16,368 million nAyr. and this 
implies that, between Hit and Hindiya, about 1,230,000 hectares were being irrigated. The 
evaporation losses at Haditha is about 1,450 mm/yr. and this figure suggests a water loss
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of 1.45 nP/yr. for every square kilometre of water surface. With a reservoir area when 
full of 415 km^, the net evaporation losses is 602 million m^/yr. Table D13 indicates that 
between 28,028 and 36,538 million m3/annum of water could be utilized throughout the 
basin of the Euphrates if all the projects were implemented. The lower figure represents 
about 88 per cent, and the higher figure about 115 per cent of the average discharge of the 
Euphrates at Hit (Beaumont, 1978, 38-41).
In a de-briefing report made by Al-Kabs (a Kuwaiti newspaper) in 1990 about 
Euphrates water utilization, it was claimed that the river's annual average quantity is about 
33 billion m3. Until 1974, about 90 per cent of the water streamed towards Iraq, 7 per 
cent was used by Syria, and the rest, about 3 per cent, was used by Turkey.
Table D1.4:
Water quantity used by the riparian countries - 1990
Irrigated area Quantity of water use
(in hectares) (billion m^)
Turkey 54,000 1,5
Syria 136,000 4,79
Iraq 492,720 12,86
Total 682,720 19,15
Source: Al-Kabs, 12 March 1990
Of the total irrigated area estimated to be 628,720 ha. in the Euphrates basin, 54,000 
ha. lies within Turkey, 136,000 ha. within Syria and 492,720 ha. in Iraq. The water 
quantity used by these countries is shown in table D1.4.
Table D1.5:
The Euphrates basin: possible irrigable land
Possible irrigable area Water needs
(in hectares) ( billion m^)
Turkey 503,200 13,64
Syria 231,400 7,95
Iraq 734,200 18,90
Total 1,468,800 40,49
Source: Al-Kabs, 12 March 1990
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Of the 1,468,800 ha. of total possible cultivated area in the Euphrates basin (table 
D1.5), 503,200 ha. exists in Turkey, 231,400 ha. in Syria and 734,200 ha. in Iraq. The 
water needs of the three countries relative to the potential cultivated lands are shown in 
table D1.5 and the future water consumption of the Euphrates River based on this data, 
reaches 40.49 billion m^/yr about 125 per cent of the average discharge of the Euphrates at 
Hit (Al-Kabs, 12 March, 1990). According to table D1.4 it seems that the author of the 
article in the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Kabs has provided a low estimate for the amount of 
irrigated land in Iraq in comparision to other sources of information. The future estimates 
concerning Iraq’s agricultural potential along the Euphrates river (shown in table D1.5), 
however, are also low. On the other hand, the estimates of the amount of water needed to 
irrigate a hectare of agricultural land (2,700 m3 in Turkey, 3,400 m3 in Syria and 2,500 
m^ in Iraq) are significantly higher than any calculation so far made by other experts 
whose estimates generally range between 1,200 - 1,600 m3 per hectare. The article, it 
must be noted, does not give any source for the data or the basis for estimating the need 
for such quantities of water. One should not ignore the possibility that the low quantitative 
values for Iraq are connected to the Kuwaiti nationality of the author.
Turning to another source, Waterbury (1990) quoted an estimate of Syria’s demand 
for the Euphrates water which ranges from 4.5 to 7.5 billion m3. Assuming that Turkey 
will irrigate no more than 1.1 million hectares in the Euphrates basin it might draw 
between 7.5 to 8.5 billion m3 per annum from natural flow of the Euphrates (bout 7,500 
m^ per hectare). It should be noted that this amount of water is very low in relation to the 
data on the high rate of evaporation in the region, and the Turks themselves provided data 
at least 20 per cent higher than Watebury's calculation. Evaporation at reservoir sites, 
seepage and transmission losses could account for an additional loss of 2 billion m3 which 
would bring the total abstraction to 10 billion m3 or more. Combining the potential 
demands of the two countries, we arrive at totals ranging from 13 to 18 billion m3, or 
from a little less than half to nearly two thirds of the average annual natural yield of the 
Euphrates (Waterbury, 1990, 14). As a whole these figures are also low but one should 
remember that the amount of water for irrigation is dependent, to a considerable degree, 
upon the type of agricultural crops, the growing season and the irrigation methods used in 
each of the states. Apart from the irrigation methods (mostly flood irrigation) and the high 
level of evaporation in the region the consumption of water for agriculture can be relatively 
rapidly changed by changing the growing season or the type of agricultural crop.
In a recent article Waterbury (1992) claims that the total demand of the three riparians 
in 1970 left a surplus of 8.5 billion m3 which drained into the marshes of lower Iraq and 
the Persian Gulf; but the potential deficit in the year 2005 could be 21 billion m3 - or more 
than two thirds of the average annual natural flow of the river as shown in table D1.6 
(Waterbury, 1992, 15). Here also, in Waterbury's 1992 article, it is not clear why Syria's
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estimated water needs reach as high as 13 billion despite the estimate of up to 7.5 
billion m^ presented in the 1990 article. This, likewise, does not explain why Iraq, which 
has an irrigated land potential equal to that of Turkey's needs a quantity of water almost 
twice that of Turkey's. It seems that Waterbury's 1992 article has been influenced by data 
presented in Kolars & Mitchell book which Waterbury has found useful for presenting a 
picture of such a serious lack of water that it would produce an inevitable conflict between 
the states.
Table D1.6:
Actual and potential water demand in the Euphrates for 1970 and 2005 
(billion m3)
1970 2005 Euphrates natural yield
Iraq 18.0 26.0 32.0
Syria 4.0 13.0
Turkey 1.5 14.0
Total 23.5 53.0 32.0
Source: Waterbury, 1992, 15
The most problematic figures regarding the water balance in the river are presented in 
Nomas' doctoral thesis (1988). where he calculates that the amount of water in the river is 
already insufficient to supply the water needs of states and will certainly not be able to do 
so in the future since the amount of water the states need today is 38.4 billion m^ - 12 
billion m^ more than his estimation of the average perennial flow. In the future the deficit 
will reach 31-34 billion m^ (see table D1.7-D1.8) - an amount of water double the annual 
flow (Nomas, 1988, 337). Note that in his calculation Nomas shows that Iraq will need 
41-45 billion m^ in the future - an amount which is 25 per cent higher than the total 
amount of the annual water natural flow of the river. It appears that Nomas as an Iraqi 
researcher has made a great effort to present calculations which show the biggest possible 
deficit of water, and these clearly politically motivated calculations do not reflect the true 
needs of Iraq for Euphrates water.
Table D1.7:
Present and future annual water balance of the Euphrates in Iraq 
regarding the total water requirements and losses (billion m^)
Euphrates average discharge at Hit (1956-80) 26.00
Present water requirement and losses 38.40
Present water balance -12.40
Future water requirement 41.74
Future water balance -15.74
Source: Nomas, 1988, 338
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Table D1.8:
Future water balance of the whole Euphrates basin, regarding the 
average long term river discharge (billion m^)
Potential river discharge
Future irrigation water requirements and evaporation losses in Turkey 
Outflow to Syria
Future irrigation water requirements and evaporation losses in Syria 
Outflow from Syria to Iraq 
Future water requirements of Iraq 
Future water deficits in Iraq
Source: Nomas, 1988, 340
A more complete picture has emerged from reports issued by the Turkish and Syrian 
governments regarding their respective plans for the Euphrates river. The most up to date 
and comprehensive study carried out by 1991 - "The Euphrates River and the Southeast 
Anatolia Development Project" (1991), was completed by Kolars & Mitchell for the 
Associates for Middle Eastern Research Institute (AMER) of the University of 
Pennsylvania. Their research includes the collection of existing literature, scientific 
material and its analysis, but these official publications do not rely on the GAP Master 
Plan, one of the most important sources for this subject. Professor Bagis from the Faculty 
of Economic and Administrative Sciences at Hacettepe university at Ankara, published a 
book about the GAP project in 1989 which is based on the GAP Master Plan (for which 
he acted as an advisor and consultant) and the DSI reports. The GAP Final Master Plan in 
its four volumes (1991) contributes much information about Turkey's development plan 
but ignores its influence on the lower riparian states. In a similar way it seems that the 
Turks have made a very selective use of the data so that they cannot be used by the 
downstream states in their claims against the development plans in Southeast Anatolia. 
Thus the Turks did not publish the figures for evaporation from the reservoirs, the crop 
rotation for the region and estimates regarding the loss of water from the irrigation canal 
system. Data from these resources, however, make a more detailed evaluation off the 
different countries' development plans possible.
Measuring supply and demand lies at the very heart of any co-operative solution to 
problems of water utilization in international river basins. If and when tripartite 
negotiations take place concerning the use of Euphrates river waters, much will depend 
upon reaching a clear understanding about quantity available at any given time to be shared 
among the riparian users. The first such measure concerns the average annual discharge of 
the river but this is no simple matter to determine, for it seems that every report and 
evaluation quotes a different set of figures. According to Waterbury (1990), riparians tend
+35.4 
-17.4 
+18 
-7.33 
+ 10.7 
-41.74/-45.5 
-31.04/-34.8
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not to agree over how much water there is, or when it is available, and how much each 
riparian needs or is likely to need. The upstream state may be in a good position to say: 
"This is how much water is in the river, and this is the amount you need". Future demand 
estimates are far more problematic because they must include making choices over use, 
and the relative efficiency with which the water is used (drip irrigation, surface irrigation, 
lined canal, etc.) (Waterbury, 1990, 11).
Watebury's theoretical approach is useful in illustrating the situation of the Euphrates 
river. According to the GAP Master Plan, the annual "natural flow" data of the Euphrates 
at Belkiskoy gauging station on the Syrian border between 1940 and 1980 was 30.33 
billion m^/yr. (GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, E-6). This figure is higher than the values given by 
Clawson - of 26,990 million m^/yr. at Birecik (Clawson, 1971, 217). Clawson's figures 
for Birecik are without the additional water which can enter the Euphrates main system in 
Turkey, 25 km downstream from Birecik, and do not include the flow of the Nizip, 
Araban, Goksu tributaries and several smaller streams. Clawson, used reports of the 
International Bank, in which estimates of irrigation diversion in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq 
were made, and estimated the total "natural" amount of the Euphrates river at Hit Iraq for 
the period 1937-1964 at 33.69 billion m^/yr. (Clawson, 1971, 205). This is the highest 
value given by any of the different sources. Another source, the Haigh Commission 
Report (1951), quoted the lowest amount for the average annual "natural" water surplus of 
the Euphrates river in Hit Iraq, based on 22 years of measurements (1925-1946), - 26.4 
billion m^ (Haigh, 1951, 39). This figure is lower than the values given by Clawson by 
about 73 billion m^/yr., or between 22 to 28 per cent of the Euphrates "natural" flow. For 
Iraq, the difference between the high and low estimates represents enough water to irrigate 
perhaps 600,000 hectares. This figure is based upon quite reasonable calculation of 1,200 
nfVhectare. Haigh's figure is very similar to the figure given by Nomas: 26.00 billion m^ 
based on 25 years of measurements from 1956 to 1980 (Nomas, 1988, 338). One should, 
however, remember that these figures have already been considerably influenced by the 
loss of water caused as a result of the development projects being carried out along the 
length of the river. According to Kolars & Mitchell (1991) the annual "natural flow" at 
Karkamish is 27.4 billion m^/yr. - 3 billion m^ less than that mentioned by the authors of 
the GAP Master Plan (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991,105).
From an analysis of the data used by the various experts about the calculation of the 
natural flow of the river, however, it appears that the estimates were made at different 
periods of time (table D1.9). The great annual differences in the flow of the river water 
(this can be seen in Figure Bl) lead to different calculations of the average flows for each 
period of time, and so one cannot detect any clear political motivation in the researchers' 
findings. Similarly, it appears that the great variance in the data is also linked to the 
difference in the terms of "natural flow" and "measured flow". Natural flow relates to the
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amount of water in the river before it was affected by human intervention and thus this 
figure should be examined as an estimate. We must remember, however, that since Turkey 
began to build its reservoirs it has had exclusive control of data about the use of the river's 
flow and, from the beginning of the eighties, it has not published the natural flow data.
By using the comparison between the periods of time which the researches used to 
estimate the flow of the Euphrates river at Hit as a basis one can see that a number of 
estimates are atypical. Nomas figures include the higher flows of water in the river in 1963 
and 1968-9 and, despite this, the average flow of the river is low. On the other hand one 
must remember that his figures are more influenced than the figures of other researchers 
by the growing use of water by the riparian states. In fact from 1974 on we can no longer 
relate to the "natural flow" of the river. It is surprising that, despite the fact that Nomas 
had the flow figures for the river from the middle of the twenties available, he chose to, 
inexplicably, ignore more than thirty years of measurements and commenced his 
calculations only from 1958. Clawson's figures about the amount of natural flow in the 
river also seem extreme and, despite the fact that his figures do not include the high flow 
of the river from the end of the sixties the perennial average flow is much higher than of 
other researchers. It appears that the source of the possible error in Clawson's estimates 
arises out of an exaggerated estimate of river water usage by the riparian states. Thus, it 
appears that the estimates of Ubell, Al-Hadithi and Abbas which show an average flow of 
29.2-31.8 billion nP/year are the most reasonable.
Table D1.9:
A summary of the experts estimates for the amount of natural water in the 
Euphrates at Hit (billion nr*)
Source Period Average flow
Clawson (1971) 1937-1964 33.69
Ubell (1971) 1940-1969 31.80
Al-Hadithi (1979) 1924-1973 30.60
Abbas (1984) 1924-1970 29.26
Haigh (1951) 1925-1946 26.40
Nomas (1988) 1956-1980 26.00
The use of different flow figures, however, can have political and economic motives. 
According to Waterbury (1990) Turkey, which will abstract large amounts of water from 
the upper Euphrates, will want the higher estimates of total supply to be generally accepted 
while the downstream states will want just the opposite (Waterbury, 1990, 11). A  high 
water estimate would grant Turkey a relatively higher portion as well as the possibility to 
use a relatively larger amount of water for irrigation. In contrast a low estimate of the 
average amount of water in the river would leave Iraq with a larger water surplus.
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Figure D1.2:
The natural flow of the Euphrates river and the period calculated for, 
according to various researchers, at Hit in Iraq (billion m^)
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It is necessary to look at the use of the river and its tributaries by the riparian states in 
greater detail in order to understand the complexities of the river basin's hydrological 
system. This will set the scene for considering various scenarios relating to the way in 
which the river may possibly be used in the future. As we shall see the role of the 
Euphrates river in the economies and lives of the three nations differs markedly:
D1.1 The utilization of the Euphrates river by Turkey
Turkey is petroleum poor but rich in rainfed agriculture and surplus water. It hopes to 
harness the Euphrates in order to generate electrical energy and to profit from the export of 
irrigated crops grown with their waters. The total amount of precipitation that Turkey 
receives is 501 billion m^ per year, however only 186 billion m^ (37 per cent) finds its 
way into the rivers. Of this amount, 95 billion m-^  (51 percent) is available as a potentially 
usable resource but currently, 25.6 billion m^ (27 per cent) of available water is being 
used. The Euphrates river contributes 17 per cent of Turkey’s rivers water potential 
(Turan, 1993, 24).
Turkey receives 18.5 per cent of its GNP from agriculture and the nation is, for all 
practical purposes, self-sufficient in food. Nevertheless, its government has undertaken a
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major regional development project - the GAP, based upon the utilization of the Euphrates 
and Tigris rivers. The GAP programme is the most ambitious development ever 
undertaken in Turkey and it has profound implications for south-eastern Anatolia which 
has long been the least developed region within Turkey. In 1985 the region's per capita 
gross regional product was 47 per cent of the per capita domestic product of Turkey, The 
population was 8.5 per cent of the national total, and the population growth has remained 
higher than the national average despite the fact that emigration from the region continues. 
The area referred to as "south-eastern Anatolia" takes up 9.5 per cent of the total area of 
Turkey and 70 per cent of the economically active population in the region is employed in 
the agricultural sector. In view of the country's poor petroleum endowment and its annual 
import bill of from $ US 2,000 million to over $ US 4,000 million for petrol products for 
its expanding economy, hydroelectric production is clearly significant (Kolars, 1991a, 4). 
In addition to growth in agricultural production, 7,561 megawatts of hydroelectric power 
generation capacity will also be created, of which 5,346 megawatts will be on the 
Euphrates and 2,215 megawatts on the Tigris. In total, the GAP's hydroelectric generating 
capacity will increase Turkey's present total generating capacity by 70 per cent (NewSpot, 
28 June 1990, 7). Turkey also sees a great opportunity for electricity exports and the 
Turkish government has been negotiating with four Middle Eastern countries to export 
electricity (Parker, 1991, 17). Not only does the government of Turkey hope to increase 
its energy supply but also hopes to improve the local economy significantly since the 
increase in agricultural production may also start a developmental "chain reaction" in other 
sectors of the regional economy. About 4.3 million people live in south-eastern Anatolia, 
so it is not over-populated, but the population could reach 10 million when economic 
development takes off and livelihoods will have to face the GAP regions rapidly increasing 
population (NewSpot, 19 July 1990, 5). When GAP is completed, it is estimated that 
Turkey will produce enough food to feed 80 million people; 3.3 million extra jobs will be 
created countrywide, urbanization will receive a boost in the region; and rural emigration 
will slow down considerably. Turkey claims that these new irrigation schemes will 
transform the country into the breadbasket of the region (South, August 1991, 14).
The Keban Dam and reservoir and the smaller projects upstream from the site were 
among the first developments to be completed on the Turkish Euphrates. The average 
annual runoff volume of the Euphrates at Keban is about 20,627 million m^ (GAP, 1990, 
Vol. 4, 30). Depletion of water through evaporation, it has been estimated by Kolars, will 
be about 985 million m^ per year when the 675 km^ reservoir is full. The irrigated area 
was about 35,000 ha. in 1990, with 58,000 ha. scheduled for about the year 2000. At that 
date, it is estimated that depletion of the river flow, (with return flow taken into account) 
will be about 1,430 million (Kolars, 1991a, 15).
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Located 166 km downstream from the Keban is the second section of the 
development planned by the Turkish authorities: the Karakaya Dam and associated 
projects; and here the average annual runoff volume of the Euphrates river is about 23.7 
billion m^ (GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, 30). The Karakaya reservoir, now full, was completed in 
1987 and being full, the 298 km^ reservoir, may lose as much as 435 million m^ of water 
annually through evaporation (Kolars, 1991a, 15).
The Lower Euphrates Project, which is the core of the GAP, is based upon the 
Ataturk Dam, 180 km downstream from Karakaya, and its vast reservoir with a volume of 
48,700 million m^, and a surface area of 817 km^. The average annual runoff volume of 
the Euphrates at Ataturk is about 26,781 million (GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, 30). According 
to Kolars, the Ataturk reservoir when it is full, may lose as much as 1,470 million m^ 
annually to evaporation (Kolars, 1991a, 16). Eight different irrigation projects totalling
1,141,500 ha. are projected for completion some time after the year 2000.
Part of the water in the Ataturk Dam reservoir will go to the Sanliurfa-Harran and 
Mardin-Ceylanpinar plants through the Sanliurfa tunnels (under construction in 1992). 
The 141,500 ha. Sanliurfa-Harran irrigation area which comprises the 43,000 ha. 
Sanliurfa and 98,500 ha. Harran irrigation subsystems stretch from the low plains south 
of the city of Sanliurfa to the Syrian border. The construction of irrigation canals began in 
1980 and were planned to be completed in 1992. Irrigation water required in the area is 
10,410 m^/yr. per ha, so about 1,520 million m^/yr. of irrigation water will be headed 
(unit water requirement changes are dependent on the crop and irrigation pattern, available 
moisture capacity of the soil and covering rate). The overall estimate of 10.410 nP/hectare 
per annum, however, seems to be a very minimalistic estimate. This figure upon which the 
Turks based their calculations of water consumption from the river appears to be 
unreasonable for this hot region so close to the Syrian desert, it is reasonable to assume 
that in this region the amount of annual water for an agricultural hectare needs to be at least 
double the figures upon which the Turks based themselves. Thus it appears here that like 
in a number of other regions (see table D1.10) political considerations are involved in the 
calculation of the amounts of water in order to try and not cause concern to Syria and Iraq. 
According to Bagis, these have been taken into consideration in estimating the irrigation 
envisaged in the GAP master plan (Bagis, 1989, 52-69). The size of the Mardin- 
Ceylanpinar Irrigation scheme which originates from the Sanliurfa tunnels and Mardin 
canal, will be 334,900 ha. Studies on this project have already been completed and the 
first stage, comprising 230,130 ha., should be completed in 1996, while the 104,809 ha. 
second stage is planned to be completed in the year 2000. The irrigation water requirement 
in the area is 10,005 m- /^yr. per ha, which implies about 3,360 million m- /^yr. of water for 
the whole project (NewSpot, 1 August 1991, 4).
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Figure D1.3:
Euphrates River : total water utilization by Turkey after the year 2000
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The Siverek-Hilvan pumping irrigation area which covers a total area of 160,100 ha. 
will be fed from the Ataturk Dam reservoir and the entire project, now at the preliminary 
planning stage, is envisaged to be fully implemented by the year 2002; irrigation water 
required in the area is estimated at 8,980 m^/yr. per ha, which implies a total water 
requirement of about 1,520 million m^/yr.
The Bozova irrigation area will cover a total of 69,700 ha. gross, of hilly terrain 
between the Hilvan and Bozova districts. Irrigation will be achieved by raising water from 
the Ataturk reservoir and the irrigation scheme project is expected to be completed in 1995. 
The irrigation water requirement in the area is 8,920 m^/yr. per ha, so about 720 million 
m^/yr. is estimated to be the annual requirement (Bagis, 1989, 53).
The Suruk-Baziki irrigation project is designed to irrigate an area of 146,500 ha. in 
the Baziki plains within the scope of the project along the Euphrates to the west of the 
Bozova district near the Ataturk Dam. 44,900 ha. of land will be irrigated from the Ataturk 
Dam's reservoir, mainly by gravity irrigation and, to some extent, by pumping.
The Suruk irrigation area is to the west of the Sanliurfa-Harran irrigation area, and 
extends to the Syrian border across the low plains and here, the total irrigated area will be
146,500 ha. with water for irrigation being pumped from the Ataturk reservoir.
In order to give continuity to water flow, especially at times when demand for water 
is high, three reservoirs, the Tozluca, Aylan, and Tasbasan, are planned to be built on the 
main waterway with a total active storage capacity of 27 Mm^. This project will be 
completed in several stages by the year 2000 when irrigation water required in the area will 
be 10,410 m^/yr. per ha, or about 1,470 million m^/yr. (NewSpot, 1 August 1991,4).
The Adiyaman-Kahta project is a multipurpose project aimed at the development of 
water resources on the right bank of the Ataturk Dam's reservoir in the central and 
northern parts of the province of Adiyaman. The total irrigated area is planned to be 
77,400 ha. with 29,600 ha. being served by the Ataturk Dam, 7,760 ha. by the Gomukan 
Dam, 6,100 ha. by the Camgazi Dam, 12,300 ha. by the Buyukcay Dam and 21,600 ha. 
by the Kocali Dam. The Adiyaman-Kahta Project will be completed in several stages by 
1994 when irrigation water requirement in the area will be approximately 7,626 m^/yr. per 
ha, or about 680 million m^/yr. (Bagis, 1989, 55).
The Adiyaman-Goksu Project will supply water for irrigation to 71,600 ha. gross, 
and city water to Gaziantep. The Cataltepe Dam on the Goksu river is the key-stracture of 
the project and feasibility studies for this project were completed in 1997. The irrigation 
water required will be 7,227 nvVyr. per ha, making a gross requirement of 430 million 
m ? /y r . (Bagis, 1989, 55).
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The Gaziantep project is designed to supply irrigation water to an 89,000 ha. area 
along the Syrian border. Irrigation water will mainly be supplied by pumping from the 
Birecik Dam but there are plans to take water from the Euphrates at Belkis and send it 
towards Kilis in a south-westerly direction. In 1997 the project will be completed and the 
irrigation water required will be 7,227 m^/yr. per ha., or 720 million m^/yr. required for 
the project (Bagis, 1989, 56). According to Kolars & Mitchell (1991), in addition to 
hydropower, 101,570 ha. are scheduled for irrigation largely from Lake Birecik and the 
Araban, Hancagis, and Kayacik reservoirs. The Birecik Dam and HPP are planned to be 
built approximately 92 km downstream from the Ataturk Dam and, with an active storage 
capacity of 972 million m^, will supply a significant part of the water for the Gaziantep 
irrigation project (although the reservoir may lose as much as 113 million m^ of water 
annually from evaporation). The Turkish government is currently negotiating with a 
European consortium to set up a 1,000 $US million to build-operate the Birecik Dam 
(MEED, 25 January, 1991, 13).
The Karkamish Dam is intended for energy production and the dam will be located on 
the river 33 km downstream from the Birecik site and 4.5 km upstream from the Syrian 
border (Bagis, 1989, 56). The reservoir may lose about 57 million m^ annually through 
evaporation.
The total proposed irrigation area of the GAP project is 1,083,460 ha. and, according 
to the GAP master plan, the amount of water required for irrigation is about 10.4 billion 
m^/yr. (see table D1.10).
Table D1.10:
Summary of GAP irrigation water requirements from the Euphrates
Irrigation scheme
Irrigation
area
Water
required
m^/yr./ha.
Water
required
Mm-Vyr.
Completion
date
Urfa-Haran 141,500 10,410 1,530 1992
Mardin-Ceylanpinar 334,900 10,005 3,360 2000
Siverek-Hilvan 160,100 8,920 1,520 2002
Bozova 69,700 8,920 720 1995
Suruk-Baziki 146,500 10,410 1,470 2000
Adiyaman-Kahta 77,400 7,626 680 1994
Adiyaman-Goksu 71,600 7,227 430 1997
Gaziantep Project 81,670 7,227 720 1997
Total 1,083,470 10,430
Source: Bagis, 1989, 52-70
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It would appear that these figures do not include evaporation from the reservoirs, 
domestic usage and industrial use, meaning that the total water utilization and losses could 
reach up to 14 billion m-^  (see figure D1.3).
Development plans for the GAP region include the improvement of urban water 
supplies. Total domestic water use in the Euphrates basin after the year 2000 has been 
estimated by Kolars & Mitchell at approximately 92.5 million m^/yr., while 82.5 million 
m^/yr. will be used for industrial purposes in the GAP region (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 
55).
D1.2 The utilization of the Euphrates river by Syria
Water poor, if not destitute, Syria has neither the ample rainfall of Turkey nor a second 
major stream such as the Tigris, nor valuable petroleum deposits as substantial as those of 
Iraq. Nevertheless, agriculture which employed 25.4 per cent of the labour force in 1984, 
is very important although declining element in the national economy. Only 30 per cent of 
the total area is agricultural land and only about 15 per cent of this is irrigated (MEI, 16 
April, 1993, 16). Traditionally, Syria was a net agricultural exporter of wheat, barley and 
cotton. In 1963 the value of agricultural imports was only 27 per cent of the agricultural 
exports but, by 1970, the food trade balance was in deficit and big wheat imports 
accounted for the bulk of the deficit. From 1970-1971, to 1976-1977 agricultural imports 
grew by 19 per cent/year and exports by only 14 per cent; so from the early seventies 
onwards Syria was importing significant quantities of food products and, in 1988, food 
made up about 71 per cent of the country's overall imports (Syria & Monde Arabs, No 
408, 1988, 1). More rapid growth in demand seems to have locked Syria into a permanent 
structural deficit of agricultural products when, being an agricultural country, exports 
should according to Hinnebusch have been earning the net income to pay for the 
machinery and finished products which the country's level of development did not allow 
(Hinnebusch, 1989, 274).
The Syrian government has pursued several major goals for the agricultural sector 
which are framed within the context of much broader national development goals such as 
sustained economic growth, increased national self-sufficiency, full employment and 
greater social equity and economic well-being. The expansion of irrigated areas was to be 
part of the strategy to reduce dependence upon rain-fed cultivation through the 
development of the waters of the Euphrates. The policies have come to be perceived by 
many as the panacea for Syria's agricultural problems (Manners & Nejad, 1985, 257). 
Excluding the Euphrates and its tributaries (the Sajur, the Balikh, and the Khabur), 
approximately 119,000 ha. are irrigated elsewhere in the country in the Orontes (Asi), the
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Yarmouk, the Queik and the Barada river valleys and several smaller streams. These 
sources are limited and, if used to total capacity, might provide another 175,000 ha. of 
irrigated land (Kolars, 1991a, 9).
Prior to 1950, the waters of the Euphrates were little used and traditional lifts (often 
camel powered), brought what little water reached fields on to the river's banks. 
Following independence, speculation in cotton by Syrian merchants led to a rapid increase 
in the number of gasoline pumps drawing water from the river (Kolars & Mitchell, 7997, 
144).
The first withdrawal of water in Syria downstream from the Turkish border will be on 
the Syrian portion of the Sajur (Turkish: Sacir) river which rises in Turkey and enters the 
Euphrates from the right bank. The annual discharge value of the Sajur is about 80 million 
m^ but the small Kayacik Dam and reservoir which can store 46 million m^ in Turkey 
might further reduce stream flow as a result of the irrigation of about 13,700 ha. at 
Gaziantep (Bagis, 1989, 56). According to Kolars & Mitchell (1991) a total of 20.3 
million m^ could be removed from the Sajur's flow downstream (Kolars & Mitchell, 
1991, 110).
The Construction of the Tishreen Dam began at the end of 1989 and, according to the 
Syrian official newspaper "Al-Ba'ath", the storage capacity of the dam is 1,883 million m^ 
(1,300 million m^ according to Kolars), and the reservoir area is 166 km^ (70 km^ 
according to Kolars). The reservoir may lose as much as 157 million m^ annually to 
evaporation ("Al-Ba'ath, 7 January, 1990; Kolars, 1991a, 16).
Continuing downstream, the head of Lake Assad formed by the Tabqa Dam is 
encountered south of Yusuf Pasha at the village of Remis. This reservoir has a storage 
capacity, when filled to a height of 40 m (300 m above sea level), of 11,600 million m^, 
and a surface area of 625 km^ but the reservoir may lose as much as 1,570 million m^/yr. 
(Kolars, 1991a, 16). An underground aqueduct leads from a pumping station on Lake 
Assad to the city of Allepo and carries about 80 million for domestic demand (Kolars 
& Mitchell, 1991, 110). Lake Assad will also serve five or six proposed irrigation districts 
and 200,000 ha has recently been proposed for irrigation for areas north and south of 
Aleppo with water for these fields being taken from Lake Assad as well. Water utilization 
rates of about 12,500 m^ per hectare which are anticipated with about 6,750 m^ per 
hectare return flow are based on values computed for similar areas nearby. Such removals 
and returns may start in 1992, and will increase steadily until the year 2010.
The Ba'ath Dam whose construction began in 1982 and was completed in 1986, was 
built with Soviet assistance, 25 km downstream from Tabqa (An-Nahar Arab Report &
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MEMO, 19 March, 1984, 20). According to the Syrian official newspaper "Al-Ba'ath" 
the storage capacity of the dam is 90 million m^ and the reservoir area 2.7 km^ (Al
Ba'ath, 21 June, 1988; Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 153) .
Figure D1.4:
The Euphrates river in Syria: major water projects
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The Balikh (Turkish: Culap) which enters on the left bank and receives the bulk of its 
water from the Ain Arous spring in Syria near the Turkish border is the next tributary. The 
catchment area for the water of the Balikh system is about 185,000 ha., of which 140,000 
is designated for irrigation (Al-Ba'ath, 8 March, 1990). The 116 km length of the Balikh 
in Syria is heavily utilized for irrigation and the annual discharge of the river is about 190 
million m^/yr. which is 0.6 per cent of the total flow of the Euphrates river. According to 
Kolars & Mitchell (1991), the return flow from the irrigation schemes planned in the Urfa- 
Harran plain, may range between 2300 and 5,800 rn^/ha. This will increase the annual 
flow of the river from the underground aquifer by amounts ranging from 368 to 928 
million m^ and this may present new opportunities for irrigation in Syria, but the quality 
of the water may be poor (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 111).
The final contribution to the flow of the Euphrates comes from the Khabur (Turkish: 
Culap) river system, which joins the mainstream 40 km downstream from Deir ez-Zor. 
The sources of the Khabur are a giant spring, the Ras el-Ain, and additional seasonal 
surface flows from Turkey in late winter and early spring. With an average annual 
discharge of 1,219 million m^, Ras el-Ain, amongst the largest of the great karst springs 
of the world lies almost midway between the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, just south of 
the Syrian-Turkish frontier, in a region of open rolling plains. The water issues from some 
thirteen springs which combine to form the effective head of the Khabur river (Burdon & 
Safadi, 1962, 58). The Turkish aquifer supplying the Ras el-Ain contains a rechargeable 
supply of 852 million m^/yr. (Kolars, 1991a, 17) ; and the ’’natural" total flow of the 
stream is about 1,780 million nP/yr. which amounts to six per cent of the total flow of the 
Euphrates river system. According to Kolars, more than 80 per cent of the waters of the 
Khabur and its tributaries originate in Turkey and will be affected by that country's 
development plans.
The course of the Khabur river extends for approximately 120 km in Turkey and 
another 486 km in Syria. Although the catchment area for the waters of the Khabur system 
lies 45 per cent within Turkey and 55 per cent within Syria, 83 per cent of the total flow 
originates in Turkey (about 1,500 million m^) (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 167-191). In 
1985 Bulgaria agreed to built two dams on the Khabur river in a project which is designed 
to irrigate eventually 40,000 ha. and includes a canal linking the two dams (Fisher, 1989, 
795). Water loss from reservoirs planned along the Khabur will approach 333 million 
m^/yr. (Kolars, 1991a, 17). The total irrigation area was originally estimated to be
400.000 ha. but a recent news release by Kolars & Mitchell (1991) gives a total of about
138.000 ha. for the Upper Khabur region (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 152). According to 
the Syrian official newspaper ’’Tishrin’’, however, the irrigation area in the upper Khabur 
region will eventually be 153,700 ha. (Tishrin, 11 March, 1992, 7).
139
Figure D1.5:
Diagrammatic hydrogeological sections at Ras-el-Ain
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Figure D1.6:
Streams and springs of the Jezirah
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The original Syrian plans to irrigate 640,000 ha. of land with water from the 
Euphrates river have been revised downward drastically. According to Kolars & Mitchell 
(1991) almost all of these downward revisions have been the result of unexpected 
problems relating to gypsiferous soils, which dissolve upon contact with water leaking 
from the new canals, thus disrupting the entire system as it is being put into place. Recent 
estimates by the Syrian government indicate that between 240,000 and 260,000 ha. of 
land will be irrigated in the main valley when the projects are completed (Kolars & 
Mitchell, 1991, 274). If one adds 153,700 ha. of irrigation land planned for the Upper 
Khabur to this amount, the "best guesstimate" for potential irrigation land from the 
Euphrates river and its tributaries will be about 411,000 ha. The total Euphrates river 
water depletion after taking into account the return flow and the evaporation losses will 
amount to about 6.9 billion m^/yr. (see table D1.11).
Table D l . l l :
Syria: irrigation projects and estimated water depletion
Project name Irrigation area Return flow Water loss
(hectares) (million m^/yr.) (million m^/yr.)
Tishreen Dam 157
Aleppo diversion 80
Lake Assad 1,570
Maskanah 74,300 591.2 932
Balikh 106,000 613.7 1,140
Middle Euphrates 29,000 273.9 488
Lower Euphrates 50,000 453.3 842
Upper Khabur 153,700 908.0 1,203
Total 411,000 2,840.1 6,896
Sources: Kolars & Mitchell, 1991,275-279; Tishrin, 11 March 1992,7
Another source, Briefing (1990), quotes 345,000 ha. as the amount that can reasonably be 
irrigated from the Euphrates, and about an additional 138,000 ha. in the Khabur basin 
making the total potential irrigated area from the Euphrates about 483,000 ha. (Briefing, 
15 January, 1990, 7). This figure is higher than the data presented by Kolars & Mitchell 
but, even if we accept this estimate, it implies that the total amount of water that Syria will 
need annually in the future will reach 7.5 billion m^ assuming water application of 15,500 
m^/ha/yr., a high level. This figure is similar to the estimates of the future water needs of 
Syria presented by Waterbury -1990, Clawson -1971 (see table D1.2), the Al-Kabs data 
-1990 (see table D1.5) and the Nomas figures -1988 (table D1.8) (Waterbury, 1990,14 ; 
Clawson, 1971,114 ; Al-Kabs, 12 March 1990 ; Nomas, 1988, 340).
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Of these sources Waterbury and Clawson can be regarded as objective. Al-Kabs and 
Nomas are likely to have taken an Iraqi perspective which could tend to de-emphasis Syria 
water needs. The most important data are those relating to likely irrigation water needs in 
Syria. The Kolars and Mitchell data seem realistic in the light of experience in the 1970s 
and the 1980s and available technology.
The limited irrigation water needs of Syria are an important element in the water 
balance equation for the Euphrates system. Even assuming a high level of average water 
use per hectare the water demand for irrigation would only be 7.5 billion m^ per year 
which could be regarded as a negotiable share of the water in the Euphrates and its Syrian 
tributaries.
D1.3 The utilization of the Euphrates river by Iraq
Although in oil-rich Iraq agriculture accounts for less than 10 per cent of the GNP in an 
economy which is dominated by the petroleum industry elaborate plans and efforts have 
been made to continue to manage the rivers. Nevertheless, Iraq remains a net importer of 
food despite the Iraqi government's declared aim to reach self-sufficiency in agriculture. 
To achieve this, the most probable policies adopted will be expansion of the area under 
cultivation and improvement in irrigation water supply (ElU, July 1980, 56). Iraq's 
economic potential is enormous. It has the second largest oil reserves in the world, a large 
area of relatively fertile land in terms of its domestic food needs, extensive cultivable areas 
available for reclamation and irrigation, an abundant supply of water and vast quantities of 
phosphates in addition to other raw materials. Nevertheless, the fertility of Iraq's soils is a 
complicated issue. Its rainfed regions are difficult to manage because of the unreliable 
rains. Its irrigable lands have generally poor soils which experience similar problems to 
those of Syria and much more serious salinity. Despite its dependency upon earnings from 
petroleum exports, almost all of its industry is based upon food processing and textiles.
Observers tend to believe that Iraq's position is somewhat unique with respect to the 
water issue on account of the importance it attaches to self-sufficiency in every field. With 
a population of over 19.5 million in 1991 and a high birth rate, Iraq sees agricultural self- 
sufficiency as vital and, since 1980, about 20 million Iraqi Dinars have been invested by 
the government in agriculture and related industries including an agricultural reform 
programme carried out in 1987. According to the "8 Days Report" (1981) the Iraqis 
became convinced that they would become the food basket of the Gulf once oil ran out, on 
condition that they continued to develop their agriculture (8 Days, 24 December 1981, 53).
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In 1980 despite producing 2.22 million tonnes of cereals, Iraq still had to import 2.48 
million tonnes to meet its internal consumption needs.
The main systems providing water for irrigation are based on the Euphrates and the 
Tigris and officials in Baghdad share the belief that, once the waters of the Euphrates and 
the Tigris are fully utilized through dams and reservoirs, the area of cultivated land in Iraq 
will be almost doubled (1985 figures show cultivated land at 3.6 million ha). For Baghdad 
agricultural sufficiency is not seen as an isolated issue, since Iraq considers self- 
sufficiency in agriculture a matter of national security and political stability or, at least, as a 
prime component of such security (Briefing, 15 January, 1990, 7). Al-Hadithi (1979) 
calculated that the application of modem techniques to irrigation and agriculture, would 
allow the irrigated area of Iraq to be multiplied to three times the present with the available 
water resources alone; and the average net benefit coming from one hectare of cultivated 
land could be made 3.5 times higher than at present (Al-Hadithi, 1979, 184).
Iraq has a relatively small population, but has the largest number of inhabitants of the 
three riparians living within the Euphrates valley. In 1990 Iraq also contained the greatest 
area of irrigated land within the basin but faced the most severe agricultural and water- 
related problems of the three riparians. Iraq's great land and water resources appear to 
offer the possibility of rich agricultural development, and its hydrocarbon endowment 
seems to provide the financial resources for investment generally and for rapid 
industrialization (ElU, July 1980, 59). However, Iraq has never enjoyed long periods of 
stability. In 1990 the agricultural sector produced a bumper cereal crop following 
favourable rains which, in view of the UN sanctions imposed on 6 August, was critically 
important. Wheat production was 1.2 million tonnes and barley 1.9 million tonnes figures 
which were 75 per cent up on 1989, a rather poor year. The normal consumption of wheat 
was about 3.5 million tonnes per year and the largest share of barley was grown for 
livestock but, in general, Iraq was producing about one-third of the grain it needed. In the 
years before the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq imported about 70 per cent of its food measured 
in calories and 80 per cent measured in value. In 1989 it imported 2 million tonnes of 
wheat, 500,000 tonnes of rice, 350,000 tonnes of flour, 320,000 tonnes of maize,
600,000 tonnes of sugar, and 280,000 tonnes of palm oil (The Middle East Review, 
1991-92, 69).
The war with Iran caused Iraq to make a greater effort to improve agricultural self- 
sufficiency and reduce its food bil- but the results were poor. Throughout the 1970's and 
1980's, enormous resources (many billions of dollars) were put into very expensive 
irrigation and land reclamation schemes which, by 1990, had not had any significant 
impact on overall crop production. The UN embargo has given Iraq its biggest push yet 
towards achieving self-sufficiency in food. Meanwhile food production in 1990 was lower 
than it was thirty years before since neglected irrigated land could not be brought back
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into cultivation quickly because of the salinity problem. The Kuwait war resulted in the 
disruption of electric power generation throughout the country which in turn curtailed the 
pumping of water for both agriculture and domestic purposes. Under these circumstances 
it is difficult to estimate the effect of the impairment of facilities on the effectiveness of 
agricultural activity.
By 1990 there had long been a shortage of labour in agriculture (which still employed 
one-third of the work force) and the need of the army for men competed with the needs of 
the land. A feature of Iraqi agriculture, and particularly irrigated agriculture in the late 
1970s and the 1980s was the contribution of Egyptian farmers to the rural work-force. It 
is difficult to estimate the numbers of Egyptian working on Iraqi farms and government 
irrigation schemes out of the 2.5 million or so Egyptians in Iraq during much of this 
period but it was likely to have been over 500,000. Iraq lost hundreds of thousands of the 
Egyptian farm labourers who fled the country after the 1990 Kuwait crisis. According to 
The Middle East Review (1991-92), it seems likely that Iraq and its people could have 
survived beyond 1991 (and perhaps much longer) on the food front provided their own 
wheat production held up. Bread was a vital issue and in September 1990, Iraqi farmers 
were ordered by the government to plant 80 per cent of their land with wheat (The Middle- 
East Review, 1991- 92, 69). On 3 December 1991, the Iraqi prime minister Mohammed 
Hamzah, affirmed that the Western coalition countries had used the critical importance of 
food in people’s lives as a weapon through imposing an economic blockade (SWB, 5 
December, 1991, 8).
Iraq, being a lower Euphrates riparian country, is in a very vulnerable position vis-a- 
vis Turkey and Syria. In order to estimate the average "natural" river flow, it is necessary 
to add the amounts of water diverted from the flow measured at several points below all 
major tributaries. Clawson (1971), using a report from the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, in which estimates of irrigation diversions in Turkey, 
Syria, and Iraq were made, estimated "natural" river flows as follows. The measured river 
records at Hit Iraq for the period 1937-1964 showed a total average of 29.24 billion 
rn^/yr., net diversion in Turkey plus the "return flow" from irrigation ) was 1.49 billion 
m^/yr.; and the net diversion in Syria of 2.96 billion m^/yr. According to this account, the 
total "natural" amount of Euphrates river flow at Hit should be 33.69 billion m^/yr. 
(Clawson, 1971, 205). According to the GAP master plan, the annual "natural flow" data 
of the Euphrates at Belkiskoy gauging station on the Syrian border between 1940 and 
1980 was 30.34 billion m^/yr. (GAP, 1990, Vol. 4, 30). The discharge value of the 
Sajur, Balikh, and the Khabur in Syria was about 2.05 billion m^/yr., so the average 
"natural" river flow in Hit Iraq could be estimated to be about 32.4 billion m^/yr. - a figure 
1.2 billion less than calculated by Clawson. Ubell (1971), Beaumont, (1978) and Gischler 
(1979), use the amount of 31.8 billion m^/yr. as the annual average volume of flow from
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1931 till 1969 (Ubell, 1971, 3; Beaumont, 1978, 35; Gischler, 1979, 100). Kolars & 
Mitchell (1991) based their research on the 49-year records provided by Al-Hadithi for Hit 
for an annual average of 28.4 billion nA  The average difference is 2,460 million nA  
more at Hit than in Birecik Turkey, based on 27 years of measurements (1937-1963) and 
this figure is lower than Ubell's values by about 3.4 billion nAyr. (Kolars & Mitchell, 
1991, 104-113). Abbas' figures which are based upon 46 years of measurements show an 
average flow of 29.26 billion m3 at Hit in Iraq (Abbas, 1984, 90). Another source, the 
Haigh Commission Report (1951), estimated the average annual water surplus of the 
Euphrates river in Iraq, based on 22 years of measurements (1925-1946), at only 26.4 
billion m^ (Haigh, 1951, 39). Nomas' figures which are based upon 24 years of 
measurement from 1956 to 1980 show an average flow of only 26 billion m^ at Hit in Iraq 
(Nomas, 1988, 338). As it is analysed in figure D1.2 it appears that the most reliable 
figures are those of Ubell, Al-Hadithi and Abbas which show the average flow to be 29.3- 
31.8 billion m^ and if we take the average of the figures the natural flow of the river is
30.5 billion nA
According to Al-Dahiri (1969), the most important areas irrigated by flow through 
canals from the Euphrates river can be designated as follows: the middle Euphrates area, 
the Hindiya barrage area, and the lower Euphrates area. The middle Euphrates canals are 
in the central parts of the country where the Tigris and the Euphrates flow close to each 
other, taking off water from the bank of the Euphrates river about 160 kilometres below 
Ramadi. The irrigation canals in these areas are the Saglawiya, Abu-Ghraib, Youssifiya 
and Latifiya, all which run roughly parallel courses between the two rivers and which 
actually irrigated about 95,000 ha. of land in 1945. The Hindiya barrage canals are the 
Hilla and Kifi canals on the left bank of the Euphrates and the Hussainiya and Bani 
Hassan on the right bank. There are two small canals taking off water from the left bank 
near the city of Musayab called the Musayab and the Nasiriya canals and, 36 km above the 
barrage on the left bank, is the Iskandaria branch. The total irrigated area in 1945 was 
about 186,000 ha. The lower Euphrates canals, mainly the Shamiya and the Kufa start 
from below the Hindiya barrage and end in the lake of Hore Al-Hammer. According to 
these figures the total area along the Euphrates river actually irrigated in 1945 was about
281,000 ha. (Al-Dahiri, 1969,122).
Another source, the Haigh Commission Report, made in 1949 after some three years 
of field investigation, estimated the total gross area in the Euphrates valley available and 
suitable for cultivation to be about 2.28 million ha. Only 1.17 million ha. of this total was 
under cultivation, and only 447,250 ha. were actually planted annually with winter crops, 
while most of the rest was left fallow. The report states that, with the installation of flood 
control works, water storage, drainage, land reclamation, new irrigation canals and the
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improvement of existing canals, one million ha. more could be irrigated, bringing the 
possible total to about 2.17 million ha. (Haigh, 1951, 8). According to the KTAM report 
made by a New York engineering firm in 1952, the total arable and irrigable area in the 
Euphrates valley amounted to 1.92 million ha., of which 1.22 million, ha were cultivated 
under the fallow system, generating an annual water requirement of 6.1 billion m3. 
Furthermore, another 700,000 ha. of arable land could be brought under irrigation 
(Quabain, 1960, 61). According to Al-Khashab (1958), the gross total irrigation area in 
the Euphrates valley amounted to 1.2 million ha. of which about one million ha. were 
cultivated in 1955 with an average annual water consumption of slightly over 9.6 billion 
m^. The greater part about 9.57 billion m3 was consumed by irrigation, 26 million m3 
was consumed for domestic uses, and 7.7 million by municipal industry. The future 
annual demands for Euphrates water would be 13 billion m3 according to the same source 
(Al -Khashab, 1958, 97). Turning to another source, Al-Hadithi (1979) claims that the 
total area of the Euphrates basin in Iraq that was under irrigation at the end of the 1970s, 
was about 1.54 million ha. using an average of 16 billion m3 of water annually (Al- 
Hadithi, 1979, 6). The estimates of water use by Iraq range, therefore, from 6.1 billion 
m  ^per year in the 1950s to 16 billion m3 per year in the 1970s and projections suggested 
that 17.4 billion m3 per year would be used in the year 2000 (see table D1.12).
The estimates of irrigated land in Iraq's Euphrates basin, show considerable 
differences from the figures gathered by researchers from the forties to the seventies. 
These differences are as large as half a million hectares. Even bigger differences can be 
found in figures for the agricultural potential of the Euphrates basin which reach as high as 
one million hectares. It seems that this discrepancy in the figures is principally because of 
different definition of the agricultural land potential, inaccurate data and different 
definitions for the area found to be being worked agriculturally which, perhaps, arises out 
of the large amount of extensive agriculture. Actually in the figures which present the 
potential for irrigated land in the Euphrates Valley, the figures presented by the Iraqi 
government are the lowest and it appears that they are the most reliable. According to the 
Iraqi Ministry of Planning data, the annual irrigated area in the Euphrates basin in the year 
2000 will be 1.05 million ha. compared to 926,000 ha. in the 1970s while the annual 
water required for irrigation will be 15 billion m3/yr. compared to 12.4 billion m 3/y r. in 
the 1970s (Al-Hadithi, 1979, 106). This figure is lower than figures calculated by other 
researchers and this also impresses one as being the most reliable and reasonable figure for 
Iraq's water needs. This amount, however, is similar to the average amount of water 
calculated from the maximum to the minimum as presented by Al-Hadithi.
The discharge of the Euphrates varies widely from year to year but, until 1952, very 
little was done to control the periodic flood menace. The worst recorded flood of the 
Euphrates, in 1966-67, had a maximum discharge of 63.4 billion m3 at Hit, and the
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lowest discharges was 10.7 billion in 1929-30 (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991,102). As a result 
the Iraqi Development Board gave first priority in its programme to flood control projects. 
According to Beaumont (1978) a striking feature of Iraq since the 1940s has been the 
increasing use of the water resources of the Euphrates, largely for irrigation purposes. 
Ubell (1971) quoted an average figure for water withdrawals of 16363 million m^/yr. 
between Hit and Hindiya for the 10 year period from 1960 to 1969. Ubell also quotes an 
average figure of 13,300 m^ per hectare/yr. Both Ockerman & Samano, (1985), and Al- 
Hadithi (1979) have claimed that the withdrawals amounted to about 16,000 m^ per 
hectare/yr. and this implies that, about 1.23 million hectares were irrigated between Hit 
and Hindiya. These figures, however, do not give any indication of the amount of water 
abstracted downstream from the Hindiya barrage or upstream from Hit, where little 
irrigation was carried out (Ubell, 1971, 49: Beaumont, 1978 , 37: Al-Hadithi, 1979, 6; 
Ockerman & Samano, 1985, 193). According To Al-Khashab (1958), the potential 
evapotranspiration is more than 1,200 mm/yr. depth over the estimated area cropped. In 
addition an allowance of 35 per cent of the diversion requirement may be added for 
justifiable waste, conveyance and application; and this would increase the water required 
to irrigate to about 1,700 mm/yr. depth (Al-Khashab, 1958, 99). The figure for the 
highest amount of evaporation, (and the most detailed), is presented in the doctoral thesis 
of Nomas (1988). The calculations are based upon the average evaporation at Haditha, 
Habbaniya, Diwaniya, Nasiriya and Basra. Accordingly the average annual evaporation in 
the Euphrates basin in Iraq reaches 2.5m a year (Nomas, 1988, 329). By 1970, according 
to Waterbury (1990), Iraq was already using about 18 billion m^ of irrigation water per 
annum, or the equivalent of about 60 per cent of the natural discharge of the Euphrates 
(Waterbury, 1990, 8). Despite the findings of these experts, in 1973 Syria claimed that 
Iraq’s actual irrigated area was only 835,000 hectares and not the 1.2 million claimed by 
Iraq making its water needs no more than 12 billion m^ (Waterbury, 1990, 17).
Here we also see a very great difference in the figures of different experts and it 
seems that this variance arises out of inaccurate data published from time to time by the 
Iraqi government and, in addition, considerable differences between agricultural potential, 
the development plans and their implementation.
Al-Hadithi claims that an improvement of the existing irrigation system and field 
practice, (assuming both an irrigation efficiency of 60 per cent and an increase of crop 
yield by 10 per cent over the average in the 1970s) would lead to a considerable drop in 
irrigation water requirements to 9.36 billion m^ per year. By adding 5 billion m^ losses in 
the irrigation channels, the average satisfactory flow of the Euphrates river in Iraq in the 
year 2000, would exceed 16.44 billion m^/yr. If the irrigation system improved, the 
transit discharge would not be required and 5 billion m^/yr. would be saved. The domestic 
and industrial water required in the year 2000 would be about 940 million m^, so the total 
demand would reach 10.2 billion m^ with the improvement of the system, and 17.44
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billion without improvement (see table D1.12) (Al-Hadithi, 1979, 103-117). It should 
be noted that the efficiency figures presented by Al-Hadithi are very high and apparently 
take into account the re-use of water. In any case it is difficult to assume that Iraq will be 
capable of improving its irrigation system up to the level presented by Al-Hadithi.
Table D1.12:
Iraq - the Euphrates river mean monthly water requirement in the year 
2000
Month
Irrigation
water
(Mm^)
Domestic and 
industrial 
(Mm^)
Total with 
improved irrigation 
system (m^/sec)
Total without 
improved irrigation 
system (m^/sec)
January 561.6 80 240 438
February 522.2 80 249 462
March 1104.5 80 442 707
April 1113.8 80 430 730
May 767.5 80 316 540
June 964.1 80 403 653
July 917.3 80 372 614
August 917.3 80 372 614
September 533.5 80 237 432
October 280.8 80 135 298
November 870.5 80 367 605
December 776.9 80 320 544
Annual (m^/sec) 324 553
Annual (billion m^) 10.20 17.44
Source: Al-Hadithi, 1979, 112-117
A detailed account of Iraq's development projects along the Euphrates river shows a 
very complex structure which includes dams, reservoirs and tens of irrigation canals as 
well as a clear and very large gap between the development plans and the area actually 
irrigated. Undoubtedly this difference between the planning and the actual execution 
contributes to the lack of clarity of the data concerning the amount of land irrigated and 
Iraq’s future water needs.
There are numerous works on the Euphrates River in Iraq including water storage, 
water diversion and conveyance systems for irrigation.
The Ramadi Barrage: Work on this barrage, which is located across the Euphrates 
and is 209 meters long and fourteen meters high, began in 1953. The barrage arrests the 
upstream water of the river and thus reduces the flood danger while the excess flood water 
is diverted to the lake through the Warier regulator which, together with the Warier Inlet
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Canal, was completed in 1952. The canal, which is 8.5 kilometres long, connects the river 
with the lake, and the 10 kilometre long Dhibban Outlet Canal and Regulator, (completed 
in 1951) connects the lake with the Euphrates. Its purpose is to feed the river from water 
stored in Lake Habbaniya during the dry season. The Majjara Escape Canal, (completed in 
1945) is 8.2 kilometres long and connects the lake with the Abu Dibbis depression which 
is a natural depression with no outlet canal and is used only for flood control purposes. 
The Abu Dibbis depression, which is about 30 metres below the average flood level at 
Ramadi and extends over an area of about 150 km^, attains a retaining capacity in the lake 
of as much as 10 billion m^ at its higher storage level (Quabain, 1960, 65).
Lake Habbaniya serves the dual purpose of being a flood escape and a storage 
reservoir. The lake is a large depression 25 kilometres long, and 12 kilometres wide and, 
until 1956, had a storage capacity of 13 billion nP. In that year, work on raising the dikes 
from 49.5 to 51 metres above sea level was completed, giving it a storage capacity of 3.25 
billion m^ (Al-Hadithi, 7979, 9 ; Al-A'ni, 1977, 35; Quabain, 1960, 64). The estimated 
annual evaporation from the lake is 1.08 million m^ (Nomas, 1988, 332).
The Hindiya barrage, completed in 1913, is the oldest barrage in Iraq, and diverts 
water from the Hindiya branch of the Euphrates into a canal that was expected to irrigate
750,000 ha. in the Euphrates Basin, but actually irrigates only half this area (Al-A'ni, 
1977, 35; Quabain, 1960, 71). According to McLachlan, no less than 40 per cent of the 
land is uncultivated as a result of salinity problems (McLachlan, 1976, 48). The Hilla 
canal system, a network of 13 canals that draws water from the Hindiya branch, is 
commanded by the Hindiya barrage and is the largest canal in Iraq served by a single 
intake.
Abu-Ghurib Canal: The First important project started by the Iraqi Irrigation 
Department was the digging and opening of this canal since the old canal had silted up as a 
result of neglect. The canal which was designed to irrigate about 66,000 ha. was opened 
in 1935 to take water from the Euphrates river south of the city of Fallouja to near by 
Baghdad (Al-Dahiri, 1969, 116).
The Baghdad Canals: These are five canals that draw their water from the 
Euphrates and flow towards Baghdad along the Tigris because of the natural slope of the 
land; they cover an area of 211,000 hectares, but actually irrigate 102,000 ha. (Al-A'ni, 
1977, 35).
The Greater Musayyib Project: Work on this project in an area 10 kilometres to 
the north of the Hindiya barrage began in 1953 and was completed in 1956 bringing 
33,480 ha under irrigation including 20,000 ha of arable land (Al-A'ni, 1977, 439). The 
work consisted of two parts: first, enlarging, remodelling, and extending the old canal,
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(which was 50 km long, had twelve lateral canals, and a 500 kilometre network of small 
canals) and second, providing full drainage facilities for the areas to be irrigated (Quabain, 
1960, 72).
Figure D1.7:
The Euphrates river in Iraq: major water projects
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Euphrates Tail Regulators: This rice-growing area above Lake Hammer, suffers 
from constant erosion which has made the bed of the Euphrates there so low in relation to 
the silted land that water distribution in the dry season has become almost impossible. To 
control erosive action, and to raise the water level in the river when needed, five regulators 
were installed on the tails of the Euphrates before Lake Hammer. The project began in 
1954 (Quabin, 1960, 72).
Tharthar-Euphrates Canal: This is a canal that stretches between the Tharthar 
lake, near Samara, and the Euphrates river. The storage capacity of the lake is 85 billion 
m^, in a reservoir extending over 2,050 km^, but the Tharthar project also reserves about 
22 billion m^ of water which may be used for irrigation (Al-Dahiri, 1969,121). In 1976, 
the Iraqi government completed the 37.7 kilometre long Tharthar-Euphrates canal which 
has a capacity of 1,100 m^/sec. The project, which is intended to feed the Euphrates from 
the lake and save Baghdad and the central and southern reaches of the Tigris from floods, 
was due to be completed in 1976 (Al-A'ni, 1977, 419). In 1977 work started on the 
construction of the Tharthar-Tigris canal to discharge water from the Tharthar- reservoir 
back to the Tigris river. A canal from the AI- Baghdad Dam (begun in 1990) on the 
Euphrates to Lake Tharthar will make it possible, in turn, to remove water from the 
Euphrates to the Tigris (Kolars, 1991a, 12). As of the year 1990, the discharge of the 
Tharthar canal ranges from 150 rn^/sec to 500 m ^ /s e c ,  according to the flood in the Tigris 
river and the irrigation requirements of the south part of the Euphrates. The water quality 
of the Tharthar lake is improving due to the continues addition of fresh water from the 
Tigris river, especially during the flood season (AMER, 1992, 3).
The Third River Canal Project (the Leader River): According to Radio 
Baghdad (16 May, 1992) the Third River Canal Project (Marsh al-Am) which stretches 
from Baghdad to Basra, will be 565 km long and will help irrigate 1.5 million ha of 
agricultural land in the basins of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers (SWB, 26 May 1992, 
Al/2; North 1993, 11). This could increase Iraq's crop production by up to 50 per cent 
(Pearce, 1993,12). Studies for the project were ordered as early as 1952 from American 
firms and work began a year later but was interrupted because of the 1980-1988 war with 
Iran. The project also aims to rid agricultural land in the region of high salinity. The Third 
River is linked to a number of drainage canals near Baghdad and work on the project 
covers the execution of a large drainage network which stretches from the Ishaqi drainage 
canal up to Shatt al-Basra to finally flow drain into the Third river basin.
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Photo 9:
Iraq - satellite image of the Third River (August 1992)
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The main canal will be 8m deep, 90m wide, have a base width of 36m and will pass 
through Hawr al- Hammer and Hawr al-Likkab lakes. A large pumping station with a 
capacity of 220 m^/sec will be built to pump the water from the Euphrates river, and the 
Third River could be used for river shipping activities, such as the transportation of goods 
from the Shatt al-Arab to the city of Numaniya (SWB, 26 May 1992, A 1/2 ; SWB, 16 
Jun., 1992, A 1/2 ; MEED, 10 July, 16). On 25th August 1992, Iraq announced that it 
would complete the "Third River" project by the end of August 1992, and thus create 
another river in addition to the Tigris and Euphrates (SWB, 28 August 1992, A/9). The 
final result would be to provide Iraq with the urgently needed food that it has been denied 
under the UN embargo after its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The project would 
drain the southern marshland, where Shi'i opposition groups are active (SWB, 28 August 
1992, A/9; SWB, 16 August 1992, A/7). This is the main reason for international reaction 
to the project being mainly based upon political arguments for building it and less upon the 
economic needs of Iraq. According to North (1993) they will be completely dry by the end 
of summer 1993 (North, 1993, 11). An analysis of a recent US satellite image taken in 
August 1992 clearly shows the course of the Third River marked here as the "Main Outfall 
Drain" (see photo 9).
The Qudisia (Haditha) Dam: According to the EIU report (1987-88) the strategy 
of the Iraqi government in recent years has been to compensate for the construction of new 
dams upstream in Turkey and Syria by providing over year storage inside Iraqi territory 
(EIU, 1987-88, 23). The dam also releases the Habbaniya reservoir from its flood control 
function, which will increase its efficiency for irrigation purposes (Al-Hadithi, 1979, 10). 
The policy of extending more effective control over Iraq's water resources has already 
brought benefits and, in the summer of 1984, the Iraqi government was able to release 
stored water to farmers, to offset the low level of the Euphrates (Fisher, 1991, 480).
The construction of a 660 MW hydro-electric power station at the Haditha dam 
(renamed the Qadisiya dam) on the Euphrates river was started in 1981 by a Yugoslavian 
construction firms, 70 km from the Syrian-Iraqi border (The Arab Economist, October 
1981, 6 : 8 Days, March 1981, 21). The construction of the 6.4 billion m^ dam was 
completed in 1985 (Ockerman & Samano, 1985, 194). The estimated annual evaporation 
from the lake is 1.13 billion nP (Nomas, 1988, 332).
According to Al-Hadithi (1979) the engineering-geological-topographical features and 
problems of the Qadisiya dam are rather complex. Gypsiferous rocks, extensive karst, and 
a high percentage of clay have all complicated the construction of the project and since the 
ground surface of the reservoir area is almost flat, it makes the surface of the reservoir 
very large and the lake shallow, which will cause a tremendous amount of water loss from 
evaporation. Trapping of the sediments by the Qadisiya reservoir will change the balance
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of sediment discharge in the Euphrates river downstream from the dam, and this will 
change the river's width and depth and affect the activities on the river banks. The benefit 
of Qadisiya reservoir for irrigation is negligible and the only benefit is hydro-power and 
regulating the river flow (Al-Hadithi, 1979, 10).
The Al-Baghdadi Dam: Another hydro - electric power plant was planned in Al- 
Baghdadi dam on the Euphrates river, 40 km downstream from the Qadisiya dam. The 
work started in 1990 and stopped one year later due to the economic situation resulting 
from the Gulf War and the UN sanctions (AMER, 1992, 32).
D1.4 Analysis of the current and future overall supplies and 
demands of water - the Euphrates system
Turkey
As expected, it seems that Turkey, as the upstream state, is the least dependent upon the 
Euphrates. Even with the development of the GAP project, the great bulk of Turkey's 
agricultural production will take place outside the Euphrates river system. Politically, 
however, the GAP is very important to the Turkish government, since, not only is 
Southeast Anatolia Turkey's poorest region but it also contains the bulk of Turkey's 
Kurdish population, and has been the object of cross-border terrorist attacks by militant 
Kurds from Iraq and Syria. Turkey hopes that this difficult political situation can be 
stabilized by improving the local standard of living and ending the support of the local 
population for the Kurdish separatist movement. Turkish officials are more and more 
conscious that psychological propaganda, in the sense of treating the people well and 
winning their support, may be even more important than overt military threats (Briefing, 
27 January, 1992, 7; Kolars, 1991a, 4; MEED, 13 October, 1989, 5). According to 
Waterbury (1990), Turkey hopes to swamp Kurdish national sentiment with regional 
development and prosperity and it may even hope to dilute the Kurdish population by 
attracting large numbers of non-Kurdish people to a region that could act as an economic 
growth pole (Waterbury, 1990, 9). The Turks reject this claim completely and argue that 
the development projects, at best, will slow down the process of migration by the Kurd 
residents of the area and will certainly not lead the Turkish population to migrate to the 
South-east of the country.
In line with the criteria of optimality and rationality, Turkey maintains that the three 
countries have to develop joint projects based on scientific principles, the aim being best 
usage for all concerned. For example, Turkish officials note that Turkey is introducing 
modem irrigation techniques, mainly based on sprinkling methods, in conjunction with the
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GAP project, whereas Syria and Iraq use open canal techniques stretching back to 
Sumerian times, (which lead to a wastage of water of up to 50 per cent due to evaporation) 
(Briefing, 2-9 July, 1990, 10). According to the Turkish officials, the technology used in 
the large, Soviet built Tabqa dam on the Euphrates in Syria, is also a source of serious 
wastage. This dam was built for "Siberian" conditions, where the melting of the snows 
provides a plentiful water supply, but it is not suited to the conditions prevalent in the 
Euphrates basin because the turbines are built too high, which means that a small drop in 
the water level puts these turbines out of action. In order to compensate for this, more 
water has be pumped to keep the turbines going (Briefing, 26 March, 1990, 18). It has 
also been claimed that, in an attempt to meet the electricity needs, Syria has allowed water 
to flow through the dams in an uncoordinated manner, leading to shortages in water for 
irrigation (Briefing, 10-17 July, 1989, 6). In 1980, to alleviate the problem of fresh water 
shortage and to share its surplus water with southern Arab neighbours, former President 
Turgut Ozal proposed the building of a "Peace Water Pipeline" to export fresh water from 
the Ceyhan and Seyhan rivers in Anatolia. The project, however, failed to take off and, in 
mid-1991, the UAE said it had been abandoned in favour of desalination plants. Analysts 
say that the Kuwait crisis has increased the Gulf states' reluctance to rely on other regional 
countries for such an important resource (MEED, 7 February, 1992, 7).
The GAP abstraction from the Euphrates might represent from a third to more than 
one half of the Euphrates "natural flow", but the lowest total amount of water used is 
estimated at about 10.4 billion m? per annum, according to the GAP Master Plan (Bagis, 
1989, 5 2-70). This also assumes that no more than 1.1 million hectares will be irrigated. 
It seems that these figures do not include evaporation from the reservoir, domestic usage 
and industrial use, so the total water utilization plus losses in Turkey could reach up to 14 
billion nP per annum. The highest amount used by Turkey is that calculated by Kolars & 
Mitchell (1991) who claim that sometime after the year 2000, the Euphrates irrigated area 
will be 1,350,243 ha. If all goes according to schedule, by the year 2000, the annual water 
utilization would be 12.4 billion m-* and, sometime after that date might even soar to 16.9 
billion m^/yr. (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 221). Another technique used to attempt to 
calculate the amount of water demanded by Turkey for its future development plan, is a 
calculation of the amount of water Turkey has committed itself to giving Syria: 500 
m^/sec. (Briefing, 2-9 July, 1990, 10). This amount is equal to 15.8 billion m^/yr. while 
the river's "natural" flow, according to GAP, is 30.3 billion m^/yr., so the total amount of 
water that Turkey will use, according to this calculation, is about 14.5 billion m^/yr. This 
figure is 2.5 billion m^ lower than the figures shown by Kolars. Despite this it seems that 
the amount of water needed for irrigation one hectare has been presented in a minimalistic 
way by Turkey.
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Since Kolars & Mitchell studied the GAP project without reference to the overall 
picture which one gets from the GAP Master Plan one could assume that the figure of 14.5 
billion is better. This amount also corresponds with the water sharing agreement made 
between Turkey and Syria. Although this figure is 40 per cent higher than Turkey’s water 
data which "forgot” to mention both the evaporation figures and the industrial and 
domestic needs, it should not create any deviation from the water sharing agreement. 
Similarly Turkey has various alternatives which can be evaluated in regard to their 
usefulness as both sources of agricultural produce and the production of hydro-electric 
power.
The GAP Master Plan, completed in mid-1989, contains several options for irrigation 
development works such as treating irrigation as an exogenous factor to change the entire 
structure of the region and uses these data for development projections in the region. 
Under the first option, the entire area originally planned by DSI would be irrigated by the 
Euphrates and the Tigris rivers, which implies that part of the energy production would be 
lost. According to this option the total GAP area to be irrigated from both rivers would be 
1,641,282 ha, and the electrical energy production would be 25,018 GWh. The opposite 
option would aim to maximize energy production and provide irrigation to priority areas 
only. In another option, the irrigated area would be only 894,460 ha, and the electrical 
energy production would increase to 29,793 GWh (Bagis, 1989, 123). This option would 
allow Turkey to increase the amount of water that flows to the downstream states. 
According to the Turkish Briefing weekly magazine (1990), and Ergil (1991), Turkey 
plans to irrigate 59 per cent of the GAP area which amounts to some 1,062,725 ha, 
whereas the additional amount of land that could be irrigated in the region (but which will 
not benefit from the Euphrates) is said to be 733,843 ha. (Briefing, 15 January, 1990, 7 ; 
Ergil, 1991, 55).
It is clear that the river development plan is vital to Turkey from many points of view. 
It, however, appears that the Turks themselves do not yet know what is the total volume 
of water they will need. The size of the agricultural area which will actually be irrigated as 
opposed to that plan is not yet known, nor is the required amount of water for each 
agricultural hectare - which relates to the method used and crop rotation which has not yet 
been decided upon. It does not appear that Turkey will use more than 14.5 billion m^ 
annually by 2025 on the basis of evaluation of a wide range of estimates, based on equally 
wide ranging assumptions concerning levels of water affected on irrigated land, (see 
chapter D l.l). These estimates ranges from 10.1 billion m^ (see table C l.8) to the 
unrealistic 16.9 billion m-^  (see figure D1.8) of pessimistic Iraqi scientists and journalists.
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Syria
By at least one measure, Syria is the most dependent of the three states upon the waters of 
the Euphrates since it is the only major river with perennial flow crossing Syria’s territory. 
Agricultural development in the hinterland west of Aleppo is contingent upon harnessing 
this water or leaving cultivation at the mercy of a highly variable rainfall.
In contrast to Turkey, Syria relies substantially on Euphrates water for drinking, 
irrigation and industry because the Euphrates accounts for about 85 per cent of the nation’s 
surface water resources. According to The Economist report (1989), Syria, with a 
population growing at 3.7 per cent per year, would be running short of water for 
agriculture by the end of the century even if the GAP project in Turkey did not exist (The 
Economist, 16-22 December, 1989, 56). This statement by the Economist is a very 
unsound analysis as Syria will suffer a water shortage, in terms of its capacity to utilise 
water. This does not mean that Syria will be able to irrigate sufficient land to be 
agriculturally self-sufficient. However, it is not water availability which is the constraint. 
Syria will, undoubtedly be increasingly dependent upon the Euphrates river in the future.
The Euphrates once seemed to offer an answer to Syria's search for new farm land, 
additional sources of domestic water, and increased supplies of energy. There is simply 
too much good water in the Euphrates for Syria to ignore it or to turn to inferior 
alternatives. Syria still remains heavily dependent any available agricultural resources 
limited as it is by the aridity of the country's interior but ambitious plans for irrigated 
agriculture which are dependent upon the waters of Lake Assad have been severely 
curtailed.
While the Euphrates is by far the largest perennial source of water in Syria, its use for 
both irrigation and power generation has failed to meet that country's expectations 
although access to its water remains a prime concern of the government and people of 
Syria.
According to Syrian officials, 640,000 ha. of land is planned to be irrigated from the 
Euphrates, but as we have seen the agricultural area which Syria is capable of irrigating is 
actually much smaller; and a reasonable estimate is 411-483 thousand ha.. The amount of 
water needed by Syria to irrigate this area, including the loss of water through 
evaporation, would reach 6.9 - 7.5 billion ir? annually. Syria has also failed to reach its 
targets for the production of electricity from the Tabqa Dam and, in 1990, the dam only 
produced ten per cent of its potential.
The question one must ask is how much of the natural flow will be available for Iraq 
in the future and under what circumstances. In April 1990, according to the MEED report 
(1991), Baghdad and Damascus signed an accord whereby Syria would take 42 per cent 
of the Euphrates flow once it had left Turkey (MEED, 25 January, 1991). Turkey, under a 
protocol signed with Syria in 1987, committed itself to giving 500 m^/sec to Syria
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(Briefing, 2-9 July, 1990, 10). This amount is equal to 15.8 billion m-Vyr., but according 
to the Syrian-Iraqi agreement, Syria's share of this water is about 6.6 billion m^/yr. and 
this amount is only 300 million nfVyr., a figure less than the amount quoted by Kolars & 
Mitchell best guesstimate (6.89 billion m^ see figure D1.8) as the total water needs for 
Syrian agriculture. This calculation does not take into account the Euphrates tributaries, 
(the Sajur, Balikh and the Khabur), which have a total additional discharge of about 2 
billion m^/yr. According to this calculation, the annual amount of water that Syria will 
have available from the Euphrates river and its tributaries will reach 8.6 billion m^ and so 
Syria's gross water budget will not be in deficit for the foreseenable future.
Figure D1.8:
W ater subtraction from the Euphrates river (million m3/yr.)
Amount used by Turke
"Irrigated high estimate''
"Best guesstimate"
^ "Highest planned estimate"
16,008
14,082
8,898
11,583
9,656
4,473
1986 1990 1995
Source: Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 212
2000 2000+
20,000 
Amount entering Iraq
Syrian use
According to Kolars & M itchell's questionable "Highest planned estimate" 
calculations only about 4.5 billion nP  will remain for Iraq sometime after the year 2000 
(Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 212). According to the calculations made in this section, 
however, combining Turkey's potential demands of 14-14.5 billion nfVyr., and Syria's 
demand of 6.9 -7.5 billion m-^/yr., we arrive at totals ranging from 21 to 22 billion m^/yr. 
or nearly two thirds of the average annual "natural" yield of the Euphrates (30.8 billion
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m^). This will allow an annual amount of about 11 billion to flow into Iraqi territory 
from the combined Euphrates, Balikh, Khabhur flows.
Iraq
Iraq claims it needs 13 billion m^ per year from the Euphrates for its agriculture. As we 
have seen, however, the estimates of water consumption range between 10.2 billion m^ 
per year (the amount of water Iraq will need if irrigation improvement methods are 
proposed) and 17.4 billion m3 per year (without improvement in irrigation methods used 
today).
Iraq's big advantages over Syria are that it can add better quality Tigris water to the 
depleted Euphrates and the river's headwaters have not been subject to major 
impoundment by dams in the same way as the Euphrates. A scheme completed in 1988, 
allows water from Lake Tharthar, north of Baghdad, to flow by canal to the Euphrates 
(The Economist, 16-22 December, 1989, 56). However, Abdul Satar Salman, the Iraqi 
Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation, declared in an interview for the Kuwaiti 
paper Al-Kabs (1990), that the water in the Tharthar basin was saline and that irrigation 
from it would cause an increase in salinity levels, which would impair soil fertility and 
possibly cause a decrease in agricultural cultivation in the Euphrates basin (Al-Kabs, 27 
February 1990, 18). In 1990 the Iraqi Oil Minister Issam Abdul Rahim, declared that, if 
the saline water of the Iraq's Tharthar Dam were used for irrigating the Euphrates basin 
land, a total area of 325,000 ha. of land would be made unsuitable for agriculture 
(Baghdad Observer, 15 January 1990, 8). On the other hand the longer the flow of water 
in the canal continues the quality of the water increasingly improves because of the 
cleansing of the salt.
Iraq controls the downstream and estuary areas of the Euphrates river so it feels 
particularly concerned about any projects undertaken in Turkey and Syria which might 
affect the final water flow. It seems that Iraq is mainly concerned about the years of 
drought in the Euphrates basin when the water volume in the river is less than the average. 
In such a case Iraq will be the first country to be affected by such shortages. Furthermore, 
any long-range Iraqi planing must consider the drought that periodically affects the river 
system, approximately every four years, and must be prepared for a serious reduction in 
available water resources. As opposed to this the enormous amount of water stored by 
Turkey today cancels the effect of the individual years of drought, and only a series of 
drought years are likely to affect the amount of water available to Iraq. The amount of 
water in the Euphrates varies considerably from year to year, with discharges at Hit 
ranging from 63.4 billion m^ per year (1966-67) to 10.7 billion m^ (in 1929-30). There 
were two severe droughts in the Euphrates area between 1937-1980, the first being in 
1958-1962, when the annual flow was as low as 14,883 million m^ (1961 being the most
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severe year). The second critical period began in 1970 and ended in 1975, with the lowest 
flow being in 1973 when the annual flow fell to 62 per cent of the annual average flow 
(Bagis, 1989, 42). The years 1984 and 1989 were also years of severe drought. In an 
extended drought the upstream dams might permit only a minimal flow of water into Iraq, 
but this is unlikely since most of the upstream dams are power-generating rather than 
reservoir dams.
As we have seen the amount of water Turkey will use in the future will reach as high 
as 14-14.5 billion m^ per year and the annual amount of water utilized by Syria will reach 
6.9-7.5 billion m^. Combining the potential demands of Turkey and Syria we arrive at 
totals ranging from 21 to 22 billion m^/yr. This amount will allow an annual amount of 
about 11 billion m^ of water to flow into Iraqi territory, an amount almost matching the 
Iraqi demand for Euphrates water. Eventually, this quantity of water will reach Iraq only 
in the years when the water volume in the river goes beyond 32.5 billion m^. The amount 
of water Iraq is capable of transferring from the Tigris to the Euphrates through the 
Tharthar canal reaches 7.3 billion m^ per year, therefore Iraq’s water potential along the 
Euphrates river reaches 18 billion m^- a quantity of water which all would agree is enough 
to supply the water needs of Iraq in the river basin. However, it seems that Iraq feels 
confident about future water availability since it reached an agreement in 1980 with Jordan 
to construct a system to divert 160 million m^/yr. of the Euphrates waters to northern 
Jordan in order to aid Jordan to overcome its increasingly grave water deficit (EIU, 4th 
Quarter, 1980, 16). This project has not been implemented and the developing 
international circumstances are not propritions for the project. The Iraqi Ministry of 
Agriculture and Irrigation assumes that the Turkish authorities will not keep their promise 
to allow the 500 m^/sec agreed with Syria to flow. Following the water distribution accord 
between Iraq and Syria, Iraq should have received 58 per cent of the water and, according 
to the Baghdad Observer (1990), a total of seven provincial centres, 83 towns, and 4,000 
villages with a total population of some 5.5 million, would be directly harmed by any 
decrease in the Euphrates water (Baghdad Observer, 15 January 1990, 8). Iraq's deputy 
Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation - Abdul Satar Salman has declared that each 
deduction of one billion will decrease the area irrigated by the Euphrates water by 
about 65,000 ha.; therefore, the Ministry is of the opinion that a tripartite accord will 
enable Iraq, Syria and Turkey to share the water of the Euphrates in a fair and just manner 
(Al-Kabs, 27 February 1990, 18).
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D2. The quality of water
A river basin is an ecological unit (ecosystem) in which the living and non-living 
environment function together. Water quality is affected primarily by domestic and 
industrial effluents, human activities like deforestation and land use practices, leaching of 
agricultural chemicals and natural causes (Biswas, 1992, 75). Just as agricultural activities 
have an enormous impact on water quality, water quality considerations have important 
implications for agricultural activities. With our present state of knowledge, it is simply 
not possible to give a reasonable picture of the status of the water quality of the Euphrates 
river as a whole. Water quality measurement involves complex and difficult 
instrumentation which is both sophisticated and expensive, as well as difficult to maintain 
and operate. Water quality data for the Euphrates river are less reliable than water quantity 
data. However, it is agreed that the quality of the water is good in Turkey, Syria and in the 
western part of Iraq up to the city of Ramadi, where the salinity is 250-500 ppm.
The main reasons, however, for this are that Turkey still does not use the river water 
for irrigation purposes and the irrigation developments in Syria have not yet been 
completed. The use of river water for the purposes of development throughout the world, 
does, teach us, however, that development has a serious effect upon the quality of the 
water and often for states which share river water. The relationship between the USA and 
Mexico was affected by the consequences of surface water development in the USA of the 
Colorado River which affected the amount and quality of the water (Beaumont, 1989, 
272-276). This river is very similar to the Euphrates from the point of view of the size of 
the drainage basin, the quantity of water in the river and the climate of the region. The 
reason for the high quality of the Euphrates flow in Turkey, Syria and in Iraq as far as 
Ramadi is that only a very small proportion of the water has as yet infiltrated the soil 
profiles of irrigation schemes. The Turkish schemes have not come on stream and the 
ambitions of Syria to irrigate extensive areas of the Euphrates and Khabur lowlands have 
encountered severe management and environmental constraints. If the Syrian and 
especially the Turkish schemes were to be fully implemented the quality of the water in the 
Euphrates will be significantly worsened unless agreements to ameliorate the impacts of 
drainage water flowing back into the Euphrates from irrigation schemes are put in place.
The experience in some United States schemes is of relevance and provides analogies 
with respect to environmental impacts as well as political adjustments. Water withdrawals 
in part of the Colorado River basin which is similar climaticaly to that of the proposed 
irrigated tracts in the GAP scheme of Turkey are much higher than those planned in 
Turkey involving withdrawals of about 24 billion m^ per year compared with a figure of 
between 10 and 13 billion m^ per year for south-east Turkey. The impact of the Welton- 
Mohawk scheme on water quality indicates the levels of deterioration in water quality
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which can be experienced. The Welton-Mohawk scheme is only part of the southern 
Colorado basin irrigation command area but it has been shown to have been responsible 
for a deterioration of water quality in the Colorado. The scheme was completed in 1952 
and quickly became waterlogged so that a drainage project was constructed in 1961. The 
waste waters from the scheme were discharged into the Colorado, including salinized 
groundwater. The water had salinity levels as high as 6000 parts per million and since the 
Colorado was experiencing low flows the saline waste water increased the salinity level in 
the river flowing into Mexico from 800 ppm to 1500 ppm in 1962 (Beaumont, 1989, 273- 
274). Water at this level of salinity is unusable for the cultivation of most crops.
It is not possible to transfer the experience from the Colorado to the Euphrates except 
to infer that there will be an indeterminate deterioration in the water quality of the 
Euphrates through drainage from irrigation schemes. The water in the upper Euphrates is 
of higher quality than in the lower Colorado, but it is likely that the water quality will 
decline from the past low levels of unmanaged flows, at less than 500 ppm, to levels 
approaching 1000 ppm by the time the waters reach the irrigated tracts of Syria and Iraq.
The political and economic consequences of surface water pollution proved to be 
expensive for the United States. After lengthy discussions the US Congress approved in 
1973 an agreement referred to as Minute 242 of the International Boundary and Water 
Commission. The United States agreed to ensure the quality of Colorado water and 
Congress authorised a budget in 1974 to construct desalinisation units to treat the waste 
water of the Arizona irrigation schemes. Such a precedent could be important in future 
relations between riparians.
Water quality has now become as immediate a problem as water quantity in the 
Euphrates river basin since the salinity of wells (due to over pumping, and the salination 
of land from increased irrigation) is a common problem and salinated acreage must be 
allowed to lie fallow in order to allow a period to leech the salts. This reduces the chances 
of increasing production by increasing irrigation as do the urban and industrial effluents 
which are turning the Euphrates waterway into a virtual sewer (Naff & Matson, 1984, 7). 
Pollution, while not itself a use of water but the result of a use, can interfere, (and, indeed 
does) with the water use by both upper and lower co-basin states. Although there is 
general recognition of the seriousness of pollution, there is little agreement over what 
action needs to be taken to control or eliminate it.
The headwaters of the Euphrates River provide water which is of reputedly high 
quality but data are not available to quantify this, although van Aart states that irrigation 
water used in the lower part of the Euphrates averages 300-500 ppm salinity, and may 
reach 600 ppm in the south. Cressey reports that the salinity of the Euphrates averages 
about 250 to 445 ppm however, the use of the water for irrigation purposes upstream 
attests to its quality. In the estuary region located south of Basra, the salinity levels are 
naturally much higher and this is especially true at high tide in the autumn when the flow is
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lowest and the salinity is typically over 5,000 ppm. Tailing presents groundwater data for 
the basin at stations located at Musayyib on the Euphrates and at El-Zubeir on the Shatt-al- 
Arab and these data indicate very high concentrations of dissolved ions, especially sodium, 
magnesium, chloride and sulphate, but they also show that the salinity of the river has 
increased from 160 to 525 ppm over the seasonal cycle as measured at Samara in South 
Iraq.
Table D2.1
Salinity at different locations on the Euphrates (micro mhos/m3)
Location Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Average
Tabqa
Deirez-Zor
550
660
530
610
475
600
420
560
420
560
430
480
480
625
505
725
525
735
565
760
615
700
450
480
497
616
Source: Kolars & Mitchell, 1991,246
Other data presented by Tailing show electro-conductivity increasing from 575 micro 
mho/cm at Qaim to over 900 micro mho/cm at and below Samara. Edaphic factors in the 
lower basin contribute to a natural reduction in water quality as the river moves 
downstream. In this regard, it is important to note that the flooding of the Abu Dibis 
depression by the Iraqis in the 1950s degraded the water because of the rapid evaporation 
rate and the high salt content in the soils of the depression.
The lower part of the Euphrates, including the Shatt al Arab, is naturally prone to the 
problems of salinity which results from a combination of poor drainage, centuries of 
irrigation, and natural soil factors. The salt content of the upper groundwater ranges from
7,000 ppm in the central part of the Lower Mesopotamian Plain to 30,000 ppm in the 
south (Naff & Matson, 1984, 87). After the confluence of the Tharthar canal near the town 
of Faluja, the salinity of the Euphrates increases suddenly due to the high salinity of the 
Tharthar canal which is 2,000 ppm
In the past, the farmers of Iraq used to irrigate their crops by spreading water over the 
soil. An ignorance of irrigation principles led them to continue this without drainage, until 
they could grow no more crops and simply moved on to another area. This practice was 
viable when the population was small, but it is not a sustainable method and has resulted in 
immense areas of valuable alluvial soil becoming saline and useless. The Iraqi Haigh 
Commission Report estimated that some 60 per cent of the irrigation area has been affected 
by salinity, and that about 20-30 per cent of the cultivated land in the irrigation zone has 
been abandoned in recent decades because it is no longer suitable for cultivation (Qudain, 
1960, 58; Haigh, 1951, 15). The high concentration of salt in the soil, especially in the 
flow irrigated areas, is caused by continuous irrigation and flooding combined with the
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high rate of evaporation that obtains in these climatic conditions. Irrigation keeps the sub­
soil water high, (just below the ground surface) and, exposed to the hot summer sun. 
When evaporation takes place, it leaves salt deposits in the plant root zone and, as the years 
go by, the salt accumulation becomes toxic in quantity, gradually causing a decline in crop 
yield, and finally making further cultivation impossible (Qudain, 1960, 59).
Additional, as yet minor pollution occurs in Syria and Iraq through the discharge of 
untreated sewage into the river. Most settlements are located on the river bank, and sewage 
is discharged into the river without any treatment (AMER, 1992, 4).
Technological means are now at hand to prevent most known forms of pollution but 
the financial cost of pollution control or elimination is often staggering and some states, 
having used the waters of international rivers as open sewers for decades and sometimes 
for centuries, have been unable to reconcile themselves to the need to pay for the use of 
water for this purpose. Certain upper riparian states go so far as to express fears that any 
pollution clean-up requirements imposed upon them will make their products non­
competitive in international markets (Garretson at all, 1967, 11). Nevertheless, the water 
quality will be further dramatically influenced by development programmes which are now 
being carried out by Syria and Turkey.
D2.1: Future pollution scenarios
The foregoing discussion has been based on not very comprehensive nor definitive data 
but it indicates that the water quality of the Euphrates water is not yet a serious problem 
except in parts of the system in Iraq where drainage water has become toxic through 
contact with saline soil profiles and involvement in the cycling of soil water with saline 
groundwater. Iraq's geomorphological and soil endowment have made it difficult 
throughout its long recorded history to create sustainable irrigated farming in the manner 
achieved by those who for millennia have managed other irrigated lowlands such as those 
of the Nile in Egypt.
Ameliorating the poor natural soil and water circumstances of Iraq and reversing the 
degradation caused by ineffective soil and water management are unlikely to be economic 
options as long as world food prices remain low. Iraq's land reclamation policies have 
not, however, been inspired by economic considerations so much as by the strategic intent 
of creating a more self-sufficient agricultural economy. An oil rich Iraq showed itself to be 
unable to make a significant impact on the reclamation of waste and degraded land in the 
1970s and the 1980s, despite loudly articulated reclamation policies. Little additional crop 
production was generated by the investments of the 1980s, and none of the production 
was cost-effective.
That land reclamation has proved to be extremely difficult and uneconomic in both 
Syria and Iraq with the good quality lower Euphrates water indicates that future land
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reclamation with the inevitably poorer water of the early twentieth century will be even 
more difficult and expensive. Experience in the Welton-Mohawk scheme in Arizona, to 
which reference has been made, suggests that water could deteriorate after passing through 
Turkish soil profiles to worse than 1000 ppm and possibly to 1500 ppm. Another 
example, that of Egypt, confirms the tendency of water to deteriorate after use for 
irrigation. Even in Egypt's favourable alluvial soil conditions in the Nile lowlands, water 
which flows into the country at about 300 ppm at Aswan falls in quality after multiple re­
use in irrigation to more than 1500 ppm in the drains in the north of the delta.
It behoves Iraqi and Syrian officials and politicians to establish a negotiating 
framework noting the precedents set by the United Sates and Mexico in dealing with the 
export of water polluted by use in irrigation. The issue of water quality will be just as 
important as that of water volume and it could be argued that quality will prove to be the 
more important issue especially as elsewhere in the thesis it is shown that water quantity 
will not be a significant constraint on economic development in either Syria or Iraq for the 
foreseeable future.
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E. Disputes and Agreements Over the 
Euphrates Water
E1. Geopolitical History
E1.1. The "division" of the Ottoman Empire
Both Iraq and Syria were under Turkish Rule from 1534 till 1917.
On May 16, 1916 the secret accord known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement was 
concluded between the British, French, and Russian governments, and provided for the 
division of the Ottoman Empire into a number of zones. Great Britain and France agreed 
to recognise an independent Arab State or a confederation of such states, headed by an 
Arab chief. In some regions, including Transjordan and a strip of territory in the south of 
the vilayet of Mosul, Great Britain was to have a right of priority. In coastal Syria, from 
a point between Acre and Sur up to and including Cilicia, France was to be allowed 
direct or indirect administration or control as she might deem fit to establish after 
agreement with the Arab state or confederation. In the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra 
Great Britain was to be in a similar position. This framework agreement, and the changes 
that were further inserted, formed the infrastructure for the geopolitical development and 
establishment of independent countries in the region.
Map E.l:
The Sykes-Picot agreement, 1916
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In January 1919 the Peace Conference decided that the newly conceived mandate 
systems should be applied to the Arab provinces. At the suggestion of President Wilson, 
an American commission (known as the Crane Commission) toured the area, and 
recommended the establishment of mandates for "Iraq and for geographical Syria" which 
should be treated as a single unit and should have a constitutional monarch. At Versailles 
the Peace Conference came to an end without having proposed a definite arrangement 
for the Arab lands (The Middle East, 1948, 155).
The Conference at San Remo, in April 1920, granted a mandate for the northern half 
of the disputed area to France and the southern half to Great Britain (see Map E.2). As a 
result of these international agreements the Euphrates River, for the first time, became an 
international river with three riparian states: Turkey, Iraq (which achieved its 
independence in 1932) and Syria (which obtained its independence in 1946).
Until the post-World War I period, water diversion from the Euphrates river did not 
constitute on international problem because the river was entirely within the jurisdiction 
of one national entity, the Ottoman Empire.
Source: Bacharach, 1984, 13
Map E.2:
The San Remo agreement, 1920
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Even after the creation of the modem states, the diversion of water did not create 
any conflict as the amounts of water taken from the river in relation to the total flow 
were minimal. Ample water was available to satisfy the needs of the riparians at that 
time (Abbas, 1984,178).
E2. Relations among the riparians concerning Euphrates 
water use (until 1974)
Rivers of common interest to two or more countries have, in modem times in the Middle 
East as elsewhere, generated political tensions and stimulated debate which has sought 
legal principles for the regulation of the use of waters by the riparian states. Such 
regulations are applied to both "boundary” rivers and "successive" rivers.
It seems that even while negotiating the secret Sykes-Picot agreement over dividing 
the Ottoman Empire by the Great Powers in 1916, the British realized that dividing the 
river waters between the mandate countries, could affect their use. That is the reason for 
their inserting a sub-section into the agreement that would guarantee the continual 
supply of river water to Iraq.
According to the tripartite (Sykes - Picot) agreement for the partition of the Ottoman 
Empire, (16 May, 1916) "a guarantee of a given supply of water from the Tigris and the 
Euphrates in area A (France) for area B (Great Britain)" was pledged (Hurewitz, 1972, 
19).
At the Peace Conference in 1919, President Wilson was aware that the international 
division of river waters would cause further conflicts between the countries according to 
the tentative recommendations submitted to him by the intelligence section of the 
American Delegation to the Peace Conference (21 January, 1919) :-
"It is essential to the development of the great irrigation projects, below 
Baghdad, that the headwaters of the Tigris River, and as much of the Euphrates 
as possible, should be under a single administration...To separate the headwater 
area of the Tigris and Euphrates drainage from the irrigated valley floors and 
lowlands further down-stream would be to create sources of dispute and render 
doubly difficult the task of establishing a suitable government" (Hurewitz, 1972, 
42).
There is no agreement between Syria and Iraq concerning river control and the 
allocation of water (supply) although a convention was signed in Paris on December 23, 
1920, between France and Britain, as mandatory powers for Syria and Iraq respectively. 
This convention established the principle that the water interests of the downstream areas 
were to be protected (Hirsch, 1956, 87). The mandatory powers called for the formation
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of a commission which would examine all proposed irrigation schemes in Syria which 
might seriously diminish "the waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates at the points where 
they enter the area of the British mandate in Mesopotamia". No such commission was set 
up but, in any case, the convention is probably no longer binding. The 1923 Treaty of 
Lausanne, which formalized the independence of the Turkish Republic, stipulated that 
Turkey inform and seek agreement from Iraq (but apparently not Syria) before 
undertaking anything that might alter the flow of the Euphrates (Waterbury, 1990,15). 
Iraq, upon the termination of the British mandate in 1932, declared itself bound by all 
the agreements made on its behalf by the mandatory administration. No such declaration 
was made by Syria when the French mandate was terminated in 1945 (Qubain, 1960, 
56).
Since 1919 there have been numerous attempts to arrive at bi- or multi-lateral 
accords, but no comprehensive instrument has been established. According to Waterbury 
(1990), from the theoretical point of view, the expected behaviour on the part of the 
three riparians will develop along the following lines. Turkey, as an upstream state, will 
prefer non-binding understandings since any obligations or commitments will 
necessarily involve concessions to the downstream states and any compensation for the 
concession can only come through reciprocation not related to the river. It also seems 
that Turkey will be unwilling to sign a trilateral agreement before the conclusion of the 
GAP project is fully underway.
The optimal arrangement for Turkey, thus, will be to insist on sovereign control of 
the headwaters of the Euphrates and assure its neighbours that, in developing those 
waters , it will always keep their interests in mind although Turkey will make no binding 
commitments. Iraq, in contrast, as a downstream state, will be the most eager to arrive at 
binding commitments, because such commitments can only bind the two upstream states 
so Iraq might offer compensation for concessions made by its upstream neighbours. 
Syria, as a mid-stream state, will want binding understandings with Turkey and loose 
understandings with Iraq. In fact, Syria cannot be expected to commit itself to allowing 
an agreed amount of water to flow into Iraq, while it remains at the mercy of Turkey's 
actions without knowing how much the Turks are going to withhold for their own 
purposes. From all this one can understand that bi-lateral accords are more likely than 
tri-lateral ones and the linking of the latter to side issues and side payments (Waterbury,
1990,15).
The three riparian states had not reached any formal agreement by the time the 
Keban dam in Turkey and the Tabqa dam in Syria had begun to fill in the middle 70s. 
Turkey and Syria had started new construction in the Euphrates valley without seeking 
the agreement of all three countries (An-Nahar Arab Report and MEMO, 19 March, 
1984, 20).
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The principle of cooperation (even though limited) between Iraq and Turkey over 
river control was laid down in the Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourly Relations 
signed by the two governments on March 29, 1946, and this is the only extant agreement 
relevant to the Euphrates waters. While regulating the use of the Tigris and Euphrates 
Rivers certain rights were assigned to downstream Iraq but Syria, whose territory 
straddles more than 400 miles of the Euphrates and includes a section of the Tigris to the 
"thalweg" was ignored (Hirsch, 1956, 84). In Protocol I of the treaty, Turkey allowed 
Iraq to establish meteorological stations in its territory (on the Tigris and Euphrates), to 
conduct geological surveys for possible flood-control dam sites and consented in 
principle, (subject to confirmation in each case), to the construction by Iraq, in Turkey, 
of water works found to be necessary. Turkey also obligated itself to inform Iraq of any 
contemplated projects on the two rivers, (of interest to both states). This principle 
exemplified above, shows the limitations imposed by the principle of territorial 
sovereignty and allowed works which might benefit the downstream state to be 
constructed in the territory of the upstream state (Berber, 1955, 101). Under the treaty, 
Iraq established three meteorological stations in Turkish territory but no river works 
were constructed there (until 1960) (Qubain, I960,56).
A 1952 agreement between Syria and Turkey was not ratified by the latter's Grand 
National Assembly because the Turks wanted the agreement to cover all of the rivers of 
common interest (including those flowing from Syria into Turkey) and not just the 
Jaghjagh and Balikh rivers (which flow into Syria) which were the subjects of the 
agreement. This feeling is connected with Syrian plans for the Orontes and the current 
Syrian use of the Afrine river which is important to the Hatay province, still a sensitive 
spot for both countries. Before Syria was able to reach agreement with Turkey on the 
Orontes, it would have had to reach agreement over this river with upstream Lebanon 
(Hirsch, 1956a, 215).
More recently, closer cooperation between Turkey, Iraq, and Iran over river control 
was effected through the "Baghdad Pact", and a Joint Irrigation Projects Committee has 
been established as a subdivision of the Pact’s Economic Committee. There is also a 
subcommittee on cooperation in agricultural planning.
At a meeting of the Joint Irrigation Projects Committee held at Ankara in July, 
1956, the Iranian and Turkish Governments undertook to establish meteorological and 
hydrological stations at the headwaters of the Euphrates, the Tigris, and the tributaries in 
their territories. The Committee also undertook to make a survey of joint irrigation 
projects which had been recommended by the Economic Committee at its meeting in 
Teheran earlier in that summer" (Qubain, 1960, 56; Naff & Matson, 1984, 92).
In 1962, Iraq and Syria agreed to exchange information on discharge and river 
levels, and a joint technical commission was established to gather the information. Iraq
170
raised the issue of its "acquired rights" to a fixed share of the river, but it is not clear 
that Syria recognized them fWaterbury, 1990, 15). During the 1960s, as the three 
riparian states' plans for the use of the Euphrates developed, Turkey, Syria and Iraq held 
a number of conferences concerning the allocation of the river's waters. As of the early 
1960s, the riparians had only gone into bi-lateral understandings that did not specify 
rights to shares, quality of the water or seasonal flows. In that sense they were non- 
binding. Little is known of the content of these discussions since, except for one 
occasion in 1965, all three countries seem to have taken pains to keep their talks off the 
public record. It was only in the middle of the 1960s, when both Turkey and Syria 
began to draw up plans for large-scale surface irrigation schemes, that a basin wide 
accord was put on the diplomatic agenda. It appears that Turkey tried to link an 
agreement with Syria over the use of the Euphrates waters to a Turkish-Syrian accord 
over the Orontes river. Syria rejected this attempt since the Orontes flows only through 
Turkey in Alexandretta, a province detached from Syria in 1939, which Syria still 
refuses to recognize as Turkish territory. During the first tripartite meeting in Baghdad 
in September 1965 each country, for bargaining purposes, put forth maximum demands. 
Iraq is said to have demanded 18 billion m^/yr. of Euphrates water, Syria 13 billion 
ir?/yr. and Turkey 14 billion m^/yr. This is a total of 45 billion m^/yr., or 1.4 times the 
Euphrates mean annual discharge of 32 billion m^/yr. at Hit, Iraq (Waterbury, 1990, 15; 
Naff& Matson, 1984, 93). Beginning in 1966, Syria and Iraq began a series of bilateral 
negotiations, in which Iraq re-iterated its claim to acquired rights for a fixed share of the 
Euphrates discharge. This notion lies at the heart of what any downstream state will try 
to establish as a binding commitment. Syria has argued that potential needs must be 
weighed against acquired rights and, in the 1967 talks, rejected the Iraqi claim to 
acquired rights. In 1967, Syria accepted that Iraq was entitled to 59 per cent of the flow 
of the river at the Syria-Iraqi border and a variant of this apportionment was discussed 
in 1967 and 1968 whereby Iraq would receive two thirds of the flow during normal 
years, but that the proportions would be reversed in favour of Syria in apportioning 
excess flow. However, by 1968, no accord had been formalized and Iraq protested to 
both Syria and Turkey about their pursuit of major hydraulic projects (Keban and 
Tabqa) in the absence of a basin-wide accord (Waterbury, 1990,17). In early 1967 Iraq 
and Syria were still reported to be far apart on questions of water allocation, with Iraq 
demanding 16 billion m^/yr. from Syria which insisted that Iraq needed no more than 9 
billion m^/yr. (Naff & Matson, 1984, 93).
A World Bank report in 1965 attempted to assess the relative needs of the three 
states and each one of the three states has utilized partial information said to be derived 
from the reports, but the studies themselves have not been made public. Syria and Iraq 
went back to it in 1972 when Iraq defined its needs based on cultivated surface, while 
Syria used the measure of crop-water duties. Nonetheless, an agreement was reached,
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much like that of 1967 wherein Iraq would receive 76.5 per cent of the normal discharge, 
while Syria would receive all the surplus of exceptional discharge, and shortfalls would 
be shared at a ratio of 76.5/23.5 per cent. Syria, in the end, declined to sign the 
agreement. At this point Iraq sought Soviet mediation and a Soviet study team arrived on 
the scene in 1972. The Soviet report used the older World Bank estimate and 
recommended that Tabqa (and Keban) be developed in such a way as to protect Iraq's 
acquired rights. Syria objected to some of the findings in the report.
1973 saw another round of unproductive negotiations. A slightly modified formula, 
by which the apportionment of shortfalls was adjusted, met with Iraqi approval but ,at 
the last moment, Syria declined to sign. Subsequently Syria claimed that the figures on 
which the Soviet report was based were inaccurate and that Iraq’s actual irrigated surface 
was 835,000 hectares instead of the 1.2 million claimed by Iraq. Therefore its water 
needs were no more than 12 billion m^. By this time the reservoirs at both Keban and 
Tabqa dam sites had begun to fill, threatening to reduce Iraq’s flow to unacceptable 
levels (Naff& Matson, 1984, 93 ; Waterbury, 1990,17).
E3. The Syrian - Iraqi "water crises" of 1974-1975
The first year that the Keban and Tabqa dams became operational passed without serious 
incident although Iraq experienced a sharp reduction in the discharge reaching its 
territory. In June 1974 it requested that Syria release an additional 200 million of 
water from Tabqa, and Syria acceded to the Baghdad request preventing any possible 
conflict. Syria agreed to release a minimum of 90 m^/sec in the month of June, 110 
m^/sec in the first ten days of July, and the entire flow of the river net of agricultural 
needs in Syria thereafter (Naff & Matson, 1984, 93). According to Al-Rifai, the former 
Syrian Minister of Industry, President Assad ordered the opening of the Syrian Tabqa 
Dam and gave Iraq the water contained there for electricity generating purposes causing 
Syria to have to buy electrical power from Lebanon. But now the situation has changed 
and Syria wants to irrigate its land and produce electricity from its own resources (The 
Arab Economist, June 1975, 25). Iraq and Syria held no further talks after November 
1974.
This is the main reason why a major crisis developed during the second season 
when the Turkish and Syrian dams impounded part of the Euphrates spring flood, and 
brought Syria and Iraq to the brink of war. In March 1975, about one and a half years 
after the official opening of the Tabqa High Dam in July 1973, Syria and Iraq clashed 
over the sharing of the Euphrates water. This coincided with the Syrians raising the 
lake's level to its full capacity (292 metres above sea level while the optimal level for 
power generating was 275 metres above sea level). Iraq issued a formal protest and took
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the matter to the Arab League which appointed a technical investigator committee whose 
findings Syria rejected (Waterbury, 1990,18). It was not certain whether the flooding of 
Lake Assad, temporarily deprived Iraq of part of the water it had previously received. 
Apart from this Iraq also saw its share of water reduced in the long term as Syria planned 
to use the lake to irrigate vast areas of new agricultural land. Unfortunately, both Iraq's 
short- and long-term losses are difficult to assess since reliable figures are extremely 
scarce or, as in the case of Syrian and Iraqi sources, blatantly contradictory. The 
different sources do not even agree on the "natural" amount of water carried by the river 
at the Syria-Iraqi border (that is the amount of water that would on average pass into Iraq 
if there were no diversion of other artificial losses upstream). The only factor actually 
known is the storage capacity of Lake Tabqa. Maximum output for the generation of 
electricity and agricultural irrigation is reached at a water-level of 300 metres above sea 
level, that is eight metres beneath the crest of the dam and this corresponds to a storage 
capacity of 11,9 billion water. The effect on Iraq of filling Lake Tabqa is difficult to 
evaluate precisely, because there is no reliable information about the beginning, end and 
speed of this process. Nonetheless, Syrian and Iraqi figures on the amount of water 
carried by the river, though contradictory, indicate that Iraq was probably short of water 
in the spring of 1975. While there is no doubt that a large part of the water of Lake 
Tabqa was stored from early 1975 onwards, by 1 May 1974 the lake already contained
4,5 billion m^. This was the minimum generating level for hydroelectric production 
which started on that date. But it is difficult to know over what span of time the build-up 
of the storage of the remaining 7.4 billion m^ extended. As the average flow of the 
Euphrates into Iraq prior to the construction of the Tabqa Dam amounted to some 29 to 
32 billion m^/yr., the storage of 7.4 billion m^ still corresponds to the entire average 
amount of water carried by the river into Iraq in two or three months. The question, 
however, seems further complicated by the fact that, in 1975, the snow in the Turkish 
mountains seems to have melted very slowly and, in consequence, the Euphrates carried 
less water than usual. In any case, according to Baghdad, the Euphrates in 1975 only 
carried some 9.4 billion m^ into Iraq. However, it is important to note that Iraq had 
received even less water in 1974 (9 billion m^) and comparatively little in 1973 (15.3 
billion m^).
In reply to Iraq's allegations that Syria was responsible for the shortage of water, the 
Syrians claimed that during the previous three years, the annual average of Euphrates 
water entering Syria from Turkey, had been 28 billion m^ while in 1974 the volume had 
fallen to 12.8 billion nA  Moreover, during the period of October 1975, it had dropped to 
eight billion m^ as compared to the normal 17 billion m^ the principal causes being 
Turkey's storing of water and the rainfall factor. According to Al-Rifai, former Minister 
of Industry, between 65 and 75 per cent of the water entering Syria was released to flow 
on to Iraq, therefore, any shortage of water was not caused by Syria (The Arab
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Economist, June 1975, 25). The Syrian Minister of the Euphrates Dam, Subhi Kahhaleh, 
claimed that the shortage of water was due to the fact that the Turks were filling the 
reservoir at the Keban dam which they had finished two years late at the same time as 
the Syrians were filling theirs (The Middle East, October 1977, 75).
On 7 April 1975 Iraq asked the Arab League Council to discuss the matter. Syria, 
according to the Iraqi complaint, was storing even more water in the lake than was 
actually necessary for irrigation and the generation of electricity and thus were 
endangering the livelihood of three million Iraqi farmers who depended on the river for 
irrigation water (Naff & Matson, 1984, 94). Iraq also claimed that the rice crop would be 
as little as one quarter the normal, while wheat and barley would be a mere one third of 
the average production leading to reported large scale migration from the area of the 
Euphrates basin (EIU, No 4, 1975, 3). The Iraqi Minister of Irrigation, Mukarran al- 
Talbani, claimed that Turkey, in the year after the completion of the Keban Dam, held 
back 10 billion m^, while Syria retained 4 billion m^ * As a result, Iraq did not get the 13 
billion m^ it needed for its irrigation networks; in fact, he claimed, the Iraqi part of the 
basin had only received 7 billion m^ in 1975. This left a shortage of more than 5 billion 
m^ according to the Iraqi assessment and 3.5 billion m^ according to the assessment of 
the World Bank (Baghdad Observer, 11 August 1975, 1 ; The Arab Economist, May
1975,16).
In August 1975, the Iraqi Minister of Irrigation, Mukarram al-Talabani, was quoted 
as saying that "the justification cited by officials and experts of the Euphrates dam in 
Syria for withholding water from Iraq, based on claims that by the end of August, the 
water level of Lake al-Assad, would be below the regular level needed for generating 
power and that a drinking water shortage would exist in Aleppo as a result of 
accumulating silt in the feeding canal which branched out of the al-Assad reservoir, is no 
way connected with either of the two above mentioned points. This lying claim is 
intended to inflict more harm on Iraqi countrymen in the Euphrates basin" (Baghdad 
Observer, 11 August 1975, 1). Iraq thus clearly expressed that, contrary to Syria’s claim, 
it considered the dispute "political” and not simply economic. According to Iraq, the 
problem with Syria was not the Euphrates water shortage and consequendy could not be 
tackled on this basis alone, but had to relate to a broader outlook.
When the Iraqi army was engaged in war in the north against the Kurds, the Syrian 
regime was supplying the Kurds with arms and other military equipment, as well as 
setting up training camps in-side the Syrian territory. The Iraqi political leadership also 
reached the conclusion that the Syrian regime wished to provoke Iraq into a military 
clash in order to achieve full cover for the acceptance of a peaceful settlement plan for 
the Middle East crisis. In addition while Iraq had been in a difficult financial and 
economic situation, Syria had demanded an increase in the fees for transit revenues of 
Iraqi oil across Syrian territory (Baghdad Observer, 27 June 1975, 5 ; 1 July 1975, 3).
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Table El:
Quantities of water flowing at the Turkish-Syrian and 
Syrian-Iraqi borders (1975)
Date
Turkey-Syria
border
(m^/sec)
Syria-Iraq
border
(m^/sec)
26/3/75 873 220
27/3 895 227
28/3 864 234
29/3 744 251
30/3 687 243
31/3 626 258
1/4 615 258
2/4 527 241
3/4 738 262
4/4 902 269
5/4 908 270
6/4 883 262
7/4 914 270
8/4 807 257
9/4 632 223
10/4 637 247
11/4 650 235
Source: The Arab Economist, June 1975, 26.
Iraq next engaged in intensive diplomatic activities to convince other Arab regimes 
of the rightness of its own position while the Arab League set up a mediation committee, 
composed of representatives from Syria, Iraq and seven other Arab countries to mediate 
the dispute. On 1 May, however, Syria announced that it would not participate in the 
committee (Naff & Matson, 1984, 94). Over the next two weeks Iraq and Syria traded 
hostile statements Iraq threatened to take any action necessary to guarantee the 
Euphrates flow and Syria protested that it was passing 71 per cent of the water it 
received from Turkey on to Iraq. In May 1975 Saudi Arabia started its own mediation, 
and in early June even the Soviet Union was involved in a search for a solution. On 13 
May Syria closed its airspace to all Iraqi aircraft and suspended Syrian flights to 
Baghdad. On 17 May, the Syrians regime closed down the Iraqi trade centre in 
Damascus while on 25 May the Syrian closed the Iraqi Consulate General in Aleppo and 
ordered its staff member out of Syrian territory (Baghdad Observer, 25 July 1975,1). By 
the end of the month Syria had reportedly transferred troops from its southern front with 
Israel to the Iraqi border where the Syrians claimed Iraqi forces were massing. Other 
reports spoke of Iraq sending MIG planes to bomb the Euphrates dam at Tabqa 
(Baghdad Observer, 1 July 1975, 3). In July relations deteriorated further when Syria
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expelled an Iraqi military mission from Damascus and recalled its own military attache 
from Baghdad. Iraq made new complaints to the Arab League charging Syria with 
violating Iraqi airspace and harassing and attacking Iraqi military and civilian personnel 
along the northern Iraqi border (Naff & Matson, 1984, 94). As the threat of military 
engagement between the two countries grew, Saudi Arabia attempted another mediation 
effort. After a series of visits and meetings and much procrastination Syria, announced 
on 3 June that it would release "water of its own share, regardless of the Iraqi regime's 
attitude". Iraq acknowledged that more water had been released by Syria, but added that 
it had come too late for the Iraqi summer crops, and that some 70 per cent of the 
country's winter crops had been lost due to the shortage of water (Kienle, 1990, 100). 
Although Saudi Arabia is credited with successfully mediating the Syrian-Iraqi water 
issue, it is likely that the Soviet Union also played an important role in defusing the 
conflict. According to Naff & Matson (1984), the Soviets had tried to work out a 
solution to riparian problems on the Euphrates in their 1972 study, and it has been 
suggested that Syria and Iraq agreed to Soviet arbitration over water disputes in the same 
year. The Soviets had considerable prestige invested in water projects in both countries 
and were not likely to have wanted to see their work turned into a cause for conflict 
(Naff & Matson, 1984, 94). On 12 August Syria announced that it had accepted the 
Saudi proposal under which the Euphrates water was to be distributed between Syria and 
Iraq on a "proportional basis", according to the amount of water reaching Syria from 
Turkey. However, no agreement was signed, and the Euphrates issue remained 
unresolved (Kienle, 1990,100; Hinnebusch, 1989, 241).
According to Naff & Matson (1984), it is doubtful that the 1975 Syrian-Iraqi "water 
crisis" was a conflict over water at all; at least, it was not primarily a conflict over water 
resources. They note both the lack of a crisis in the winter of 1973-74, and the failure of 
the water agreement to improve Syrian-Iraqi relations (Naff & Matson, 1984, 95). It 
seems that the conflict between Baghdad and Damascus is much more complicated than 
only the "water crisis".
In 1980 all three riparians agreed to establish a technical commission for the 
exchange of information, but it only began meeting in 1982. According to Mackenzie 
(1990), because of Turkey's determination to go ahead with its projects, this committee 
has not yet produced a report. The first crisis was defused once the Keban and Tabqa 
reservoirs were full and because progress in extending the surface irrigation schemes in 
both Syria and Turkey was slow (Waterbury, 1990,18).
Because of the low rainfall in the Euphrates basin in 1984, the annual flow of the 
river was only 20 billion m^. This amount was not enough to satisfy Syria's industrial, 
domestic and agriculture requirements and regular electricity output was insufficient to 
meet demand. Although this amount of water should, apparently, satisfy Syria's needs
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the dam and irrigation system in Syria is planned for an amount of water which is at least 
30 per cent greater. The Syrian deputy Minister of Irrigation, Mahmoud Tajar, claimed 
that, at that time, Turkey was taking water off at the Keban Dam which further reduced 
the flow to Syria. He suggested that the establishment of a Euphrates valley authority 
would go a long way to defining and reacting agreements over the "rights to water on the 
river". He favoured an agreement that would require any country that planned to build 
any construction along the river, or which took water out of the river, to take into 
account the needs of other riparian states. He complained that Turkey had started new 
construction in the valley without seeking the agreement of her neighbouring countries 
(An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO, 19 March, 1984, 20). However, since contracts had 
already been awarded for Turkey's Ataturk dam in 1983, Syria began pressing Saudi 
Arabia and the Arab Gulf states not to make financial aid available to Turkey for the 
project unless a water sharing agreement was reached (Naff & Matson, 1984, 100). In 
1980 the World Bank, a major agency in making the development of large river basins 
possible, sent a letter to the riparians of the Euphrates saying that further financial 
support for irrigation and agricultural development schemes was dependent on a definite 
agreement being made between them on the partition of the Euphrates waters (Kienle, 
1990,167). The bank had provided loans to Turkey for both the Keban and the Karakaya 
dams.
Turkey took the lead in trying to head off another confrontation in July 1987 when 
Prime Minister Ozal made a visit to Damascus and reached an agreement with 
President Assad by which Turkey would maintain the Euphrates flow into Syria of at 
least 500 m^/sec after the Ataturk dam was completed. This was less than had 
originally been asked for, but was apparently acceptable to Syria. In return, Syria 
agreed to suppress "groups engaged in destructive activities” in Turkey. At the 
beginning of October 1987, Ozal reopened the breach by publicly hinting that Turkey 
might cut off the flow of the Euphrates into Syria if Damascus continued to support 
Kurdish insurgents. The Syrian response came on October 21 1987, when Syrian 
military jets shot down a Turkish civilian survey plane over Turkish territory (EIU, No. 
1,1990,10; MEED, 13 October, 1989, 4;).
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E4. The water crisis of 1989-1990
Iraq and Syria have often complained that Turkey is opposed to a trilateral accord which 
would partition the Euphrates water among the three countries. During the 15 meetings 
held between representatives of the three countries between 1980-1990, Turkey quite 
frankly stated that it was against such an agreement, but would be very careful about 
responding to the water needs of Iraq and Syria. The fears of Syria and Iraq seemed 
justified when on 29 November 1989, Turkey shocked its downstream neighbours, by 
announcing (through the Turkish Public Works Ministry) that it would hold back the 
flow of the Euphrates for one month from 13 January - 13 February, 1990 for essential 
hydraulic works at the reservoir behind its newly built Ataturk Dam, (part of the GAP 
project on the Euphrates) (The Economist, 16-22 December, 1989, 55; Briefing, 15 
January, 1990, 4). Turkey restored the flow some 36 hours ahead of schedule, on the 
night of 12-13 February but the damage that this stoppage described as an act of 
international piracy would inflict on Syria and Iraq was only the beginning, for the 
complete filling of the Ataturk reservoir would still take four to five additional years 
(ME1,16 February, 1990,12).
Syria and Iraq had made diplomatic attempts to get Turkey to review its decision 
and reduce the period of one month, which they considered too long. Syrian technicians 
believed that a period of ten days would be enough for the Ataturk Dam to carrying out 
the essential hydraulic works and Iraqi technicians also thought that ten days to two 
weeks would be sufficient. Almost all the Gulf newspapers launched a simultaneous 
campaign to attract attention to the water-cut, calling for Turkey to reconsider its 
"requirement", while some went to the extent of associating this act with Turkey's 
hostility towards Syria over that country's support for separatist terrorism. Observers at 
the Turkish Foreign Ministry, at the beginning, stated that the campaign was a result of 
pressure exerted by Damascus and Baghdad on other Arab capitals but, later, according 
to Briefing (1990) they changed this observation, claiming that both Iraq and Syria 
"understood the technical requirements of Turkey" (Briefing, 15 January, 1990, 5). 
Officials in Ankara claimed that Turkey had tried to do all it could to minimise the 
hardship to its southern neighbours (Briefing, 25 December, 1989, 9). January and 
February were the months chosen by Turkey to hold back the flow of the Euphrates 
because water needed for irrigation in Syria and Iraq and evaporation losses are minimal 
during these months (Utlcan, 1990, 12). They declared that Turkey had released 3.43 
billion m^ of water, or an average of 780 m^sec from the Keban and Karakaya Dam 
systems, over 52 days starting from 23 November 1989 to 13 January 1990, in order to 
compensate for the losses that might accrue to these two countries during the following 
month. If we take into account the total make-up and low-flow periods of 82 days
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starting from 23 November 1989 till 13 February 1990, we can see that an average 
quantity of water passing through the Turkish-Syrian border was 531 m^/sec, or 3.76 
billion (see table E2). However, according to Turkey, Syria and Iraq got more water 
during the 82 days and there was actually an increase in the amount of water, instead of a 
decrease. During the 31 days of closure, the Euphrates river was fed by the downstream 
tributaries like Goksu, Araban, and Nizip and the long term average of these tributaries 
is about 120 m^/sec (Utlcan, 1990, 13).
This, officials in Ankara claimed, amounted to 500 m^/sec running across the 
border which, if used cautiously, could be stored for thrifty use in order to overcome any 
discomfort. They declared, however, that this should not be judged on a daily or weekly 
basis, but as a monthly average (Briefing, 25 March, 7997, 10). They also noted that 
Turkey had displayed goodwill towards its neighbours by providing an average of 500 
m^/sec a month during the 1989 summer months, when Turkey itself had suffered one of 
the worst droughts for the past fifty years (Briefing, 25 December, 1989, 9). The total 
amount of water that passed through the Turkish-Syrian border was 25.7 billion m^* 
whereas the natural flow for the same period was calculated at 20.8 billion m^. The 
difference between these figures, (4.9 billion m^) was made up by releasing water from 
Keban and Karakaya reservoirs, to maintain the level of flow (Utlcan, 1990, 13).
These displays of goodwill however, do not appear to have appeased officials in 
either Damascus or Baghdad. Syria's Minister for Information, Mohammed Salman, was 
quoted in the press as saying that the most important problem between his country and 
Turkey concerned the sharing of the waters of the Euphrates. He was also quoted as 
saying that he hoped this question would be resolved through "peaceful means" ,and it 
was sufficient for Ankara to detect an "unfriendly tone" (Briefing, 25 December, 1989, 
10). The Syrians and Iraqis had a real grievance. They thought the Turks had no more 
right to use Euphrates water than they had and were simply seizing what they wanted: 
that is the lion's share (The Economist, 16-22 December, 1989, 55). By reducing the 
water flowing in the Euphrates river, Ankara would be directly showing Baghdad and 
Damascus that it controlled things in the region. According to the MEI report (1990), 
Turkey, in complete defiance of international law, was doing as it pleased simply 
because it was the strongest country involved (MEI, 16 February, 1990,13).
In a rare show of unanimity, both Damascus and Baghdad unequivocally rejected 
Ankara's claims. Syrian officials argued that water rationing had to be instituted in 
northern Syria and that power supplies had been disrupted as a direct result of the 
Turkish action while Iraq complained that 7 million of its citizens had been affected by 
subsequent shortages.
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Table E2:
Euphrates river discharges at Turkish-Syrian border, 23 November 
1989 - 12 February 1990
Karakaya
Dam
Ataturk
Dam
Goksu river 
Araban river
Nizip river
Tishrin
Dam
Tabqa
Dam
Billion m3 m3/sec
23/11/89
through
13/01/90
3.438 780
13/01/90
through
13/02/90
0.321 120
23/11/89
through
12/02/90
3.759 531
Turkey
Syria
n
/
Source: Utlcan, 1990, 14
The Iraqis also claimed that the reduction in the Euphrates level would affect 1.3 
million hectares of rich farmland, (40 per cent of Iraq's arable land), and would force 
Iraq to shut down four power plants which produced 40 per cent of the country's 
electricity (MEI, 16 February, 1990, 12; MEED, 25 January, 1991, 10). Shaker 
Bazaoua, the director-general of Syria's Al-Thawara Dam, believes the Ataturk Dam will 
eventually cut the Euphrates's flow by two-thirds. "There is no longer a river; the 
Euphrates is dead... In the future, people will visit the Euphrates valley and say, There 
used to be a river there" (Tekeli, 1990, 221). Olcay Unver, who is the GAP regional 
project director in Sanliurfa, stated that Turkey was not required by law to send 500 
m^/sec into Syria but claimed that this was done as an act of goodwill. "Syria was 
pleased at first but now both Syria and Iraq are demanding 700 m^/sec from Turkey, 
which more or less amounts to demanding the entire supply as the total, "natural flow" is
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something over 900 m^/sec". In an interview with Cumhuriyet, Inan he underlined the 
Turkish position by comparing Turkey's military situation with that of its neighbours. 
Putting it bluntly, he said: "We have the water and they have the missiles" (Briefing, 15 
January, 1990, 6).
The ruling Ba'ath Socialist Party's newspaper "Al-Thawara" warned that Turkey's 
action of blocking the river for a month would seriously harm Iraq and could cause "a 
real agricultural disaster" in the long term, adding that Ankara-Baghdad relations could 
suffer. Al-Thawara reported that seven provinces with 5,000 villages inhabited by about 
5.5 million people, would be threatened by the severe water shortage caused by the 
Turkish action. Iraqi officials believed that the Euphrates flow could eventually be 
reduced from its current 32 billion m^/yr. to 11 billion m^/yr. - or two billion m^/yr. less 
than Iraq claimed was its minimum requirement. Although Ankara had increased the 
flow of the Euphrates by 100 per cent over the normal flow of 500 m^/sec into Syria to 
compensate for the loss of water during the cut-off period, it made little difference 
because Iraq had already filled its Al-Qaddissiya dam to capacity to make up for 
shortages during the summer growing season. Claiming that villages and towns in the 
area north of Al-Qaddissiya dam would not be able to make use of that water (Turkish 
Daily News, 15 January, 1991, A1 ; Baghdad Observer, 15 January 1990,1).
The Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Nizar Hamdoun, complained that the 1987 
Turkey-Syrian accord excluded Baghdad making a trilateral agreement necessary and 
that the diversion would leave Iraq with little water. He said: "Really I cannot talk about 
minimum. We need to keep industrial projects going. Our population should get at least 
enough." Hamdoun's complaint was probably justified because Turkish officials claimed 
that Turkey had given Syria 3.4 billion m-^  since November, but Syria had released only 
860 million m^ to Iraq during the same period (Bolukbasi, 1990, 53).
Iraq's concern, however, led it to seek help from its partners in the Arab 
Cooperation Council, in the form of exerting pressure on Turkey. Both Baghdad and 
Damascus tried to find supporters among other members of the Arab League and the 
secretariat of the League actually made an announcement in late January 1990 calling for 
a just partition of the Euphrates waters and requesting Turkey to reconsider its decision 
to divert the river for a month. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mesut Yilmaz, reacted to 
these diplomatic moves by asking the Iraqi and Syrian ambassadors in Ankara to get 
their government to stop trying to internationalize the issue and turning other Arab states 
against Turkey. In addition, Ankara sent delegations to Arab capitals to explain why 
Turkey had diverted the Euphrates (Bolukbasi, 1990, 55; MEED, 26 January 1990,13).
According to Briefing (1989), officials in Ankara believed that what was actually 
disturbing Syrian and Iraqi officials was the effect on their public when they observed
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Turkey's ability to cut water off at will. They felt that this would be interpreted in Syrian 
and Iraqi public opinion as a show of strength by Turkey and a sign of weakness by the 
regimes of Hafez Assad and Saddam Hussein (Briefing, 25 December, 1989, 10). But, 
even if the cut-off were due to technical requirements, and had no political motivation 
who could guarantee that this would be the case in the coming years or in the case of a 
serious regional crisis?
In April 1990, according to the MEED (1991) Baghdad and Damascus signed an 
accord by which Syria would take 42 per cent of the river's flow once it had left Turkey. 
However, as in all fifteen meetings of the Syrian-Iraqi-Turkish joint commission on the 
Euphrates held over the past ten years, finding a solution has remained elusive. Here, the 
talks reportedly broke down over the volume of water to be discharged by Turkey and 
the decision to carry on with the negotiations. The Turkish side presented a three-phase 
plan at the 1990 meeting of the Technical Committee, outlining the course that had to be 
followed to resolve the question. According to this plan, Turkey, Syria and Iraq were to 
conduct joint studies about their Euphrates water resources and the data collected was to 
be evaluated by engineers with a view to reducing wastage to a minimum. In addition, 
current projects were to be reviewed in order to conform with the principle of optimal 
usage. This plan was rejected by both Syria and Iraq who insisted that there was no need 
for such intricate measures and that supplying water on the basis of unilateral 
declarations of requirement would be sufficient. Baghdad demanded the release of 700 
nfVsec instead of the 500 m^/sec offered by Ankara and Iraq indirectly, but clearly, 
stated that they could have sorted out their problems with Syria had Turkey not spoiled 
things by not giving enough water (MEED, 25 January, 1991; Briefing, 26 March, 1990, 
18 & 2-9 July, 1990, 10). The fact that Turkey has embarked on the grand-scale GAP 
project, involving a network of dams in the Euphrates and the Tigris basins, has led both 
Syria and Iraq to believe that, in the long run, they are going to be deprived of water 
since the Euphrates is one of the main rivers in the GAP region. Both countries are 
critically dependent on the Euphrates, and therefore wish to conclude some form of 
binding arrangement with Turkey which would involve quotas for the amounts of water 
from this river for each of the three countries.
On 26-27 of June 1990, Turkey, Syria and Iraq held two days of ministerial level 
talks in Ankara in order to try and reduce the differences over the question of the sharing 
of regional water which had been clouding Ankara's relations with both Baghdad and 
Damascus. According to a Dateline report (1990) the Turkish officials pointed out that 
there was more than just the Euphrates river in the region. There was also the Tigris, and 
the river Asi which flowed from Syria into Turkey and was used to irrigate the Amik 
Valley, not to mention a host of smaller rivers and streams which had to be taken into 
account. Turkey claimed that when all water resources were taken into account, a more
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effective, rational and equitable system could be implemented for sharing the water 
between the three nations. In view of all this, Turkey argued that the whole area had to 
be accepted as a single geographical unit, and that the water resources in this basin, 
rather than being shared, had to be made subject to a joint use agreement based on the 
criteria of optimality, fairness and rationality. Turkey also offered technical help to 
minimize wastage of water (Dateline, 30 June 1990, 9). According to Briefing (1990), 
however, Syria and Iraq did not want to get involved in any technicalities with Turkey 
but preferred a simple mathematical solution to a problem which in reality, is very 
complex (Briefing, 2-9 July, 1990, 10 ; Dateline, 30 June, 1990, 9). In addition to the 
protocol signed with Syria in 1987, which committed Turkey to giving 500 m^/sec., 
Turkey also offered to increase the flow from the system of dams in the region to Syria, 
and subsequently Iraq, by 100-200 m^/sec, according to the availability of water during 
certain periods of the year especially when these countries were in dire need of water for 
agricultural purposes.
Before further negotiations could take place, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait took place 
and the Euphrates water issue was eclipsed by other pressing concerns. According to the 
MEED report (1991), Turkey was under pressure to cut the flow of the Euphrates and 
Tigris rivers in an attempt to drive Saddam Hussain out of Kuwait. Water could be 
viewed as Iraq's Achilles heel and the denial of water was a possible means of ensuring a 
swift and bloodless end to the Kuwait crisis (MEED, 25 January, 1991, 10). There were, 
however, clear threats made by Saddam's son (who was the Minister of Energy) that if 
Turkey stopped giving Iraq its required water, they would know what to do (Frankel, 
1991, 261). The Turkish authorities have repeatedly said that they do not intend to use 
the river as a political or military tool against their neighbours to the south and their 
behaviour during the Gulf Crisis and War of 1990-1991 appears to confirm that Turkey 
is pursuing a long-term policy which does not introduce any unnecessary increments of 
tension and resentment to relations with its downstream riparians. The Turkish press 
claimed during the Gulf war that the Ataturk Dam represented a prime military target 
(Dateline, 18 August, 1990,1).
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E5. Relations between Turkey, Syria and Iraq
A deep study of the conflict between the states concerning the sharing of Euphrates river 
water teaches us that the subject of water cannot be isolated from broader geographical, 
historical, political and economic issues. Thus is needed to understand the true 
importance of hydro-politics on the background of the complex of relations between 
states.
The examination of the relations among the riparian states shows the importance of 
four factors. These factors include the respective policies of the three states toward the 
amount of water to be drawn from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, the Kurdish question, 
the rivalry between the Iraqi and Syrian branches of the Ba'ath party, and Syria's history 
of animosity towards Turkey.
E5.1 Relations between Turkey and Syria
The source of the difficulties in achieving a real improvement in relations between 
Turkey and Syria up to 1991 undoubtedly lies in the dichotomy of Turkey's membership 
of NATO and Syria's reliance on support from the former Soviet union. In other words, 
the confrontation between East and West is reflected in the Middle East in general and in 
Turkish-Syrian relations in particular. Even though this tension has been reduced by the 
world-wide softening of the Cold War, it has not completely disappeared.
Relations between the two countries have not been cordial since 1939, when France, 
then the mandatory power in Syria, handed the area around Alexandretta (Iskanderun in 
Turkish, Hatay in Arabic) over to Turkey as a bribe to enter World War II on the side of 
the allies. Turkey accepted, but then stayed neutral. Syria has never accepted this 
territorial loss and Syrian maps still show the territory as part of Syria. Damascus has 
never been able to hide the fact that it considers Turkish sovereignty over the Hatay as 
illegitimate. Ali Mustafa, the Syrian consul general in Istanbul, argued, in 1985, that 
Syrian maps still included Hatay region within Syrian borders because ''Syria does not 
accept the present frontiers which were drawn up in Hatay through a referendum, 
because that referendum was conducted following an agreement between Turkey and 
France. In those days there was no independent Syrian state". In addition to this, the 
consul declared that Syria's hostility was at least partly due to Turkey's GAP project, and 
the construction of the giant Ataturk Dam that would harm Syrian interests. He added 
that the controversy concerning the sharing of the Euphrates waters should be solved 
according to the rules of international law governing the joint use of rivers and other 
waterways (Bolukbasi, 1990, 27). Until the late 1970s diplomatic relations remained
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"correct", yet both sides knew that the state of affairs could best be described as 
"peaceful coexistence". Perhaps because of this background, Syria has been willing to 
permit anti-Ankara Kurds and leftist opposition groups to use its territory as a base for 
operations, and Ankara has sometimes angrily admonished Damascus on the issue (MEI, 
16 February, 1990, 13; Bolukbasi, 1990, 3). The subject of Syria's helping Turkish 
opposition groups during the 1970s by aiming them and sending them back secretly into 
Turkey has aroused the most severe displeasure in the Turkish administration. Evidence 
has also been put forward suggesting that Syria had helped Armenian terrorists, and 
during the 1980s had similarly provided arms for Kurdish terrorists. In particular, Syria 
was held responsible for the fact that Abdullah Ocalan (APO), the leader of the Marxist- 
oriented Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) which was founded in Turkey in 1978, had 
moved his headquarters to Damascus and, from 1984 on, had sent Kurdish terrorists, 
trained in the Bekka valley of Lebanon, (under Syrian control), into Southeast Anatolia. 
Syria has refused to admit training and arming members of the PKK, or providing 
facilities for them.
In December 1986, Turkish police claimed that they had discovered Syrian-backed 
terrorists operating to blow up the Ataturk dam (The Middle East, October 1987, 27). 
The Turks reported that there were three training camps in northern Syria housing 
militants belonging to the "Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia" 
(ASALA) and the PKK, and that Syrian agents, disguised as diplomats, had delivered 
arms to ASALA militants in various European countries. On 17 September 1986 the 
PKK Central Committee held a meeting in Damascus where it decided on more 
increasing its operations, especially its crossings of the Turko-Syrian border into Turkey 
(Bolukbasi, 1990, 24;41). The Syrian Prime Minister Abed al-Rauf al-Kasm stated in 
1986, that Damascus was unable to prevent PKK incursions into Turkey because Syria, 
with a long frontier, had no army in the north, since it was needed to watch the enemy in 
the south. Thus, although Syria was doing its best to avoid friction with Turkey, they 
could not keep the border under strict control (Bolukbasi, 1990, 34).
In July 1987 the Turkish Prime Minister Ozal went to Damascus and two months 
later Kadurra, the Vice-Prime Minister of Syria, went to Turkey. At these meetings, a 
protocol for "Cooperation on Security Problems" was signed, bringing up a number of 
bilateral matters dealing with the prevention of the smuggling of goods across the 
common border, the cross-border trade in counterfeit money and the return of fugitives 
to the country from which they were escaping (Lewis, 1991, 73).. In addition discussions 
were held on the prevention of terrorism (from Turkey's point of view- the PKK, and 
from Syria's, certain elements of the Syrian Moslem Brotherhood). Particular attention 
was given to the important problem of regulating the water of the Euphrates. As a result 
of his visit Ozal proposed Turkish help in the prospecting for gas and oil in Syria, 
presented a project to supply electricity to Syria if Damascus needed it, and suggested
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that increased trade and economic cooperation would benefit both countries. His major 
proposal was, however, the installation of the Peace Pipelines (Bolukbasi, 1990, 43). 
According to Briefing (1989), the result of this protocol was that the Syrian government 
moved the PKK camp out of Syria into the Bekka valley in Lebanon. Turkish officials 
felt that such a move was not sufficient in itself because there was evidence of Syrian 
territory still being used for many of the PKK attacks. They did not accept the Syrian 
excuse that the PKK camps were in sovereign Lebanese territory and therefore beyond 
their reach for, in fact, the Bekka Valley was under Syrian control (Briefing, 10-17 July, 
1989, 5). Many questions were left unanswered such as the fate of the PKK terrorists in 
the Bekka Valley, and Syria's attitude towards the extradition of the PKK leader, 
Abdullah Ocland, about whose presence in Syria Turkey had documentary proof but 
about whom Damascus claimed complete ignorance (Briefing, 20 July, 1987,15).
On 21 October, 1989, two Syrian MIG-21 fighter planes entered Turkey's airspace 
near Samandag, Hatay, and shot down a Turkish plane killing two pilots and three 
technicians. Syria argued that its pilots had disobeyed orders and Ankara accepted 
Damascus' explanation, but many suspected that Damascus was in fact trying to scare 
Ankara so that Ozal would not dare to use the "water weapon". In November 1989, Jamil 
al-Assad, the Syrian president's brother, made a statement that a Kurdish state should be 
established in the region and should also encompass Southeast Anatolia, adding that the 
Syrian government was providing every kind of political and logistical support to the 
PKK. Later on in December 1989 the Syrian Minister of Information, Mohammad 
Salman, claimed that his country did not recognize the Hatay region as part of Turkey. 
All these were perceived by Ankara as a Syrian attempt to build up tension between the 
two countries in order to force Ankara to revise its "water policy", and agree to 
Damascus' demand to sign a treaty to formally share the water of the Euphrates 
(Bolukbasi, 1990, 50).
In a sense Turkey was taking a "wait-and-see" stance towards Syria to see if Syria 
would, in fact, take serious steps to broaden the scope of its relationship with Turkey, 
especially its economic and commercial relations. However, there was a certain reticence 
on the part of Syrian officials about the prospect of coming too close and thus becoming 
more dependent on Turkey, as had already happened in the matter of water (Briefing, 10- 
17 July, 1989, 6). Turkish exports to Syria in 1989 (first 8 months) reached 110 million 
US dollars, of which nearly half were agricultural products (Erengul, 1990, 15). 
According to Ozal, Syria was a very important "key country" in the Arab world and 
relations with it would further increase its importance in the region. Ankara's close ties 
with Arab and Islamic countries also had a great importance for Turkey's relations with 
the west (Briefing, 20 July, 1987,15).
The visit of Syrian Foreign Minister, Farouq A1 Shara, to Ankara in March 1991, 
marked a new phase in the relations between the two countries. These relations, often
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strained in the past because of the issues of the water of the Euphrates and cross-border 
security, have vastly improved since the two countries found themselves on the same 
side of the fence during the Gulf crisis; but according to The Sunday Times (1991), 
Hafez al-Assad, the Syrian president, ordered his soldiers in Lebanon to leave the PKK 
base alone because he wanted the camp as a bargaining chip against Turkey which he 
feared could use the Euphrates dams to cut off Syria's water (The Sunday times, 13 
October 1991,24).
According to The Guardian (1992), the Turkish Interior Minister, Ismet Sezgin, 
visited Damascus on 17 April 1992 and, as a result, Turkey and Syria have drawn up two 
protocols aimed at improving joint border security and removing the PKK from the 
Bekka (The Guardian, 18 April 1992, 12). According to Briefing (1991), there was a 
visible desire on both sides to overcome the traditional problems which had beset 
bilateral relations in the past (Briefing, 25 March, 1991, 9). When it came to discussing 
bilateral issues, the Syrian's again brought up the topic of the water of the Euphrates. 
Neither side harbours the illusion that the water issue will not be a focus of discussion 
again and again in future contacts between the two capitals, but there appears to be a 
recognition, that water could become the cause of fresh tensions in the region as it seeks 
to recover from the Gulf crisis; and therefore, cooperation is needed to prevent this 
(Briefing, 25 March, 1991,10).
E5.2 Relations between Turkey and Iraq
The Turkey-Iraq situation is rather different since Iraq and Turkey are more than 
just a neighbours but major trading partners with Turkey buying a substantial part of its 
oil from Iraq, some of which acts as rent for pipeline and port facilities in Turkey 
through which Iraq ships oil to international markets (till the embargo resolution of the 
UN in 1990).
According to the Turkish National Pact adopted by the last Ottoman Parliament on 
28 January 1920, the Mosul area (the towns of Mosul, Kirkuk, Suleymaniye and their 
surroundings), had to remain within the Turkish border. On 1 May 1920, Mustafa Kemal 
(Ataturk) declared that this would be the case in 1925, however Britain, bearing in mind 
the oil fields in the Mosul area and the strategic importance of Iraq, decided that the 
whole of the Mosul area was to remain in Iraq. Turkey did not participate in the Council 
of the League of Nations at which this decision was taken unanimously and was not in a 
position at that time to consider changing the fait accompli, which would have meant 
going against Britain, so, instead, she re-opened talks with Britain in 1926. In exchange 
for certain concessions, Turkey accepted the decision of the League of Nations, and 
signed the "Treaty between Turkey, the United Kingdom and Iraq concerning the
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establishment of the border between Turkey and Iraq", thus putting an end to the dispute 
over this border (Lewis, 1991, 29). Since then, the two countries have been on fairly 
good terms although the Turks still say that the oil producing area of Mosul should have 
been allotted to them after World War I rather than being incorporated into the new Arab 
state of Iraq, then under British mandatory rule. Since the 1926 agreement, however, 
there has not been a single territorial dispute between these two states.
Indeed, Iraq and Turkey have another common interest: the suppression of Kurdish 
dissidents in their frontier areas, and this is the major factor which has led to cooperation 
between the two countries. Both states have been generally careful not to harbour or 
support the other side's opposition groups and when the Iraqi army was preoccupied with 
fighting Iran in the Gulf War, Iraq even granted the Turkish army the right of "hot 
pursuit" of Kurds across the border. After the closure of the port of Basra during the Gulf 
War, road and rail links across Anatolia and from Iskanderun, became Iraq's back door 
for supplies. What is more, new and enlarged pipelines carried Iraqi oil to the export 
terminal in Yumurtalik near Mersin and, in normal circumstances 60 per cent of Iraq's 
total oil output would flow across Turkey. Thus Iraq, heavily dependent on Turkey's 
good will, cannot strongly protest about that country's unilateral usurpation of the 
Euphrates water (MEI, 16 February, 1990,13).
Turkish-Iraqi relations made very rapid progress from the mid 1970s until the end of 
the 1980's on both the economic and political fronts and, after April 1982, Turkey 
became the major outlet for Iraqi oil. In 1977 a first pipeline was laid from Kirkuk in 
Iraq to Yumurtalik in Turkey and, by the end of 1984, the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline's 
capacity had been extended from 700,00 barrels per day to 1 million barrels per day. In 
1985 Iraq and Turkey began building a second pipeline through Turkey which was 
completed by June 1987 increasing oil exports via Turkey from 1 million to 1.5 million 
barrels per day. Thus nearly half of Turkey's annual 20 million tonnes of oil imports 
comes from Iraq as well as 280 million dollars in royalties per year for the oil 
transported via these pipelines. Without the Turkish outlet, Iraqi oil exports would have 
come to a virtual standstill long ago (Irian, 1989, 51; Bolukbasi, 1990, 22).
Turkish-Iraqi cooperation reached its climax when both sides signed the security 
protocol in October 1984 whereby Iraq granted Turkey the right of "hot pursuit". The 
protocol allowed forces from either country to pursue "subversive groups in the territory 
of the other" up to a distance of five kilometres, thus Turkey could continue pursuing 
members of the PKK into Iraq and, in August 1986, Turkish planes first bombed camps 
set up by the terrorist organization on the Iraqi side of the border (Lewis, 1991, 70; 
Bolukbasi, 1990, 21).
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Turkey and Iraq have, however, faced several major problems over the last few 
years particularly Baghdad’s increasing concern over Turkey’s GAP project and the 
feeling that it was left out of the Damascus-Ankara agreement of July 1987 over the 
sharing of the Euphrates water during the building phase of the Ataturk Dam. During his 
Baghdad visit in April 1988, Ozal declared that the Turkish-Syrian agreement was a 
temporary one and that the real treaty would be reached through tripartite talks to be held 
by the three countries (Bolukbasi, 1990,39).
The failure of the respective governments to reach an agreement over oil prices has 
led to a drastic decline in trade between Iraq and Turkey. In 1989, Turkish exports to 
Iraq were reduced to one quarter of what they had been in 1987, and imports from Iraq 
(95 per cent of which were oil), were halved. Turkish exports to Iraq in 1988, when the 
trade volume was at its peak (986 million US dollars), had consisted mainly of live 
animals, poultry and eggs, cereals, chemicals, and iron and steel products (Erengul, 
1990,15).
Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and Turkey's compliance 
with the subsequent embargo resolution of the UN, the pipelines were closed, but the 
Kirkuk oil installations and the Iraq-Turkey pipeline survived the Gulf War undamaged 
(Lewis, 1991, 69). The closing of the pipeline, introduced a problem of distrust in the 
mutual relationship which will not be easy to overcome since, until recently, Turkey had 
conveyed the impression to Iraq that it viewed the pipeline as a commercial enterprise, 
protected from the uncertainties of politics. Turkey's closing of the pipeline has left the 
Iraqi government suspicious that the pipeline might be turned off whenever it suits 
Turkish economic or political interests.
The political cost of the Turkish action may be no less serious than the economic 
cost. It should be remembered that of all Turkey' s neighbours, Iraq - along with the 
former Soviet Union - is the country with which Turkey has the fewest problems. The 
Iraqi regime not only does not try to base its legitimacy on religion (being more secular 
than many other Middle Eastern countries) but, unlike the Islamic revolutionaries of Iran 
and the fundamentalist conservatives of Saudi Arabia, Iraq has no ideology to export to 
Turkey which might cause strains and stresses in the basically secular Turkish society. In 
addition Iraq and Turkey have no territorial claims against each other.
E5.3 Relations between Syria and Iraq
Relations between Iraq and Syria in the 1940s and 1950s were characterized by 
asymmetry. Iraq, the stronger of the two, with significant economic resources, a stable 
leadership, and ambitions for the dominance of Syria, was capable of intervening and 
affecting Syrian politics. Syria was relatively unable to affect Iraqi politics and its 
politicians were pleased to receive financial and political assistance from Iraq. Between 
1955 and 1958, relations between the states took on an ideological dimension and the 
main motive for Iraqi activity in Syria during those years became more and more 
defensive: to prevent Syria from joining the anti-Iraqi, pro-Egyptian camp. The rise to 
power of the Ba'ath parties in both Syria and Iraq intensified the rivalry between the two 
countries by adding the dispute over the legitimacy of their respective regimes (Eppel,
1991,3).
The Ba’ath regimes of Syria and Iraq have been in conflict since the very beginning 
of their coexistence in July 1968. According to Kienle (1990), this conflict, until 1972, 
chiefly arose from the desire of the Syrian rulers to monopolize Ba'ath legitimacy and 
prevent certain categories of their Ba'ath supporters from shifting their political 
allegiance to the regime in Baghdad. Although the Syrian rulers partly overestimated the 
danger, such tendencies did exist among certain members of the Syrian establishment, 
mainly those who occupied key positions in the army and the party and who threatened 
to erode the regime in Damascus from within. Reviling and attacking the more attractive 
Ba'ath neighbour seemed to be the most adequate from of self-defence. With the 
increasing consolidation of the structure of the Syrian regime bilateral relations in 1972 
entered a calmer period that, nonetheless, was marked by serious and narrow conflicts of 
interest (Kienle, 1990, 170). Given the lack of democracy and, the inability to maintain 
legitimate opposition activity, the forces and personages opposing the regime in each 
state found asylum within the rival country. Syria persistently encouraged and assisted 
Iraqi groups which opposed Saddam Hussain and his regime, including the Kurdish 
opposition operating from Damascus. Assad's opponents and Syria's enemies likewise 
received assistance from Baghdad and, since the early 1970s, Iraq has been granting 
assistance to anti-Syrian groups (Eppel, 1991, 6).
In 1975, relations between the two countries reached a crisis level over economic 
interests, involving such questions as the pipeline from Iraq to the Mediterranean and the 
division of the water from the Euphrates, and this led to the massing of military forces 
on the Iraqi-Syrian border. In April 1976, after the breakdown in negotiations over fees 
for the transit of Iraqi oil across Syria and the price for supply of Iraqi crude, Iraq 
cancelled the transit agreements and cut off oil supplies until February 1979 when a new
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agreement was reached and supplies resumed (Drysdale, 1990, 351; EIU, Syria, 1991 - 
92, 34). According to Waterbury (1990), it is in this respect that side issues and side 
payments became especially important. One of these already manifested itself in the 
mid-1970s, and that was the deal made between Iraq and Turkey to construct an oil 
pipeline from northern Iraq to the Mediterranean in Turkey. This was seen by Syria as a 
hostile act, which threatened the existing, economically vital pipeline through Syria and 
part of Syria's intransigence towards Iraq over the Euphrates must have stemmed from 
this affront (Waterbury, 1990, 18) . During the 1970s and the 1980s, Iraq frequently 
accused Syria of withholding up to 60 per cent of Iraq's share of the Euphrates water but 
Damascus denied this.
Even after the loss of its Gulf ports at the outset of the Iran-Iraq war Iraq was able to 
use both the Turkish and Syrian pipelines. Although the Syrian pipeline was damaged at 
the beginning of the war it became operational again by December 1980 and, in 1981, 
Baghdad was exporting 500,000 barrels per day through the Syrian pipeline. Syrian-Iraqi 
relations which had already started to deteriorate after the aborted unity attempts of 1978 
and 1979, however, reached their lowest point during the beginning of 1982 and, by 
early 1982, the Iraqis felt that Syria was not only supporting Iran in the Gulf war, but 
was trying to bring down Saddam Hussain as well. In July 1982, when Iran had 
recaptured most of the Iranian territory and carried the war into Iraq, Syria also 
pressured Iraq by shutting down the Iraqi oil pipeline which carried oil to Banyas and 
Tripoli in Lebanon as well as closing the Syrian-Iraqi border. With the loss of the Syrian 
pipeline the only remaining outlet for Iraqi oil exports was the Turkish pipeline, but the 
closure of the Iraqi-Syrian border also forced the shut down of the Turco-Iraqi railway, 
which passed through Syria, and was used by Iraq to import European goods 
(Bolukbasi, 1990,18).
Saddam Hussain, who replaced Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr as president of Iraq in July 
1979, started a large scale purge within the Ba'ath in February 1980, and there were 
abortive coups and assassination attempts made against him during 1980. Saddam held 
Syria responsible for these attempts which contributed to a drastic deterioration in 
relations. Saddam's ambitions for regional power and Iraq's growing military strength 
were among the factors which led Assad to approach Iran in a spirit of cooperation 
during the war against Iraq. The end of the Iraq-Iran war in 1988 increased Syrian fears 
of Saddam Hussein's ambitions and of the Iraqi military machine, which was now 
unhampered by war. After the August 1988 Gulf cease-fire, already poor Iraqi-Syrian 
relations were further strained by Baghdad's active military and material support of 
General Aoun, the head of the Christian military government in East Beirut, who during
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1989 and 1990 had waged a "war of liberation" against the "Syrian occupation force" in 
Lebanon (EIU, Iraq, 1991-92, 6).
Before Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and annexed the Emirate, there had 
been signs of a possible rapprochement between the two Ba'athist rivals, Syria and Iraq. 
The two sides found common ground on issues such as the sharing of the Euphrates 
water, and the Israeli problem. Iraq was important to Syria as its strategic depth against 
Israel and as an Arab partner in its relations with Turkey in the dispute over the 
Euphrates water. Paradoxically, Syria needed an Iraq which was militarily and 
economically strong but, at the same time, one which both refrained from regional 
ambitions, (to avoid endangering Syria and its leadership), and adapted itself to the 
considerations and priorities of the Syrian leadership. The Iraqi invasion of the Arab 
state of Kuwait was, for the Syrians, clear proof that their previous suspicion regarding 
the nature and tendencies of Saddam Hussain and his regime were correct. The 
immediate Syrian response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 was a call for 
the urgent convocation of the Arab summit conference. Shortly after the Gulf crisis 
erupted, Syria adopted a pro-western approach, joining the US led international coalition 
to protect the Saudi Kingdom. Together with Egypt and Morocco, it was one of the three 
Arab countries to dispatch troops and armoured tanks to the Gulf to join the US led 
multinational military force. Syria's long land border with Iraq has made it a crucial 
factor in the enforcement of UN trade and military sanctions imposed against Iraq as a 
result of the latter's aggression (EIU, Syria, 1991-92, 8). Syria's insistent and 
uncompromising attitude resulted from fear of Iraqi expansionism and of Saddam 
Hussain's increased strength, should his move into Kuwait prove successful. An Iraqi 
success in Kuwait would have tipped the balance of forces even further to Syria's 
disadvantage, endangering the status and survival of Assad's regime and, perhaps, that of 
Syria in general. The attempt to forge a united opposition front against the Ba'athist 
government in Iraq, (which fell apart in the shambles of the failed Kurdish and Shia 
uprising of March 1991), was finally resurrected in December 1991 (EIU, Iraq, 1992, 
No. 1,8).
E6. Conclusion
The diplomatic relations between Turkey and Iraq are fashioned by three principal 
factors.
a) The sharing of Euphrates river water.
b) Security issues - problems with the Kurdish minority in Northern Iraq and
South-Eastern Turkey.
c) Close commercial links including a safe, continental conduit for Iraqi oil.
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The national aspiration of the Kurdish minority obliges Turkey and Iraq to co­
operate in order to safeguard their common interest in maintaining stability in South- 
East Anatolia and Northern Iraq especially in the area of Kirkuk and Mosul where half 
of Iraq's oil is also produced. The Iraqi pipeline to the Mediterranean also traverses 
Turkey through an area mostly settled by the Kurdish population and this also requires 
the states to co-operate. Thus, particularly since the eighties, Iraq and Turkey have co­
operated against the Kurdish population and principally against the PKK. One must 
remember that the establishment of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq would probably 
have far reaching implications for the national aspirations of the Iraqi Kurdish minority 
in South East Anatolia.
The close commercial links between Turkey and Iraq up to the Gulf War relate to 
the logistical importance of Turkey as a safe passage-way for the transportation of goods 
to and from Iraq, including its being a reliable continental conduit for Iraqi oil. 60 per 
cent of Iraq's oil at the end of the eighties was exported through Turkey as well as a 
significant amount of other commercial products.
Iraq's has become Turkey's preferred source of oil supply but Turkey has benefited 
from transfer payments and Iraq's political and economic dependence something which 
has enabled Turkey to develop its exports to Iraq.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, had far-reaching ramifications for the 
web of diplomatic relations between the states. Without Turkey's co-operation it would 
have been impossible to carry out any efficient economic embargo against Iraq. Despite 
this Iraq's economic and political dependence upon Turkey can be seen in the fact that 
Turkey was the first state with whom Iraq tried to rehabilitate its relations after the end 
of the war. Thus it is reasonable to assume that after the economic sanctions against Iraq 
are cancelled the previous relations between the two states will be restored to what they 
were.
Of all its Muslim neighbours Syria is the one with which Turkey has the coldest 
and tensest diplomatic relations. The main area of contention between the two states for 
several decades was the fate of the Alexandretta territory which was annexed to Turkey 
in 1931 with France's consent. Since the seventies, however, the issues of sharing the 
water of the Euphrates and the Syrian assistance to the radical anti-Turkish movements 
(mainly Kurdish and Armenian) have dominated the relationship between the two states. 
During the middle of the eighties it was already possible to talk about a network of 
relations based upon water for security. Syria's support for Greek-Cyprus, from 1974 on, 
did not make matters easier for the relations between the states.
Although Syria and Turkey co-operates against Iraq during the Gulf War and it 
appears that this co-operation reduced the mutual distrust between the states, one cannot
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yet identify any significant change in their relations. On the other hand a future forecast 
suggests Syria will need to come out of its political and economic isolation and therefore 
will improve its network relations.
Examining Syria and Iraq's complicated relations we can observe that although the 
issue of sharing the water of the Euphrates brought the two states to the brink of war in 
1975 it appears that since then both states have avoided conflict over the water. Syria 
did not exploit its position as an upstream state to harm Iraq and, even more, the same 
subject caused Syria and Iraq to co-operate in 1990 against Turkey's development plans.
There are no two regimes more similar to each other, both structurally and 
ideologically than Syria and Iraq in the Arab World that severe disagreements over 
political, diplomatic, economic and strategic relations as well as personal rivalry 
between the leaders (which has worsened over the years) are what shapes the relations 
between the states.
From an economic point of view Syria harmed Iraq by stopping the flow of oil in 
the pipeline from Kirkuk in Northern Iraq to the ports of Baniyas and Tripoli on the 
Mediterranean Sea for the first time in December 1966 and then in March 1967. In 1972 
Syria nationalized the Syrian section of the pipeline and in 1973 forced Iraq to double its 
transit payments. From 1976 to 1979 Iraq stopped the flow of oil in the pipeline in 
protest over the intervention of Syria in Lebanon and, in 1982, Syria stopped the flow of 
oil in order to damage Iraq's war effort against Iran. Since then the pipeline has been 
closed.
Syria militarily supported Iran in its war with Iraq in 1982 and then again, in 1990 
it supported the Alliance in its war to remove the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. This support 
by Syria in the war against Iraq did not only arise out of the severe rivalry between the 
leaders and the different ideological points of view of the Ba'ath parties but that this 
military intervention helped Syria to overcome a crisis connected with the end of the 
Cold War, the collapse of the communist regime in the Eastern Bloc and so allowed it to 
begin to develop economic and political ties with the western world.
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F. Models from international Law
F1. The nature of international law
The utilization of the waters of an international drainage basin raises many problems 
with respect to both international relations and international law. Water rights have been 
the subject of state concern ever since the earliest appearance of any form of state 
organization. In the light of the most recent research it may not even be going too far to 
say that the organization of the state as it has been known over the last six thousand 
years had its origins in water rights. The history of water legislation in the Middle East 
goes back to antiquity and appears in extant ancient Talmudic, Muslim, and Ottoman 
law as well as in modem water laws (Hirsch, 1957, 2). It is only in the last century since 
the increased development of systematic irrigation planning, domestic and industrial 
consumption, and hydro-electric power that water relations between states have become 
a complex legal problem. This problem still contains many uncertainties and unsolved 
questions and is, in view of the ever increasing shortage of water throughout the world, 
one of the most important fields of research in international law at the present time.
In the area of management of international water bodies, the geopolitical 
considerations and hydropolitical implications for the co-basin countries cannot be 
divorced from the technical, legal, economic and environmental issues. When water 
becomes scarce and is considered to be a strategic national resource, hydropolitics needs 
to be taken into account for the national management of international water bodies 
(Biswas, 1993,179).
Law, an instrument which can be used to smooth out conflicts of interest in the 
sharing of water resources, provides guidelines for ordering future conduct. Law can be 
determined by a court action which may set a precedent that becomes a "guideline" for 
future cases but may also come from legislation by an administrative body, for example 
a government, which passes a statute when it sees a need. According to Barrow (1987), 
in many countries the state constitution affects water rights and water management 
because it binds legislation and common law or its equivalent (Barrow, 1987, 68).
International rivers are of two general categories: those that flow between the land 
territories of two or more states (contiguous or boundary rivers), and those that flow 
from the territory of one state into the territory of another state (successive rivers). In the 
case of a successive river one state is in complete physical control of the river as it 
passes through its territory, while in the case of contiguous rivers, there is dual physical 
control of the waters. The sources of both successive and contiguous rivers bring them
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into physical contact with the land territory of two or more states and one type of river is 
no more a separate physical unit than the other. Even the geographic distinction between 
the two kinds of rivers can, in some cases, be more apparent than real, for a river may be 
both successive and contiguous. For example, it may flow through the territories of two 
states and, at some point, between their territories as well (Garretson & Haydon, 1967, 
17). The Helsinki rules define an international drainage basin as "a geographical area 
extending over two or more states determined by the watershed limits of the system of 
water, including surface and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus. A 
basin state is a state or territory which includes a portion of an international drainage 
basin” (United Nation, 1977, 78). The International Law Commission (ILC), has 
provided a different definition of an international river. "International watercourse 
means a watercourse, parts of which are situated in a different state. Watercourse means 
a system of surface and underground waters constituting, by virtue of their physical 
relationship, a unitary whole and flowing into a common terminus” (Environment Policy 
and Law 21 May 1991, 249). The difference between a river, tributary, watercourse or 
stream is largely one of degree measured by the size, length and breadth of the 
watercourse; but, in the legal sense, there is no particular difference between them.
The state located uppermost in the drainage basin of an international river is 
normally in a position to exercise its control over the waters first. Generally, there can be 
only one such "upper basin state" since all other states within the drainage basin are 
"lower basin states" with respect to that state, although, in turn, some may be "upper 
basin states" with respect to others. In the case of an international drainage basin 
composed of a tributary stream in addition to the principal river, there may be more than 
one upper basin state relative to all other co-basin states (Garretson & Haydon, 1967,1).
State territory, which is a principal sphere of "essentially domestic" matters, 
undoubtedly includes those waters flowing within it, which are so-called "national 
waters". As a result of its physical qualities, water which is in the territory of one state 
today and therefore a part of its state territory, will flow, into the territory of another 
down stream state tomorrow and become part of that state's territory. According to 
Berber (1955) the fact that one part of state territory (in contrast to the definition of 
territory), is movable and, even naturally, a fluid element, gives it a characteristic 
similarity to the most mobile elements of nature such as the clouds and the winds, 
despite its association with the most stable of all elements, the land. This contradictory 
character of flowing water raises complicated questions in international law. By 
definition it belongs to the domestic jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign; but the 
territorial sovereign acts to the full extent of its powers, and interferes with the 
legitimate expectations of the lower riparian. Contemporary international law is based
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on the distinction between internal matters, which are only concerned with the 
individual state, and matters of international importance, over which no single state has 
exclusive jurisdiction. The boundary between the two is fluid (Berber, 1955, 4). In 
general, the rights of any country with respect to a river pertain only to that section that 
lies within its territory and under its sovereignty. More precisely, the rights of the 
country pertain to the river bed rather than to the water, since it is limited by 
international law in what it may do with the water; and what it can do with the water 
may be done only as long as the water is in that part of the river bed in that particular 
state's territory. A river that crosses the borders of a country remains under that country's 
jurisdiction only as far as the border of the next country, where the river becomes part of 
the territory of a different state (Hirsch, 1956a, 207).
In the Middle East today, five elements of water legislation are discernible and they 
are based upon:
1) Local customs, based in part on legal principles perhaps dating back to earlier 
antiquity, which may still dominate the water relationships in many parts of the 
area.
2) Principles of religious law (or civil-law provisions of religious law codes) 
often provide a theoretical super- structure which has an independent legal 
existence overshadowed by ancient customs, on the one hand, and more recent 
legislation on the other.
3) Ottoman law which has survived in many parts of the Middle East and 
remains an important factor for water laws.
4) The independent states of the region which have also passed more recent 
legislation, some of it enacted after these states attained independence (Hirsch, 
1956, 147).
5) International law, founded on the concept of the nations that participate in the 
system.
International law comes from international agreements, international custom, and 
general principles of law and its principles are based up on equity and natural justice. 
However, while international law cannot provide all the needed answers, it is, 
nevertheless, essential if legitimate answers are to be found. There are several aspects of 
international rivers that are legally relevant and they are: water use; water allocation; 
water pollution and joint development (Solanes, 1992, 116). Hypothetically, legal 
principles can be effective devices for settling problems which arise over the competing 
uses of water. These principles are fairly well developed in legal theory, but the 
institutional machinery for applying them is still rudimentary, especially in the 
international arena. International legislation can result from new approaches to settling
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water conflicts but it cannot, a priori, direct the search for a solution (Naff & Matson,
1984, 4).
In pursuing their claims for the water resources of an international river, riparian 
countries have pressed certain theories into service which have received varying degrees 
of acceptance over the years. Reviewing the principles which govern the use of waters 
flowing through more than one state, one finds that there are several similarities in the 
approach taken by the scholars. Berber (1955), Garretson & Haydon (1967) as well as 
Rogers (1991) and Solanes (1992) define four basic principles:
1. Absolute territorial sovereignty
2. Absolute territorial integrity
3. Limited territorial sovereignty
4. Community use of the waters.
1. Absolute territorial sovereignty. This principle favours only the upper riparian 
and is the most controversial of the theories. It derives from the complaint by Mexico 
about the flow of the Rio Grande on the United States side of the border (Harmon 
Doctrine) and claims the right to the free disposal of water within a state's territory but 
without the right to demand free flow from other countries. According to this other 
riparians do not have any rights to constrain a country's use of a river within its own 
boundaries. This doctrine, which contradicts international law, was rejected by the 
U.S.A after it was used only a few times.
2. Absolute territorial integrity. This principle appeals only to lower riparians who 
are more powerful and, where there are several riparians, only to the lowest. The basic 
principle of the theory states that sovereign rights are limited by the duty not to injure 
the interests of other members of the international community. The consideration one 
state must take will also express itself in relation to the advantage gained by one to the 
injury caused to the other. Furthermore, no state is allowed to alter the natural conditions 
of its own territory to the disadvantage of the natural conditions of the territory of a 
neighbouring state. This theory is no longer accepted.
Neither of these principles provide a solution regarding the personal, chauvinistic 
and conflicting interests of the upper and lower riparians. However, the absolute 
territorial sovereignty doctrine and the theory of absolute territorial integrity constitute 
two extreme positions, between which there are other two more pragmatic concepts.
3. Limited territorial sovereignty. This is a restriction of the free usage of the water 
and is the most appropriate principle for a fully developed legal community; but there is
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still a question about whether such a community exists. There is a distinction made 
between boundary rivers and successive rivers according to this principle.
a. Boundary rivers. So far, boundary rivers have been treated as successive rivers 
but the application of this law goes beyond its application to successive streams 
probably because of the establishment of boundaries between states and due to an 
awareness of the geographic facts which may deprive either state of a natural advantage 
over the other in regard to these waters. It is a general rule of international law that 
boundary water is divided among the states sharing the streams as a boundary, with each 
being subject to the equal rights of the other.
b. Successive rivers. There is a corresponding duty not to injure the interests of a 
neighbouring state and the sovereignty of each of the riparians acts to guarantee the 
reciprocal restriction of the actions of each towards the other. Treaties between states 
respecting successive rivers have one common element - the recognition of the shared 
rights of the signatory states to utilize the waters of an international river (Garretson & 
Haydon, 1967, 33). Where many states are involved in resolving a legal dispute, there is 
a legal basis which they all believe necessitates such conduct.
4. Community of water. This principle appeals for the common cooperation of all 
the riparians involved in sharing the waters in an acceptable way. This is a modification 
of the third principle and is applicable to a less advanced level of international 
integration (Berber, 1955, 14). This approach considers that the geography of the river 
often has little (if any) relationship to the political frontiers which divide it and, in order 
to make optimum use of the waters, it is often necessary to develop a more integrated 
program for the entire drainage basin. The ideal location for such an installation as a 
dam for harnessing basin waters for hydroelectric use, for instance, may be within the 
territory of a riparian state which is not interested in such a use when a less desirable 
location might be inside the interested state. There are two approaches to this issue. The 
first prefers to separate the development programmes of each riparian, but permits the 
use of the territory of a co-riparian state for varying purposes. The second, more 
advanced approach, considers that a joint effort made by the riparians might best 
develop the basin for joint benefit without interference to state borders (joint planning, 
construction, management and maintenance) (Garretson & Haydon, 1967, 39). The best 
expression of the principle of communal water utilization can be found in the Dubrovnik 
draft (1956), the Helsinki rules (1966) and the ILC draft (1991), which have become the 
accepted legal foundation for the utilization of international rivers.
It is an assumption of international law that the allocation of scarce resources 
requires legal adjudication if conflict is to be avoided. International law recognises the 
community of property among riparian states as a customary rule of law, that is, each of
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them is entitled to use a share of the river so long as unreasonable injury to another 
riparian does not ensue. Although this principle has been upheld in the courts, it contains 
an inherent weakness and has also been challenged by countervailing legal arguments. 
The flaw lies in the fact that customary rules tend to be highly unstable unless all 
involved parties have compatible interests, preferably guaranteed by formal agreement. 
International law has recognised that a river is the property of the community of all 
riparian states and this has been followed by a recognition of the existence of certain 
limitations to territorial sovereignty in favour of the international community in general. 
However, the first step toward translating legal theory into institutional application is the 
production of political agreements. Such facts are essential to the creation of a broader 
array of legal instruments for solving international disputes over shared water resources 
(Naff&Matson, 1984, 5).
One can sum up this section with the two doctrines which propound the absolute 
authority of the state and they are: a) Absolute Territorial Sovereignty, as opposed to
b) Absolute Territorial Integrity. These two doctrines first developed during ancient 
times and do not reflect concordant international law (i.e. international conventions) but 
the reality of agreements in which states or the empire took the waters of some river for 
themselves. When a state was located on the upstream part of the river it propounded the 
doctrine of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (e.g.. the USA vis-a-vis Mexico) and, if it 
was located downstream (such as Iraq and Egypt), it propounded the doctrine of 
Absolute Territorial Integrity. These doctrines were the dominant rule until the end of 
the 19th century when the body of international law began to develop.
At the end of the 19th century and principally in the 20th century the concept of 
sovereignty changed. States banded together into international bodies such as The 
League of Nations or The United Nations and laid the foundations of the International 
Court in Hague in order to interpret, clarify and lay down basis for the voluntary 
sacrificing of part of one's sovereignty for the good of "world peace". In this way the 
body of concordant international law (such as the Geneva Convention and The Law of 
the Sea) was created and replaced the doctrines of Limited Territorial Sovereignty and 
The Community Use of Water, doctrines according to which states recognize the water 
rights of other states and agree to share a resource this would later express itself in the 
principles of The Helsinki Rules, the ILC draft and the Dubrovnik draft as we shall see 
anon.
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F2. The law of international water resources
The first attempt to identify international rivers was made by the Centre for National 
resources, energy and transport (CNRET). In its revised edition of a report which was 
first published in 1958, it identifies 166 international river basins on a world map. In 
1978, CNRET published a register of international rivers which identified 214 
international rivers and lake basins. According to the report, nearly 47 per cent of the 
world’s area (excluding Antarctica) falls within international basins (Biswas, 1993, 170).
The International Law Association, at its meeting in August 1956 in Dubrovnik, 
Yugoslavia, unanimously adopted a statement of principles "as a sound basis upon 
which to study further the development of rules of international law with respect to 
international rivers". Acceptance of these, or substantially similar principles, by the 
parties to international water disputes might go far towards advancing adjustment and 
agreement (United Nations, 1970, 34).
From the principles of the Dubrovnik draft, it is quite obvious that there has been no 
attention paid towards a variety of issues such as topographic structure, hydroelectric 
potential, and the irrigation components, in addition to political, economic and 
sociological factors. However, pending the establishment of an accepted international 
code, the Dubrovnik draft statement of principles potentially affords a sound basic 
philosophy for planning and executing a project for integrated river development in an 
international river basin. The fifth principle, in particular, should be useful to furnish a 
guide to the solution of disputes with respect to the use of such waters, recognising, as it 
does, the pertinence of all equitable and historical circumstances in the resolution of 
such disputes.
According to the fifth principle "the states upon an international river should in 
reaching agreements, and states or tribunals in setting disputes, weigh the benefit to one 
state against the injury done to another through a particular use of the water. For this 
purpose, the following factors (among others) should be taken into consideration:
a) The right of each to a reasonable use of the water
b) The extent of the dependence of each state upon the waters of the river
c) The comparative social and economic gains accruing to each and to the entire 
river community
d) Pre-existent agreements among the states concerned
e) Pre-existent appropriation of water by one state" (United Nations, 1970, 35).
The above are the general rules of international law applicable to the use of waters
of an international drainage basin, as adopted by the International Law Association at its 
fifty-second Conference in Helsinki in 1966.
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The Helsinki rules introduced the concept of international drainage basins as: "the 
aggregate of both surface and ground water within a given geographic area flowing into 
a common terminus". The rights of basin states (those sharing a common basin) are 
outlined by the Helsinki rules which also attempt to establish an attitude towards a 
variety of issues that the Dubrovnik draft avoided. The heart of the 37 article Helsinki 
rules is Article 5, whose recommendations contain the " relevant factors which are to be 
considered included, but are not limited to:
a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the drainage 
area in the territory of each basin state;
b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water by 
each basin state;
c) the climate affecting the basin;
d) The past utilization of the water of the basin, including in particular existing 
utilization;
e) the economic and social needs of each basin state;
f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin state;
g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and 
social needs of each basin state;
h) the availability of other resources;
i) the avoidance of unnecessary water in the utilization of water of the basin;
j) the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin states as a
means of adjusting conflicts among users;
k) the degree to which the needs of a basin state may be satisfied without 
causing substantial injury to a co-basin state (see figure F.l)
The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in 
comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable and 
equitable share, all relevant factors are to be considered together and conclusions 
reached on the basis of the whole (Manner & Metsalampi, 1988, 22).
Figure F.l, as it is presented by Kliot does not show any difference in the 
importance between the various factors which appear in the Helsinki rules. Thus, for 
example, the factor of political and legal systems and the factor of society are far more 
significant in the system of relations between states than the factor of geomorphology 
and hydrology. In contrast the factor of economy can, at time, enable a state to find an 
economic alternative to a shortage of water. As we can see in chapter G there are far 
more accompanying political issues which influence the system of relations between 
states, than factors mentioned in the Helsinki rules.
In 1970, Finland introduced a resolution in the UN General Assembly on laws for 
international watercourses, which proposed that the Helsinki Rules be considered a
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model. While the UN Committee felt that the subject of international watercourse law 
was important, three reservations about the Helsinki rules surfaced. First, the rules were 
formulated by a professional organization which did not represent nation-states. 
Secondly, some countries such as Ethiopia argued that adoption of these rules as a 
model could preclude new considerations about this complex issue. The third was 
expressed in the fact that the Helsinki rules were based on a drainage basin approach, 
that could be a potential threat to national sovereignty (Biswas, 1993, 172).
Figure F.l:
A framework for the analysis of international rivers based on the Helsinki rules
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Since 1970 the United Nations, through its International Law Commission (ILC), 
has been attempting to establish a set of rules governing to the sharing of international 
water resources for purposes other than navigation (Cano, 1989, 168). The ILC rules 
contains 32 Articles, offers some simplification of the 37 articles of the Helsinki rules, 
and develops the mechanisms of regional consultation. The relevant articles from the 
ILC rules which are compatible with the above Helsinki rules are articles 5 and 6.
Article 5 of the ILC rules states that riparian countries shall, in their respective 
territories, utilize the water in an equitable, reasonable and optimal manner, avoiding 
appreciable harm to the other riparian countries. Article 6 specifies the factors relevant 
to the equitable and reasonable utilization of international rivers and these relevant 
factors are:
a) geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic and other natural factors;
b) the social and economic needs of the water course states concerned;
c) the effects of the use or uses of an international watercourse (system) caused 
by one watercourse state to other watercourse states;
d) the existing and potential uses of the international watercourse (system);
e) conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water 
resources of the international watercourse (system) and the cost of measures 
taken to that effect;
f) the availability of alternatives, of corresponding value, for a particular planned 
or existing use (Environment Policy and Law, 21 May 1991, 247).
Rules concerning international aquifers were formulated for the first time at the 
Seoul meeting of the ILA. The ILA Seoul rules recongnized that ground and surface 
water resources should be treated similarly and the rules called for the prevention of 
pollution of international groundwater and, the exchange of relevant information 
concerning the aquifer and integrated management; but there is no suggestion of how 
these waters should be divided among the co-riparians (Kliot, 1994, 8).
The most significant difference between the Helsinki rules and the ILC draft can be 
seen in the principle of prior appropriation of the "natural" or historic rights of a state to 
utilize water, which is stated in the Helsinki rules (Article 4 d). The ILC draft refers to 
protecting "existing and potential" uses (Article 7 d), rather then "prior" uses of the 
international watercourse (Mallat, 1992, 6). In the context of the Euphrates river, for 
example, Iraq lost its historical rights to the water, and Syria and Turkey gained priority 
on the basis of potential uses. In contrast Iraq can try and protect most or part of its 
rights (dependent upon its bargaining powers) by making claims based upon the ILC 
draft where Section 5 and 6c state that the equitable allocation of water is desirable as 
long as considerable damage is not done to one of the co-riparians. A dramatic change in
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the present allocation of water could, according to Iraq, cause considerable damage. The 
factor concerning the population that depends on the water in each basin state in the 
Helsinki rules (Article 4 b), has been deliberately ignored in the ILC draft. This also 
appears to weaken the legal position of Iraq, where there is a larger population 
dependent on the Euphrates water. The factor of the "availability of other resources" in 
the Helsinki rules (Article 4 h), has been replaced in the ILC draft by the "availability of 
alternative resources" (Article 7 f). in the context of the Euphrates river, and this favours 
Syria which has fewer alternative resources than Turkey and Iraq (see table FI).
Table FI:
Summary table of significant advantages (+) and disadvantages (•) for the riparian 
countries of the Euphrates according to the ILC draft and Helsinki rules
T urkev Svria Iraq
1) Helsinki - past utilization - - +
ILC - existing and potential uses + + -
2) Helsinki - population that depends on the water - - +
ILC - ignored the subject + + -
3) ILC - equitable allocation has to consider damage - - +
Helsinki - ignored the subject + + -
4) Helsinki - the availability of other resources + - +
ILC - the availability of alternative resources - + -
5) ILC - obligation to early notice regarding the 
construction of water project and damage
to water flow +
Helsinki - ignored the subject + + -
The ILC draft embraced both the principle of equitable appointment and the 
obligation not to cause appreciable harm to other states, but without clearly indicating 
the relationship between the two principles (Dellapenna, 1993, 19).
The Helsinki Rules and, even more so, the ILC draft, reflect the new spirit of 
international law by laying emphasis upon equitable allocation; and the difference 
between them also reflects the emphasis upon the new section of "damage protection" 
which, to quite a degree, contradicts the section on equitable allocation. This is also true 
for the subject of water quality as it is expressed in Section E of "Conservation and 
Protection". Another section which refers to the "new spirit" of the ILC is connected to 
the group of sections which deals with the obligation for consultation between states and 
the obligation to give prior notice of development plans or intervention into the flow of
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the river's water. States, through their behaviour in this area, indicate that they recognize 
the limitations of their sovereignty as well as their obligation to take the co-riparians of 
their river's drainage basin into consideration.
This may be the place to point out that the ILC draft and, principally the Helsinki 
Rules, contain many limitations which make their implementation by the co-riparian 
states difficult. Thus, for example, it is not clear why the Helsinki Rules use the term 
'’Watercourse'' - a definition which does not exist in geomorphological terminology and 
whose meaning is not clear - while they do not use the term: "drainage basin". It seems 
that the legislation's lack of understanding of geographical terminology has led to this 
situation. In addition, in the sections of Article 5 which state that geographical factors of 
the basin have to be considered there is also no explanation of which factors and what 
weight must be given to each of them and all these features contribute to the lack of 
clarity.
Another serious problem which would arise in any attempt to apply the articles of 
the ILC and Helsinki which deal with hydrology is the assumption that there are 
accurate data about the volume and quality of the water in each drainage basin and, in 
our case, the Euphrates river basin. A question arises here about how to divide up the 
river water when the characteristics of the drainage basin are not completely known or 
when there are no data for a sufficiently long period to show trends of change in the 
quantity and quality of the water in the river. Trends in hydrology of the basin are 
affected by climate change and changes in supply over a long period of time. 
International law is not a sufficiently flexible response to climatic changes which cause 
changes in flow and does not answer the question about how to apportion the water in 
the case of several successive years of drought. This is a very significant issue 
particularly in arid or semi-arid climatic regions, and, in our case, the large perennial 
differences in the quantity of water in the Euphrates river which makes reference to 
"average flow", virtually impossible. One must also note here that the articles dealing 
with different geographical variables do not at all relate to problems such as salinity or 
pollution of the river water, an area which in our case has very serious implications in 
the long run for Iraq.
Another problematic area involves the variables which determine the proportion of 
each state in the drainage basin, of the river bed and of its water contribution. Neither 
the Helsinki rules nor the ILC offer suggestions about whether or how to give weight to 
each of the factors involved in the subject. Iraq's share of the Euphrates drainage basin is 
the greatest, but Turkey contributes 98 per cent of the water and Syria, whose share of 
water of the basin is the smallest, contributes virtually no water at all.
The whole subject of subterranean water, both within and outside the drainage basin, 
is completely absent from the Helsinki rules but does receive some attention in the ILC 
which points out difficulties of two kinds - the problem of measurement and the problem
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of the flow of subterranean water outside of particular drainage basins. The subject of 
subterranean water will certainly have to be given additional attention by the legislators.
From the hierarchy of treaties, customs, generally accepted principles and judiciary 
decisions, it is extremely important to note that neither the Helsinki rules nor the ILC 
rules are legally binding. The International Court of Justice at the Hague recognises only 
treaties as binding, but the principle of equitable utilization of international river basins 
has become the principle most widely advocated by the international legal community 
(Kirimani 1990, 204). The Helsinki rules and the ILC-endorsed principles can only 
provide a guiding framework for negotiations.
A major problem with both the Helsinki rules and the ILC draft is that they were 
devised from the point of view of establishing legal principles rather than from the point 
of view of the operationalisation of an system of legal, economic and political 
intercourse. That they were moderated via committee procedures which appear to have 
included the tendency to compromise and adjust to the political interests of participants 
has resulted in drafts which lack precision in essential definitions. The most important 
deficiency, however, is the absence of any understanding of economic principles which 
might have enabled the value of water to be addressed by those who might use such 
guidelines and rules. It is understandable that the deliberations should concentrate on the 
water in river channels and, to the extent which available data allows, to groundwater 
flows and storage. But such a treatment is a dangerously narrow one and this inadequacy 
leads to a very partial and generally irrelevant analysis of international water resources 
in the political economies of riparians. In a national economy surface water flows are 
only part of the economically relevant water resources of a basin in that precipitation 
might be an even more important economic resources. Individual riparians have differing 
endowments of utilisable rainfall which enters their soil profiles and is available for 
productive cropping. By addressing only the water in surface streams and groundwater 
flows and storage illogical positions will be taken up by contending riparians.
To be so selective in isolating one factor, water, in the economies associated with 
productive, or potentially productive, economic activity, is unhelpful in another way 
because such an approach does not take into account the capacity of real political 
economies, in which real allocators such as politicians, engineers and farmers operate, to 
react and develop their economies. These officials and users can, and frequently do, 
substitute for scarce resources, including water, and otherwise make adjustments to 
abundance or scarcity.
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F3. The riparian approach to international law
From the theoretical point of view, an upper riparian state will initially claim "absolute 
territorial sovereignty" and this means claiming the right to do whatever it chooses with 
the water regardless of the effect of the activity upon other riparian states. Lower 
riparian states begin with a claim to the "absolute integrity" of the watercourse which 
means claiming that the upper riparian state can do nothing that affects the quantity or 
quality of water that flows down to the lower riparian states. Eventually, the competing 
riparian states will reach a "modus vivendi" based on the theory of "restricted 
sovereignty", meaning that each riparian state recognise the right of all riparian states to 
use water from a single shared source and the obligation to manage that use so as not to 
interfere unreasonably with the use of the water in other riparian states (Dellapenna, 
1993, 13). The quantity of water to which each state is entitled might be defined 
according to some more or less objective measure of need such as historic pattern of use, 
population, area, arable land or the United Nation's clear idea that each state is entitled 
to an "equitable share" of the river's water.
According to Ergil (1991), Arab countries do not like to be dependent on another 
power, especially about water which appears to be very important from a socio- 
psychological point of view. Turkey's southern neighbours both see the Euphrates and 
the Tigris as the waters of a common basin and, as countries of this basin, they wish to 
use these waters and share them according to their needs. On the other hand, Turkey sees 
the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers as single rivers with separate basins. Turkey refuses 
to accept its southern neighbours' proposals for "common use", "natural" use or "taking 
water according to their needs" approaches. Turkey does not see these waters as 
common property but as transboundary water courses. In this respect, international law 
is also ambiguous. Current international law gives the right of ownership of waters 
flowing within the borders of a country to that country but, while implementing this, it 
adds a principle that one should not cause any loss to create a disadvantageous situation 
for another country. It is neither clear how one determines this "loss", what the "criteria" 
are nor which authorities are responsible to settle a possible dispute. In this case, the 
country of origin, Turkey, has certain advantages and international law gives certain 
rights to the first country in the chain as the owner of the water. The owner has moral 
and traditional responsibilities to the dependants and the Turkish government is aware of 
its responsibility (Ergil, 1991, 52); but because of an increased population and the need 
for food, southern neighbours want to water deserts and infertile lands, activities which 
can cause the waste of large volumes of water. Both Syria and Iraq, thus, are demanding 
extra water from Turkey, but are not renovating their irrigation systems, improving
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watering techniques nor adopting water saving methods. It is therefore not reasonable 
for Turkey to respond to their southern neighbours' demands which could be interpreted 
as "we need this much water therefore Turkey ought to share it with us according to our 
needs alone".
The Turkish government insists that its southern neighbours use available water 
with minimum waste and then come forth with realistic demands for more water if it is 
needed (Ergil, 1991, 55).
Turkey does not want a rigid agreement over the Euphrates water since it claims 
that the river originates in Turkey and is fed on the whole by the rain and snow that falls 
on its own territory. According to Turkey, there is nothing in international law that says 
that Turkey must share its water on the basis of a quota system even if there are 
precedents in this field on an international level (Briefing, 2-9 July 1990, 10). The 
Turkish former prime minister, Suliman Demirel, gave his opinion on this subject in a 
recent interview: "If the natural resource is in our country, we have every right to use it 
the way we see fit. Water is an upstream resource in Turkey and downstream users 
cannot tell us how to use our resource. By the same token, oil is an upstream resource in 
many Arab countries and we do not tell them how to use it" (South, August 1991, 14 ; 
The Middle East, August 1991, 30). Demirel also stated: "The Euphrates and Tigris are 
not international waters, and nobody foreign has any claims on resources within Turkish 
boundaries" (Tekeli, 1990, 211). According to Ferruk Amik, the Turkish director general 
of the State Hydraulic Works (DSI): "Syria and Iraq insist on their right to share the 
water. We reject this term of 'share'. It is a Turkish river so we are not required to share 
any of the water" (Frankel, 1991, 292). Actually, in these statements, Demirel and Amik 
claim absolute Turkish territorial sovereignty over the Euphrates river.
As one can learn from these declarations, even if they have only been made for 
internal purposes, Turkey supports the principle of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty 
despite the fact that international law today does not support this point of view. It also 
must be pointed out that the comparison made between water flowing in an international 
river and oil deposits found within the territory of some state is not relevant, for when an 
oil field goes beyond a state's border (Iraq/Kuwait) this factor also causes tension for 
inter-state relations.
Turkey differentiates between the notions of "international waters" and 
"transboundary flows" declaring GAP rivers as "transboundary". This Turkish approach 
is based on two assumptions:
1) Turkey distinguishes between "international" and "transboundary" watercourses in the 
following way. An international watercourse has its opposing banks under sovereignty
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of different countries and such waters are shared by the riparians through the "median 
line", while a transboundary watercourse crosses common political borders.
2) The Euphrates and the Tigris rivers must be considered as one transboundary 
watercourse system, since they are linked by the Tharthar Canal before merging as 
Shatt-el-Arab, allowing the substitution of Tigris waters for demands from the Euphrates 
(Tekeli, 1990,213).
Iraq and Syria, however, do not accept Turkey's definition of the river as a 
transboundary river and Turkey will probably have difficulty in basing its claims upon 
international law. In a statement in 1975, the Syrian Minister of Industry, Mureddin al- 
Rifai, made his government's position clear on its unequivocal right to development and 
use of the river; "The Syrian Euphrates project is Syria's future. The Euphrates region is 
the new Syria and Syria will not be able to stand on its own feet and ensure a stable and 
prosperous economy in the future unless it is capable of benefiting from its share of 
Euphrates water. There is no other way" (Caelleigh, 1983,127).
An interview with Professor Yuksel Inan (Gazi University Ankara, 8 July, 1992), 
gives a broader explanation for the Turkish approach towards international law. Inan 
claims that Turkey does not insist on "absolute sovereignty", but on the "community of 
water" principles. He bases his arguments on several examples:
"According to the 1946 agreement ("the neighbourhood relations agreement") 
which was made with Iraq, Turkey has accepted the right of Iraq to build dams and 
reservoirs within Turkish territory. Iraq has also accepted that the best and. most 
suitable place to block the water and regulate the flow of both the Tigris and the 
Euphrates rivers is be located within the territory of Turkey".
"According to article 3 of the general resolution from December 12, 1974, 
especially concerning the transplant of the water courses by means of sharing 
natural resources, every state can use the water resources for its own benefits 
without interfering with the essential rights of the other states. But prior to any use 
or utilization, the state concerned has to provide technological knowledge and 
consult with the other states in order to achieve co-operation in the field. Giving 
prior knowledge not only means that this is compulsory for technical purposes, but 
can also aim to diminish the losses that upper riparian states could face. Prior to the 
construction of the Keban reservoir, Turkey informed both Syria and Iraq of its 
plans, but Syria and Iraq refused to enter into negotiations at all. On the other hand, 
in order to achieve the level of investment required, Turkey had to approach several 
sources and one of them was the ARD (an international investment fund). 
According to this agreement from August 31, 1966, Turkey promised to give 
sufficient water to the lower riparian states.
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Turkey intended to build new constructions and, new reservoirs but due to the 
publicity and propaganda of the lower riparians including the Iranians, none of the 
international finance corporations gave any financial credit to Turkey. When Turkey 
started to plan the GAP project, it also notified the lower riparian states of Syria and 
Iraq. The Arab countries got together, but in the end they agreed not to agree. This 
sort of cause probably led both Syria and Iraq into non agreement. In 1987 Turkey 
concluded an agreement with Syria and promised to give not less than 500 m^/sec. 
This amount was divided between Syria and Iraq with 42 per cent of this flow being 
used by Syria and 58 per cent by Iraq. This agreement came into force in May 1990 
prior to the Gulf crisis" (Inan, 1992).
Another Turkish argument, according to Inan, is based on the length of the 
Euphrates river in each basin state, the area of the drainage basin and the contribution of 
water. Turkey contributes 89 per cent of the annual flow of the Euphrates and Syria 
contributes only 11 per cent of this flow. Since 1987 Turkey has delivered 500 m^/sec 
which is more than 50 per cent of the water. In other words, Turkey has agreed to leave 
more water for the down stream states than they contribute to the system. On the other 
hand when this whole project came into force, Turkey left two thirds of the annual flow 
of the Euphrates and Tigris waters which was sufficient for both Syria and Iraq. These 
two rivers has to be considered as falling from a single basin. Prior to the Gulf crisis Iraq 
was selling some of this water to Kuwait. By 1992 Turkey consumed only 1.5 per cent 
of the flow but when the GAP project is completed, Turkey will consume about one 
third of the whole consumption. Turkey’s contribution to both rivers is 19 billion m^/yr. 
of water from the Tigris basin and 30 billion m^/yr. from the Euphrates basin, which 
amounts to 49 billion m^/yr. Turkey is going to consume one third of this - 18 billion 
m^ per year. 36 billion m^ of water will be allocated to the lower riparian states, but 
only if they accept the equitable principles which were requested in the draft articles of 
the international law commissions (the 1991 ILC draft). These articles, indicate the sorts 
of principles which should be taken into consideration in order to create equity among 
the concerned states. In 1976 an additional agreement called "a technical co-operation 
and economic co-operation" agreement concerning the GAP project, was made between 
Turkey and Iraq.
"The Turkish principle of equity relates to actual needs. Syria indicates a need of 13 
billion m^/yr. According to European publications its actual need is only 8 billion m^. 
Iraq demands 26 billion m^ of waters and this means that it is claiming more than it 
needs. Right now Iraq uses only 12 billion m^ of water from both rivers. Iraq and Syria 
are still using unsatisfactory techniques for irrigation. If modem techniques are used, 
Iraqi and Syrian demands for water will decrease. If these two states use modem
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techniques there will be no disagreement between the consumers. Turkey insists on 
considering both the Euphrates and Tigris basins as a whole. They both originate from 
Turkey which makes the greatest contribution to them. The water from the Euphrates 
and the Tigris should be more than sufficient for Iraq especially after constructing the 
Tharthar project which links the Tigris and the Euphrates" (Inan, 1992).
According to MEI (1990), Turkey in complete defiance of international law, is 
doing as it pleases, simply because it is the strongest country involved. Neither Iraq nor 
Syria has even considered taking Turkey to the International Court of Justice, (it would 
be "ex post facto" now anyway) - where they could present a strong case against Turkey 
to oblige it to take no more than its fair share of the river's waters (MEI, 16 February 
1990, 13). The crux of the disagreement may be summarized as follows Syria and Iraq 
consider the Euphrates river to be international (common) waters and demand their 
rights to share them accordingly, whereas Turkey, points out the "transboundary" 
character of the waters, and has come up with a counter-proposal for "rational and 
optimal utilization". However, it is important to note that neither the Helsinki rules nor 
the ILC draft recognises the definition of "transboundary river" as Turkey uses the term.
It seems that as long as Turkey continues to base its development programs upon 
the viewpoint of being an upstream state, Iraq and Syria will continue to make claims 
based upon the viewpoint of being downstream states. Together with this it is obvious 
today that Turkey is more concerned than ever about negative international opinion 
about the way they relate to the apportionment of the river water. This has not led to a 
change in the development plans but it can be assumed that Turkey's policies today are 
based upon the principle of - the state can do what it likes provided it appears to be fair 
from the point of view of international law. It should be noted that the 500 m^ of water 
which Turkey has undertaken to transfer to the downstream states annually comes more 
from the need to produce cheap electricity than any consideration for international law.
It seems that Turkey is also unwilling to sign a trilateral agreement, especially 
before the conclusion of the GAP as Turkey does not want to place itself under any 
obligation before the GAP project is fully underway. It seems that the optimal 
arrangement for Turkey is to insist on its sovereign control of the headwaters of the 
Euphrates and assure its neighbours that in developing these waters it will always keep 
their interests in mind, even though it will make no binding commitments.
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F4. Conclusion
It has been emphasised in the preceding discussion that a concentration of the legal 
frameworks devised by the drafters of the Helsinki Rules and the ILC draft on surface 
water flows places constraints on the scope of any analysis of real water using situations 
and especially on circumstances where waters are shared. That the Helsinki Rules and 
the ILC draft have not been the basis of any agreement is a reflection of the lack of fit 
between what they address and what is important to individual riparians. International 
law is helpful in disputes over territory, and also in regulating procedures in areas of 
commerce. The application of international law encounters great problems in other areas, 
for example in the application of law to environmental issues because there are great 
problems associated with concepts of environmental evaluation and in valuing the 
environment generally. Valuing a water resource is easier than valuing the environment, 
elements of which have intangible and unmeasurable qualities, but attempts to value 
water are intellectually challenging and therefore easy to discredit in a political arena 
where simple and familiar ideas are persuasive. That the drafters of the Helsinki and ILC 
documents failed to take the valuation of water into account reflects partly the 
predictable unease of one profession, the law, using the tools of another, the economist, 
partly the recognition that principles of evaluation, even of water, are difficult to 
establish and operationalise and partly that downstream riparians need to be negotiated 
out of the idea that water is free. Whenever representatives of downstream countries 
participate in a drafting session such as the Helsinki and ILC commissions they will 
insist that free water be the basis of any legal framework and close the option on 
considering markets in water. That water is being sold by an upstream country, Lesotho, 
to downstream Republic of South Africa, sets a legal precedent that the legal drafters 
have yet to accommodate (Davies, 1992).
The direct sale of water between countries is for the moment exceptional, but no 
longer unprecedented. Meanwhile the indirect purchase of water has been an important 
economic instrument throughout history in that the price of food on the international 
market includes an actual input of water which is a notional cost to the food importer. If 
the food importer could gain access to such water for the shadow value of this 'virtual' 
water it is possible that the transactional costs of producing the equivalent food at home 
would be less than those associated with food importation. If such water were to be 
available via pipeline, or ship or 'bag' transporter, it should certainly be seriously 
considered whether food production would be a viable economic option using such 
water.
Any review of international law with respect to water is inevitably unsatisfactory 
which is confirmed by the absence of examples where the Helsinki Rules or the ILC
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draft have been the framework adopted by negotiators. In addition to the neglect of 
economics by the drafters another major reason why it is difficult for riparians to use the 
guidelines for the allocation of water is that water is an element in cultures which 
attribute to water a high ’emotional' value based on traditions, expectations and practices 
which did not in the past lead to water deficits. Traditional management of water was 
also often not irrigation oriented, and since irrigation is by far the most demanding use 
for water, tensions were avoided. Traditional technologies also tended to be benign in 
terms of water consumptive use. In addition traditional assumptions that water should be 
available free were safe for utilisation rates of less than 50 m^ of water per person per 
year which is sufficient to service the livelihoods of individuals not involved in irrigated 
farming. They are, however, very unsafe assumptions when levels of use involving over 
1000 m^ per person per year are expanding in order to support livelihoods on irrigated 
farms. Inevitably arguments concerning entitlement and rights to water will occur as 
long as water is assumed to be free irrespective of the returns to be achieved from that 
water.
Based on past practice water throughout the region is perceived to be free by most 
users and they do not want to pay even the actual costs of delivery and have no concept 
of the actual value of water in an economic sense. Water like all elements in a productive 
cycle has a value which can be estimated, or shadowed, by identifying the cost of 
obtaining water from an alternative source. In some circumstances such water could 
come from an expensive desalinisation process or in many cases water would be 
obtained through the development of new water, either from a groundwater storage 
catchment or even from another basin involving transport by pipeline.
In these circumstances a constructive approach to valuing water would be best 
achieved by considering initially the costs of the control works necessary to provide 
sufficient flow and adequate quality together with the cost of water delivery systems. 
These costs, at least for the Euphrates surface water flows will be low in terms of cost 
per cubic metre, say between five and ten US cents per cubic metre. The productive 
sectors of the respective economies of the Euphrates Basin could support such costs.
The capacity to pay for additional water will be determined by the ability to purchase 
water in imports. No theory has been developed to determine the value of such 'virtual 
water', even though for some countries in the region, although not those of the Euphrates 
Basin, the water imported in, for example, food is already or will become the most 
important water in their national water budgets. Egypt is such a country, as well as 
Jordan and Israel and all the oil exporting economies.
Trade in food, rather than the implementation of difficult to agree legal principles of 
water sharing, is the most readily available means of filling water gaps and is a 
commonplace solution in the region. Some economies can readily afford to import food. 
For example a strong oil economy. In the Euphrates Basin, in normal circumstances, Iraq
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unencumbered by international problems and trade embargoes would be in such a 
position. Before the 1990 crisis Iraq imported 80-90 per cent of its food and in due 
course it will resume its role as a major food importer. Meanwhile Turkey does not need 
to import food except in exceptional years. Only Syria has a significant problem in 
affording necessary food imports in the long term. In the case of Syria, the only reason 
that it would need to enter the international market for food in a major way would be if it 
does not achieve its plans to extend its irrigated area in the Euphrates lowlands. In the 
1970s and the 1980s Syria found it more difficult to develop its water than to import 
food and it appears to be a case of what economist call 'transactional costs' being so high 
in one set of institutions and practices, in this case the development of water in irrigated 
farming to produce food, than those available in gaining access to imported food with its 
implicit content of water required for its production.
In other words trade in food is a system which can be effectively operationalised. 
The sharing of water on the other hand according to a legal framework is proving to be 
an intractable problem because it is impossible to operationalise an agreed procedure of 
implementation. It is concluded that the sharing of Euphrates waters will become a 
subordinate issue within the overall political economy of food and water in the 
Euphrates Basin as it becomes clear, as it has already to some analysts of the Nile water 
resource where the duplication of demand for water by its riparians is palpable, that the 
ability to purchase food on the world market is the important capability for arid countries 
such as Egypt rather than the protection of relatively small volumes of water from 
upstream sources (Allan, 1994). The Euphrates countries are decades away from the 
predicament of the countries of the Nile Basin. Meanwhile they are industrialising and 
will adopt the approach to food provision of industrialised economies, in all probability 
with much of the paraphernalia of subsidies and support which have been established in 
such political economies.
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G. Factors Which Have an Impact on Domestic 
Policies and International Relations.
The conflict over the Euphrates water is a good example of a conflict ostensibly over 
fresh water which, on closer analysis, can be seen to be affected by many factors of 
which water is just one. The political economy of the catchment area, in which 
Euphrates water is a significant element, is influenced by the ideological, national and 
security aspirations of the political entities that occupy the Euphrates basin. In such 
conflicts one cannot determine which factor is foremost in shaping the approach of an 
individual riparian at any given time, nor is it possible to determine whether a dispute 
over the quantity and quality of fresh water resources has led to a political conflict, or 
vice versa, or whether economic, security interests or ideological factors have, or have 
not exacerbated the conflict over water.
Figure Gl:
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In order to deal with such complexity it is necessary to address the three major 
factors that appear to shape the conflict over water use by riparians namely: economic 
interests, foreign political interests, and domestic policy (see figure Gl).
The major ideas and principles which underlie national interests and inspire the 
policy of national governments are listed and discussed in the following paragraphs.
Economic interests - shaping co-riparian behaviour
Economic factors are of great importance in setting priorities. Although water is 
nowhere treated as a pure economic good, economic theory does provide some 
guidelines for policy options regarding efficient water distribution. The three most 
important economic factors for developing the Euphrates basin are food security, the 
production of hydroelectric power and the development of industry. A riparian country's 
perception of future water needs determines whether it will be cooperative or 
uncooperative in its relations with other riparians concerning the water issue. If a 
riparian nation foresees a great need for additional water in the future, it will be more 
defensive in negotiations with other countries; in contrast, if it has little concern about 
water use, it will more readily agree to the institution of water allocation and 
management measures (Abbas, 1984, 208).
Economic development, especially in its early stage, is often dependent upon 
agriculture and agricultural demands for water always dominate water allocation in arid 
and semi-arid countries (80 per cent in Turkey and about 77 per cent in Iraq). On the 
other hand, the economic returns for agriculture, and especially returns to water are 
relatively low compared with those for industry. Industrialization has enjoyed a high 
priority in the planned government expenditure of all the riparian states, and when 
industry develops, the amount of water required increases. But food security policies 
have the most important impact on water resources and are perceived by the 
governments of the riparian states as a matter of national priority. Food security, in turn, 
leads to special emphasis on agriculture, which increases the demand for water and for 
"water security". Stress on water security leads to more tension with riparian neighbours 
over water, which leads to increased general concern over security, and stiffer defence of 
agriculture (Frey, 1993, 63). Non agricultural uses of water such as the production of 
hydroelectric power will also have an impact on the water management of rivers through 
the evaporative losses from reservoirs. The availability of adequate power generation 
capacity is considered to be a prerequisite for rapid economic and social development 
and energy consumption has increased in all the riparian countries very dramatically. 
However the hydroelectric potential from the Euphrates river is very limited in Syria and
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Iraq because of the topographic conditions which do not allow the construction of high 
dams.
Foreign policy:
Clearly the decisions involved in developing policies for international river development 
are mainly political and can only be adequately addressed in political terms. It is 
recognized by international lawyers that international law can only be involved when 
treaties and mutually acceptable agreements have been signed and ratified. International 
politics are among the most important features of international river basin development 
and have to be addressed in any analysis (Rogers, 1991, 14). Several significant factors 
in international relations influence the degree and intensity of conflict over the Euphrates 
water. Factors such as national image, international law and linkages with other issues 
such as territorial claims, border security, ideological conflict and economic relations, 
can all influence a country's position in matters concerning water resource utilisation 
(see figure Gl): for example, Turkey claims that both Baghdad and Damascus wish to 
amplify the water issue to deflect attention from their other problems (Tekeli, 1990, 212).
National image:
The concern for a positive national image may be one of the most important factors in 
deciding how to deal with international water issues. Turkey attaches great importance to 
the GAP project not only because of its economic and sociological benefits, but also as a 
matter of national prestige. Syria also has a similar point of view towards the Tabqa 
Dam project and the economic projects linked to it. On the other hand, the autocratic 
regimes of Syria and Iraq do not like to be dependent on a non-Arab power, especially 
for the supply of water which is a very important resource, not only strategically and 
economically but also from a socio-psychological point of view (Ergil, 1991, 52). 
Vulnerability to water scarcity contradicts the image of a serious and powerful 
leadership. The image of political weakness would become evident through palpable 
water shortages and could be politically destabilizing.
International law:
Another important component in international relations is the riparian attitude towards 
international law. Nations may either ignore or adhere to the principles of international 
law. Usually riparians support only those principles of water law that favour their 
position in a basin, but they may accept widely espoused international principles even
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when they are to their disadvantage because they do not want to appear to be opposed to 
international law or to lose their credibility in the world community (Abbas, 1984, 210). 
The basic principles of international law in the matter of international rivers are based on 
equity and justice. But as discussed in chapter F, international law does not provide any 
institutions that automatically establish operational procedures to implement the legal 
principles. "Equitable" does not mean equal use; rather it means that a large variety of 
factors, including population, geography, availability of alternative resources and so on, 
can be considered in the allocation of water rights. The international law for international 
rivers is not mandatory and cannot compel states to solve international conflicts; 
however, its principles are widely understood although not publicly accepted by riparian 
countries. The development of non-binding international legal principles can be an 
important factor in enabling a country to become involved in negotiations and principles 
of international law could function as basic guidelines for the management of water 
equitably in the Euphrates basin states. As discussed in chapter F3, Turkey has drawn 
attention to the differences between "international" and "transboundary" water courses, 
and has claimed privileges as a Euphrates upstream state over water sharing. Turkey also 
claims that, according the international law, the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris 
rivers have to be considered as one single basin, and the sharing of the water among the 
riparian states should be related accordingly. On the other hand, Syria and Iraq consider 
the Euphrates river as international (common) waters and demand that they be shared 
according to "common use" or "according to their own needs." Syria's interests will 
relate to the international law, particularly with reference to articles that deal with the 
"availability of alternative resources" because Syria is short of water resources compared 
with Turkey and Iraq. Iraq’s claims on Euphrates water relate to the articles dealing with 
"prior uses" and "historical rights" and the articles dealing with the "population factor". 
It seems that the Turkish declaration of "absolute territorial integrity" has been made 
mostly for internal proposes, but as long as Iraq and Syria maintain their demands based 
on their lower riparian position, Turkey will insist on its advantage as an upper riparian 
state.
Syria is the only riparian to recognize the ILC principles, being one of only two 
governments which has. That Syria has agreed the principles is a sign that its position 
lacks the real power of Turkey to control flows, or of Iraq to enter into compensatory 
agreements in normal economic circumstances.
Ideological conflict:
The foreign relations of the riparians in the Euphrates basin have fluctuated widely 
since they came under the influence of western powers following World War I. After 
World War II, these western powers attempted to bring the riparian countries into their
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coalition through military alliances such as Turkey's membership in NATO and later the 
Baghdad Pact. From the 1960s onwards the Soviet Union began to play a more 
important role in the region and the political differences in the foreign relations of the 
riparian tended to reflect the conflicting interests of the superpowers in the area (Abbas, 
1984,225).
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the break-up of Syria's leading 
ally, the USSR, at the end of the 1980s, left Syria without the important support of the 
Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Gulf War provided Damascus with an avenue for 
shifting its priorities to the western camp. The end of the Cold War and the Gulf crisis, 
however, have also changed Turkey's priorities and forced it to look further afield than it 
had in a bi-polar world (Briefing, 18 January, 1993, 5 ; MEI, 16 April, 1993,16).
Linkage with other issues:
Linking conflicts over the water of a river basin with other bilateral or multilateral issues 
is one way which countries may use to extract concessions from their neighbours. As 
discussed in section C3, the relations among the Euphrates riparian states are highly 
influenced by other factors such as territorial claims, border security arrangements, 
economic interests and ideological conflicts. None of these factors relate directly to the 
water of the Euphrates river, but they are on the agenda of many bi-lateral meetings and 
figure in other communications between political leaders; in fact they play a most 
important role in bi-or trilateral negotiations among the riparian nations. For example, in 
1990 President Saddam of Iraq demanded a formal sharing of the Euphrates water, 
through a trilateral agreement before any economic agreement could be reached with 
Turkey (Tekeli, 1990, 210). In addition, Saddam's decision in 1990 to send his oil 
minister to Turkey to negotiate over the water issue, can be seen as a reminder of the 
wide range of concerns involved in maintaining good relations.
A number of issues adversely affect Turkish-Syrian relations and the most important 
is the Syrian support of the PKK which started immediately after Turkey's construction 
of the Ataturk Dam and its talk of the "stolen province of Alexandretta". Shortly after the 
Gulf crisis erupted, Syria adopted a pro-western approach and, as a result, Turkish- 
Syrian relations improved. Another example of linkage presented by Nasrallah (1990) is 
that Turkish actions concerning the Euphrates could be seen as political manoeuvres 
carried out in association with United States interests to continue pressuring Syria 
through Lebanon (Nasrallah, 1990,16).
Iraq and Turkey have fewer linkage issues which threaten their relations as they 
have no territorial claims upon each other. Up to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990, they had considerably strong economic and political relations as well as common
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interests in their fight against the Kurds in northern Iraq. One must remember that their 
mutual economic relations were good before the Kuwait War and it is logical to assume 
that they will again be so in the future. All these factors enabled them to create good 
relations.
Iraq and Syria’s relations have been heavily influenced by the ideological conflict 
between the separate Ba'ath regimes of the two countries, as well as by the personal 
hostility between the leaders, the closing of the pipeline connecting Iraq with the 
Mediterranean sea, Syrian support of Iran during the Iran-Iraq war and its coalition with 
the UN during the Iran-Iraq Gulf War.
Domestic interests:
There are several important factors that have to be taken into account when setting 
priorities and resources concerning the development plans of a country (see figure Gl). 
For example priorities have to be set vis-a-vis population dispersion here mainly because 
rural to urban migration accounts for about one third to one half of the growth of the 
main cities in Turkey and Iraq. It is also necessary to plan how to achieve improvements 
in the standard of living of the population in rural areas, and in internal security (the 
Kurdish population in Southeast Turkey and the Shia population in Iraq). The 
development of hydroelectric power, agriculture and industry are aimed mainly to 
achieve these targets. The political stability of the riparians also influences the nature of 
the conflict since a weak nation might be too preoccupied with its internal problems to 
become actively involved in external disputes. On the other hand a state beset with 
international difficulties may well choose to divert attention from its domestic 
difficulties and to attempt to bring about a modicum or semblance of internal unity in the 
face of a presumed external danger (Abbas, 1984, 207). National emotions have also 
been mobilized with respect to water as well as the personal prestige of the riparian 
leaders and these also affect the setting of priorities concerning the water development 
plans. Such is the case with the dams on the Euphrates river which have acquired a 
psychological importance as a symbol of development. The Euphrates project in Syria 
which has been given a high political priority, is an example of being a showcase of the 
Ba'ath development drive, especially in its naming the reservoir after the president 
Assad, his personal prestige has been attached to it.
In these circumstances internal disputes have always been likely between 
entrenched rural agricultural interests fighting to retain an advantageous position, vis-a- 
vis growing urban and industrial interests. On the other hand, if a government fails to 
secure food supplies, whether from internal or external sources, an atmosphere of 
political disquiet will emerge. Thus a natural political alliance has arisen between the 
countries' political leaderships and their rural communities since the former want to
221
ensure national security, and the rural communities want to provide food for national 
needs (Allan, 1992, 5). The political power of agriculturists has enabled the agricultural 
sector to exert powerful pressure on national water policy and policy makers respond to 
these pressures in the development of their national and international policies.
Gl. Cognitive mapping
One approach which assists in the analysis of the three important factors by each riparian 
is that of "cognitive mapping". With this approach one can obtain a type of mental map 
or cognitive structure of issues as seen by the relevant actor (Frey & Naff, 1985, 74). A 
comparison made between the cognitive maps of an issue held by each major actor is 
helpful in locating critical differences that may determine policy and behaviour, and for 
ascertaining whether the issues are real. The technique enables the analyst to identify the 
factors involved in the network of relationships between the states as well as to 
determine whether perceptions are similar and whether problems lie in conflicting 
interests. It also indicates whether a significant part of the conflict arises from the 
utilization of discrepant cognitive maps which might be harmonized through 
information, negotiation or other means. The mapping permits a basic analysis of power. 
A full application of this technique allows for the mapping of all the riparians in the 
Euphrates basin, the identification of critical sub-national actors, and the relationship of 
decision-makers to the complexity of the issues as well as to their perception of the 
policy environment.
The cognitive mapping will examine the factors of national interests of the three 
riparian states during three periods of time:
A) before the construction of the main dams, when mainly natural factors 
determined the availability of water to the three riparians;
B) the period between the 1960s and 1990s - which was characterized by rapid 
development in all the riparian countries;
C) the future period, in which the riparian development plans will be completed (see 
figure G2; A-C).
The thickness of the lines in figures G2. - G4. indicates the perceived strength of 
association between factors and interests; the thin line represents low-level interests, the 
medium thick line the high-level interests and the thickest line the interests which are 
critical from the point of view of the individual states. A crucial error in some cognitive 
maps is the omission of the overall importance (the evaluation or utility) of the cognitive 
realm being mapped. In the present instance, however, since "natural interests" is a main 
component and is obviously of utmost importance, this limitation is not significant (Naff
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& Matson, 1984, 185). The more connected or embedded a cognitive element is, the 
more significant it is and the more resistant it is to alteration or replacement.
It is necessary to adopt a systematic approach in reviewing evidence necessary for 
the utilization of the three models: cognitive mapping, quantitative indicators of 
vulnerability due to water shortages and a Matrix model (which will be presented in the 
following chapter). As the same evidence will used throughout, on occasions it will be 
necessary to develop the discussion of the three models, there will be some repetition. 
This is inevitable, if each model is to be adequately addressed.
We shall apply the cognitive mapping approach first to Turkey.
G2.1 Turkey's interests in the Euphrates water
A) Prior to the 60's
In this period the only economic interest which Turkey had in the water of the river 
was related to the irrigation needs of the scant local population living along the river 
banks. These irrigated areas were small, rarely exceeding a few hectares in extent and 
irrigation was solely gravitational. At this time, no use was made of the river water for 
the generation of hydro-electric power, although plans were being formed for the future 
utilization of the river water. The harnessing of the river water for industrial 
development had no importance whatever at this point.
In the area of foreign policy, during the period Turkey began to become aware of its 
position and strategic upstream location, as well as its political power vis-a-vis its 
neighbours downstream. This implied the existence of potential political tension in 
relations with Syria, on the grounds of ideology as well as Syria’s territorial claims in 
regard to the Hatay region - all of which made the Euphrates river water an important 
political factor.
In the area of internal interests . such factors as the low standard of living and the 
negative emigration from South-East Anatolia, did not, as yet, appear to be a cardinal 
concerns affecting the government. Even the matter of internal security, did not at that 
time, require any special government intervention.
B) The period between the 60's and the 90's -
In this period a significant change came about in the level of interest shown by the 
Turkish government towards the Euphrates water. Widespread development was
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undertaken in the form of two dams (the Keban and the Karakaya) constructed for the 
generation of hydro-electricity and the gigantic Ataturk dam which combined the 
generation of hydro-electricity and extensive plans for irrigation. The anticipation of 
socio-economic and political benefits to accrue due to the implementation of the 
development plans brought about an increase in the economic value and political 
significance of the river water.
Economic issues: At present, the improvement of the economy is Turkey’s main 
concern (Inan, 1990, 5). The Ataturk Dam and the GAP project are currently the most 
important projects in Turkey but they are also the most costly. With the dynamism 
generated by this project, Turkey wishes to become the economic super-power of the 
Middle East. Turkey during this period aims to utilize its agricultural and hydroelectric 
potential to the greatest extent; however, the main importance has been placed on the 
generation of hydro-electric power. Turkey which is poor in petroleum but rich in 
surplus water, hopes to harness the Euphrates river in order to generate electrical energy 
for its expanding economy and the GAPs hydroelectric generating capacity will increase 
Turkey’s present total power generation by 70 per cent (NewSpot, 28 June 1990, 2). 
Turkey also anticipates profiting from a great opportunity for electricity export. In 
contrast, the irrigation of agricultural lands although planned to recommence in the 
summer of 1993 will take a long time to implement. Industrial development, based 
mainly on the processing of agricultural produce, will start at an even later stage these 
types of development have limited importance in this period.
In foreign policy the implementation of the development plans in Turkey is 
affecting its relations with the countries situated downstream. The subject of the security 
of Turkey's frontiers, has become absolutely essential, for its foreign relations with Iraq 
and especially with Syria at the end of 1992 especially as Syria supported the PKK 
rebels until 1992. The materialization of development plans affects international 
relations as it boosts the national image, on the one hand, while, on the other, the 
importance of the system of economic relations with its neighbouring countries increases 
as Turkey's need to export agricultural produce from the region of South Eastern 
Anatolia, to its southern neighbours increases. The dominant power of Turkey also 
aimed to exploit this tacit advantage, leading the weaker Syria, to resist strongly any 
likely increase in the hydraulic control by the dominant power. Thus Syria was at great 
pains to prevent Turkey's obtaining international financing for the GAP project 
successfully arguing to the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank and others that 
funding should not be granted in the absence of an international agreement.
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Internal interests: South-eastern Anatolia is the least developed region in Turkey. 
The per capita regional product in 1985 was only 45 per cent of the average per capita 
gross domestic product of Turkey and this is the main reason for the emigration from the 
area although the population density is also below the national average (Morvaridi, 
1990, 308). Turkey hopes, by improving the standard of living of the local population 
and by urbanization, that migration to the main cities will slow down (Tekeli, 1990, 
206). Another factor relating to Turkey's development plans for the area concerns the 
subject of internal security which has become most important in regard to the separatist 
movement of the Kurds in the region since the GAP region contains the bulk of Turkey's 
Kurdish population. The region is a target for cross-border attacks by militant Kurds but 
Turkey hopes that this difficult political situation can be stabilized by improving the 
standard of living in the region which may also weaken the support of the local 
population for the Kurdish separatist movement (Waterbury, 1990, 9). Economic plans 
for agricultural development in the region, the generation of hydro-electric power and 
industrial development are mainly intended to help solve this problem.
The development projects are linked to the names of the leaders, Ozal and Demirel, 
who have supported the process of formulation and implementation of these plans as 
well as contributing to the acceleration of implementation and, thus, to their chance of 
success. The strength of commitment expressed to date makes it impossible to imagine 
Turkey renouncing the project at this stage.
C) Future forecast:
When the development plans have been implemented, Turkey's economic 
expectations, based on the Euphrates water and its dependence on them, will increase. 
Meanwhile Turkey is, for all practical purposes, self-sufficient in food, and it wishes to 
remain so in the future. The present agricultural production in the GAP area is limited to 
one harvest every two years but with irrigation and modem technology, the soil and 
climate could sustain two or three harvests annually (Tekeli, 1990, 208). Turkey, 
however, expects to profit from the export of crops grown in the irrigated areas of GAP, 
because South-East Turkey is located in a favourable geographical position to deliver 
fresh and packaged foods to both the Middle Eastern countries and Europe cheaper, and 
in better condition, than any other supplier. Markets have also been identified in 
neighbouring countries and Turkey plans to export agricultural products to Iraq and 
Syria both of which face food deficits (Turkish exports to Iraq in 1988 were $US 986 
million, and exports to Syria were $US 110 million (Ergil 1990, 11). When the GAP 
project is completed, it is estimated that Turkey will produce enough food to feed 80 
million people, and 3.3 million extra jobs will have been created countrywide. The 
increase in agricultural production may also be expected to start a "chain reaction" in
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Figure G2: Cognitive maps of Turkey's interests in the Euphrates river: 
pre 1960s, 1960s-1990s, future
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other sectors of the regional economy, thus Turkey perceives that it cannot tolerate any 
limitation on its economy caused by any delays in the GAP project (Inan, 1990, 5).
The cognitive maps of the three phases in its political and economic development 
show very clearly the shifts in emphasis in domestic and foreign interests as well as in 
the economic outcomes of the GAP investments. The most important contribution will 
be the generation of hydro-electric power which will greatly contribute towards the 
economic development of the country and will temporarily decrease the need to import 
fuel for the generation of thermal electric power. The extensive irrigated areas will 
contribute to the creation of jobs, raise the standard of living, become a source of foreign 
currency resulting from the export of foodstuffs, and provide an infrastructure for the 
further industrial development of the region. Turkey thus hopes that it will put a stop to 
the negative emigration from the region and that the problems of internal security will 
diminish.
In the area of foreign policy , it seems that the problem of the security of Turkey's 
frontiers will abate after the signing of a security agreement with Syria; but some 
military tension is still to be expected on the Iraqi border involving the Kurdish 
opposition. There is no forecast that the subject of the territorial demands made by Syria 
and Turkey, will significantly affect the foreign relations of the countries, since 
nowadays, the end of the cold war makes it possible for the normalization of their 
mutual relations to take effect. The subject of economic relations will assume much 
more significant dimensions in the future and there is no doubt that the decision about 
whether Turkey will become a member of the European Community or not, will have 
implications for the importance of the economic ties between Turkey and the 
neighbouring countries. Turkey is also a member of NATO and wishes to play a certain 
role in that organization, has important trade and financial relations with Middle East 
countries and is interested in economic opportunities in North America, the Black Sea 
area, and Central Asia. Hence, its international image is a rather important concern 
(Frey, 1993, 65).
The development project in Turkey will affect Syria and Iraq’s water supply and, 
together with this, the balance of power in the Middle East, both economically and 
politically (Manisah, 1990, 7). On the other hand the most vital element in Turkey's 
economic approach to the region is the achievement of long-term international stability 
in the Middle East.
In the area of internal policy - the subject of the redistribution of population will be 
of cardinal significance but as the standard of living of the population of South-East 
Anatolia rises, this source of instability will lose some of its pivotal importance. The
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extensive use of the Euphrates water for the development of irrigation and industry will 
promote both the rise of the standard of living and its quality. Turkey looks forward to a 
widespread development of the municipal systems in the region and the river water is 
intended to provide for the municipal and rural water needs which will greatly increase 
in the future.
G2.2 Syria's interests in the Euphrates water
A) Prior to the 60's :
In this period very much like Turkey, Syria’s sole economic interest in the Euphrates 
water, was linked to the irrigation needs of the riparian population and very small 
number of areas were actually irrigated, mainly gravitational, along the river banks. 
Syria at this stage, did not generate hydro-electric power, although development plans 
for the construction of a dam generating electricity, and providing water for irrigation, 
began taking shape under the French Mandatory government.
In the field of foreign policy. Syria was aware of its upstream position relative to 
downstream Iraq, the former being itself in the same position in respect to Turkey. 
Syria's foreign relations with Turkey were affected by both territorial claims regarding 
the Hatay region and ideological conflicts; but with regard to Iraq, Syria was involved in 
an ideological conflict.
The subject of the use of river water as a matter of internal interests, did not occupy 
a central position in the Syrian government's concerns since the population living in the 
Jezirah region was sparse and Syria was mainly concerned with internal problems of 
political instability.
B) The period between the 60's and the 90's:
Regarding economic interests, a significant change is revealed in this period on the 
level of interest exhibited by the Syrian government in the river water. In this period 
Syria erected the Tabqa dam as well as some small dams on the Euphrates, and its 
tributaries. These dams were aimed at generating hydro-electric power and at irrigating 
extensive agricultural areas. Unlike Turkey, which was still unable to use the river water 
for irrigation, Syria was still irrigating some 250 thousand ha. in the nineties, therefore, 
the importance of river water for irrigation increased in this period. Agriculture 
dominates the Syrian economy and society and the agricultural sector employed about 
32 per cent of the Syrian labour force in 1980 (see table HI). At that time Syria had the 
potential to feed its accelerating population and even export basic food products such as
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wheat and barley. Food security became one of the most important elements for the 
development of Syria's economy although in 1988 food made up 71 per cent of the 
country's overall imports, which resulted mainly from the rapid rise in population (Syrie 
& Monde Arabe, 1988, no. 408, 1). The aim of the Syrian government was to achieve 
food self-sufficiency and expansion of the irrigated areas to reduce dependence upon 
unreliable rainfed cultivation, full employment and national social well-being were the 
stated goals of the Syrian government.
Syria was, until recently, petroleum poor but since the late 1980s it has expanded oil 
production. Increases in the generation of electricity are to be regarded as the key to 
much of Syria's future industrial development. The 800 MW of hydro-electric power 
generated by the Tabqa dam, was intended to supply, at least 70 per cent of the country's 
consumption of electrical power (Meyer, 1987, 49). Here too, therefore, one may point 
out a critical factor in a country poor in energy resources. Likewise the region saw the 
beginning of industrial development based mainly on the processing of agricultural 
products and the development of mineral resources.
In the area of foreign policy, the subject of secure frontiers turned into an 
international issue in which Turkey's vulnerability was exploited by Syria. After Turkey 
had announced the erection of the Ataturk dam in 1983 Syria began supporting the 
Kurdish, PKK organization. The ideological conflict between Syria and Turkey also 
intensified since Turkey' was a member of the NATO alliance, while Syria adhered to 
the communist bloc and, Turkey's developing democratic system clashed with Syria's 
presidential regime.
The political tension between Syria and Iraq rests mainly on the hostility between 
the Ba'ath parties (of the two countries) and the personal rivalry between the two 
respective presidents. This finds expression in Syria's support of Iran during the Iraq/Iran 
war and, later, in Syria's support of the allies in the Gulf War.
In the matter of internal interests. Syria's Euphrates basin, comprising the two 
provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez Zor, is part of the country's vast but under-populated and 
under-developed arid Eastern hinterland which contain only 8.3 per cent of the Syrian 
population (Hinnebusch, 1989, 233). The rapid rate of urbanisation has put a strain on 
services and the infrastructure of cities and has led to the growth of shanty towns along 
the edges of large urban centres such as Damascus and Aleppo; the urban growth has, in 
turn, been fuelled by a continuing influx of people from the countryside (Lewis, 1987, 
15).
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Figure G3: Cognitive maps of Syria's interests in the Euphrates river: 
pre 1960s, 1960s-1990s, future
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The Syrian authorities had great hopes for the Euphrates Dam project not only with 
respect to its economic contribution but also for its potential to transfer water to other 
cities in the country. The project was also expected to help create a new class of skilled 
manpower and personnel who would ultimately be of great benefit to the country's 
development. This implied establishing new cities and towns, the provision of health 
care, education, communications and other social services in the region to provide a 
socio-economic infrastructure which would help redress the effects of the growing 
urbanisation of the country (The Arab Economist, April 1978, 18).
The success of the development plans is linked to the personal prestige of President 
Assad as expressed by the reservoir behind the dam bearing his name - an indication of 
the importance Syria attaches to the implementation of the development plans.
The Euphrates dam and the subsequent agricultural and industrial development 
became the showcase of modernization in Syria and thus became part of Syria's image 
vis-a-vis its neighbours.
C) Future forecast -
It seems that the economic importance of the agriculture based on river water will 
increase as a result of Syria's rapid demographic growth and its aspiration to produce 
enough food to meet its food needs. On the other hand, the importance of river water, to 
Syria's economy, through the generation of hydro-electric power will decrease, because 
the potential to generate electricity is restricted and the growth of the Syrian economy 
will eventually rest on generating thermal electricity. Therefore, the production of 
electricity on the Euphrates as part of the GNP will gradually decrease.
In foreign policy. the issue of the security of the frontiers between Syria and Turkey 
will gradually lose some of its significance as a result of the agreements made between 
the two countries. The ideological conflict will dwindle as one of the consequences of 
the crumbling of the Soviet Union. These new circumstances will also contribute to the 
development of the mutual economic interests of the countries.
The political tension between Syria and Iraq will continue on an ideological basis, at 
least as long as Sadam remains the ruler of Iraq. The same may be said of the tension 
involved in the distribution of river water, which turns Iraq into the principal casualty of 
the agricultural development of the upstream regions, as regards both the quantity and 
the quality of the water.
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As to internal policy, the re-distribution of the population will go on being a central 
issue in Syria, which aspires to transfer two million of its inhabitants to settlements in 
the Jezirah region. Agricultural and industrial development are aimed at providing the 
inhabitants with a quality and standard of living which will persuade them to move into 
the region and establish themselves there. Consequently, more water will gradually serve 
domestic and industrial needs. Unlike Turkey, Syria has no internal security problems in 
the region nor any emigration of inhabitants moving to the country's big cities from the 
region.
G2.3 Iraq's interests in the Euphrates water
A) Prior to the 60's
During this period Iraq's only economic interest in the water was linked to the 
agricultural sector. Iraq, unlike Syria and Turkey, irrigated extensive areas, and the 
Euphrates river development projects in this period, were also connected to the 
prevention of inundation by the river.
Foreign policy. - Iraq was aware of its disadvantage in being located downstream 
and endeavoured to reach agreements with Turkey and Syria regarding the distribution 
of river water. Iraq had mutual economic interests with Syria, concerning the flow of oil 
from the northern oil-fields of the country to the Mediterranean sea-ports and Iraq's 
relations with Turkey were normal.
Internal relations. - Euphrates water served household and municipal needs, thus 
raising the standard of living of the region's inhabitants, but it must be remembered that 
Iraq, during this period, was occupied by internal problems and characterized by political 
instability, which hindered the process of development plan.
B) The period between the 60's and the 90's -
With respect to the economy. Iraq's position was exceptional in the Euphrates basin. 
Its economic potential was enormous with one of the largest oil reserves in the world, 
and a large area of fertile land relative to its domestic needs. It had vast quantities of 
phosphates besides other raw materials, and abundant supplies of water. Despite its 
dependency upon earnings from petroleum exports, almost all the industry was based 
upon food processing and textiles and the agricultural sector employed 33 per cent of the
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Figure G4: Cognitive maps of Iraq 's interests in the Euphrates water: 
pre 1960s, 1960s-1990s, future
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labour force in 1987 (Fisher, 1989, 465), while agriculture accounted for less than 10 
per cent of the country's GNP. Iraq has traditionally irrigated about a million ha. of land 
with Euphrates water as well as using water for domestic purposes.
The Iraqi government wished to reduce the country's dependence on oil exports as 
the main supplier of foreign exchange. Despite its apparently high agricultural potential, 
however, Iraq was not self-sufficient in food production and in 1990, not only was 90 
per cent of its food imported but food imports comprised 25 per cent of total imports 
(Hussain, 1990, 237). During this period Iraq persevered in the development of the river 
valley and erected the Haditha dam for the generation of hydro-electric power, and to 
regulate the flow of river water so as to decrease its dependence on food imports in years 
of drought as well as its dependence on the regulation of river-water flow from the dams 
in Syria. During this period Iraq relied on oil money to import foodstuffs but actually 
neglected its agricultural development. Compared to Syria and Turkey, Iraq has little 
dependence on the generation of hydro-electric power, due to its topographic structure 
which does not allow the economical generation of hydro-electric power; on the other 
hand the availability of oil makes it possible to generate cheap thermal-electric power.. 
Iraq does use river water with little loss for the cooling purposes in its thermal power 
stations.
The Iraq-Iran war and subsequently the Gulf War, (in the wake of which the UN 
declared an embargo upon Iraq) emphasised the problematic nature of absolute 
dependence upon an income derived from oil exports while having shortcomings in the 
capacity to produce in food to meet national needs.
Foreign relations. The ideological conflict with Syria did not allow for any 
cooperation between the two nations. On the other hand, Iraq’s economic dependence on 
Turkey, particularly in the field of oil exports, prevented Iraq from taking drastic steps 
against Turkey's development plans, despite the fact that Iraq, thereby, emerged as the 
principal casualty. Iraq regularly lodged protests against Turkey's plans, but it would 
seem that these protests were meant to bolster its national image. It must be remembered 
that Iraq and Turkey share common interests, and cooperate in the security field against 
Kurdish rebels on the formers' common frontier.
Internal policy. Of the three Euphrates riparian states, Iraq had the largest area of 
irrigated land within the Euphrates basin in 1990 and the largest number of inhabitants 
living within the Euphrates valley but the poor standard of living in the agricultural areas 
has generated a strong rural to urban migration (Mofid, 1990, 50). This trend has created 
a need to import hundreds of thousands of agricultural workers mainly from Egypt to 
make up for the shortage of agricultural workers. By improving the farmers' standards
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of living, Iraq hopes to decrease the migration rate, and to prevent the expansion of the 
slums surrounding Baghdad.
Another internal security factor is related to Iraq’s plans for improving the standard 
of living which the Sunni administration in Baghdad hopes will help it gain the Shia 
population’s support (EIU, Iraq, 1990, 8). The Government of Iraq also wishes to 
prevent politically embarrassing food shortages (which aggravate problems of inflation 
and increase reliance on uncertain foreign sources) and too much importation of food 
which also impairs national security.
Like Turkey, Iraq suffers from the internal emigration of the agricultural population 
from the region and as a consequence imported thousands of farmers from Egypt in the 
1970s and 1980s. This variable has induced Iraq to develop plans for the redistribution 
of its population and, to further this end, the standard of living of the farmers in the 
region must be raised.
The eight years' wars with Iran caused Iraq to make more of an effort to improve 
agricultural self-sufficiency and reduce its food import bill, but the UN economic 
embargo in 1990 has given Iraq its biggest push yet towards achieving improvements in 
the production and productivity of its agricultural sector.
C) Future forecast -
The principal importance of Euphrates water to Iraq, from an economic point of 
view, is linked to the development of agriculture. The share of hydro-electric power (out 
of all the power produced) will gradually decrease even further. A large number of the 
projects developed in Iraq, whose principal aim was to prevent flooding will become 
redundant as a result of the constant flow of the river, caused by the controlled release of 
water from the dams in Turkey and Syria. On the other hand the quantity of water in the 
river will be reduced and its quality impaired. This may affect the extent of agricultural 
areas and the type of production but Iraq has an alternative option - the use of the Tigris 
river water, transferred to the Euphrates through Lake Tharthar and the construction of a 
third river which will add agricultural land to the country.
Foreign policy. Iraq’s dependence upon Turkey and Syria will grow, because the 
upstream states will determine the quality of water flowing in the river. The close 
economic ties with Turkey may be expected to be renewed and even strengthened after 
the embargo is raised. As for Iraq's relations with Syria, only a change in the latter's 
regime will improve the fabric of foreign and economic relations between the countries.
235
Internal policy. The Euphrates waters will continue to be important if Iraq wants 
to raise the standard of living of the local population, and thus prevent negative 
emigration from the region. To achieve this, more and more water will be diverted to 
domestic use. The Euphrates water is also associated with the image of the country’s 
leaders, who wish to see massive development in the region in order to restrict the 
extensive importation of food into the country.
G3. Conclusion
The three diagrams in the chapter (G2-G4) clearly reflect the level of the riparians 
states' interests in the waters of the Euphrates river over three periods of time: the past - 
before the commencement of the implementation of the large development projects for 
the river water and when the use of water was minimal; the present - from the 1960s to 
the 1990s when the three states were at the peak of their implementation of development 
plans and the resultant use of the river water grew; and the future - after the completion 
of the development projects when the resultant use of the river water reaches its peak. 
The importance of the various factors in the determination of the level of the states' 
interests in the river water is based on the data accumulated in the previous chapters. A 
number of very significant wide-ranging conclusions can be drawn from the three 
diagrams.
A. The period up to the 1960s was characterized by scanty use of the river water, 
mainly by Syria and Turkey which are located upstream. The natural flow of the river 
actually reached Iraq which invested most of its efforts during this period in projects 
aimed at preventing flooding. Syria and Turkey, in contrast, were planning the 
construction of dams along the river and Turkey, in particular, was planning dams for 
the production of electricity which would only marginally affect the amount of water in 
the river. Syria was planning the construction of a multi-purpose dam for the production 
of hydro-electric energy and for irrigation purposes whose potential effect on the flow of 
water to Iraq was very limited.
Since there were, as yet, no development projects for the river in Turkey and Syria 
the level of economic expectations and internal interests of the states was particularly 
low. As a result the effect of river water usage on the foreign relations of the states was 
limited.
This period can be summed up as one with a limited range of low-interest level 
factors of marginal importance in their effect upon the network of relations between the 
riparians, with a limited demand for water and so a low potential for conflict over the 
river water.
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B. the period between the 1960s and the 1990s was characterized by the accelerated 
implementation of development projects by the three riparians which was expressed in 
the building of dams for the production of hydro-electric power and dams which 
combined the production of electricity with wide-ranging irrigation projects. As a result 
the level of states' interests significantly increased and additional factors of interest 
accumulated.
From the economic point of view Turkey's three dams were expected to produce 
hydro-electric power and this would have an important effect upon the oil-poor country. 
Turkey had not yet begun to exploit the river water for the irrigation of large areas in 
south east Anatolia.
Syria intended to produce hydro-electric power with the Tabqa dam and this raised 
high expectations but they were not to be satisfied. Irrigation projects which demanded 
growing amounts of water were a central goal for Syria although is was already clear 
that both the area irrigated and that expected to be irrigated would be smaller than hoped 
for.
In contrast to the two upstream states, Iraq neglected the development of the river 
which, as far it was concerned, was unimportant as potential for hydro-electric power 
and preferred to base its economics upon the importation of feed products over the 
development of its agriculture.
Economic developments projects reflect the development of many other factors and 
the domestic interests of the states which were of marginal interest during this period 
now became very significant. Such development was significant for Turkey in its 
preventing the negative migration from the area through raising the standard of living. It 
was further expressed by an attempt to improve the shaky internal security which had 
arisen because the Kurdish revolt. The prestige of Turkey's leadership was also 
significantly linked to the success of the development project.
Syria encourages migration to the Euphrates river area (in order to reduce the 
pressure on the urban networks systems) through raising the standard of living in those 
areas. The development of the Euphrates valley became a matter of personal interest for 
the Ba'ath party and for President Assad.
These development projects had major significance on the network of foreign 
relations among the riparians which itself, was directly connected with the international 
power system (Turkey, a no Arab state, a member of NATO and with a western form of 
government; Syria and Iraq mainly influenced by the foreign policies of the USSR, and 
with governments more suited to third world states).
The system of dams built in Turkey which allowed to control the flow of the river 
water changed the balance of power in the region. Syria and Iraq made considerable 
efforts to reduce the damage involved as much as possible. Iraq and Syria which were on 
the brink of war in 1974, here co-operated against their common source of danger -
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Turkey. In the first stage they tried to prevent and later to hold up, the building of the 
Ataturk Dam by trying to delay the granting of international financial assistance for 
constructing the dam. Syria began to support the Kurdish rebels during this period and 
Iraq complicated its economic relations with Turkey. This period simbolizes one of 
significant tension in foreign relations between the states, potential for instability linked 
to the ever growing demand for water and change in the strategic balance.
C. The future. By analyzing the processed taking place in the region one can 
postulate that despite the predictions, a reduction in the tension and lack of stability will 
take place in the future regarding the management of the Euphrates water. This thesis is 
based upon the changes taking place in a number of factors which determine the level of 
the states' interests in the river water: The end of the Cold War has led to closer relations 
between Syria and Turkey as well as co-operation between them against Iraq during the 
Gulf War. Iraq has become politically and militarily weaker as a result of the War, 
something which reduce the changes of a possible war between Iraq and Syria. Iraq 
needs Turkey as it is the only continental exit for its goods especially oil. Syria has 
officially decided to end its support for the PKK as a quid pro quo for an agreement over 
the division of water with Turkey. There is also an agreement over the division of water 
between Syria and Iraq now. Syria and Turkey are expected to realize that there is a gap 
between their vision of wide spread regional irrigation as it appears in the states' 
development plans and reality. Dependence upon hydro-electric power will develop 
significantly in Syria and gradually in Turkey as the hydro-electricity supplies a lower 
percentage of the total production of electricity in the states. All of the states will need 
closer commercial ties in order to export goods and agricultural produce. The subject of 
food security will become more significant in Syria but most of the effort will centre 
upon improvement of the agricultural produce and irrigation methods and not upon 
extending the agricultural areas into low-grade, low soil quality areas.
Iraq today, one must note, is capable of compensating itself for the loses of the 
Euphrates water by connecting Wadi Tharthar to the Tigris river. The construction of a 
system of dams would allow for a more efficient management of the water resources and 
it is, in fact, the quality of the water that should concern them more than the quantity.
Through the development of the model of the cognitive map an attempt has been 
made to give quantitative values to the various factors in order to create a hierarchy of 
the importance of such factors for the three states over three periods of time, and to 
differentiate between major and secondary factors.
With this purpose in view ten international experts on water and the Middle East 
were interviewed and were asked to grade the various factors involving the level of 
interest for the three states during the three time periods, according to the information 
they possessed. The results have produced a very low correlation and often a subject
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which appeared to be essential to one expert was only marginally important in the 
opinion of another. Despite this several trends pointed out by most of the experts.
Turkey
Most of the experts graded Turkey's domestic interests up to the 1960s as a factor with 
high implications for the level of interests in the river water as opposed to foreign 
relations which was seen as being only secondary. From the 1960s on into the future 
economic interests and foreign relations are perceived as having much more significance 
than domestic interests.
A. Foreign relations - Most of the experts saw the factors of national image and 
political influence up to the 1960s as most significant as opposed to factors of 
ideological conflict and border security which were of no significance during the above 
period. In contrast, during 1960-1990 the factor of political influence appeared and 
territorial claim joined the list of none important factors. In the future, the factor of 
ideological conflict will also lose its importance.
B. Economics - Up to the 1960s the economic interests of the Euphrates river were 
perceived as insignificant. From the 1960s on into the future the production of electricity 
is perceived as a factor which produces the most significant level of interests, followed 
by agriculture, while industry and services were found to have only marginal 
importance.
C. Domestic interests - Up to the 1960s the standard of living and internal security 
were perceived as being most significant as opposed to the factors of population 
distribution and food security which were evaluated as being unimportant. During 1960- 
1990 the subject of population distribution was found to have supreme importance s 
opposed to the factors of standard of living and the image of Turkish leaders which 
became marginally important. For the future, the factors of standard of living, domestic 
use and internal security are perceived as being more important than the image of 
Turkish leaders and the goal of population distribution.
Syria
Up to the 1960s the experts graded the factor of domestic interests as the most 
significant of Syria's interests in the river water as opposed to the factor of foreign policy 
which was perceived as marginally important. In contrast, from the 1960s on the factors 
of foreign policy and economy are seen as most significant while, during this time 
domestic interests became marginal
A. Foreign policy - The factors of national image and territorial claim were 
perceived as more important than the factors of ideological conflict, international law 
and economic relations. During 1960-1990 the factors of territorial claim, national image 
and political influence were evaluated as more important than international law,
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ideological conflict and border security. In the future, claim the experts the factors of 
economic relations and international law will become more significant and border 
security and ideological conflict will decrease its importance.
B. Economy - Up to the 1960s only the factor of agriculture had a marginal level of 
importance. From this period on the factors of production of hydro-electric power as 
well as agriculture became important and only the factor of industry and services was 
found to be marginally important.
C. Domestic interests - Up to the 1960s the factor of domestic use was perceived as 
most significant as opposed to standard of living, population distribution and food 
security which were seen as marginal factors. The standard of living, the image of the 
leaders and population distribution became most significant from the 1960s on into the 
future in contrast to the factor of internal security which became secondary.
Iraq
According to the experts grading, up to the 1960s the factor of domestic interests was 
found to be most significant for Iraq and the factor of foreign policy had secondary 
importance. In the 1960-1990 the most important interests were economy and domestic 
interests became marginal. In the future the experts expect domestic interests to again 
become most significant and foreign policy to become marginal.
A. Foreign policy - The factors of political influence, border security and national 
image were most important during the 1960s as opposed to ideological conflict, 
international law which were considered to be marginal. During 1960-1990 the factors of 
political influence, national image and economic relations were the most significant. 
International law which was considered marginal up to the 1990s will, in the future, 
become a major factor while international security will become marginal.
B. Economy - Grading the economic factors from the past into the future, the 
experts rank agriculture as the most significant factor and the production of hydro­
electric power and industry and services as having only marginal importance. The 
factors of domestic interests such as domestic use and internal security were perceived 
as most significant from the past to the 1990 as opposed to population distribution, 
standard of living and food security which had marginal importance. The factors of 
internal security and the image of the leaders will, in the future, decrease importance in 
contrast to food security and preserving the standard of living.
One should again point out that these results are based upon a low correlation which 
does not permit the relative ranking of the importance of the various factors. In order to 
develop the subject of a hierarchy of different variables the use of other models will be 
made (see chapter H).
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H. Models from Geopolitical Science for the  
Explanation of Disputes
H1. Quantitative indicator of the vulnerability due to water 
shortages
The cognitive map in the previous chapter helped us to identify the various factors which 
determine the level of the riparians interests and describe their changing importance over 
three time periods. The attempt to add quantitative values to the relative importance of 
the various factors did not prove to be effective. The two models in chapter H 
(quantitative and Matrix Model) allow us to quantitatively assess the various factors and 
so assist us in examining the issue of the research: is a military conflict between the river 
states over the division of the water to be expected?
Gleick (1992) claimed that although non-renewable resources such as oil are more 
typically the focus of traditional international security analyses, water can also fit into 
this framework if water provides a source of economic or political strength. This is the 
reason why water provides a justification for going to war or why water resources are an 
object for military conquest. Gleick analysis five factors that make water likely to be an 
object of strategic rivalry:
1) the degree of water scarcity.
2) the extent to which the water supply is shared by more than one region or state.
3) the relative power of the basin states.
4) the ease of access to alternative fresh water sources.
5) the ease of access to substitutes for water (Gleick, 1992, 6).
A quantitative indicator, which takes into account changing population relative to 
the water amount, land use and economy is shown in table HI. This table lists the 
riparian countries with their annual per capita water availability in 1971 and by the year 
2000. According to the table Syria is in the worst situation, and by the year 2000, will 
fall below 1,000 nAy ear/person (or conversely more than 1000 people will need to be 
supplied one million m^ of water per year). This level of water availability is typically 
considered the minimum per capita water requirement for an efficient, industrialized 
nation and therefore classified as extremely low (see table A.l). According to the table, 
Iraq is in a better position and in the year 2000 will have 1,300 m^/year/person available, 
an amount that is also classified as very low. Turkey is in the best position with 2,300 
m-Vyear/person in the year 2000, an amount that is still classified as low according to 
international standards, but very high according to the Middle East standards.
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A second quantitative indicator which measures the extent to which water supplies 
are shared among the riparian states, is the total water supply originating outside of the 
border, and which is therefore under the control of another nation. According to this 
factor Syria is in the worst situation, as 85 per cent of its surface water originates outside 
of its territory. Iraq is in a better position because only 66 per cent of its water originates 
outside of Iraq’s border, and Turkey is in the best position among the riparian states 
because almost all its water originates inside Turkish territory. An alternative way to 
measure the vulnerability of the riparian states is the ratio of external supply to internal 
supply. According to Gleick (1992), where this ratio is greater than one, more than half 
of the nation's water supply will be subject to external political pressures and constraints 
(Gleick, 7992,16). From this point of view, Syria is in the worst situation with a ratio of 
6.4; Iraq is in a better situation with ratio of 1.8, and Turkey is again in the best position 
with ratio of 0.1.
Gleick’s use of quantitative values for the various factors is expressed in the 
selection of physical factors alone, making his approach very deterministic. Physical 
variables do not absolutely determine foreign policy (such as in cases where states are 
oil-dependent) and this is not the only factor which shapes the foreign policy of such 
states, for an example the U.S.A., Japan and Germany cases.
A third quantitative indicator that measures vulnerability to hydrologic conditions is the 
dependence on hydroelectricity as a fraction of total electrical supply. This measure can 
indicate both positive and negative effects on the one hand with high hydroelectric 
dependence bringing a high vulnerability to either natural or international changes in 
water availability, while on the other hand, low hydroelectric availability typically 
means high dependence on fossil fuels. According to Gleick (1992), a nation that relies 
on hydroelectricity for 50 per cent of its total energy supply, will be vulnerable to 
military actions against hydroelectric dams. The international alteration of flows which 
cross borders, and any changes in climate that affect water availability would all be 
strongly felt (Gleick, 1992, 16). In the case study of the Euphrates river, Turkey 
produces the highest amount of hydroelectric power about 40 per cent of its total energy 
supply (Bilen & Uskay, 1991, 4.13). The completion of the GAP project will increase 
this by 70 per cent. On the other hand Turkey being an upstream state is not vulnerable 
to international alteration, but is vulnerable to interruptions of oil imports as was 
demonstrated in 1973 and 1990. On the other hand, the importance of Syria's 
hydroelectric power potential will decrease because the share of hydroelectric power in 
total national electricity production will drop sharply, since the Euphrates river which 
was expected to generate 80 per cent of the country's electric power in the 1970s 
generated only 40 per cent in 1985 (Maury, 1983, 322). The share of hydro power in the
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Table HI:
Basic indicators of area, land use, population and economy (at various dates)
Turkey Syria Iraq
Total surface area (1,000 km-) 719 a 185 a 438 a
Area suitable for agriculture 
1990(1,000 ha.) 27,699 b 6,149 c 11,800 d
Area under cultivation 
1990 (1,000 ha.)
25,305 b 5,626 c 3300 d
Irrigated area (1,000 ha.) 2,990 b 693 c 1,560 d
Per cent of irrigated area of 
total cultivation - 1990
12 12 44
Population (1991- millions) e 58.6 12.9 19.5
Average annual growth of 
population ( % - 1980-1990) a
2.4 3.6 3.6
Population (2025 - millions) a 91 35 48
GNP per capita ($ US 1990) a 1,630 1,000 2,870
Contribution of agriculture 
to GDP 1990 (percentage)
18 a 28 a 5 /
Sectorial distribution of
the Labour force (1980) g
Agriculture
Industry
Services
58
17
25
32
32
36
43
26
31
Urban population as a per­
cent of total population a 
1965 
1990
34
61
40
50
51
71
Per capita water availability h 
( l ’OOOm3) 1971 
(l'OOOm3) 2000
4.9
2.3
3.0
1.0
3.6
13
Euphrates water as per cent 
of total surface water
32 85 38
Euphrates river potential 
irrigation area (million ha.)
1.1 0.5 1.2
Euphrates hydroelectric Potential (MW) 5,346 i 885j 660 k
Sources: a-World Development Report, 1992, 218-222, 268, 278; b,-Gulbahar, 1991, 
5 3 l;c,-Syrian Arab Republic, 1991, 6/4; d-Hussain, 1990, 238; e- World Population 
Profile, 1991,A/5; f- EIU, 1990-1991, 14; g- Richard & Waterbury, 1990, 17,74; h- The 
Global 2,000, 1982, 156; I-Bagis , 1989, 52; j- Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 153; k- The 
Arab Economist, October 1981, 6.
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total energy supply will continue to fall because of the topographic conditions of the 
country which do not permit the creation of new dams. Meanwhile, the scarcity of 
available water and on the other hand, the development of new oil fields have cancelled 
the necessity to import fossil fuels. From this point of view, Iraq is in the best position, 
since only 4 per cent of its total energy consumption is hydroelectric power (ElU, Iraq, 
7997, No. 2, 14), the major part of which originates from the Tigris river and its 
tributaries because of topographical conditions. In addition, Iraq has an enormous 
amount of oil that reduces its dependence on hydroelectric power.
A fourth quantitative indicator which measures the vulnerability of the riparian 
states to hydrological conditions is the possibility of being self - sufficient in agricultural 
production, because food security is viewed by the governments as being a question of 
national security. By the end of the century, it is expected that the Turkish population 
will be about 70 million, and about 91 million by the year 2025 (see table HI).
Looking at land and population together, we find in 1991 a population density per 
square hectare in Turkey of 0.75 persons, very similar to that of Syria - 0.69, and 55 per 
cent more than that of Iraq - 0.44 persons per square hectare.
Another calculation that is more significant for food self - sufficiency is an analysis 
of population density per unit of area suitable for agriculture. According to this factor, in 
1991, Turkey and Syria had 2.1 inhabitants per square agricultural hectare, and Iraq is 
again in the best position with 1.6 inhabitants per hectare.
At the same time, Turkey is one of the few countries in the world that is 
agriculturally self sufficient and which even has food surpluses to market. This position 
is even more important for Middle Eastern country. This is the reason that Turkey is in 
the best position among the riparian states. Iraq with the lowest population density, 
although without agricultural self sufficiency, but with the potential to be so, is in a 
better position than Syria which has a higher population density relative to agricultural 
area and has no potential for agricultural self sufficiency.
The combination of the index of water availability per capita, and hydroelectric 
dependence with the index of dependence on water originating outside national borders 
and the availability of food self-sufficiency provides an indicator both of the significance 
of water in the economy and in the domestic security of a state, and the vulnerability of a 
nation's energy supply to outside intervention.
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Each of these components has been given a quantitative proportional weight which 
ranges from a value of three - (high vulnerability) to one - (low vulnerability), (see table 
H2) and these have been inserted into the table for the co-riparian states.
Table H2:
Summary of quantitative indicators of the vulnerability of the riparian states
Per capita Dependence on Dependence on Food self- Total 
water international hydroelectricity sufficiency 
availability water
T urkey 1 1 3 1 6
Syria 3 3 2 3 11
Iraq 2 2 1 2 7
According to this table, Syria is the most vulnerable country to water shortages and 
Turkey is in the best position among the riparian states.
Please note that this model' which still requires further development, gives the 
different factors the same rank of importance for vulnerability. Self-sufficiency in food, 
for example, does not necessarily have to be equal, to dependence on hydro-electric 
power but the model assumes "equality".
H2. Matrix Model
With such basic information on the status of the three riparians it is possible to analyse 
the factors influencing their past and future relationships. In Naff & Matson (1984), the 
riparians which participate in the hydro-politics of the Euphrates river are each analysed 
according to their respective "riparian position", "power", and "interests" (N a ff & 
Matson, 1984, 192). Mandel (1991) reinforcing this point, notes that "the power ratio 
among riparian states involved three elements -
1) the states' overall political/military/economic power levels;
2) the states' technological power to disrupt or alter the river basin;
3) the states' geographical power reflected in a more, or less advantageous 
downstream position with respect to the river" (Mandel, 1991, 6).
Whatever the specific water controversy among the riparians, its ultimate resolution 
or not depends on the power relationships involved. For this aim we have to address two 
more factors: the riparian position within the drainage basin, and the factor of projectable
245
strategic power. Information on these power relationships enables the deployment of the 
conceptual frameworks for modelling water conflicts. Power relationships can be placed 
into a power matrix (Naff & Matson, 1974, 192; Frey & Naff, 1985, 79). The Matrix 
Models contain the above five basic factors that form riparian water conflicts: riparian 
position within the drainage basin, projectable strategic power, economic interests, 
external and internal politics. Each of these components has been given a subjective 
quantitative weight ranging from a value of five (high significance) to one (low 
significance), and they are then inserted into the matrix for the Euphrates river system 
and applied to each co-riparian. The Matrix Model, and a process of cognitive mapping, 
will examine the power relationships and the importance which each political participant 
has attached to the river at three periods. The first period is before the 1960s, before the 
construction of the main dams, when only natural factors determined the availability of 
water to the three riparians, when there were neither water storage structures interfering 
with the natural flow, nor irrigation uses at a level sufficient to create competitive water 
demands. The second period was between the 1960s to 1990s and was characterised by 
rapid development by all the riparian countries; and the third is the future - a period in 
which development plans of the riparians will be completed. In this period new 
geopolitical positions are being established which will determine the potential 
negotiating strengths of the three riparians.
The riparian positions within the drainage basin
The comparative riparian positions need to be distinguished: upstream, midstream, and 
downstream. Upstream means being first with significant flow, downstream means being 
last and midstream refers to any riparian between the upstream and downstream nations.
In general, the upstream position of a riparian gives clear potential power 
advantages (Frey & Naff, 1985, 76), and the upstream state may be in good position to 
dictate the quantity of water that it is going to use and the amount of water that will be 
left for the lower riparian. From this position a state can usually take action that can be 
contested or countered by a downstream riparian only with considerable and increasing 
difficulty or cost. The upstream state can present lower riparian states with a fait 
accompli the alteration of which would be far more demanding than the decisions and 
water managing activities which were made before. An upstream country can also affect 
the quality of a downstream country's water by diverting or polluting it, but the 
downstream country cannot reciprocate hydrologically. In this respect it seems that the 
upstream states have certain privileges and rights in the context of international law. If 
the lower riparian has access to alternative sources of water, that nation will be less 
sensitive and vulnerable to the action of upper riparians when compared to riparians who 
do not have any access to an alternative resource of water (Abbas, 1984, 239).
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The geostrategically favourable location of Turkey in the region has not diminished 
with time, but has been enhanced. In the past, Turkey's strategic value has usually been 
seen as a buffer between the Middle-East and Europe. However this role, which was 
valid, for example, during the Cold War, is no longer relevant. Today, the economy is 
Turkey's main concern and this is exemplified by the GAP project. With the dynamism 
initiated by this project, Turkey aims to become an economic and political superpower in 
the Middle East. Turkey in this context, as an upstream state of the Euphrates river, 
would prefer non-binding understandings concerning the allocation and management of 
Euphrates water. Any obligation or commitment would necessarily involve concessions 
to the downstream states. Iraq, in contrast, as a lower Euphrates riparian, is in a very 
vulnerable position concerning Euphrates water quantity and quality vis-a-vis Turkey 
and Syria. This is the reason Iraq is the most eager to arrive at binding commitments, 
that would only bind the two upstream states - Turkey & Syria. Syria, as the second 
midstream riparian user of the Euphrates, would want binding understandings with 
Turkey because it will be affected by Turkey’s development plans, but loose 
understandings with Iraq, its upstream state (Waterbury, 1990,15).
Projectable strategic power
Projectable strategic power is defined as a nation's military capability (defensive power 
and projectable power) and this factor is a crucial aspect in political analysis.
The factor of projectable power refers to a nation's ability to threaten its potential 
opponents credibly and thus shape their behaviour in matters concerning water. The 
ability to project military power (such as air power, artillery and missiles) against 
diversionary water works has as special a significance, as have the defensive capabilities 
against such force. Gleick (1992) claims that the more vulnerable a nation is to water 
shortages or cut-offs, the more tempting the water weapon. Similarly, the weaker the 
downstream nation, the more likely it is that the water weapon will be exercised (Gleick, 
1992, 8). There is, however, no systematic analyses been made of the strategic and 
military implications of large scale water projects. It may be that the development and 
existence of large scale dams and reservoirs significantly affect the military and strategic 
postures of proximate nations. Large scale water installations are dangerously 
vulnerable, no matter how well protected. Nations with such installations will tend to be 
more cautious in their international behaviour, since the potential costs of military 
conflict are so high (Naff & Matson, 1984, 194). At the same time the contribution of 
reservoirs and dams in the upper riparian state gives it economic and military bargaining 
power. It enables the upper riparian to manipulate the stream or to condition agreements 
on water sometimes taking into account other issues affecting the states involved. 
Nasrallah (1990) claims that the Arab states will have to act in concert over the water
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issue if they wish to prevent themselves from being caught in a position of strategic 
inferiority (Nasrallah, 1990,16).
The riparian position within the drainage basin
Turkey - the most militarily powerful country in the Euphrates basin during the early 
1990s, felt itself sufficiently secure to act as it pleased with development programmes 
for the Euphrates river, and had no serious fear of military retaliation from the 
downstream countries. Examples of this are Ozal's hinting to Syria in 1987 that Turkey 
might cut the flow of the Euphrates into Syria unless Damascus stopped supporting to 
the Kurdish rebels of the PKK (MEED, 13 October 1989, 4), and Demirel’s 1991 
description of the Euphrates water as a "national resource” similar to oil, in addition 
warnings given to Turkey's neighbours not to interfere in Turkey's national resource 
policies (The Middle East, August 1991, 30), reflect the state's confidence in its military 
power regarding its downstream neighbours. Syria, in 1975 on the other hand, was 
forced by international pressure, from Saudi-Arabia and the USSR, as well as by fear of 
military attacks from Iraq, to release water from the Tabqa reservoir for the benefit of 
Iraq.
Turkey, has the advantage of being an upstream state, with storage capacity in three 
major dams on the Euphrates, that store about 90 billion m^, of water, which is equal to 
approximately three times the river's natural flow. These structures have the capacity to 
reduce the flow of the river to the lower riparian states and thus attract five points on the 
matrix model. Syria, the second riparian state, has only storage capacity for 13.8 billion 
m^ (that is less than half of the annual natural flow), and therefore has only limited 
power to influence the river flow into Iraq. Even if Turkey does reduce the flow of the 
water in the river, it is most unlikely to reduce the flow to a level that will affect Syria's 
agricultural development plans, therefore Syria will get three points. Iraq as the lower 
riparian state will be greatly influenced by both Turkish and Syrian development 
projects and any period of drought in the upper Euphrates will first harm the river flow 
to Iraq, as happened in 1984 (Fisher, 1991, 480). Iraq faces more than just the question 
of inadequate water supplies; it also faces high river water salinity - an inevitable 
consequence of the extensive new irrigation schemes upstream in Syria and Turkey. This 
is the reason that Iraq will get only one point.
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Strategic power
Turkey, as the strongest riparian country both in the past and in the near future will get 
five points; Iraq, until the 1991 Gulf War, was stronger than Syria from a military point 
of view giving it four points; while Syria gains only three points during the period of 
1960s-1990s. However, as a result of the Gulf War and the UN sanctions, it seems that, 
in the near future Syria will become stronger than Iraq, and this is also seen in the future 
matrix. Syria, will probably not take any military action against Turkey in order to 
secure its water but might try to influence the Turkish regime on matters concerning the 
Euphrates water, as it did with other bilateral issues in the past.
Economic interests
Before the 1960s neither Turkey nor Syria used the river for hydroelectric power as 
well as industry. The use for irrigation was minimal, so their economic expectations 
from the river were low (see cognitive maps); on the other hand, by 1960, Iraq was 
already using the river water to irrigate significant areas. By 1969 Iraq was withdrawing 
approximately 45 per cent of the Euphrates water flowing through Iraqi territory 
(Beaumont, 1978, 38). From table HI we can calculate that the Euphrates water 
potential irrigation area in Iraq is 36 per cent of the total area under cultivation making 
Iraqi's economic expectations from the river quite high.
During the construction of the development projects in the 1960s- 1990s, period 
Turkey and Syria were already producing hydroelectric power, while Syria was even 
using water from the Euphrates and its tributaries for irrigation and for domestic use, 
mainly to the city of Aleppo, and for the urbanization of the river basin. Therefore their 
level of expectations increased.
At that period, Iraq had based its economy on oil exporting and focused less on the 
agricultural sector, leading to a reduction of its expectations from the river.
For the future, it seems that the economic factor will become more significant for 
Turkey, as it plans to produce more hydroelectric power (about 5,350 MW) from the 
river, as well as up to one million ha. of irrigated land (see table HI). The Urfa/Haran 
irrigation tunnel, which started operating in the summer of 1993, making Turkey the 
major user of the Euphrates water. However, the Euphrates irrigation potential in 
Turkey is only 4.3 per cent of the total area under cultivation.
Syria will only produce about 885 MW of hydroelectricity and will irrigate up to
480,000 ha. of area (see table HI) but Syria is more dependent on the river as it is the 
poorest riparian country with limited natural resources, Syria has neither large amounts
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of rainfall, as has Turkey, nor a second major stream such as the Tigris, nor large 
valuable petroleum deposits like Iraq. The Euphrates provides about 85 per cent of 
Syria's water, and its irrigation potential is about 7 per cent of the total area under 
cultivation. As a result, the use of the Euphrates water is a central element in any Syrian 
economic policy. However, the plans of the Turkish agricultural and electricity 
authorities, are far larger than the Syrian schemes in terms of scale, and it seems, that in 
the future the importance of the hydroelectric power potential of the Euphrates river for 
Syria will decrease because the share of the hydroelectric power of total national 
electricity production will continue to drop sharply.
In the future, it seems that the Euphrates water will be less significant for Iraq, the 
user most vulnerable to water quantity and quality reductions through developments 
upstream, but enjoying the compensating economic effect of oil in normal 
circumstances. The low hydroelectric power capacity (660 MW) and the existence of the 
Tigris river from which there will be much less water withdrawal upstream along with 
the development of new irrigation areas along the new "third river" will also reduce 
Iraq's reliance on the Euphrates. The delivery of less water to the agricultural sector will 
not be easy for Iraq to achieve, particularly because of the special circumstances (1991- 
94) having to endure the UN food embargo. These circumstances underline the 
importance of local agricultural production. When Iraq re-establishes a more stable 
economy based on oil exports, it will, most probably, also renew its food imports and 
will not have to concentrate on food security programmes; but Iraq, with an external debt 
of about $US 100,000 million (MEED, 27 November, 1992), will not become an 
economic superpower in the near future.
External political interests
Before the construction of the main dams on the Euphrates in the 1970s, the river played 
a small role in the foreign relations of the riparian states, in spite of the great importance 
given to the river by Iraq, the only riparian country making major use of the river (see 
cognitive maps).
During the recent period of the implementation of rapid development projects, the 
Euphrates had become a major component in the external politics of the riparian states, 
because they have faced a potentially explosive situation over the division of water flow 
from the river. As a result the Euphrates has become a burning issue in Syrian-Turkish 
and the Iraqi-Syrian relations and this can be seen in the 1974 and the 1990 crisis. In 
1980 the three riparian agreed to establish a technical commission for the exchange of 
information and to assist in finding a solution to the river conflict. Up to October 1992,
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the riparian countries had held 16 trilateral meetings at ministerial level, but without 
successfully finding a way to share the water.
After completion of the development projects, Turkey will hold both the most significant 
position and hold the highest economic interests, because its far-reaching dam 
construction and irrigation programmes, will dramatically reduce the river flow to Syria 
and Iraq. Syria will hold a significant interest in international relations while Iraq will 
have less interest, as the river plays a less important role in its economy.
Internal political interests
From this point of view, the river before the 1960s was only of minor significance for 
Turkey and Syria. For Iraq, on the other hand, it was very important, especially for the 
agricultural sector and domestic use (see cognitive maps). The need for population 
dispersal both in Turkey and Syria, as well as Turkey's internal security problems 
increased their domestic interest in constructing development plans for the river. In the 
future, it seems that internal political interests will become urgent for Turkey, significant 
for Syria but less important for Iraq. Apparently, Turkey has no certain solution for the 
internal problem of the Kurdish population in the Southeast, and this is expressed in the 
emigration from the area as well as the low standard of living there. An important 
explanation of why the project has such a high priority has been the personal interest of 
both Suliman Demirel and the late Turgut Ozal. They both held important engineering 
posts in the past, especially Demirel as the director of the DSI, and they have remained 
highly motivated to push the project ahead. They have seen the GAP Project as part of 
their own personal and professional achievements.
Syria does not face minorities or emigration problems in the Jezirah region. The 
Euphrates project has had a high political priority as a showcase of the Ba'ath regime’s 
developmental ambitions as well as being an element in the Syrian president's personal 
prestige.
Iraq, on the other hand, is able to find a proper answer to the emigration of the rural 
population by using another water resource, such as the Tharthar canal, and by using 
income from oil exports in order to increase the standard of living of the population in 
the river basin, thus either acquiring the Shia population's support or controlling it.
The main hypothesis informing this analysis is that stable riparian relations are most 
likely when vulnerability to water shortages is low for all parties, and the military power 
is equal, or when the upstream state is also the strongest. Conflict is most likely when 
the riparian is vulnerable to water shortages; and conflict potential is generally higher 
among riparians with relatively high interest and relatively equal overall ranking. The
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highest conflict potential is when the down stream nation is most powerful and has most 
interest in the water but the upstream nations also have considerable interest (Naff & 
Matson, 1984, 193). Under such conditions, the top military power is inclined to use that 
power to improve its riparian position.
Table H3:
Model Matrix of changing role of the Euphrates among the riparian countries
Riparian
position
Strategic
power
Economic
interest
Political-interest 
External Internal Total
a) before 1960s 
T urkey 5 5 2 2 2 16
Syria 3 3 2 2 2 12
Iraq 1 4 5 3 4 17
b) 1960s-1990s 
T urkey 5 5 4 4 4 22
Syria 3 3 4 3 3 16
Iraq 1 4 4 3 3 15
c) Future
Turkey 5 5 5 5 5 25
Syria 3 4 4 4 4 19
Iraq 1 3 3 3 3 13
The validity of these contentions is confirmed by the tensions and events of the 
1960-90 period in the context of the relations between Syria and Iraq. Economic interest 
in Euphrates water for agriculture was high in Iraq; it had become high in Syria through 
the prominence given to its new land reclamation schemes. In addition both states had 
strong military forces although they both had major strategic priorities outside the 
Euphrates Basin, Iraq with Iran and Syria with Israel. It was during the 1960-90 period 
that there were a number of hostile verbal exchanges in 1974 and in 1990 and significant 
military posturing on the Syrian border with Syrian forces confronting Iraq's threatening 
build-up which had been brought on by the low flow of the river at the border in 1974.
According to the Matrix Model assembled for the Euphrates river, it is unlikely that 
a military conflict will occur in the future, considering the ranges indicated for the five 
factors, and the fact that Turkey, the country with the strongest interest, is the upstream 
state (in contrast to the situation in the Nile basin).
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H3. Conclusion
According to the Matrix Model in the future, Turkey will overall be in the most 
advantageous position, while Syria will be in a restrained position, and Iraq will be in a 
poor riparian position. Apparently, there is little if any, possibility for a military conflict. 
However, it appears that Naff & Matson's claim that Turkey holds a lower degree of 
interests (Naff& Matson, 1984,193) should be disregarded.
We must recall, here, that Naff & Matson developed the theory of the Matrix Model 
at the beginning of the eighties, a period in which there was not yet any international 
awareness about Turkey's development projects in Southeast Anatolia which 
significantly changed the level of political and economic interests for the Euphrates 
river. The Iraq/Kuwait war in 1991 who changed the strategic balance of forces among 
the Euphrates riparian states, at least in the short run.
The Matrix Model should be used with care since, in contrast to the quantitative 
indicator of the vulnerability model, it is much more subjective. Thus different research 
scholars will give different numerical values to the power matrix. Here, as in the earlier 
models, all the factors receive the same quantitative weight without an attempt being 
made to determine, for example, whether strategic power is more important than 
economic power or vice-versa.
The questions which has been addressed in this chapter were in first, can past levels 
of tension between riparians be explained by geographical, economic, political (internal 
and external) factors, and by the relative military strength of the riparians. Secondly can 
future levels of tension and possible conflict be analysed using the same approach.
The pre- 1960s period was one where water shortages were rare and only associated 
with national events and international tension over water was not an issue. Tension 
emerged in the 1970s because the high interests of Syria and Iraq occurred at a time 
when the military strength of the two countries were similar. The conjunction of equality 
of economic interest and of military strength associated with the tensions of the 1970s 
appears to confirm the agreement of Naff & Matson (1984) that such conjunctions are 
significant and predictive.
Future scenarios are uncertain, and the Matrix Model analysis applied to the 1960- 
1990 period in circumstances of increasing demands on Euphrates water does not predict 
with certainty. It is unlikely that any Euphrates power will be able to take military 
action, as none of the riparians will have a sufficient high military position to risk action. 
Nor would they ignore the likely reaction of the international community which is 
currently a deterrent to regional international military aggression.
The question for the future, which will certainly be one of mounting demands for 
water, is whether the mounting water demands can be met for each of the countries. The
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answer to this question is yes (see page 159) if the national resources as whole are 
utilised efficiently. The tension over water will also be ameliorated if economic policy 
adjustments are made to substitute for water by accessing water in the international 
market for food (Allan, 1994).
This chapter, therefore, can be summarized by claiming that analysis based on 
methods of international relations are not sufficiently precise to be a basis for the 
prediction of the future behaviour of the riparians and there is place for further 
development of the models which might show the possibility of a military conflict 
developing between the co-basin states.
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I. Summary
The Euphrates river system represents a complex of water problems set in the midst of 
many additional factors connected with the geographical conditions of the area, and the 
external and internal policies and the different economic approaches of the countries of 
the drainage basin. Many researchers claim that the future of the Middle East is linked to 
its water sources and these may even cause the outbreak of the next war in the Middle 
East. Since the important rivers in the area are also international rivers the international 
dimensions of water in the region have been presented to be of critical importance. In an 
article in 1991, for example, Joyce Starr claimed that "water security will soon rank with 
military security in the war rooms of defence ministers" (Starr, 1991,18).
An analysis of the factors which influence the system of relations between the states 
shows that the region is very heterogeneous. Factors which contribute to the inter-state 
conflict, like those which contribute to inter-state cooperation, are influenced by 
geographical conditions, internal and external policies and economic development - all 
of which are re-projected upon water policy. One must add ethnic, cultural and 
ideological differences as well as the personal relations between the leaders which also 
adds in same cases to the climate of conflict. There is no doubt that the potential for 
conflict over water allocation from an international river shared by states which have 
correct and friendly relations will be smaller than in a region which there is much 
tension. Apparently the political tensions existing between the countries of a drainage 
basin and their inability to arrive at any common agreement over the division of the 
water has fed the conflict approach among many of the researchers. Since water sources 
have already created conflicts between various countries in the world in the past, it is 
reasonable to assume that, in the future, the tensions will strengthen as a result of a 
growth in population, a rise in the standard of living, industrial development and, 
principally, because of the increase of irrigated agricultural land. All of these will lead to 
an increase in competition between the states over the limited water resources.
A shortage of water can, on the one hand, be caused by limited amounts of available 
water and, on the other hand, by a rise in water demand. Each of these sources of 
increased demand may cause a conflict over water as defined by Frey & Naff (1985). 
The shortage of water is the heart of the problem and the shortage of water is, "a zero- 
sum security issue and thus creates a constant potential for conflict" (Frey & Naff, 1985, 
67). But on the other hand, from an economic point of view water is part of a non-zero- 
sum economies where it is possible to substitute for water and as a result, politicians 
avoid conflicts.
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Many factors have contributed to the assumption that a military conflict over the 
division of the water of the Euphrates is expected:
The geographical conditions - the collection basin of the Euphrates is influenced by 
the physical conditions caused by the topography and climate. Large areas of arable land 
are located along the length of the river and these areas in South East Anatolia in 
Turkey, the Jezirah area in Syria and the Mesopotamia plain in Iraq will allow a total of 
3 million ha. to be irrigated according to the development plans of the various states. 
Since the aforementioned areas have arid or semi-arid climates they are dependent upon 
river water for irrigation. As a result of the high level of evaporation large amounts of 
water are needed for this. This factor is very important since more than 90 per cent of the 
river water in Turkey and Iraq and more than 85 per cent of the Euphrates water in Syria 
are designated for irrigation.
One must add the climatic differences in the water source region in Turkey. This 
difference exists on a monthly basis - rainfall only in Winter, and on an annual basis - 
rainy years as opposed to years of drought. This fact has caused the need to control the 
river flow and store the winter water supply for summer and the annual water supply 
from wet years for dry years.
Population - the growth of population is a central factor which influences the 
possibilities of there being a conflict over the river water. The populations of the three 
countries are growing very rapidly and, as a result, the number of inhabitants will 
virtually double by 2025 - from 90 million in 1990 to 174 million in 2025 (see table HI). 
Accordingly, the demand for water in all three countries is expected to grow because of 
the need to supply the food to feed the population, to service industrial development, 
urban development and the expected rise in the standard of living. The growth in 
population will also create the need to invest in the implementation of development 
plans for population dispersal. Population density throughout the whole region of the 
Euphrates basin is relatively low so the states are encouraging migration to its lowland 
area or, alternatively, are trying to prevent negative migration from it. The larger the 
population living in the river valley the more the demand for water will grow and the 
lower the quality of water will fall.
There are other aspects of the population sharing the river water which contribute to 
the conflict and are linked to the fact that the population is very heterogeneous. They 
represent different languages, ethnic groups, races and cultures and contain minorities, 
the most important of which are the Kurdish population in South East Anatolia and the 
Shia population in South Iraq. These minorities contribute to the tension in the area. It 
appears that the only feature that all these races, ethnic and language minorities have in 
common, is the religion of Islam.
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The political and economic structure - the different economic and political structure 
of the drainage basin countries also contributes to the tensions between them. In Syria 
and Iraq the basic economic system is socialistic in contrast to Turkey which is based on 
capitalism. In Turkey there is a democratic regime in contrast to the presidential regimes 
in Syria and Iraq. In addition to this factor there is the traditional enmity between the 
Ba'athist parties of Syria and Iraq which has existed since their independence and which 
has always been accompanied by bitterness and suspicion; one must remember that Syria 
twice supported military forces which fought against Iraq, first during the eight year war 
between Iran and Iraq and then when they took an active role against Iraq during the 
Gulf war. Since then the Syrians have continued in their attempts to bring about the fall 
of the present regime in Iraq. Other political factors which increase the suspicion of 
Syria and Iraq are Turkey’s close links with the western world, its membership in 
NATO and its being a non-Arab country.
An additional common economic subject shared by the drainage basin states is the 
policy of water subsidy. Agricultural water is supplied free in Syria and Iraq and, 
according to all economic theories, this creates waste. In contrast, Turkey aims to charge 
for the use of water but, because of the system of flood irrigation, the price is set 
according to the size of the cultivated area and not according to the amount of water used 
- such an approach does not contribute to saving water.
Other factors - a number of other factors also contribute to the atmosphere of 
tension and suspicion between the states. The development of the river valley is seen, 
mainly by Turkey and Syria, as a matter of national image and a symbol of the 
development program. This is also linked to the inter-personal images of the leaders 
who wish, at least externally, to demonstrate their determination and serious approaches 
to the development programs.
The subject of the division of the Euphrates water, is closely connected to the 
subject of Syria's territorial claims from Turkey in the Hatay region, and to security 
agreements primarily connected with the subject of border crossing and Syria's support 
of the Kurdish PKK organization.
It appears that all the above factors, in fact, feed the development of idea and 
theories which foresee the possibility of a military conflict over the division of the 
Euphrates' water. One must, however, remember that there are other variables connected 
with water scarcity which, for example, raise the principle question of whether the 
shortage of water is an internal or external threat to the stability of a state.
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This poses a number of questions:
A. Is a shortage of water for members of the Euphrates drainage basin expected?
B. Does the conflict between the countries arise out of the difficulty of dividing the 
water which, in turn, causes the political conflict or do the economic, security or 
ideological factors project themselves on the water issue?
C. Is a military conflict between the states of the drainage basin of the river 
expected?
A. The possibility for shortage of water among members of the Euphrates drainage 
basin.
A critical aspect of the Euphrates water issue is that of haw an agreement over the 
division of the river's water supply could be reached. As we have seen there is 
unfortunately no agreement between the riparian nations over the average amount of 
natural water flowing in the river (which can be assessed at 30 billion m^/year give or 
take ten per cent). This number, lost its importance when, in 1987, Turkey promised to 
transfer a constant amount of water annually: 500 m^/sec on the average, and not a 
specific percentage of the river's annual water supply. In this way the average annual 
amount of 15.8 billion which Turkey undertook to transfer to Syria was established. 
This approach has brought about the situation whereby if the calculated yearly flow 
presented by Turkey was exaggerated, it will have to bear the consequences.
According to this calculation and other data about the flow which Turkey has 
presented, the average amount of water is 30.3 billion m^ at the Turkish/Syrian border, 
that is to say an average amount of 14.5 billion m^ of the river water is supposed to 
remain in Turkish territory. Of this total, according to the information in figure D1.2, 
close to 3 billion m^ will be lost by evaporation and about 11 billion will remain for 
irrigation purposes. This calculation is even higher than Turkey's official data which 
claim consumption of 10.1 billion m^ for irrigation from the Euphrates river (see table 
C l.8). Calculations concerning the amount of water which will remain for Syrian use, 
should be based on the latest bilateral agreement signed between Syria and Iraq in 1990. 
This agreement determines that Syria should receive 42 per cent of the water transferred 
by Turkey (15.8 billion m^ according to Turkey); and Iraq should receive 58 per cent of 
this total - equivalent to 9.16 billion m^. As a result Syria's share, according to the 
agreements should be 6.6 billion m^ per year. 2 billion m^ which Syria receives from 
harvests from the Euphrates tributaries should be added to this. As a result the final total 
reaches 8.6 billion m^ per year. If we accept the claim made by Kolars & Mitchell 
(1991) concerning the influence of Turkish irrigation on Syria, then in the future, Syria 
will benefit from additional amounts of water estimated at between 1.1 and 1.4 billion 
rrP annually which will be added to the supply from the Euphrates tributaries through
258
the subterranean aquifer despite the fact that the quality of water might be lower (Kolars 
Sc Mitchell, 1991,134).
The minimum amount of water which will be left for Iraq - 9.16 billion m^ will be 
correct only if Turkey and Syria succeed in using all the water at their disposal. Since, 
according to estimates made by experts, Syria is not capable of irrigating all of its 
cultivable land, the annual amount of water, after calculating the evaporation and return 
flow, Syria’s need will be 7 billion m^ (Kolars Sc Mitchell, 1991, 275-279). Thus the 
annual amount of water which will reach the Iraqi border will probably be 11 billion 
annually. This amount of water which will continue to reach Iraq is based upon a water 
division agreement as well as Syria’s ability to use its relative allocation. One must also 
consider the amount of water Iraq is capable of transferring from the Tigris through the 
Tharthar depression and the Tharthar/Euphrates canal, which was completed in 1988. 
According to Iraqi claims the level of salinity of the water transferred through the 
Tharthar depression is high, and the use of this water for irrigation in the Euphrates basin 
will cause the salination of 325,000 ha. of agricultural land (Baghdad Observer, 15 
January, 1990, 1).
As the flow of water continues each year, however, its quality will improve. 
According to research done by Al-Hadithi (1979), an annual quantity of 7.3 billion 
can flow a through the Tharthar/Euphrates canal. One can thus expect that the amount of 
annual general water which will be at Iraq's disposal in the Euphrates basin in the year
2,000 will reach 18 billion m^. This amount of water should satisfy Iraq’s needs. Iraq 
needs 16 billion m^ to irrigate 10.5 million ha. and another 1.2 billion m^ for industry 
and domestic purposes - a total of 17.2 billion m^ per annum. If, however, as Al-Hadithi 
claims, there is an improvement in the irrigation methods which today, lose about 5 
billion m^ of water annually in the irrigation channels alone an amount of 9.3 
annually and another 1.2 billion m^ for industrial and domestic use will supply Iraq's 
needs. Large surpluses of water will be created in the river or, alternatively, the need to 
transfer water from the Tigris river will be cancelled (Al-Hadithi, 1979, 103-117). One 
needs to remember that both Turkey and Syria base their agriculture in the Euphrates 
valley on flood irrigation, a system which can be changed and so lead to water economy. 
Water can also be saved by raising less wasteful agricultural crops.
Distinctions between flow calculations over periods of time need to be made here. 
Until Turkey completes the filling of the reservoir behind the Ataturk dam in 1995, it 
will continue to allow a regular annual flow of 15.8 billion m^ of water to Syria. In the 
decade after 1995, however, it seems that the amount of water flowing in the river will 
grow until Turkey and Syria reach maximal exploitation of the river water for 
agriculture. Thus, by the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, the amount of 
water in the river which will reach Iraq will be even greater than shown in the 
calculations made above.
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These calculations lead to the conclusion that, according to the best estimates 
available it appears that the factor of the amount of water will not be a principal issue of 
contention between the states. One should note that there is the possibility that, in fact, 
the various articles published by western scholars over the last twenty years may have 
created psychological pressure on the leadership and public opinion creating the fear of 
future water shortages - especially in Iraq and Syria. Clawson (1971), for example, 
calculated the amount of future water needed by the states from the Euphrates river for 
irrigation to be 40 billion m^ - a figure which is 25 per cent higher than the average 
amount of water in the river (see table D1.2). Beaumont (1978) calculated the maximum 
amount of water at 36.5 billion m^ - a figure higher by 15 per cent than the annual 
average over many years (see table D1.3). Soffer (1992) claims that between 1990-2005 
a serious conflict will break out between the states over the division of water. Soffer 
bases the reason for the conflict on the future water consumption in 2005 which will 
reach 45 billion m^ - a figure 40 per cent higher than the average annual river flow 
(Soffer, 1992, 117-128). The highest amount is that calculated by Waterbury (1990). 
According to his calculation the amount of future water needed by the riparians in the 
Year 2005 is 53 billion m^ - a figure 65 per cent higher than the average annual flow 
(see table D1.6).
The question one must ask is what is the possible source of error in the above 
calculations. It appears that there are several common factors:
1) Not distinguishing the fantasies of leaders and state development programmes 
from the area which will ultimately be irrigated in practice seriously distorts estimates of 
future water use. Both the Turks and the Syrians, for instance, have admitted that they 
are incapable of carrying out their development programmes fully first because of the 
quality of the soil, secondly because of agreements over water allocation and thirdly 
because of the need to let water flow in the river to produce hydro-electric power. It 
appears that Turkey will, ultimately, irrigate only 625,000 ha. as opposed to the 
1,083,470 ha. in the development programme (Briefing, 15 January, 1990, 7) and Syria 
will irrigate a maximum of 480,000 ha. instead the 650,000 ha. which appears in the 
development programme (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, 275-297).
2) Disregarding existing agreements over water division also leads to an 
exaggeration over the potential duplication of use. Although there is no common 
agreement for all the states, there are bilateral agreements between them. Disregarding 
agreements creates a situation in which, for example, Kolars & Mitchell (1991) reach the 
final conclusion which leaves 4.4 billion m^ for Iraq on the simplistic assumption that 
Turkey and Syria complete all of their development programmes (Kolars & Mitchell, 
1991,212).
3) Not discriminating between data presented by states for the purposes of 
bargaining during negotiations over water division and the states’ real need for water is
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misleading. At the meeting between the three nations in Baghdad in 1965, for instance, 
Syria demanded 13 billion m^» Turkey 14 billion m^ and Iraq 18 billion m^ - a total of 
45 billion m^> an amount 40 per cent larger than the average flow over several years. 
Iraq’s and Syria’s demands in this case are clearly for purposes of bargaining (Naff & 
Matson, 1984, 92).
4) A no less important matter which might cause a lack of clarity and lead to 
enormous and unrealistic estimates regarding development programs is the quality of the 
data. One must remember that the different figures concerning the amount of water in 
the river annually, the development programmes, the amount of irrigated land, seeding 
periods and irrigation methods, calculations concerning return flow and the water 
quality - are all figures provided by the various governments which have decided how 
and whether to publicize them. The agricultural development of Iraq, for instance, is 
considered to be a secret associated with the national security of the country. In contrast, 
Syria for its own purposes, does not publish figures about irrigated areas or the amount 
of water it pumps from the Tigris river. Turkey does not publish calculations made on 
return flow and provides unrealistic estimates about the amount of water it is planning to 
use for irrigating a hectare of agricultural land. This lack of reliable data, undoubtedly 
makes research difficult and contributes to enormous estimates - especially concerning
the potential of the river water for agriculture.
5) Politicians have internal political incentives to present a scenario of conflict 
relating to the water scarcity which will affect the capacity to produce food, the quality 
of life, health as well as the production of energy and industry. This argument is easier to 
project than one based on variables such as internal or external tension - which are less 
understood by the population. Also strategic research institutes, as well as International 
Relations experts prefer to present a view based on conflict and so encourage the 
development of climates of conflict between the states. It similarly appears that experts 
generally tend towards giving more weight to pseudo-quantitative factors since it is 
relatively easier to estimate them than ethnic, cultural, ideological and symbolic factors. 
On the other hand if Syria and Iraq admitted that agreed amount of water satisfies their 
needs, they would lose an important bargaining chip in their external relations.
We can answer here the question whether a shortage of water is expected along the 
Euphrates drainage basin. It seems, in fact, that no shortage of water from the Euphrates 
river is foreseen which might prevent countries carrying out their development 
programmes in the drainage basin.
B. Political, economic and ideological sources of potential conflict.
If water resource deficiency is not an inevitable source of long term conflict, we 
thus, need to examine a second possibility namely that political, and ideological tensions 
between states could project themselves on water politics and management or vice versa.
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In this examination of the Euphrates as an example of a conflict over resources we have 
a quite complicated situation in which the relations between cause and effect are far from 
clear.
We can refer, here to the most serious conflict which brought Syria and Iraq to the 
brink of war in 1974-75. It is probably doubtful that the conflict was principally about 
the quantity of water but was more influenced by other tensions which existed in the 
relationships between the states. It is, perhaps, possible to prove this by the fact that 
Turkey, whose part in stopping the flow of water in the river was at least equal to Syria's, 
was not accused of this by Iraq in order not to damage the relations between them. A 
further confirmation can be formed in the fact that the restoration of flow in 1975 did not 
improve the bilateral relations between Iraq and Syria.
The 1990 "water crisis" was caused by Turkey's decision to stop the river flow for a 
month in order to carry out works to enable the start of the filling the Ataturk dam. 
Turkey made sure that downstream countries were compensated in order to ensure that 
the promised annual amounts of water not be infringed upon, produced a sharp protest 
from Syria and Iraq who claimed that it was an act of international piracy. One can see, 
that both states understood that there was a temporary, technical need to stop the flow 
and the agreement was only over the amount of time needed for this.
There is no doubt that Turkey's ability to stop the flow of the river bothers Syria and 
Iraq very much since it changes the strategic balance in the area - although it appears that 
their protests against Turkey also served internal and external political needs. Neither of 
the two states threatened to use their armies against Turkey, and the principal implicit 
threat was existing to the economic links. This shows that the heart of the conflict is 
linked to political and economic factors and although the subject of the division of the 
water river makes an additional contribution to the tension it does not create it.
C. The possibility for a military conflict to arise out between the states of the drainage 
basin.
Many experts claim that conflicts over water have, in the past, caused and will, in 
the future, cause a war over this resource. Gleik (1992) for instance writes: "Water has 
already been a source of conflict among nations. We fight for access to water, we use 
water as a tool and weapon in battle, and we target the water facilities of our enemies". 
"In arid and semi arid areas of the world, where water is already a vital resource, 
conflicts over access and possession are likely to worsen" (Gleik, 1992, 13). It is a fact 
that the existence of agreements over water rights influences the external relations of the 
states - but agreements are not "wars" according to conventional meanings. Many 
examples given by experts - from the Korean war to the Gulf war - do relate to the fact 
that reservoirs and water installations were damaged; but these were not wars in which 
water was central to the out-break of war. The 1967 war between Israel and the Arab
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states, in which water resources were also captured, contributed greatly to the 
development of the idea and models of wars fought over water among various scholars - 
although this is clearly a unique case.
Is it a fact that the existence of various regions in the world in which the inhabitants 
suffer from malnutrition (partly because of internal wars and partly because of climatic 
factors) has not caused any state to try and conquer additional sources of water.
In order to examine the chances of war breaking out over the division of Euphrates 
water, an examination of factors was carried out over three periods of time. The factors 
included: the different interests the nations have concerning the Euphrates river, the level 
of vulnerability in case of water shortage as well as the reasonable chances of war over 
water sources.
An analysis of the variables shows that, from the point of view of the states' 
vulnerability to water shortage, Syria is the most vulnerable because of the high 
percentage of total Syrian Euphrates water which comprises. Euphrates water is also of 
great importance because of the considerable amount of electric power produces in the 
river and Syria's strong desire to reach a situation in which it can reach self-sufficiency 
in food production. Iraq, on the other hand, is less vulnerable since its water economy is 
larger, its dependence on hydro-electricity production is lower owing to its greater 
wealth in oil, and because its economic situation (after the world's boycott ends) will 
again allow the state to continue to base itself upon the importation of food products. 
Iraq's vulnerability is mainly expressed by its being the state that will be most heavily 
influenced by Turkey's and Syria’s development programmes for the Euphrates river. 
Turkey’s situation is the best of all. The amount of water per inhabitant is relatively 
large, its dependence on international rivers is small and has the best placed with respect 
to self-sufficiency in food production. On the other hand, Turkey's dependence on 
hydro-electric power is the greatest although it can, in the case of continuous drought 
years, determine its own scale of priorities between electricity production and 
agricultural development.
The Matrix Model of changing role of the Euphrates among the riparian countries 
examines the theory of the possibilities for war which arise out of the possibility of water 
shortage. An examination of the factor concerning the location of the state in the 
drainage basin shows that Turkey is upstream and so has the best location. Syria will be 
influenced by Turkey's development program and Iraq's downstream location is the 
worst since it will be influenced by the development programmes of both Turkey and 
Syria.
An examination of the military power factor is the most significant for the readiness 
of a state to fight. Turkey, here as well, is in the best situation since it is militarily the 
strongest state in the drainage basin, it is militarily linked to the NATO pact and the
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development of reservoirs on the Euphrates river give it the possibility to use water 
strategically power against its downstream neighbours. In contrast, Syria is very limited 
in its ability to control the river flow in the direction of Iraq because of the low storage 
capacity in reservoirs. It must also be emphasized that Syria has also become weaker 
from the point of view of the strategic links which, in the past developed with the USSR. 
Iraq's military strength was stronger that Syria's in the 1980's, but the Gulf War changed 
this situation and Syria has little to worry about in the future from any Iraqi military 
action.
An examination of the economic interests of the states in the development of the 
river's resources shows that here also Turkey has the strongest interest. Only Turkey can 
produce a significant amount of hydro-electric power and it is the only state which still 
does not use the river's water for irrigation purposes. Turkey’s great agricultural potential 
also creates far-reaching expectations concerning the creation of livelihoods, raising the 
standard of living of the local population and the development of the area as the Middle 
East's "grain market".
Syria's economic expectations are lower because of its relatively low hydro-electric 
potential and smaller land areas in the drainage basin which can be cultivated. Together 
with this, however, one must remember that Syria is the poorest country in the drainage 
basin and so is heavily dependent on the Euphrates which supplies most of the water in 
the country.
From an economic point of view Iraq has the lowest set of expectations from the 
Euphrates water, mainly because of its ability to base itself on oil revenues. From the 
point of view of electricity production the river has no significance. It appears that the 
economic sanctions against Iraq after the Gulf war of 1991, have actually created an 
awareness that there is a need for food self-sufficiency. Thus one cannot completely 
ignore the economic expectations of the river states in regard to food production.
From the point of internal policy it seems that Turkey, again has the most significant 
interests in the development of the river. Turkey suffers a great deal from internal 
problems connected with the Kurdish population living in the area, as well as the 
negative migration of the population which strains the infrastructures of the large cities 
in the country. The only solution the state sees to these problems is connected with 
creating places of work and raising the standard of living for the inhabitants of the 
region. One needs the river water to produce electric power for irrigation and for 
industrial development.
Syria in contrast, does not suffer from problems of minorities in the region or from 
negative population migration. The opposite is true and Syria aims to transfer population 
to the region in order to reduce the pressure in the centre of the country.
Iraq, which like Turkey suffers from negative migration from the river valley, can in 
principle solve its problem by using oil revenues to raise the standard of living for the
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population. Iraq, however, usually uses the water to increase its control over the Shia 
population mainly living near the southern part of the river.
According to these principles which are expressed in the Matrix Model, Turkey, 
militarily the strongest state, is located upstream and its internal interests in the 
development of water sources are the strongest. Syria, has the worst location, is 
militarily weaker and has moderate economic and political interests. In contrast, Iraq has 
the worst geographical position, currently the weakest military strength and the lowest 
economic and political interests. Referring to the Matrix Model (section c) which 
attempts to examine the possibility of military conflict in the future, suggests an answer 
to the third question and an assertion - there is not expectation of a reasonable possibility 
for military conflict between the nations of the drainage basin, since the downstream 
states do not have the military capability or the economic and political motivation to try 
and achieve their right by force. It should be noted that the theoretical models which 
have been applied in this work have revealed themselves to be subject to difficulties 
deriving from their owing to their great subjectivity and because the different factors 
could not be ranked according to a hierarchy of importance. Analysis based on the 
methods of international relations are not sufficiently precise to be a basis for the 
prediction of the future behaviour of the riparians. There is place for additional 
development in the construction of the theories.
It is reasonable to assume that, in the case of a future conflict over the division of 
the river water, political or economic pressure will be applied as has been done in the 
past (Syria’s support of the PKK) but this will not cause war to break out between 
countries. One may also assert here that the construction of the reservoirs and water 
installations in the drainage basin of the river reduce the chances of war because of their 
vulnerability. The danger of damages to the water installations influences foreign policy 
making it more cautious. The recognition of the cost of modem warfare also, 
undoubtedly, lessens the chance of a war breaking out. On the other hand, agricultural 
and industrial development in the drainage basin of the river will also demand more 
economic cooperation between the states.
Economic activity in the region such as the export of oil from Iraq to Mediterranean 
ports, will be encouraged by the development of trade in agricultural and industrial 
products - it is reasonable to expect that these developments will also contribute to the 
development of economic and, later, political links between the nations. Turkey has been 
particularly energetic in encouraging a prospect of increased mutual economic 
interdependence and the creation of a regional economic trade and development zone.
The projects involving the construction of numerous reservoir on the Euphrates 
river, principally in Turkey, can contribute much to the development of the downstream 
states. This is because of the capacity which has been created will stabilize the flow of
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the river water throughout the year, prevent the flooding which once characterized the 
river and continue to release water from the reservoirs in times of drought. This capacity 
is very important for the development of agriculture, especially during the summer 
months when the river flow used to be low and the need for water for agriculture the 
greatest. One must remember that Syria and Iraq, without investing any money, will 
benefit from this. The large project for the prevention of flooding in Iraq and the annual 
cost of maintenance will also now become superfluous. There is no longer any need to 
build additional reservoirs to store water in Syria and Iraq or to stabilize the flow of the 
river. Moreover it can be expected that these developments will encourage Iraq and Syria 
to improve their irrigation systems and increase the efficiency of water use.
According to Turkish claims, one can expect the evaporation from the Ataturk 
reservoir to increase the moisture in the air. This might create a belt of 30-50 km. in the 
North Jezirah area of Syria and make it rainier. The completion of Turkey's irrigation 
channels on the Syrian border might, likewise, encourage Syria and Turkey to reach 
agreements in order to continue them into Syrian territory for irrigating the desert region 
at virtually no expense (Frankel, 1991, 285), but this subject has not been fully 
investigated.
On the other hand, it must be emphasized that the construction of reservoirs gives a 
most significant strategic advantage to Turkey - something which Iraq, but mostly Syria, 
finds hard to accept. The quality of the river water will also be harmed as a result of 
return flow to the river from agricultural land which will receive large quantities of agro­
chemicals. As a by product of the industrial development and rise in population larger 
amounts of sewage will, likewise, flow into the river - something which might cause 
damage particularly to Iraq. This is not yet part of the major order of priorities in the 
network of relations between the nations but it is only logical that it will be in the future.
One must remember that the countries are carrying out their development 
programmes with no cooperation taking place between them, and that no overall 
agreement for the division of water exists. The programmes are similar in their aims - 
control of the river water, the production of hydro-electric power, the irrigation of arid 
and semi-arid regions and industrial development. Because of the different geographical, 
political and economic conditions, the states operate according to different agenda and 
motivations and without cooperation - so the tension over the river water will probably 
continue to be a central issue in the framework of the nations' foreign relations.
The findings of this study can be summarized by a number of additional conclusions 
that were arrived at during the research:
It is impossible to define the Euphrates system as a closed system especially in the 
case of Iraq where other resources like the Tigris river flow through the
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Tharthar/Euphrates canal which also plays a role in satisfying the demand for water. 
Thus the overall water balance of the Euphrates, the Tigris and their tributaries needs to 
be examined in order to determine the water needs of the riparians states and be taken 
into consideration regarding the sharing of the water.
There is sufficient water in the Euphrates system to meet the social and economic 
needs of the riparians until 2025 notwithstanding the proposed projects in Turkey. This 
adequacy relates also to the capacity of Syria and Iraq to utilize water that has been and 
will continue to be restricted by environmental and institutional impediments. Thus it 
appears that the division of the water will not be a cause for war between the states and 
that other political and economic factors play a decisive role in determining the network 
of relations between the states. Neither Syria or Iraq will lack the water necessary for 
existing developmental projects in the near future but this fact does not solve the 
problem of their inability to ensure their food security. Therefore the solution to any 
periodic and long term water deficits will be in the global political economy in which the 
riparians have already participated and will continue to participate according to their 
individual interests as opposed to their sometimes conflicting interests as riparians. The 
political economy of water is subordinate to the global political economy of food and to 
the political economy of trade in food.
Since there is no co-operation between the riparians for the common development of 
the river basin, the individual economies can and will solve their problems independent 
of their riparian neighbours in the global system something which, in the future, will 
lead to closer economic and political co-operation between the states.
Principles of international law are unlikely, in the case of the Euphrates, to be a 
significant basis for a procedure for sharing water and since the principles and 
instruments of international law are difficult to put into practice, the riparians will have 
recourse to other remedies which are applicable such as international trade.
Water sharing dominates the current thinking of the downstream riparians but they 
will increasingly adapt to the idea that they can find substitute for water as they 
recognize that this solution has been the remedy to their food production problems 
during the past two decades and will remain a major remedy in the future.
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